Tracts for the Times

ON THE MYSTICISM ATTRIBUTED TO THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH

by John Keble

[Number 89]

§i- Occasion, Grounds, and Limits of the Present Inquiry

(1.) It is curious, and may not be uninstructive, to observe how from time to time the assailants of Primitive Antiquity have shifted their ground, since the beginning of the seventeenth century. During the struggle of the Reformation, men had felt instinctively, if they did not clearly see, that the Fathers were against them, so far as they had begun to rationalize, whether in ecclesiastical practice, or in theological inquiry. But it was many years before they ventured to avow this feeling distinctively to themselves, much more to maintain and propagate it. It was not until divines of this class had thoroughly wearied themselves in vain endeavours to reconcile the three first centuries with Calvin and Zuinglius, that Daillé published its celebrated treatise Of the Right Use of the Fathers¹: in which under the pretence of impugning their sufficiency as judges between Papist and Protestant, he has dexterously insinuated every topic most likely to impair their general credit; professing all the while extreme respect for their sanctity and their wisdom; although perhaps an attentive reader may perceive his ironical meaning, disclosing itself more and more, as his argument draws to a point. However, by his skill in rhetorical arrangement, and by a certain air of thorough command of his subject, which he has been very successful in assuming, he became at once the standard author for all who took that side of the question: opening (if so homely a simile may be allowed) a kind of cheap shop, to which all who had a fancy for wares of that kind have ever since found it convenient to resort.

But though at the bottom Daillé seems to have had no more respect for Antiquity than those who came after him, he differs from them greatly, not only in his tone and manner, but also in the very ground and substance of his argument: professing, first, to confine himself to those points which are disputed between the Reformed and the Roman Church, (and, therefore, not to except against the Fathers’ evidence on matters debated in their times, e. g. on the Trinitarian controversy) and, secondly, laying, or seeming to lay, the chief stress of his objections on the scantiness of their remains, the amount of corruption and interpolation, the difficulty of ascertaining their real sense and the like. When he does proceed to challenge their authority, he is careful in pointing out their own disclaimers of such authority, before be exemplifies their supposed errors and inconsistencies; which be does largely, but with great show of unwillingness, in the concluding sections of his work.

But now, if we pass over a hundred years, and come to the attacks made on the Fathers in the beginning of the eighteenth century, we shall find, for the most part, the same quotations appealed to, the same particulars insisted on, but with an air of much more open defiance, and with the direct and avowed purpose of impugning their credit, not in this or that point only, but in all questions of Christian religion. Thus Whitby prefaces his collection of what be calls specimens of patristical exposition of Scripture, with a declaration², that be wishes to exclude appeals to Antiquity, as to the transmission of the Rule of Faith, (meaning the great fundamental doctrines,) no less than in facts of general history, or in the controversies between England and Rome. And Middleton, in his flippant "Free Inquiry," lays the stress of his argument on his being able to prove that the ancient Fathers "were of a character from which nothing could be expected but what a weak or crafty understanding could supply, towards confirming those prejudices with which they happened to be possessed, especially where religion was the subject".³

One would think it impossible to go, beyond this in the way of disparagement; but so it is, that in the course of the century which has elapsed since Whitby and Middleton, a yet more disrespectful, because more summary, way of dealing with the Fathers has become current. Whitby and Middleton did think it necessary to appear to have examined what is really to be found in Antiquity; and the former especially exhibits, throughout his treatise above-mentioned, what on his principles must be called a morbid anxiety, to confirm his own views on several important subjects, (on original sin, for example, and the natural condition of infants,) by the testimony of the very writers, whom he is most busy in disparaging. But in our day, perhaps, the more usual course is, for persons who do not even profess any acquaintance with those writers, beyond vague impressions received from report or quotation, to dispose of their authority in any controverted point, under the notion, understood or expressed, that "the Fathers were Mystics, and need not be regarded at all."

(2.) Now, if it were indeed an object with the Evil Spirit, to decry the relics of Christian Antiquity, and divert men’s attention from them, it is difficult to say what single word he could have chosen, so critically adapted to his purpose in our days, as this same word, Mysticism. In the first place, it is not a hard word, having been customarily applied to such writers as Fenelon and William Law, whom all parties have generally agreed to praise and admire. So far it suits well with the smoothness of phrase, on which the present generation especially prides itself. It seems to got down the Fathers gently, and so is readily acquiesced in by many, who would shrink from the coarse sneers of Middleton or Gibbon.

In the next place, it touches the very string, which most certainly moves contemptuous thought, in those who have imbibed the peculiar spirit of our time. Mysticism, implies a sort of confusion between physical and moral, visible and spiritual agency, most abhorrent to the minds of those, who pique themselves on having thoroughly clear ideas, and on their power of distinctly analysing effects into their proper causes, whether in matter or in mind.

Again, Mysticism conveys the notion of, something essentially and altogether remote from common sense and practical utility: but common sense and practical utility are the very idols of this age.

Further, that which is stigmatized as Mysticism, is almost always something, which at once makes itself discerned by internal evidence. The man of the world, the practical man, the inductive experimental philosopher, commonly persuades himself that lie can "perceive" by instinct, when a train of thought, or mode of speaking is mere religious dreaming, indistinct fanciful theory; and he rejects it accordingly and is saved all trouble of research. Here, again, is no small temptation, in the eyes of a world full of hurry and business, to acquiesce over lightly in any censure of that kind.

Yet, again, if any man be disposed to speak and think more harshly of the early Christian writers, this same term, Mysticism, may serve his purpose also; for it is easy, by a dexterous enunciation, or choice of context, to insinuate through it a charge of Deliberate fraud. It is an instance, therefore, of a. mode of speaking, equally convenient for all shades and degrees of enmity to, or, contempt of, Antiquity. We see what its power is in a kindred instance; bow meanly even respectable persons allow, themselves to think of the highest sort of poetry,-that which invests all things, great and small, with the noblest of all associations,-when once they have come to annex to it the notion of Mysticism. And perhaps its mischievous effects on theology are as great as any attributable to a single word.

(3.) It may, therefore, be of some use to consider, as distinctly as we can, what people really mean when they charge the Fathers with Mysticism; which being done, we may perhaps have a better chance of making out to our satisfaction, whether, and how far as a body, they deserve the charge.

By the term Mysticism, then, as applied to the writers in question, I understand to be denoted, a disposition, first, to regard things as supernatural which are not really such; and secondly, to press and strain what may perhaps be really supernatural in an undue and extravagant way.

(4.) Upon which bare statement, without going any further, a devout mind will probably at once acknowledge, on which side in the present question the peril of erring will be greatest. The question is like that of the general evidences of religion: a person who would go into it with advantage, should he imbued beforehand with a kind of natural piety, which will cause him to remember all along, that perhaps, when he comes to the end of this inquiry, he will find that God was all the while really there. He will "put off his shoes from off his feet," if he do but think it possible that an, angel may tell him, by and by, "The place where thou standest is holy ground." So it must be, in some measure, with every right-minded person, in the examination of every practice and opinion, against which the charge of Mysticism is brought. Whatever may appear in the case at first sight, likely to move scorn or ridicule, or tempt to mere lightness of thought; it will be an exercise of faith, a trial of a serious heart, to repress for the time any tendency of that kind: the loss and error being infinitely greater, if we are found trifling with a really sacred subject, than if we merely prove to have been a little more serious than was necessary. In this sense, that is to say in regard of the reverent or irreverent temper, in which such inquiries may be approached, superstition is surely a great deal better than irreligion: whatever may be thought of the abstract question, Whether it be the safer extreme to believe too much, or too little?

It may be said, that the Fathers themselves indicate an exception to this rule, by the light and sarcastic way, in which they often allow themselves to treat the pretended mysteries, sometimes of heathens, sometimes of heretics as bad as heathens. But the case is not strictly in point. For I am speaking of pretensions unexamined, and therefore, as yet, more or less doubtful: but the Fathers had, or accounted themselves to have, good grounds for believing that the mysteries and miracles which they held up to scorn were, in part at least, the work of evil spirits, with whom they thus most effectually renounced communion. Before we indulge the like feeling in our treatment of any claim to supernatural powers, we had need have the like assurance of diabolical agency in them: and that to show them any reverence would seem like imparting of God’s honour to the Evil One. Although even in such a case deep fear and humiliation of heart would seem the more appropriate sentiment for ordinary Christians. For is it not a fearful and humbling thought, that mankind, that we ourselves, are, or have been, in danger of mistaking the work of God’s enemy for his own?

Further, it may be well to bear in mind, that the noblest and most refined devotional tendencies have always had to bear the imputation of Mysticism, or some other equivalent word; as if to cultivate them were a mere indulgence of a dreamy, soaring, indistinct fancy. In this use of it, the word Mysticism has done probably as much barm in checking high contemplative devotion, as the kindred term, Asceticism, in discouraging Christian self-discipline.

Thus much for the first impression, which the very application of the term to the Fathers would make on a considerate person, as yet ignorant of their writings. He would expect, almost certainly, to find them imbued with devotional feelings of an unusually high order; and he would be prepared for the possibility, that even those views of theirs, which might seem at first glance overstrained, fantastic, or unnatural, might turn out in the end to be portions of true Christian wisdom.

(5.) What now are the particulars of the Fathers’ imputed Mysticism? i.e. in what respects would they be commonly charged with an undue anxiety to make out supernatural meanings and interferences? The following heads would seem to comprehend the greater part of their supposed delinquencies in this kind:

1. Their interpretations of Scripture are said to be far-fetched and extravagant; extracting figurative, theological allusions out of the most irrelevant or insignificant details of language or history.
2. Correspondent to this is their mode of treating natural objects, and the truths of philosophy and common life; fancying every where indications of that system, on which their own hearts were set.
3. They were mystics in their notions of providential interference, whether in the way of judgement, deliverance, or warning. To which head may be referred whatever they state of the exercise of the gift of prophecy in their times; as also their accounts of reputed miracles, and of the sensible agency of evil spirits, and of their own and others’ warfare with them.
4. Finally, they are blamed for Mysticism, properly so called, in their moral and devotional rules; i. e. for dwelling too much on counsels of perfection, tending (as is affirmed) to contemplation rather than action, to monastic rather than social and practical virtue.

These are the sort of imputations on which the changes have been rung, for the two last centuries, by those who have wished to evade the testimony of the Fathers, without setting them down distinctly as deliberate impostors.

(6.) It may be added, that many of their professed advocates, (Warburton for example,) have in fact given up their cause, as far as concerns every one of these representations. For what, in reality, does his defense of them come to, even when he is led to state their case most favourably; e. g. in the Preface to Julian? Just to this, and no more: that they might be trusted in their relations of things which came within the scope of their own knowledge, provided there was no room for surmising any thing miraculous: and again, that on other subjects, whether as reasoners or as narrators, they, were not weaker, but a little wiser, than Pagan and Jewish writers of the same date.

It is true that Warburton belonged to a school, which has a temptation of its own for slighting the Fathers, over and above differences in particular doctrines; a school, whose leading principle is, that theology, like other sciences, improves by time: or, (to use the words of one of its most plausible advocates) that "Christianity was in its infancy, at most in its childhood, when these men wrote; and therefore it is no wonder that they spake as children, that they understood as children, that they thought as children. This was according to the economy they were then under⁴."

Such writers, when they speak most modestly of themselves, and most respectfully of antiquity, do not however hesitate to make use of the old simile, of a dwarf seeing further than a giant when raised on a giant’s shoulders; imagining it to be as applicable to religion, as it is to physical and human learning; and, when they would most appear to advocate the ancients, cannot of course refrain from stigmatizing them as inadequate judges of Christian truth, infected sometimes with Platonic, sometimes with Rabbinical error: and thus, while with a sort of candour they excuse the men at the expense of the age, they do the Adversary’s work, by detracting from their authority, and withdrawing attention and deference from their writings.

But even those who in their hearts really loved to lean on Antiquity, and would have been uneasy, if they bad not the suffrage of the Fathers with them, have not always taken the course most likely to win them due respect. Whether it were that they feared to commit themselves,—or that they shrunk before popular notions,—or as a mere matter of taste and feeling,-the champions of the Fathers, for many years past, have generally been content to claim credit for them only as witnesses to certain palpable facts of their time: the inevitable consequence of which has been, that even diligent and earnest inquirers have been satisfied with a second-hand knowledge of their writings; and often, when they have come in to fill their proper place in argumentative discussions, they have nevertheless been far from occupying the room which justly belonged to them, in our theological views and impressions. There are, and have been, praiseworthy attempting to raise their credit, by drawing attention to those portions of their literature, which seemed to have most in common with modern ideas, whether in the way of general reasoning with unbelievers, or of refined devotional feeling, or of eloquent morality. But the very circumstance of such selections being made with a view to modern prejudices, shows that they can do no more than palliate the evil. When a reader passes from specimens of that kind to the whole body of any Father's writings, he is apt to feel as if he had been unfairly dealt with, and is inclined rather to be the more intolerant of the many things which be is sure to meet with, alien to his former tastes and habits of thought.

(7.) May it not with reason be suspected,, that the root of the matter lies deeper, and that in order to arrive at it, we must make up our minds thoroughly to consider the whole subject ab initio? It may perhaps turn out that the boldest way of meeting the difficulty is the most rational, and ultimately the most consoling. We must not be startled, though we find ourselves compelled to own, that modern and ancient theology, are to a great extent irreconcileable; that if popular notions are right, the Fathers are indeed "mystical" in a bad sense, and that, in all the several departments above mentioned. Thus, in respect, first, of Scripture interpretation, the received doctrine of this age seems to be, that nothing ought to be figuratively or typically explained, except on the authority of Scripture itself⁵; it being assumed, that we can no otherwise be certified of the divinely intended relation, necessary to make up the nature of a real Type. Now those who hold this rule must necessarily think meanly of the Fathers as expounders of Scripture, since in every paragraph almost we find some allegory, not scriptural according to the required test.

Secondly, in respect of allusions moral or theological, regularly and uniformly deduced from the contemplation of the creatures of God, in the manner, e. g. of Boyle’s Occasional Reflections; it would probably be considered a candid judgment, in our time, which should allow that such might constitute tolerable poetry: - but to consider them as a part of theology, to regard them as having been from the beginning intended by the Creator, and the creation ordered with a view to them;-who is there among us, that would not first be tempted to reject such a theory as overstrained and merely fanciful?

Thirdly, consider the tone of thought, which is accounted safest and meets with most encouragement in our clays, concerning the intimations of God’s mysterious providence, whether national or individual. Is it not a subject, that, as things are, even sincere-minded persons shrink from? They are afraid of trusting themselves with it, though but in thought. What is meant will be perceived in a moment, if people will reflect what their first impressions were, on reading, c. g., the Journal of Archbishop Laud, those portions, of it which detail supposed providential warnings. Or, again, how backward we all find ourselves in Confessing our sense of God’s judgments, public and private, when in our thoughts we can hardly fail to perceive them. I am far from asserting that this backwardness is not both pious and reasonable, taking all circumstances into account: but does it not imply a great change, either in men’s condition or opinions, or in both, since the days of St. Ignatius and St. Cyprian?

Lastly, the difference in moral sentiments is too obvious to be denied. The cheerful, liberal, indulgent side is the popular one, now, in all questions of ethics: severity, strictness, self-denial, are but so far approved, as their immediate good effect is seen and understood. Need it be remarked, that the direct contrary is the case of the Primitive Church?

On the whole, the discrepancies between the two ages, occasioning the imputation of Mysticism to the ancients, are far beyond being accounted for by local, accidental, or temporary circumstances, they must be referred to some difference in first principles: and, unless we are prepared to say positively, with the philosophic theologians above mentioned, that theology is, like other sciences, really advancing, of course, as the world grows older; we cannot but in candour allow it at least possible, before examination, that the ancients may have been in the right, and we in the wrong.

(8.) In order to judge of this fairly, one should begin by stating, with its due limitations, the real judgment of Christian Antiquity on the several matters above enumerated,-an undertaking evidently far beyond the limits of such an essay as the present: one can only endeavour to give some faint specimen of the results, which, it is conceived, more extensive inquiry would establish; premising, however, the following cautions, as necessary to be kept in view throughout the inquiry.

First, that since we are to speak of the Fathers collectively, we must be careful to select those points, in which they exhibit a tolerably general agreement. This limitation disposes at once of many of the most plausible objections to the views of Antiquity, and also of many of the unworthy and inadequate allegations of its timid defenders; as I hope to show hereafter in some important examples.

But to make the rule a practical one, we should well understand, secondly, what is to be accounted general agreement among the Fathers. For it is the third particular in the rule of Vincentius, Quod ab omnibus, which has ever afforded most scope for cavil to the rationalist, and for perplexity to the unwary. But let us only apply to this matter the same rules of common sense, which guide us on analogous subjects in ordinary life. A person not regularly trained in medicine desires to know what are safe rules of diet: is he to believe that there are no such rules at all, because he finds none from which, at some time or other, ingenious innovators have not contrived to dissent? Another wishes to ascertain some point of common law: does be think it necessary for that purpose, that cases in all points exactly like his own shall have come under the cognisance of each former generation of jurists? Or, in matters of navigation, would it be said there were no fixed rules, because but a few out of many seamen have left the results of their experience any where on record? The question about the Fathers is so far like these, that it is strictly a question of practice: men, want to know which is the safest way in regard of their duty towards God; if they require in every point absolute inevitable demonstration, of course they cannot have it in the Fathers: but do they really think they find it in Holy Scripture?

Certainly many of the principles most relied on by Daillé and other such writers, are such that, if we followed them out, we should not stop short of universal scepticism. E. g. Whitby lays it down as an axiom⁶, That if Scripture be a perfect rule of faith, it must be so clear in necessary things as to require no interpreter ; and that it cannot be a rule or measure where it is obscure. Might he not as reasonably have said, that it cannot be a rule to any one who does not thoroughly understand the languages in which it was originally written? Such sentiments are, in fact, inconsistent with the present condition of man: they deal with us as though we might be independent of human testimony, or arrive at mathematical certainty in moral matters. We can only be safe by putting them aside, and resolving to use, on this subject, the same kind of intuitive good sense, which is given us for our guide in all other matters or conduct; which good sense, as even heathen moralists could discern, is the ordinary accompaniment and providential reward of intellectual fairness and purity.

Nor can any measure of general agreement be laid down, in words so precise, as not to leave a great deal to the exercise of this practical wisdom. However, one obvious rule would be, not to demand coincidence in detail, but in general principles; and again, in those generals only, which belong to the professed subject matter, and scope of the writers. For example, there is hardly one of the Fathers, of whose works we have any considerable quantity remaining, but has left on record his interpretation of one part or another of the Old Testament, in sufficient quantity to indicate his rules of exposition. Now, who will deny that it would be a very remarkable fact, should those rules be found, on the whole, the same throughout the whole series of Catholic Fathers;-a fact on which important conclusions may depend? and yet it may so happen, that no one passage in the Bible is quoted by them all; and again, that there are no two of theme who agree in their explanations of all the passages they quote.

Again; it may be, that in the detail of some historical facts, or in some abstract principles not immediately bearing on theology, there may exist a general, not to say an universal, agreement, on which, nevertheless, very little can be built, because on such things they may very well be supposed to have taken for granted what was generally received in their age. Or, if they differ, such difference rather illustrates their concurrence on the great ecclesiastical subjects; for it proves the activity of their minds, and their energy in judging for themselves, where religion permitted.

For example, among the opinions attributed to the Fathers as erroneous, we find⁷ the notion of the soul in its separate state having a kind of body or sensible form, an aërial e ’i d w l o n , or vehicle (as it has sometimes been called). And again, we find cited⁸, as a specimen of the discrepancies of Catholic writers, the opposite conjectures of St. Augustine and St. Jerome on the origination of the soul. Now, these are metaphysical not theological points; they fall not within the province of Christian Antiquity as such; on such points, neither discrepancy nor agreement in error proves any thing against the Fathers, as Divines.

(9.) As then common sense teaches, that in judging collectively of that large and miscellaneous body of literature, which goes under the name of the Fathers, we must select those points, if any, which are common to the, whole mass; and again, that when we speak of agreement among them, we must mean agreement in principle not in detail, and on Christian not on secular subjects so a little ecclesiastical knowledge will suggest to us another consideration, very needful to be borne in mind, when we are estimating the value of their concurrence in any point within their sphere,-I mean the reverential reserve, which undoubtedly they practised in every part of religion, in proportion to its sacredness. If we would deal fairly with the subject, we must make allowance for this reserve. Knowing for certain that it did exist, we are bound to take it into the account, and often to give those who wrote under its influence credit for a more thorough agreement in high and mysterious doctrines, than their words at first sight would otherwise appear to express. One very remarkable instance, which it is enough just to mention now, it having been of late amply illustrated, is - the doctrine of the Ante-Nicene Fathers concerning the Divinity of the Son of God. Another is the rule of solemnization of the Holy Sacraments. A reader, versed in liturgical language, will often discover in the writings of the Fathers, sometimes in Scripture itself, allusions to the sacraments conveyed in one word or syllable, allusions primâ facie so faint, that we could hardly dare to reason upon them, were we not aware of the duty of reserve which would hinder the writers from more express disclosure of the particulars of those Holy Mysteries.

(10.) It may be well to add one more caution, relating particularly to the interpretation of Scripture. Like all questions of language, especially poetical language, it is to every one of us in some decree a matter of taste: we come to it prepossessed with certain conventional rules, or certain associations of our own, which cling by us in spite of ourselves, and often affect our reasonings more than we are aware. But as the Scripture itself, both in substance and in form, is surely far unlike what mere human wisdom would have anticipated, so it is more than possible, that the true method of interpreting it may conduct us on a very different line, from any which would be pointed out by merely human criticism. It seems reasonable, therefore, and religious, to come to questions of that kind, expecting to meet with many things, which may at first seem strange or fanciful, or otherwise unworthy of Divine wisdom; to make up our minds beforehand, that we will not be too much startled by such things, nor reject them at once, but try them by their proper measures; lest we be found deferring to our own prejudices, rather than to the truth of God:-prejudices, not so much of opinion, as of rhetorical or poetical taste.

Under such impressions, we may safely approach the first bead of Mysticism imputed to the Fathers, viz. their mode of interpreting Holy Scripture.

1. In 1631
2. Pref.. § 2. ed. 1714.
3. Pref. p. xxxii
4. Bishop Law, as quoted by Middleton, p. 57.
5. Bp. Van Mildert, B. L. 239, ap. Horne, Introd. ii. 724; Macknight, oil St. Paul’s Ep. iv. 439.
6. Pref. p. 8, 9.
7. Whitby, pp. 201-3
8. Ibid. Pref. lxxvi-lxxviii.
9. p. 57
10. C. xvi.
11. C. xii.
12. Ep. S. Barnab. C. ix.
13. For example, S. Clem. Alex. Strom. vi. 84 ; S. Ambr. de Fide, i. init. and § 121; S. Aug. Quæst. in Jud. 37; S. Hil. de Synod. 86.
14. Compare Gen. 17:27; 14:14
15. See Isai. 56:7; Jer. 7:11.
16. Strom. vi. 11.
17. In loc. S. Barn.
18. De Doct. Christ. ii. 22.
19. De Civ. Dei, xviii. 43.
20. Heb. 9:15-20.
21. S. Aug. ubi sup.
22. Prolog. in Gen. t. ix. p. 10. Ed. Vallars. Venet. 1770.
23. I Cor. 12:28.
24. De Cor. Mil. c. 3.
25. De S. S. Interp. p. 9.
26. See S. Jerome on Ezek. ix.4. t. v. pars i. P. 95,6
27. S. Barnab. Ep. c. xi.
28. Opp. p. 312—314.
29. Free Inquiry, &c. p. 29.
30. p. 367 c.
31. 2 Apol. p. 90. B.
32. Lamentations 4:20.
33. Ep. 86. Ed. Fell, p.231.
34. C. xxiii. 29.
35. 1 Ep. ad Cor. c. xii.
36. i. 18.
37. iv. 37.
38. Dial. cum Tryph. p. 338. D.; Ed. Paris 1636.
39. De Civ. Dei, xvi. 2.
40. See Warburton, Int. to Julian, Works, iv. 340, 341. Ed. 1788.
41. In Joan. t. x. c. 2.
42. Hom. 2. in Gen. § 3.t.ii. 63. A. Ed. Bened. 1733.
43. Comm. In Matt. xiv. § 11 t.iii. 629. B, C, E.
44. In Matt. xv. § 31 t.iii. 699. B.
45. Ep. 137. § 18, t. ii. p. 310.
46. III. 5.
47. Hexaëm. ix.
48. Hooker, E. P. v. 50. 3.
49. t. iii. pars 1. p. 90; Ed. Bened. 1702
50. Whitby, Pref. in Diss. de Interp. S. S. p. lviii.
51. De Genes ad lit. viii. 4.
52. Ibid. 5.
53. De Princip. iv. 6. t. i. 161.
54. § xi. t. i. 168.
55. § i. t. ii, p. 205.
56. In Matt. Hom. xiv. § 12, t. iii. p. 630. D.
57. Strom. vi. c. xv. § 132.
58. Apol. pro Orig. p. 36; D. ad calc. Orig. Ed. Bened. t. iv.
59. In Matt. xii. 30. ; tom. Iii. 549. A.
60. In Gen. Hom. 2. t. ii. p. 59—63.
61. Ibid. 7, § 2 ; t. ii. p. 78. C, D.
62. Ibid. 11, § 2 ; t. ii. p. 90. C.
63. Ibid. 8. 10. t. ii. p. 83.
64. Ibid. § 9.
65. Ibid. 10. 4. t. 11. p. 88.
66. On c. 43, 13. t. ii. p. 48. E.
67. In Jesu Nave Hom. viii. 7. t. ii. p. 417. B, C.
68. Ibid. § 6.
69. In Gen. Hom. v. 3. t. ii. p. 74. F.
70. In Joan. Comm. x. 2. t. iv. 162. B.
71. Ibid. § 3, 4
72. In Matt. Comm. Series, § 77. T. iii. p. 892, 3.
73. In Exod. I. § 5. t. iii. p. 131. E.
74. Comm. in Matt. tom. 16. § 12. t. iii. 732.
75. Pref. in t. ii. p. xvil.
76. Comm. in Matt. t. xv. 2. tom. iii. 653.
77. In Gen. Hom. vi. i. t. ii. p. 76, D.
78. In Gen. Hom. x. 2. t. ii. p. 87. F.
79. In Exod. Hom. ii. 1. t. ii, p. 133. E.
80. Hom. in Gen. vii. 5. t. ii. 80. B.
81. Vid. Harduin. Concil. t. ii. p. 286—288.
82. P. xxiii.
83. Hexaëm. Hom. ix. § i.
84. In Gen. Hom. xiii. t. i. p. 80.
85. Epiph. Epist. ad Joan. Ierosolym. ap Hieron. t. i. 247, &c.; Ed. Vallars. 1766; Hieron. contra Joan. Ierosol. § 7 ; t. ii. 413.
86. Hom. 13, in Gen. t. i. p. 80, lin. 29, Ed. Savile.
87. t. i. 652, 16.
88. In Esai. lib. i. 4 ; t. i. p. 113.
89. T. i. p. 2. C. ed. Aubert. Paris. 1638.
90. Contra Celsum, iv. 48, 43, 45.
91. Ibid. § 44; p. 537, B
92. Ibid. § 48; t. i. p. 540
93. De Civ. Dei, viii. 7.
94. Ibid. cap. 10
95. Contra Celsum. Iii. 75.
96. Strom. i. 99 ; vi. 44.
97. Ibid. i. 38 ; vi. 45.
98. Ibid. i. 73.
99. Ibid. vii. 87.
100. Contr. Faust. Lib. xxii. 26.
101. Ibid. xxii. 27.
102. Ibid. xxii. 73
103. Quæst. in Jud. xlix. 4. t. iii. p. i. 456. D.
104. Contr. Faust. xxii. 74.
105. Ibid. § 79.
106. In I Reg. qu. 34. t. i. 379. Ed. Schulze
107. Comm. in Hos. t. iii. 13. C.
108. Contr. Faust. xxii. 23.
109. Lib. iv. 29. (1 Cor)
110. de Mendacio 32. t. vii. p.341.E.
111. Contr. Faust. xxii. 24.
112. Lib. iv. § 37, p. 333.lin. 32. Ed. Grabe.
113. Ibid. iv. 37, p. 336. 26.
114. Contr. Cels. iv. 43. t. i. p. 537. C.
115. Apol. p. 40. D. t. I ; Paris, 1609.
116. Contr. Mendac. ad. Consent. c. 24, t. vi. 337 D
117. De Jacob et vita beata, II. 6; t. i. 546
118. In Gen. Hom. 43 ; t. i. 415. 7. Ed. Savil.
119. De Jacob et vita beata, II. 9; t. i. 546
120. Ap. Galland. Bibl. Patr. t. ii. 485. B.
121. Serm. iv. § 16 ; t. v. 13. D.
122. Ibid. § 15—2, 23
123. Ibid. § 21.
124. Ibid. § 24.
125. Contr. Faust. xxii. c. 59.
126. Lib. iv. c. 38.
127. e. g.
St. John Chrysostom in Gen. Hom. 29, t. i. 226. Ed. Savil

"Ride on triumphantly : behold we lay
Our lusts and proud wills in Thy way.
Hosanna ! welcome to our hearts. Lord here
Thou hast a Temple too, and full as dear
As Sion, and as full of sin.
Nothing but thieves and robbers dwell therein—
Enter, and chase them forth, and cleanse the floor," etc.

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