

[10.] By dependency we mean subordination and subjection. A manifest token of which dependency may be this: as there is no more certain argument that lands are held under any as lord^c, than if we see that such lands in defect of heirs do fall by escheat unto him^d; in like manner it doth rightly follow^e, that seeing dominion, when there is none to inherit it, returneth unto the body, therefore they which before were inheritors thereof did hold it with dependency upon the body. So that by comparing the body with the head, as touching power, it seemeth always to reside in both; fundamentally or^f radically in the one, in the other derivatively; in the^g one the habit, in the other the act of power.

May then a body politic^h at all times withdraw in whole or in part thatⁱ influence of dominion which passeth from it, if inconvenience doth^k grow thereby? It must be presumed, that supreme governors will not in such case oppose themselves, and be stiff in detaining that, the use whereof is with public detriment: but surely without their consent I see not how the body should be able by any just means^l to help itself, saving when dominion doth escheat. Such things therefore must be thought upon beforehand, that power may be limited ere it be granted; which is the next thing we are to consider.

[11.] In power of dominion, all kings have not an equal latitude. Kings by conquest make their own charter: so that how large their power, either civil or spiritual, is, we cannot with any certainty define, further than only to set them in general^m the law of God and nature for bounds. Kings by God's own special appointment have also that largeness of power, which he doth assign or permit with approbation. Touching kings which were first instituted by agreement and composition made with them over whom they reign, how far their power may lawfullyⁿ extend, the articles of compact between them must^o shew: not the articles only^p of compact at the first beginning, which for the most part are either clean worn out

^c lords E.C. ^d fall unto them by escheat E.C. ^e follow rightly E. rightly *om.* C. ^f and E.Q.C.L. ^g the *om.* E.Q.C.L. ^h may a body politic then E.C. ⁱ the E.C.L. ^j inconveniences do E.Q.C. conveniences do L. ^k by any just means should be able E. ^l the line of E. [underscored by Fulm.] ^m lawfully *om.* E.Q.C.L. ⁿ is to E.Q.C.L. ^o only the articles E.C.L.

of knowledge, or else known unto very few, but whatsoever hath been after in free and voluntary manner condescended unto, whether by express consent, whereof positive laws are witnesses, or else by silent allowance famously notified through custom reaching beyond the memory of man. By which means of after-agreement, it cometh many times to pass in kingdoms, that they whose ancient predecessors were by violence and force made subject, do grow even by little and little^a into that most^r sweet form of kingly government which philosophers define to be^s "1regency willingly sustained"^{ss} "and endured, with chieftly of power in the greatest things."

[12.] Many of the ancients in their writings do speak of kings with such high and ample terms, as if universality of power, even in regard of things and not of persons only, did appertain to the very being of a king². The reason is, because their speech concerning kings they frame according to the state of those monarchs to whom unlimited authority was given: which some not observing, imagine that all kings, even in that they are kings, ought to have whatsoever power they find^t any sovereign ruler lawfully to have enjoyed. But the^u most judicious philosopher, whose eye scarce any thing did escape^x which was to be found in the bosom of nature, he considering how far the power of one sovereign ruler may be different from another's^y regal authority, noteth in Spartan kings³, "that of all others lawfully reigning they had^z the

^a do by little and little grow E. do grow by little, &c. Q.C.L. ^r most *om.* E. ^s to be *om.* E. ^{ss} sustained, and endured with . . . E. and edd. ^t judge E.C.L. ^u that D. ^x scape D. ^y another E.Q.C.L. ^z have E.Q.C.L.

¹ Arist. Pol. lib. iii. cap. 1*. [cap. 10. E. cap. 16, ed. Duval, t. iii. 477. B. βασιλείας μὲν οὐκ εἶδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν· μία μὲν, ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους· αὕτη δ' ἦν ἐκόντων μὲν, ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὀρισμένοις· στρατηγὸς γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος.] ed. Gaisford.] "He that ruleth according to virtue is called a king, "and hath such friendship and "community towards those that be "under him, as God hath towards "the world and those things that "be in it."

² Polit. iii. 14. [Ἡ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τῆν χώραν, ἡγεμὼν ἔστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδίδεται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. comp. c. 15. init.]

³ Pythagoras apud Ecphant. de Regno. Ὁ κατ' ἀρετὰν ἐξάρχων καλέεται [τε] βασιλεὺς, καὶ ἐντι, ταύταν ἔχων φιλίαν τε καὶ κοινωνίαν ποτὶ τῶς ὑπὸ αὐτὸν, ἄνπερ ὁ θεὸς ἔχει ποτὶ τε τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. [ap. Stob. Floril. ii. 323.

* Pol. l. i. c. 10. D.

† This extract is wanting in E; the Greek in C; the English in D.Q.L.

"most restrained power^a." A king which hath not supreme power in the greatest things, is rather entitled a king, than invested with real sovereignty. We cannot properly term him a king, of whom it may not be said, at the leastwise, as touching certain the very^b chiefest affairs of state^c, *αὐτῶ μὲν^d ἄρχειν, ἄρχεσθαι¹ δὲ ὑπ' οὐδενός*, "his right in them is to have rule, not subject to any other predominant^e." I am not of opinion that simply always^f in kings the most, but the best limited power is best^g: the most limited is, that which may deal in fewest things; the best, that which in dealing is tied unto the soundest, perfectest, and most indifferent rule; which rule is the law; I mean not only the law of nature and of God, but very national or municipal law consonant thereunto^h. Happier that people whose law is their king in the greatest things, than that whose king is himself their law. Where the king doth guide the state, and the law the king, that commonwealth is like an harp or melodious instrument, the strings whereof are tuned and handled all by one^{hh}, following as laws the rules and canons of musical science^{hhh}. Most divinely therefore Archytas maketh unto public felicity these four stepsⁱ, every later whereof^j doth spring from the former, as from a mother^k cause; *ὁ μὲν¹ βασιλεὺς νόμιμος, ὁ δὲ ἄρχων ἀκόλουθος, ὁ δὲ ἀρχόμενος ἐλεύθερος^m, ἂ δ' ὅλαⁿ κοινωνία εὐδαίμων²*; adding on the contrary side, that "where this order is not, it cometh by transgression thereof to pass that the king^o groweth^p a tyrant; he that ruleth under him abhorreth

^a they were most tied to law, and so [had C.I.Q.] the most restrained power E.C.L.Q. ^b very om. E.C.L. ^c the state E.C.L. ^d αὐτῶ μὲν, and afterwards δὲ, om. E.C. ^e predominancy E. ^f always om. E.C.L. ^g E.Q.C. insert "both for them and the people," as does L, repeating "best" before that clause. ^h The reading of C. here is, "I mean not only the law of nature and the law of God, but the national consent thereunto." Q, as in the text, omitting "very." L and E, "I mean not only the law of nature and of God, but the national law consonant thereunto." The text is from D. ^{hh} hand ins. E'. ^{hhh} Happier—science ital. E'. ⁱ and degrees ins. E.Q.C.L. ^j every of which E. later of which Q.C.L. ^k another E.C.L. ^l δὲ E. ^m ἀπόλυτος E. ⁿ ἂ δ' ὅλη E.Q. [C. omits the Greek.] ^o a king E.C. ^p grows D.

¹ [The margin of the Queen's Coll. MS. has here, "Ecphantus 'Pythagoricus.'" Vid. Stob. Floril. ed. Gaisford, II. 326. The whole passage is, *Ὅπερ ἔντι μὲν τῷ Θεῷ, ἔντι καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ, αὐτῶ μὲν ἄρχειν* (*ἀπ' ὧπερ καὶ ὁ αὐτάρκης καλεῖται ἄρχεσθαι δ' ὑπ' οὐδενός.*) ² [Ap. Stob. Floril. II. 166.] "The king ruling by law, the magistrate following, the subject free, and the whole society happy*."] ^{*} This English in text of E. om. D. in marg. Q.C.L.

"to be guided and commanded by him^a; the people subject under^r both, have freedom under neither; and the whole community is wretched¹."

[13.] In which respect, I cannot choose but commend highly their wisdom, by whom the foundations of this^s commonwealth have been laid; wherein though no manner person^t or cause be unsubject to the king's power, yet so is the power of the king over all and in all limited, that unto all his proceedings the law itself is a rule. The axioms of our regal government are these: "Lex facit regem:" the king's grant of any favour made contrary to the^u law is void; "Rex nihil potest nisi quod jure potest." Our kings therefore, when they take^x possession of the room^y they are called unto, have it painted^z out before their eyes, even by the very solemnities and rites of their inauguration, to what affairs by the said^a law their supreme authority and power^b reacheth. Crowned we see they are, and^c enthronized, and anointed: the crown a sign of military^d; the throne, of sedentary or^e judicial; the oil, of religious or sacred power.

[14.] It is not on any side denied, that kings may have such^f authority in secular affairs. The question then is, "What power they lawfully may^g have, and exercise in causes of God." "A prince, a magistrate, or community," saith D. Stapleton², "may have power to lay corporal punishment^h on them which are teachers of perverse things; power to make laws for the peace of the Church; power to proclaim, to defend, and even by revenge to preserve from violationⁱ dogmata, very^j articles of religion themselves." Others³

^a by him, or commanded E. ^r unto E.Q.L. ^s the E.C. ^t manner of person E.Q.C.L. ^u the om. D. ^x are to take E.C. ^y crown E. ^z pointed E.C.L. ^a same E.Q.C.L. ^b power and authority E.Q.C.L. ^c and om. E. ^d military dominion E.Q.C.L. ^e and E.Q.L. ^f such om. E.C.L. ^g may lawfully E.C. ^h punishments D. ⁱ from violation om. E. ^j which inserts it after themselves. ^k the very E.

¹ [Καὶ τούτων παραβάσει μὲν βασιλεὺς, τύραννος· ὁ δὲ ἄρχων, ἀκόλουθος· ὁ δ' ἀρχόμενος, δοῦλος· ἂ δ' ὅλα κοινωνία, κακοδαίμων. Id. ibid.] ² Stapl. de Doct. Princip. [Contr. II.] lib. v. c. 17. ["Non negatur principi, magistratui, vel communitati potestas, perversa docentes corporali pœna puniendi, legesque pro ecclesiæ pace ferendi, dogmata promulgandi, defendendi, et contra violatores vindicandi." p. 189. Paris, 1579.] ³ Choppin. [René Chopin, 1537-1606.] de Sacra Politia forensi. Par. 1577, and 1589. Præfat. [This reference is from the Dubl. MS. Hooker quotes from the dedication of the edition of 1589, addressed to cardinal Bourbon under the name of Charles X. "Regium istud est, civiliumque magistro-

BOOK VIII. Ch. ii. 14. in affection no less devoted unto the papacy, do likewise yield, that "the civil magistrate may by his edicts and laws keep all ecclesiastical persons within the bounds of their duties, and constrain them to observe the canons of the Church, to follow the rules^k of ancient discipline." That "if Joas^{kk} were^l commended for his care and provision concerning so small a part of religion as the church-treasury^m; it must needs be both unto Christian kings themselves greater honour, and to Christianity a larger benefit, when the custody of religion wholeⁿ and of^o the worship of God in general is their charge." If therefore all these things mentioned be most properly the affairs of God, and ecclesiastical^p causes; if the actions specified be works of power; and if that power be such as kings may use of themselves, without the leave^q of any other power superior in the same things^r: it followeth necessarily, that kings may have supreme power, not only in civil, but also in ecclesiastical affairs; and consequently, that they may withstand what bishop or pope soever shall, under the pretended claim of higher spiritual authority, oppose himself^s against their proceedings. But they which have made us the former grant, will hereunto never^t condescend. What they yield that princes may do, it is with secret exception always understood, if the bishop of Rome give leave, if he interpose no prohibition: wherefore somewhat it is in shew, in truth nothing, which they grant.

Our own reformers do the very like. When they make their discourses^u in general concerning the authority which magistrates may have, a man would think them far^x from withdraw-

^k rule E. ^{kk} Joash E. 1666. ^l was E.Q. ^m treasure E. ⁿ whole om. E.Q.C.L. ^o of om. E.Q.C.L. ^p God's ecclesiastical E.Q.C.L. ^q fear E.Q.C.L. ^r thing E.C. ^s themselves E.C.L. ^t never hereunto E.Q.C.L. ^u discourse E.C.L. ^x to be far E.

"rum munus, ecclesiae decreta tueri, conservare, tum latis legibus omnes sacris addictos continere in officio; urgendos etiam ad canonum ecclesiasticorum veterisque cultum disciplinæ, principali non minus auctoritate quam pontificali. . . Laudatus est enim vel ex eo Joas Hebræorum rex, quod metuens ne sacerdotes nummos interverterent, qui offerebantur a populo ad tutelam templi, eos primum in arcam clausam inferri jussisset, de-

"inde scriba suo præsentis fabricis ac cæmentariis erogari. Sed longe augustius illud, Christianæque utilius reip. regem ipsius adeo religionis cultusque divini custodem se profiteri, nedum sacri ærarii: qualem se gessisse Constantinum Magnum accepimus, et Galliarum tuarum heroas præstantissimos plerosque." The writer was a lawyer of eminence in the parliament of Paris, and a vehement partisan of the League. v. Biog. Univ.]

BOOK VIII. Ch. ii. 15. ing any jot of that which with reason may be thought due. "The prince and civil magistrate¹," saith one of them, "hath to see that² the laws of God touching his worship, and touching all matters and orders³ of the Church be⁴ executed, and duly observed; and to see that⁵ every ecclesiastical person do that office whereunto he is appointed, and to punish those which fail in their office accordingly." Another acknowledgeth⁶, that "the magistrate may lawfully uphold all truth by his sword, punish all persons, enforce all to do⁷ their duties unto⁸ God and men; maintain by his laws every point of God's word, punish all vice in all men; see into all causes, visit the ecclesiastical estate, and correct the abuses thereof; finally, to look to his subjects, that under him they may lead their lives in all godliness and honesty." A third more frankly professeth⁹, that in case their church-discipline were established, so little it shorteneth the arms of sovereign dominion in causes ecclesiastical, that her gracious Majesty, for any thing which¹⁰ they teach or hold to the contrary, may no less than now "remain still over all persons, in all things supreme governess, even with that full and royal authority, superiority, preeminence^f, supremacy, and prerogative, which the laws already established do give her, and her Majesty's injunctions, and the articles of the Convocation-house, and other writings apologetical of her royal authority and supreme dignity, do declare and explain."

[15.] Posidonius was wont to say of the Epicure, "That he thought there were no gods, but that those things which he spake concerning the gods were only given out for fear of growing odious amongst men; and therefore that in words he left gods remaining, but in very deed overthrew them, inasmuch^g as he gave them no kind of motion^h, no kind of action⁴." After the very selfsame manner, when we come

¹ that om. E. ² all orders E.C. ³ to be E. ⁴ that om. E. ⁵ do om. E. ⁶ towards E. ⁷ which om. E.Q.C.L. ⁸ and preeminence E.C. ⁹ inasmuch E.Q.C.L. ^h no kind of motion om. E.

¹ T. C. lib. i. p. 192. [154.]

² * Fenner's "Defence of the godly Ministers [against the slanders of D. Bridges, contained in his answer to the preface before the Discourse

"of Ecclesiastical Government." 1587. Sign. E. 1.] ³ Humble Motion, p. 63. ⁴ Cicero, lib. i. de Nat. Deor. [c. 44. "Posidonius disseruit in

BOOK VIII. unto those particular effects and^k prerogatives of dominion
 Ch. ii. 16. which the laws of this land do grant unto the kings thereof,
 it will appear how these^l men, notwithstanding their large
 and liberal speeches, abate such parcels out of the fore-alleged
 grand^m and flourishing sumⁿ, that a man comparing the one
 with the other may half stand in doubt, lest their opinions^o
 in very truth be against that authority which by their speeches
 they seem mightily to uphold, partly for the avoiding of public
 obloquy, envy, and hatred; partly to the intent they may both
 in the end, by establishment^p of their discipline, extinguish
 the force of supreme power which princes have, and yet in
 the meanwhile by giving forth these smooth discourses, obtain
 that their favourers may have somewhat to allege for them by
 way of apology, and that in such words as sound towards all
 kind of fulness in power^q. But for myself, I had rather con-
 strue such their contradictions in the better part, and impute
 their general acknowledgment of the lawfulness of kingly
 power unto the force of truth, presenting itself before them
 sometimes alone^r; their particular contrarieties, oppositions,
 denials, unto that error which having so fully possessed their
 minds, casteth things inconvenient upon them; of which
 things in their due place.

[16.] Touching that which is now in hand, we are on all
 sides fully agreed; first, that there is not any restraint or limit-
 ation of matter for regal authority and power to be conversant
 in, but of religion whole^s, and of whatsoever cause thereto^t
 appertaineth, kings may lawfully have charge, they lawfully
 may therein exercise dominion, and use the temporal sword:
 secondly, that some kinds^u of actions conversant about such
 affairs are denied unto kings; as, namely, actions of the power

^k and om. E. ^l those D. ^m afore alleged E'. grant E.C. ground Q. ⁿ shew E.
 some C. ^o opinion E.Q.C.L. ^p the establishment E.Q.C.L. ^q that such
 words only sound towards all kind of fulnes of power E. *All the MSS. read as in
 the text, except that C has a kind of fulness of power.* ^r above E. ^s only E.
^t thereunto E.Q.C.L. ^u kinds Q.L. *In the margin of E. Kinds stand here, as
 if the title of a section; perhaps by the printer's mistake, from its being inserted in
 his copy as a probable emendation.*

"libro quinto, nullos esse deos, "geret... onmino nihil curantem,
 "Epicuro videri; quæque is de "nihil agentem... Re tollit, ora-
 "diis immortalibus dixerit, invidiæ "tione relinquit, deos." Lactant.
 "detestandæ gratia dixisse: neque Epit. 36. "Verbo reliquisti, re sus-
 "enim tam desipiens fuisset, ut fin- "tulisti."]

of order^x, and of that power of jurisdiction, which is^y with it BOOK VIII.
 unseparably^z joined; power to administer the word and sacra- Ch. ii. 17.
 ments, power to ordain, to judge as an ordinary, to bind and
 loose, to excommunicate, and such like: thirdly, that even in
 these^a very actions which are proper unto dominion, there
 must be some certain rule, whereunto kings in all their pro-
 ceedings ought to be strictly tied; which rule for proceedings^b
 in ecclesiastical affairs and causes by regal power, hath not
 hitherto been agreed upon with so^c uniform consent and cer-
 tainty as might be wished^d. The different sentences of men
 herein I will not^e now go about to examine, but it shall be
 enough to propose what rule doth seem in this case most
 reasonable.

[17.] It hath been declared already¹ in general, how "the By what
 "best established dominion is where the law doth most rule rule^f.
 "the king:" the true effect whereof particularly is found as
 well in ecclesiastical as in^g civil affairs. In these the king,
 through his supreme power, may do great things and sundry^h
 himself, both appertaining unto peace and war, both at home,
 by commandmentⁱ and by commerce with states abroad,
 because so much the law doth^j permit. Some things^k on the
 other side, the king^l alone hath no power^m to do without con-
 sent of the lords and commons assembled in parliamentⁿ: the
 king of^o himself cannot change the nature of pleas, nor courts,
 no not so much as restore blood; because the law is a bar unto
 him; not any law divine^p or natural^q, for against neither it were
 though kings of themselves^r might do both, but^s the positive
 laws of the realm have abridged therein^t and restrained^u the
 king's power; which positive laws, whether by custom or other-
 wise established without repugnancy unto the law^x of God and
 nature, ought no^y less to be of^z force even in the spiritual^a

^x power and order, and of spiritual jurisdiction E. the power of order and of
 spiritual jurisdiction C.L. ^y hath E. *which has no stop at* joined. ^z in-
 separably E.Q.C.L. ^a those E.Q.C.L. ^b proceeding E. ^c such E.C.
 some L. ^d wish't D. ^e omits not. ^f om. D. ^g in om. E.Q.C.L.
^h sundry great things E.Q.C.L. ⁱ and by command E. ^j the law doth
 so much E. ^k sometimes E. ^l the king, &c. (as a quotation) E. ^m right
 E.C.L. ⁿ his lords and commons in parliament E.C. ^o of om. E. ^p either
 divine Q. ^q human L. ^r the kings in themselves C. ^s not any... both,
 but om. E. ^t have a privilege therein E.Q.C.L. ^u restrain E.Q.C.L.
^x laws E.Q.L. ^y not E. ^z in E.C.L. ^a supernatural E.

affairs of the Church. Wherefore^b in regard of ecclesiastical laws, we willingly embrace that of Ambrose, "Imperator bonus¹ intra ecclesiam, non supra ecclesiam, est; kings have dominion to exercise in ecclesiastical causes, but according to the laws of the Church." Whether it be therefore the nature of courts, or the form of pleas, or the kind of governors, or the order of proceedings^o in whatsoever spiritual^d businesses^o; for the received laws and liberties^f of the^g Church the king hath supreme authority and power, but against them, none^h.

What such positive laws have appointed to be done by others than the king, or by others with the king, and in what form they have appointed the doing of it, the same of necessity must be kept, neither is the king's sole authority to alter it.

Yeaⁱ even as it were a thing unreasonable, if in civil affairs the king (albeit the whole universal body did join with him) should do any thing by their absolute supreme power^j for the ordering of their state at home, in prejudice of any of^k those ancient laws of nations which are of force throughout^l the world, because the necessary commerce of kingdoms dependeth on them; so in principal matters belonging to Christian religion, a thing very scandalous and offensive it must needs be thought, if either kings or laws should dispose of the affairs^m of God, without any respect had to that which of old hath been reverently thought of throughout the world, and wherein there is no law of God which forceth us to swerve from the wayⁿ wherein so many and so^o holy ages have gone.

Wherefore not without good consideration the very law itself hath provided, "That judges ecclesiastical appointed under the king's commission shall not adjudge for heresy any thing but that which heretofore hath been so^p adjudged

^b church, whether E. church; where even C. ^o proceeding E.Q.C.L.
^d spiritual om. E.Q.C.L. ^o business E.C.L. ^f liberty E.Q.C.L. ^g C. has
that church. ^h never E. ⁱ alter it; yet E. (Fulm. yea.) ^j supreme om. E.
^k any of om. E.Q. ^l throughout all E.Q.L. throughout the whole C. ^m law E.
laws Q.C.L. ⁿ ways E.Q.C.L. ^o so om. E. ^p so om. E.

¹ Ambros. Ep. 32. d. 160*. [II. 873. N. B. The word "bonus" is not in the MSS. of St. Ambrose.]

* This marginal reference from C.

"by the authority of the canonical scriptures, or by the first four general councils, or by some other general council wherein the same hath been declared heresy by the express words of the said canonical scriptures, or such as hereafter shall be termed^a heresy by the high court of parliament of this realm, with the assent of the clergy in the convocation¹." By which words of the law who doth not plainly see, how in that^r one branch of proceeding by virtue of the king's supreme authority, the credit which those four^s general councils have throughout all churches evermore^t had, was judged by the makers^u of the foresaid act a just cause wherefore they^x should be mentioned in that case, as a requisite part of the^y rule wherewith dominion was to be limited^z. But of this we shall further consider, when we come unto that which sovereign power may do in making ecclesiastical laws.

[18.] The cause^{zz} of deriving supreme power from a whole entire multitude unto^a some special part thereof, is partly the necessity of expedition in public affairs; partly the inconveniency of^b confusion and trouble, where a multitude of equals dealeth; and partly the dissipation which must needs ensue in companies, where every man wholly seeketh his own particular (as we all would do, even with other men's hurt^c) and haply the very overthrow of ourselves^d in the end also, if for procurement^e of the common good of all men, by keeping every several man in order, some were not armed^f with authority over all, and encouraged with prerogatives of honour^g to sustain the weighty burden of that charge. The good which is proper unto each man belongeth to the common good of all, as a part of the whole's perfection^h; but yetⁱ these two

^a determined to be E.Q.C.L. [The phrase of the statute is, "adjudged to be."] ^r that in E.Q.C.L. ^s four first E.C. ^t churches, and evermore E.
^u making E.L. ^x it D. ^y that E. ^z This marginal note om. E.C.
[Fulm. For what inconveniency.] ^{zz} case E'. 1662. ^a into E.C.L. ^b inconveni-
ence E.L. ^c hurts E. ^d themselves E. ^e the procurement E.C.
^f invested E. arrayed marg. Q. ^g prerogative honour E. ^h as part to
the whole perfection E. as part of L.C. as part to Q. ⁱ yet om. E.C.L.

¹ An. 1. Reg. Eliz. [1 Eliz. c. 1. "of 16 Car. I. c. 11, yet these rules § 36.]

² ["It hath been generally holden "will be good directions to ecclesiastical courts in relation to heresy." 1 Hawkins, 4. ap. Burn. Eccl. Law, II. 277. ed. 1788.]