

addition, are somewhat different from such as have been already noted. For as nature draweth love from God, so corruption of nature procureth hatred, it being as natural to him to abhor that which defaceth his handywork, as to delight in the absolute perfection which himself hath given. So that sin hath opened now in God every way of wrath which before was shut. Sin hath awakened justice, which otherwise might have slept. Wrath and justice we attribute to God, by reason of those effects of punishment which God inflicteth. The first rule therefore of providence now, is, that sin do not go altogether unpunished in any creature; whereupon it followeth, that seeing all men universally are sinful, punishment hath also fallen upon all. Some are, after this life, tormented with eternal flames, yet here permitted to live at ease till the hour of death come. Some, during life, never free from miseries, whose state after is perpetual joy: some, neither in this world, nor in the world to come, pardoned; but the death of all is argument sufficient that none escapeth it, both [in both?] altogether without touch. For death even in new-baptized infants, yea in Saints, in Martyrs, we must acknowledge to be a punishment; a punishment which God inflicteth, in judgment, and not in fury, but yet a punishment. It was a branch of the error of Pelagius, to think our mortality no punishment inflicted by the hand of the supreme Judge, but a part of that state and condition, which, as Creator, he hath imposed on mankind¹.

[31.] That justice which worketh by way of revenge, proportioneth punishment unto sin. And sin hath two measures whereby the greatness thereof is judged. The object, God, against whom; and the subject, that creature in whom sin is. By the one measure, all sin is infinite, because he is infinite whom sin offendeth: for which cause there is one eternal punishment due in justice unto all sinners. In so much that if it were possible for any creature to have been eternally with God, and co-eternally sinful, it standeth with justice by this measure to have punished that creature from eternity past, no less than to punish it unto future eternity. And therefore the sin [time?] which cometh between the birth and death of such as are to endure this punishment, is granted them by dispensation as it were, and toleration, at God's hand². From the other measure, which is according to the subject of sin, there are in that eternity of punishment varieties, whereby may be gathered a rule much built upon in

¹ [S. Aug. Serm. ccxcix. § 11. "esse quod morimur, et moriturum t. v. 1217. "Dicunt, non de peccato nos mori, quantum pertinet "ad corporis mortem, sed naturæ"]
"fuisse Adam etiamsi non peccasset."
"set."]
² Rom. ix. 22.

holy Scripture: That degrees in wickedness have answerable degrees in the weight of their endless punishment.

But lest only wrath and justice should take effect, love and mercy be without exercise, by reason of sin, God hath not suffered the preparations of eternal life to be thus frustrated altogether as concerning man, but chosen rather to remit on his own part much of that, which extremity and rigour of justice might require, being contented to condescend unto favourable conditions: and except it be where incurable malice, on the part of the sinful themselves, will not suffer mercy with such conditions to take place, leadeth still to eternal life, by an amiable course, framed even according to the very state wherein we now are. He is not wanting to the world in any necessary thing for the attainment of eternal life, though many things be necessary now, which according to our first condition we needed not. He bestoweth now eternal life as his own free and undeserved gift; together also with that general inheritance and lot of eternal life, great varieties of rewards proportioned to the very degrees of those labours, which to perform he himself by his grace enableth. He leaveth us not as Adam in the hands of our own wills, at once endued with ability to stand of our own accord, but because that ability is altogether lost, he putteth into our souls continually new strength, the paths of our duty he layeth before us, and directeth our steps therein, he giveth warning whereby to know, and wisdom also whereby to prevent the fearful hazards whereinto our souls, being left to themselves, would assuredly fall: that permanent wrath which is for ever, he turneth away; from temporal punishments altogether, and especially from natural death, though none young nor old be exempted, yet his mercy which endureth for ever towards some, turneth both life and death and all things unto their everlasting good. So that from punishments in this world there can be no certain collection drawn, either to clear or condemn men, as being in degree of sin according to that we see them sustain here more or less, but only that in general our punishments prove we all have sinned, because without sin we should never have suffered any thing unpleasant or grievous to nature. And the reason why temporal punishments, declaring all to be sinners, do not argue that they always have sinned most, who suffer most in this present life, is because those things which here we suffer are not still inflicted by the hand of God's revengeful justice, as in the world to come they are. And therefore, after this life, it standeth much more firm, The heavier punishment, the greater sin. In the act of sinning, God hath the place of a meer patient. For all sin is against

BOOK V. God, and therefore all sinners termed his enemies. As for the
Appendix I. punishment which his will determineth upon them, it is the con-
[32.] sequent of their iniquity, and their iniquity the cause of it.

[32.] If therefore we look upon the rank or chain of things voluntarily derived from the positive will of God, we behold the riches of his glory proposed as the end of all, we behold the beatitude of men and angels ordained as a mean unto that end, graces and blessings in all abundance referred as means unto that happiness, God to be blessed for evermore, the voluntary author of all those graces. But concerning the heaps of evils which do so overwhelm the world, compare them with God, and from the greatest to the least of them, he disclaimeth them all. He refuseth utterly to be intituled either *Alpha*, or *Omega*, the beginning, or the end, of any evil. The evil of sin is within the compass of God's prescience, but not of his predestination, or fore-ordaining will. The evil of punishment is within the compass of God's fore-appointed and determining will, but by occasion of precedent sin. For punishments are evil, because they are naturally grievous to him which must sustain them. Yet in that they proceed from justice thereby revenging evil, such evils have also the nature of good; neither doth God refuse, but challenge it as an honour, that he maketh evil doers which sow iniquity to reap destruction, according to that in the Prophet Jeremy¹, *There is no evil in the city, which I the Lord have not done.* God therefore, with the good evil of punishment, revengeth the evil good of sin. Sin is no plant of God's setting. He seeth and findeth it a thing irregular, exorbitant, and altogether out of course. It is unto him an occasion of sundry acts of mercy, both an occasion and a cause of punishment: by which mercy and justice, although God be many ways greatly glorified, yet is not this glory of God any other in respect of sin than only an accidental event. We cannot say therefore truly, that, as God to his own glory did ordain our happiness, and to accomplish our happiness appoint the gifts of his grace: so he did ordain to his glory our punishment, and for matter of punishment our sins. For punishment is to the will of God no desired end, but a consequent ensuing sin: and, in regard of sin, his glory an event thereof, but no proper effect. Which answereth fully that repining proposition, *If man's sin be God's glory, why is God angry?*

As therefore sin hath entered into the nature of man, notwithstanding the general will of God's inclination to the contrary: so the same inclination of will in him for the good of man doth continue

¹ [Rather, Amos iii. 6.]

still, notwithstanding sin. For sin altereth not his nature, though it change ours. His general will, and the principal desire whereunto of his own natural bent he inclineth still, is, that all men may enjoy the full perfection of that happiness, which is their end. Signs of the general inclination of God, are all promises which he maketh in holy Scripture, all the Precepts which he giveth of godliness and virtue, all Prohibitions of sin and threatenings against offenders, all counsels, exhortations, admonitions, tolerations, protestations, and complaints. Yea all the works of his merciful providence, in upholding the good estate of the world, are signs of that desire, which the Schoolmen therefore term *his signified will*¹: Damascen, the *principal will* of God². And according to this will, he desireth not the death, no not of the wicked³, but rather that they might be converted and live. He longeth for nothing more than that all men might be saved.

[33.] He that willeth the end, must needs will also the means whereby we are brought unto it. And one [our?] fall in Adam being presupposed, the means now which serve as causes effectual by their own worth to procure us eternal life, are only the merits of Jesus Christ, without whom no heathen by the law of nature, no Jew by the law of Moses, was ever justified. Yea it were perhaps no error to affirm, that the virtue of the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ being taken away, the Jew by having the law, was farther removed from hope of salvation and life, than the other by wanting the law: if it be true which Fulgentius⁴ hath, that without the graces of belief in

¹ [Sent. i. dist. xlv. art. 4. "Utrum voluntas Dei distinguatur in voluntatem beneplaciti et voluntatem signi." . . . "Magna est adhibenda discretio in cognitione divinæ voluntatis, quia et beneplacitum Dei est voluntas ejus, et signum beneplaciti ejus, dicitur voluntas ejus. Sed beneplacitum ejus æternum est, signum vero beneplaciti ejus non. Et consonat rerum effectibus beneplacitum ipsius, et ipsi effectus rerum ab eo non discordant. Fit enim omne quod beneplacito vult fieri, et omne quod non vult fieri nequaquam fit. Non ita autem est de signis, quia præcepti Deus multis ea, quæ non faciunt, et prohibet quæ non cavent, et consulit quæ non implet." This distinction was perhaps in the minds of the framers of

the last sentence of the seventeenth Article of our Church.]
² [De Orthod. Fide, lib. ii. c. 29. t. i. p. 190. ed. Le Quien. *χρηὴ δὲ εἶδέναι, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς προηγουμένως θέλει πάντα σωθῆναι, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ κολάσαι ἐπλασεν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀγαθὸς· ἀμαρτάνοντας δὲ θέλει κολάζεσθαι, ὡς δίκαιος. Λέγεται οὖν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, προηγουμένον θέλημα, καὶ εὐδοκία, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄν· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον, ἐπίμενον θέλημα, καὶ παραχώρησις, ἐξ ἡμετέρας αἰτίας· καὶ αὕτη διττὴ· ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ, καὶ παιδευτικὴ πρὸς σωτηρίαν, ἡ δὲ ἀπογνωστικὴ πρὸς τελείαν κόλασιν. Comp. E. P. V. xlix. 3.]*

³ Ezech. xviii. [23, 32.]
⁴ De Incar. et Gra. c. 16.
["Legalis quoque auditus non so-

Christ, the law doth more heavily condemn being known, than unknown: because by how much the ignorance of sin is made less, by so much his guiltiness that sinneth is greater. And St. Paul's own doctrine is¹, that the law, severed from Christ, doth but only aggravate sin. God being desirous of all men's salvation, according to his own principal or natural inclination, hath in token thereof for their sakes whom he loved, bestowed his beloved Son. The selfsame affection was in Christ himself, to whom the wicked at the day of their last doom will never dare to allege for their own excuse, That he which offered himself as a sacrifice to redeem some, did exclude the rest, and so made the way of their salvation impossible. He paid a ransom for the whole world; on him the iniquities of all were laid; and, as St. Peter plainly witnesseth, he bought them which deny him, and which perish because they deny him². As in very truth, whether we respect the power and sufficiency of the price given; or the spreading of that infection, for remedy whereof the same was necessary; or the largeness of his desire which gave it; we have no reason but to acknowledge with joy and comfort, that he tasted death for all men: as the Apostle to the Hebrews noteth³. Nor do I think that any wound did ever strike his sacred heart more deeply, than the foresight of men's ingratitude, by infinite numbers of whom that which cost him so dear would so little be regarded; and that made to so few effectual through contempt, which he of tender compassion in largeness of love had provided to be a medicine sufficient for all. As therefore the gospel itself, which Christ hath commanded to preach unto all creatures, is an apparent effect of his general care and providence: so Christ, the principal matter therein contained and taught, must needs likewise have been instituted by the selfsame general providence to serve for a most sufficient remedy for the sin of mankind, although to ordain in whom particularly it shall be forceable *and effectual be an act of special or personal providence.*

[34.] But if God would have all men saved, and if Christ through such his grace have died for all men, wherefore are they not all saved? God's principal desire touching man's happiness is not always satisfied. It is on all sides confest, that his will in this kind oftentimes

"lum neminem de potestate tenebrarum eripuit, quin etiam peccatoribus cumulum prævaricationis adjecit. Sine gratia quippe fidei gravius lex agnita quam ignorata condemnat. Ubi quantum ignorantia peccati minuitur, tantum reatus peccatoris augetur." p. 240.

ed. Raynaud. 1633.]

¹ 1 Tim. 4. [10.] Servator omnium ma- (sic) [maxime creditum?]

² John vi.; Esai. liii.; 1 John ii.; 2 Cor. v.; 2 Pet. ii. 1.

³ Heb. ii. 9.

succeedeth not; the cause whereof is a personal impediment making particular men uneable [uncapable?] of that good which the will of his general providence did ordain for mankind. So that from God, as it were by a secondary kind of will, there groweth now destruction and death, although otherwise the will of his voluntary inclination towards man would effect the contrary. For the which cause the Wise Man directly teacheth, that death is not a thing which God hath made or devised with intent to have so many thousands eternally therein devoured: that condemnation is not the end wherefore God did create any man, although it be an event or consequent which man's unrighteousness causeth God to decree. The decree of condemnation is an act of hatred; the cause of hatred in God is not his own inclination thereunto: for his nature is, to hate nothing which he hath made; therefore the cause of this affection towards man must needs be in man some quality whereof God is himself no author. The decree of condemnation is an act of divine justice. Justice doth not purpose punishment for an end, and faults as means to attain that end: for so it should be a just thing to desire that men might be unjust: but justice always presupposing sin which it loveth not, decreeth punishment as a consequent wherein it taketh otherwise no pleasure. Finally, if death be decreed as a punishment, the very nature of punishment we know is such as implieth faultiness going before; without which we must give unto it some other name, but a punishment it cannot be. So that the nature of God's goodness, the nature of justice, and the nature of death itself, are all opposite to their opinion, if any will be of opinion, that God hath eternally decreed condemnation without the foresight of sin as a cause. The place of Judas was *locus suus*, a place of his own proper procurement. Devils were not ordained of God for hell-fire, but hell-fire for them; and for men, so far forth as it was foreseen, that men would be like them. There are speeches in Scripture, where we read of Christ himself laid in Sion as a stone to stumble at, and a rock to make men fall: of the wicked *created to the day of wrath, fashioned to destruction, fore-ordained to condemnation.* But the words are ambiguous. For inasmuch as *ends* and *events* have this common, that they are the last thing which befalleth, therefore the same phrase of speech doth usually serve in both. But our understanding must distinguish where the one is meant, and not the other. Where we say that man is born to die, we mean that death is the event of his birth. When we teach that Christ died to redeem the world, we mean that the end of his death was redemption. The determination of God therefore touching re-

BOOK V. Appendix I. [35.]
 probates, is of Damascen¹ termed aptly enough a consequent will, forasmuch as it presupposeth in man a just and deserved cause leading him who is most holy thereunto.

[35.] There is not in this life any cross or calamity, be it never so short, but when we suffer it at the hands of God, his own most sacred will directeth us unto sin as the very root out of which originally it groweth: and because we are sinful, therefore the burden under which we groan, we impute to none but to ourselves only. Now if all the miseries, plagues, and torments of the whole world could be laid upon one back and th . . . [that to endure?] as long as a million of worlds, should he be able (one succeeding another) to continue: what were this unto those torments, which, when they have worn out that time oftener doubled and multiplied than any number can comprehend, are not one jot nearer to an end, than they were when they first begun, but are still to endure even as long as there is in heaven a God of power to extend them further? And shall we think that to these torments he hath for the only manifestation of his power adjudged by an eternal decree the greatest part of the very noblest of all his creatures, without any respect of sin foreseen in them? Lord, thou art just and severe, but not cruel. And seeing all the ancient Fathers of the Church of Christ have evermore with uniform consent agreed, that reprobation presupposeth foreseen sin, as a most just cause whereupon it groundeth itself: sin at the least original in them whose portion of eternal punishment is easiest, as they that suffer but the only loss of the joys of heaven: sin of several degrees in them whose plagues accordingly by the same act of reprobation were proportioned: let us not in this case of all other remove the limits and bounds which our fathers before us have set.

But seeing all unrighteousness is of its own nature offensive to God, and in that whole mass which containeth, together with Satan and his retinue, Adam and Adam's natural posterity without exception of any one, we find from the first to the last none in whom there is not unrighteousness, either actual, or at the least original; shall we therefore conclude that death and condemnation are even as largely decreed as sin is itself spread? Behold mercy hath found a way how to triumph over justice, love how to bury the cause of hatred, grace how to save that which unrighteousness would destroy. There is an act of God's most favourable determination, which the Apostle usually termeth *the good pleasure of Almighty God*, by

¹ [Ubi supra.] the margin of the MS. But to what
² [This reference stands here in book it relates does not appear.]

which good pleasure the first chosen to eternal life is *Christ Jesus, for his own worthiness' sake*; with and under him the elect angels which had no spot nor blemish foreseen; in and through him no small number of men also, taken out of the flames of that general combustion, to be made vessels of his honour, partakers of his felicity and bliss, inheritors of his indefeasible glory; angels elect in Christ the Lord, men in Christ the physician of the world, the decree of God being ever as certain touching the very least of these, as it is of the angels themselves, yea of Christ Jesus, if he, they, and we, be all elect before the foundations of the world were laid, and the election of all three an act of God's unchangeable will.

[36.] When Pelagius, to the utter overthrow of soundness in Christian belief, had denied that man is born in original sin, and taught that every man hath in himself power to accomplish his own salvation by himself, or at least to merit what help soever besides he should need to receive at the hands of God: St. Augustin, to repress so intolerable insolency, pride, and presumption against God, was drawn by degrees from the consideration of that which man doeth by way of duty towards God, to the contemplation of that which God did by way of secret decree and purpose concerning man before the foundations of the world were laid. *For whereas Pelagius did make merit the cause of grace, St. Augustin derived graces from the well-spring of God's eternal predestination.* His opinion was, *at the first*¹, that God foreseeing who would believe and who would not, did for their belief's sake choose the one sort, and reject the other for their incredibility [sic]: that unto them whose belief he foresaw, the grace of well doing was also fore-ordained; the rest, forsaken, left, and given over to be hardened in their own impiety; that faith was the cause of all men's election, the Spirit of sanctification, bestowed on the elect, to the end they might bring forth the fruit of good works, and obtain the reward of eternal life. But the error of Pelagius, after examined, gave him occasion to *retract this sentence*², which maketh faith to prevent grace, and the election of

¹ [Proposit. ex Epist. ad Rom. Expos. § 62. sup. c. ix. 19. "Sic respondet (Apostolus) ut intelligamus, . . . patere posse prima merita fidei et impietatis, quomodo Deus præsciens eligat credituros et damnet incredulos; nec illos ex operibus eligens, nec istos ex operibus damnans; sed illorum fidei præstans ut bene operentur, et istorum impietatem obdurans deservendo ut male operentur." Ibid. § 60. sup. c. ix. 11-13. "Non ergo elegit Deus opera cujusquam in præscientia, quæ ipse daturus est; sed fidem elegit in præscientia; ut quem sibi crediturum esse præscivit, ipsum elegerit cui Spiritum Sanctum daret, ut bona operando etiam vitam æternam consequeretur." t. iii. pars 2. 918, 916. comp. Epist. Hilar. § 3. ap. S. Aug. t. x. 786.]
² [Retract. i. c. 23. 2, 3. t. i. 34.]

God to follow upon the foresight of our virtue. His latter judgment therefore was, that the whole body of mankind, in the view of God's eternal knowledge, lay universally polluted with sin, worthy of condemnation and death: that over the mass of corruption there passed two acts of the will of God: an act of favour, liberality, and grace, choosing part to be made partakers of everlasting glory; and an act of justice, forsaking the rest, and adjudging them to endless perdition, these vessels of wrath, those of mercy, which mercy is to God's elect so peculiar, that to them and to none else (for their number is definitely known, and can neither be increast nor diminished) to them it alloteth immortality and all things thereunto appertaining; them it predestinateth, it calleth, justifieth, glorifieth them, it poureth voluntarily that spirit into their hearts, which spirit so given is the root of their very first desires and motions, tending to immortality: as for others, on whom such grace is not bestowed, there is justly assigned, and immutably to every of them, the lot of eternal condemnation¹.

[37.] The first publication of these things, never before descended into, troubled exceedingly the minds of many². For a time they rested silent, as if some thunder from heaven had astonisht them, till at the length a part of the clergy of Marseilles in France, and when the ice was once broken, sundry others begun to doubt³, both *that grace* and that *predestination*, which St. Augustin the glory of those times had delivered. Their *scruple touching grace*, was, whether God bestow his Spirit before it be askt, laboured and sought for, or else after⁴: 2. *touching predestination*, whether certain be absolutely ordained unto life, or every man living capable thereof, and no man's predestination so necessary but that he may perish, neglecting the means whereby salvation must be attained, and may neglect the means if he will⁵. Prosper, at that time a man of very good account in France; and Hilary, whose learning was no whit less,

De Prædestin. Sanct. c. iii. t. x. 793.]

¹ [Vide (int. al.) De Nat. et Grat. c. 5. t. x. 129 G. Contr. Julian. v. c. 6. p. 636 C. De Corrept. et Grat. c. xiii. p. 772 B. et c. vii. p. 757.]

² [Among the rest, the monastery of Adrumetum was especially disturbed, which gave occasion to the treatise *de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, and to that *de Correptione et Gratia*. See the correspondence of St. Augustin with Valentinus, t. ii. 791-9.]

³ [See the letters of Prosper and Hilary to S. Aug. t. x. 779-787.]

⁴ [Prosper. ap. Aug. x. 782. See hereafter, p. 581. note 5.]

⁵ [Ibid. 786. "Præscientiam, et prædestinationem, vel propositum, ad id valere contendunt, ut eos præscierit, vel prædestinaverit, vel proposuerit, eligere, qui fuerant credituri . . . Nolunt autem ita . . . perseverantiam prædicari, ut non vel suppliciter emereri vel amitti contumaciter possit." It appears from Prosper's letter, that many of the objectors to absolute predestination did not share the scruple about preventing grace. See § 3, 4.]

his authority and place in the Church greater¹, both devoted to St. Augustin: the one², persuaded of the opinion, but not sufficiently instructed to defend it, the other loath³ to dissent, yet fearful also to be over hastily carried; these sent into Africa their letters most effectually and largely written, omitting no part of that respect which St. Augustin's dignity and quality did well deserve; neither concealing from him what questions and doubts had grown upon his former writings. For their own satisfaction they desired to learn how they might soundly maintain, that grace doth begin, continue, and finish the work of man's salvation, without taking away that natural freedom⁴, whereby we know the will unconstrainedly always worketh. 2. Again, which way it should be safest to deliver the doctrine of immutable *predestination* both to glory and to grace; that neither the Fathers might be rejected, with whom his former did more agree⁵, than his latter opinion, nor yet exhortations to godliness and virtue be the less regarded⁶, as things unnecessary

¹ [He being Bishop of Arles: although the Benedictine editor doubts their identity.]

² [Prosper, ubi sup. § 7. "Possumus quidem ad non credendum esse constantes, sed ad auctoritatem talia sentientium non sumus pares."]

³ [Hil. ubi sup. § 10. "Nolo sanctitas tua sic me arbitretur hæc scribere, quasi de iis quæ nunc edidisti ego dubitem." . . . § 9. "Tuæ sanctæ prudentiæ est dispicere quid facto opus sit, ut talium et tantorum superetur vel temperetur intentio." Prosper, § 9, intimates that Hilary (if it were the same Hilary) was among the number of the objectors.]

⁴ [Prosper, ubi sup. § 8. "Digneris aperire. . . . quomodo per istam præoperantem et cooperantem gratiam liberum non impediatur arbitrium."]

⁵ [Id. ibid. "Illud etiam qualiter diiuatur, quæsumus, patienter insipientiam nostram ferendo, demonestres, quod retractatis priorum de hac re opinionibus, pene omnium par invenitur et una sententia, qua propositum et prædestinationem Dei secundum præscientiam receperant; ut ob hoc Deus alios vasa honoris, alios contumeliæ

"fecerit, quia finem uniuscujusque præviderit, et sub ipso gratiæ adjutorio qua futurus esset voluntate et actione præciverit." Hil. Ep. ad. Aug. § 8. "Parvulorum causam ad exemplum majorum non patiuntur adferri. Quam et tuam sanctitatem dicunt eatenus adtigisse, ut incertum esse volueris, ac potius de eorum pœnis malueris dubitari. . . Hoc etiam de aliorum libris, quorum est in Ecclesia auctoritas, faciunt, quod perspicit sanctitas tua non parum posse juvare contradictores, nisi majora, aut certe vel paria proferrantur a nobis."]

⁶ [Prosp. ubi sup. "Quemadmodum per hanc præordinationem propositi Dei, quo fideles fiunt qui præordinati sunt ad vitam æternam, nemo eorum qui cohortandi sunt impediatur, nec occasionem negligentiam habeant, si se prædestinatos esse desperent." Hil. ubi sup. § 5. "Asserunt in utilem exhortandi consuetudinem, si nihil in homine remansisse dicatur, quod correptione valeat excitare. . . . Si sic prædestinati sunt, inquit, ad utramque partem, ut de aliis ad alios nullus possit accedere, quo pertinet tanta extrinsecus correptionis instantia?"]