

BOOK V. Appendix I. [14.]  
 ἔστι προνοίας ὄθεν, ὡς πρόνοια τῆς ἐκάστου φύσεως σωστικῆ, τῶν αὐτοκινήτων ὡς αὐτοκινήτων προνοεῖ, καὶ τῶν ὄλων καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον οἰκειῶς ὄλη καὶ ἐκάστῳ, καθ' ὅσον ἡ τῶν προνοουμένων φύσις ἐπιδέχεται τὰς τῆς ὄλης καὶ παντοδαπῆς προνοίας ἐκιδιδόμενας ἀναλόγως ἐκάστῳ προνοητικὰς ἀγαθότητας. Dionys. pag. 338. De Div. Nomin. c. iv. § 33. [Paris. 1562.]

In sum, the grace of God hath abundantly sufficient for all. We are by it that we are, and at the length by it we shall be that we would. What we have, and what we shall have, is the fruit of his goodness, and not a thing which we can claim by right or title of our own worth. All that we can do to him cometh far behind the sum of that we owe; all we have from him is mere bounty. And seeing all that we of ourselves can do, is not only nothing, but naught; let him alone have the glory, by whose only grace, we have our whole ability and power of well-doing.

*Natura et Numerus Sacramentorum.*

[14.] A *Sacrament* is generally in true religion every admirable thing which divine authority hath taught God's Church, either to believe or observe, as comprehending somewhat not otherwise understood than by faith: only<sup>1</sup> in a word *Sacraments* are God's secrets, discovered to none but his own people. The name being used for the most part with the<sup>2</sup> ancient thus at large, doth notwithstanding

<sup>1</sup> [The sense seems to shew that the Dublin MS. has here a wrong stop; and that it should stand "by faith only: in a word"]  
<sup>2</sup> Tertull. lib. v. contra Marc. [c. i. "Hæc figurarum sacramenta." (he is speaking of certain historical allegories which he finds in the Old Testament:) and, c. iv. he says of the history of Hagar, "allegoriæ habere sacramentum."] August. cont. advers. Legis et Proph. lib. i. [c. 24. (speaking of S. John vi. 54, 56.) "verbis sacramento congruis pascens animam credentem."] et de Gen. ad lit. lib. viii. cap. 4, et 5. ["Erat in lignis cæteris alimentum, in illo autem sacramentum."] "Pottuisse autem per lignum, i. e. per corpoream creaturam tanquam sacramento quodam significari sapientiam in paradiso corporali, ille credendum non existimat, qui vel tam multa in scripturis rerum spiritalium corporalia sacramenta non videt, vel hominem primum cum ejusmodi aliquo sacramento vivere non debuisse contendit," &c.] Contra Faust. lib. xix. c. 14. ["Antiqui justi, qui sacramentis illis intelligebant venturam prænuntiari revelationem fidei."] De peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. ii. c. 26. ["Non unius modi est sanctificatio: nam et catechumenos secundum quendam modum suum per signum Christi et orationem manus impositionis puto sanctificari; et quod accipiunt, quamvis non sit corpus Christi, sanctum est tamen, et sanctius quam cibi quibus alimur, quoniam sacramentum est."] De Symb. ad Catech. lib. iv. c. 1. ["Omnia sacramenta quæ acta sunt et aguntur in vobis per ministerium servorum Dei, exorcismis, orationibus, canticis spiritalibus, insufflationibus, cilicio, inclinatione cervicium, humilitate pedum," &c.]

with some restraint of signification oftentimes in their writings likewise note those visible signs only which in the exercise of religion God requireth every man to receive, as tokens of that saving grace which himself thereby bestoweth. It is therefore required to the nature of a *sacrament* in this sense, First, that it be a perpetual duty in religion; and of a *Christian Sacrament*, that it be proper to Christian Religion: Secondly, that Christ be author thereof: Thirdly, that all men be bound to receive it: Fourthly, that it have a promise from God for the effect of some saving grace to be thereby wrought in the person of the receiver: Fifthly, that there be in it a visible sign, both betokening the grace wrought, and the death of our Saviour Christ, to us the fountain of all grace: Lastly, that all these things concerning it be apparent in holy Scripture, because they are supernatural truths which cannot otherwise be demonstrated.

[15.] True definitions are gathered by that which men consider in things particular; a man defined by that which is seen to be in all men, together with that which only men, and no other have in them. Wherefore because in *Baptism* and in the *Eucharist* only, as much as hath been before declared is most manifest, what should forbid us to make the name of a *Sacrament*, as St. Augustine<sup>1</sup> doth, by way of special excellency proper and peculiar to these two, when<sup>2</sup> the Fathers note the paucity of<sup>3</sup> *Christian* in comparison of *Jewish Sacraments*, when they teach that our<sup>4</sup> *Sacraments* have flowed out of the side of Christ, from whence only water and blood issued, which are resembled and represented, the one in *Baptism*, the other in the *Supper* of our Lord, it should seem by this they confined their opinion touching the number of holy sacraments, with stricter limits sometime than the Church of Rome liketh. Which therefore hath broken

<sup>1</sup> August. de Doctr. Christ. lib. iii. c. 9. ["Posteaquam resurrectione Domini nostri manifestissimum indicium nostræ libertatis illuxit, nec eorum quidem signorum, quæ jam intelligimus, operatione gravi onerati sumus; sed quædam pauca pro multis, eademque factu facillima, et intellectu augustissima, et observatione castissima ipse Dominus et apostolica tradidit disciplina; sicut est Baptismi sacramentum, et celebratione corporis et sanguinis Domini."] <sup>2</sup> [two? When] <sup>3</sup> August. Epist. 118. [al. 54. t. ii. 124. "Tenere te volo, quod est hujus disputationis caput, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, sicut ipse in Evangelio loquitur, leni jugo suo nos subdidisse et sarcinæ levi: unde sacramentis numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, significatione præstantissimis, societatem novi populi colligavit, sicut est Baptismus Trinitatis nomine consecratus, communicatio corporis et sanguinis ipsius, et si quid aliud in Scripturis canonicis commendatur."] <sup>4</sup> August. in Evangel. Johan. Tract. 15. [c. 8. "De latere in cruce pendentis lancea percusso sacramenta Ecclesiæ proflexerunt."]

down those narrow pales, and made the *territory* of *Sacraments* more ample by extending the same to divers exercises moe, wherein it is not possible to prove, either that force or that necessity which in the other two is evident of itself. Yet would we not stand with them about the use of words howsoever, were it not, that by labouring to bring all unto one measure, they attribute to divers rites and ceremonies surely more than the truth can bear, by means whereof there are brought into Christian faith many intricate strifes and questions wherewith the better days of the Church were never troubled. For having made so many *sacraments*, it is strange to see how extremely they toil, and what pains they take, to frame every supposed *Sacrament* unto the general rules, which they give concerning all: wherein their dexterity and edge of wit is many times exceeding fine, but in this argument still accompanied with this error, that they speak without book, they tie not their understanding to that which they evidently learn from God, but what he delivereth in terms, framable unto different expositions, they so construe as themselves list, they wrest antiquity to the bolstering of their own construction and sentence, what things their wits can imagine possible, and draw out any thing wherewith to colour them, the same they stiffly maintain as true: they urge them as doctrines of Christian belief; if any of their own vary from them, they [have?] plaisters in a readiness to salve the matter; but for us to make question or doubt thereof, is always held a damnable *heresy*. Such is their partial affection, even in matters of faith, where nothing but the fear of God and conscience ought to sway.

[16.] Touching *Sacraments*, whether many or few in number, their doctrine is, that *ours both signify and cause grace*: but what grace, and in what manner? By grace we always understand, as the word of God teacheth, first, his favour and undeserved mercy towards us: secondly, the bestowing of his Holy Spirit which inwardly worketh: thirdly, the effects of that Spirit whatsoever, but especially saving virtues, such as are *faith*, *charity*, and *hope*; lastly, the free and full remission of all our sins. This is the grace which *Sacraments* yield, and whereby we are all justified. To be justified, is to be made righteous. Because therefore, righteousness doth imply first remission of sins; and secondly a sanctified life, the name is sometime applied severally to the former, sometimes jointly it comprehendeth both. The general cause which hath procured our remission of sins is the blood of *Christ*, therefore in his blood we are justified, that is to say cleared and acquitted from all sin. The condition required in us for our personal qualification hereunto is faith. Sin, both *original*

and *actual*, committed before belief in the promise of salvation through *Jesus Christ*, is through the mere mercy of God taken away from them which believe, justified they are, and that not in reward of their good, but through the pardon of their evil works. For albeit they have disobeyed God, yet our Saviour's death and obedience performed in their behalf doth redound to them, by believing it they make the benefit thereof to become their own. So that this only thing is imputed unto them for righteousness, because to remission of sins there is nothing else required. *Remission of sins* is grace, because it is God's own free gift; faith, which qualifieth our minds to receive it is also grace, because it is an effect of his gracious Spirit in us; we are therefore justified by faith without works, by grace without merit. Neither is it, as Bellarmine<sup>1</sup> imagineth, a thing impossible, that we should attribute any justifying grace to *Sacraments*, except we first renounce the doctrine of *justification* by faith only. To the imputation of Christ's death for remission of sins, we teach faith alone necessary: wherein it is not our meaning, to separate thereby faith from any other quality or duty, which God requireth to be matched therewith, but from faith to seclude in justification the fellowship of worth through precedent works as the Apostle St. *Paul* doth.

For in *Children* God exacteth but baptism unto remission of sin: in converts from infidelity, both faith and penitency before baptism: and for remission of sins actual after baptism, penitency in all men as well as faith. Nor doth any faith justify, but that wherewith there is joined both hope and love. Yet justified we are by faith alone, because there is neither *Jew* nor *Gentile*, neither *martyr* nor *saint*, no man whose works in whole or in part clear can make him righteous in God's sight. Now between the grace of this first justification, and the glory of the world to come, whereof we are not capable, unless the rest of our lives be qualified with the righteousness of a second justification consisting in good works, therefore as St. *Paul* doth dispute for faith without works to the first, so St. James to the second justification is urgent for works with faith. To be justified so far as remission of sins, it sufficeth if we believe what another hath wrought for us: but whosoever will see God face to face, let him shew his faith by his works, demonstrate his first justification by a second as *Abraham* did: for in this verse *Abraham was justified* (that is to say, his life was sanctified) by works.

[17.] The Schoolmen which follow *Thomas*, do not only comprise in the name of justifying grace, the favour of God, his Spirit and [an?]

<sup>1</sup> [De Justificatione, lib. i. 16.]

BOOK V. effect of that favour, and saving virtues the effects of his Spirit, but  
 Appendix I. over and besides these three a fourth kind of formal habit or inherent  
 [18.] quality which maketh the person of man acceptable, perfecteth the  
 substance of his mind, and causeth the virtuous actions thereof to be  
 meritorious. This grace they will have to be the principal effects of  
*Sacraments*, a grace which neither Christ nor any Apostle of Christ  
 did ever mention. The Fathers have it not in their writings, although  
 they often speak of *Sacraments* and of the grace we receive by them.  
 Yea they which have found it out are as doubtful as any other what  
 name and nature they should give unto it: besides inasmuch as what-  
 soever doth belong to our spiritual perfection on earth, the same is  
 complete in that grace which was first mentioned; their new *scholas-  
 tical* invention must needs be vain and unnecessary. Let it there-  
 fore suffice us to receive *Sacraments* as sure pledges of God's favour,  
 signs infallible, that the hand of his saving mercy doth thereby reach  
 forth itself towards us, sending the influence of his Spirit into men's  
 hearts, which maketh them like to a rich soil, fertile with all kind of  
 heavenly virtues, purgeth, justifieth, restoreth the very dead unto  
 life, yea raiseth even from the bottomless pit to place in thrones of  
 everlasting joy.

Modus quo [18.] They pretend that to *Sacraments* we ascribe no efficacy, but  
 Sacramenta conferunt Gratiam. make them bare signs of instruction or admonition; which is utterly  
 false. For *Sacraments* with us are signs effectual: they are the instru-  
 ments of God, whereby to bestow grace; howbeit grace not proceed-  
 ing from the visible sign, but from his invisible power. "God by  
 "*Sacraments* giveth grace:" (saith Bernard<sup>1</sup>): "even as honors and  
 "dignities are given, an Abbot made by receiving a staff, a Doctor  
 "by a book, a Bishop by a ring;" because he that giveth these pre-  
 eminences declareth by such signs his meaning, nor doth the receiver  
 take the same, but with effect; for which cause he is said to have  
 the one by the other: albeit that which is bestowed proceed wholly  
 from the will of the giver, and not from the *efficacy* of the sign.

They, to derive grace in *Sacraments* from the very sign itself as a  
 true coefficient with God, are so wrapped about with clouds and mists  
 of darkness, that neither other men's wits can follow, nor theirs lead  
 to any manifest and plain issue. It was offensive to the elder School-

<sup>1</sup> [In Cœna Domini Serm. ii. t. i. "bas per baculum, episcopus per  
 187. Paris 1586. "Sicut in exte-  
 "rioribus diversa sunt signa, &c. . .  
 "variae sunt investituræ secundum  
 "ea de quibus investitur: v. g. in-  
 "vestitur canonicus per librum, ab-  
 "baculum et annulum simul; sicut  
 "inquam in hujusmodi rebus est,  
 "sic et divisiones gratiarum diversis  
 "sunt traditæ sacramentis."]

men<sup>1</sup> that the Master of Sentences defined<sup>2</sup> *Sacraments* of the new  
 law, to be signs which cause grace. Thomas, in defence of the  
 Master, declared after what sort they are causes of grace, namely by  
 producing a preparative quality in the soul, but what quality he could  
 not tell, only his opinion was, that something doth ensue from God  
 himself, creating the same. Which sentence of Thomas very few  
 have allowed, but they are neither few, nor meanly accounted of, that  
 have oppugned him in that point. Wherefore even they which at  
 this present pretend his name, are yet of another mind than he was  
 concerning *Sacraments*: inasmuch as they hold the very elements  
 and words for causes which immediately produce grace by being  
 moved with the hand of God till an effect infinite degrees above them  
 in excellency proceed from them. The motion of God is, as they  
 themselves expound it, an application of the sign together with the  
 charge and commandment given it, to convey an intimation of his  
 will to the soul, which presently thereupon conceiveth and bringeth  
 forth grace, through that obedience which all creatures yield to God's  
 word, when they once hear it. An explication more obscure than  
 the thing itself which they would explain; and all because they affect  
 metaphors, where nothing but exact propriety of speech can plainly  
 instruct.

"Aqua in Baptismo ut applicata et mota a Deo per ministrum,  
 "non solum lotionem corporis attingit, sed etiam ipsam ablutionem  
 "animæ et gratiæ productionem . . . In quo non partem operatur  
 "Deus, et aliam partem sacramentum, sed ut fit in actionibus natu-  
 "ralibus, ut quando sol et homo generant hominem totum hoc et  
 "totum ille uno atque individuo opere peragunt . . . Aqua a Spiritu  
 "Sancto mota habet eandem potentiam quam ipse Spiritus Sanctus,  
 "respectu animarum nostrarum." Allen: de Sacram. in gen. cap. 35.  
 "Sacramenta sunt causæ efficientes, etiam physicæ, sed instrumen-  
 "tales; virtus autem divinitus indita non est aliqua nova qualitas  
 "inhærens, sed solum motus sive usus Dei . . . Motio illa qua Deus  
 "moveret sacramenta, est sola applicatio sacramenti ad opus . . . Educi-  
 "tur autem gratia de potentia animæ non naturali, sed obedientiali . . .  
 "qua potest in ea fieri et ex ea produci quicquid Deus vult." Bellarm.  
 de Sacram. in gen. lib. ii. cap. 11. (in substance.) [De Controv. t. iii.  
 p. 180 C. D. 182 D. 183 C.] "Virtus Sacramentorum non est aliud  
 "quam usus seu motus quo per ministrum recte et ex institutione divina

<sup>1</sup> [Vid. Scot. ad 1 Sentent. dist. i. "mentum proprie dicitur quod ita  
 quæst. iv. et v. ed. Wading. t. viii. "signum est gratiæ Dei et invisibi-  
 p. 78, &c.] "lis gratiæ forma, ut ipsius imagi-  
 "nem gerat et causa existat."]

<sup>2</sup> [Lib. iv. dist. i. c. 1. "Sacra-

BOOK V.  
Appendix I.  
[19.]

“fungentem suo munere adhibentur et usurpantur a Deo principali agente ad producendum illum effectum qui est gratia.” Greg. de Valent. in 3 part. Thom. disp. 3. de Sacram. in gen. qu. 3. puncto 1. [t. iv. p. 507 C. Venet. 1600.] “Sacramentum comproducit gratiam quia intimat imperium Dei . . . Huic enim instrumento, vicem Dei tenenti, et denuntianti imperium efficax Dei, obedit subjecta creatura ut transmutetur, sicut Pro-Regi obediunt cives tanquam ipsi Regi . . . Imperium Dei, quod per scriptum aut instrumentum assumptum intimat, est simul causa physica et efficax. Omnis enim creatura etiam inanimata censetur audire et sentire imperium Dei . . . Sic in creatione Deus per imperium produxit res, in Evangelio imperavit Christus ventis ac mari . . . Atque ita Baptismum comproducere gratiam nihil aliud videtur, quam gratiam educi de potentia hominis obedientis imperio Baptismi.” Henric. Summ. lib. i. cap. 17. [p. 43, 44. Ven. 1596.] Were they not as good to say briefly that God’s omnipotent will causeth grace, that the outward sign doth shew his will, and that *Sacraments* implying both are thereby termed both signs and causes, which is the selfsame that we say? Their motions and intimations to make signs in themselves seem causes do amount to no more in very deed than that they are signs. And as we understand not how, so neither can they express in what manner they should be more.

*The Tenth Article<sup>1</sup> touching Predestination.*

[19.] To make up your first decade of Articles, you cast yourself headlong into a gulf of bottomless depth, God’s unsearchable purpose, his eternal predestination and will; moved as you pretend thereunto by words of mine concerning a general inclination in God towards all men’s safety, and yet an occasioned determination of the contrary to some men’s everlasting perdition and woe. Wherein how strange your proceedings are, I willingly forbear to lay open before you, till it be first made manifest touching man’s eternal condition of life and death not only that there is in the will of God that very difference which you in no wise can digest, but further also how the same distinction doth as a ground sustain and pass as a strong principle throughout all the parts of that doctrine, which delivereth rightly the predestination of Saints: whereinto because you compel me to enter, I may not in a cause of so great moment spare any requisite labour and pain: but, God’s most gracious Spirit assisting me, declare to the uttermost of my slender and poor skill what I think is true.

<sup>1</sup> [See Chr. Letter, p. 15.]BOOK V.  
Appendix I.  
[20.]

To begin therefore with that foundation which must here be laid, forasmuch as the nature of the matter in question is contingent, neither can be understood as it ought unless we foreconceive the difference between things contingent, and such as come necessarily to pass; let it be first of all considered what the truth is in this point.

[20.] We have not for the course of this world any one more infallible rule, than that besides the highest cause wherein all dependeth, there are inferior causes, from which, since the first creation, all things (*miraculous events* excepted) have had their being. The nature of which inferior causes is exprest in the nature of their effects: for if the cause be uniform and constant in operation, the effects of that cause are found always like themselves: if it be variable, they alter and change. And by this we are led to distinguish things necessary from contingent, respecting how diversly they issue from their true immediate peculiar and proper causes<sup>1</sup>

Of which causes we have perfect sensible experience, we know and see in what sort they work; and we are thereby out of doubt that all things come not necessarily to pass, but those effects are necessary which can be no other than they are, by reason that their next and nearest causes have but one only way of working; from which as it is not in their power to swerve, so they are not subject to any impediment by opposition, nor unto change by addition of any thing which may befall them more at one time than at another, nor to defect by losing any such habilitie or complement as serveth to further them in that they do.

On the other side, those contingent, which in regard of the very principal inferior causes whereupon they depend, are not always certain; inasmuch as the causes whereof they come, may divers ways vary in their operation. Things aptest to suffer are always least certain in that they do. Again, whatsoever hath any thing contrary unto itself, the same, when it meeteth therewith, is evermore subject to suffering, and so in doing consequently hindered. For the more subject that causes are to impediment or let, the further their effects are off from the nature of things necessary. And apparent it is, that some things do bring forth perpetually the same effects; whereby it appeareth they are never hindered; some things, the

<sup>1</sup> Φανερόν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐτ’ ἔστιν οὐτε γίνεται. Aristot. de Interpr. c. 9. [t. i. 60. ed. Duval.] Τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχει ἀναγκαῖον φάμεν ἔχειν οὕτως. Μεταφυσ. lib. v. c. 5. [t. iv. 324.] Συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται, ὃ ὑπάρχει μὲν τι καὶ ἀληθὲς εἶπεν οὐ μόνον οὐτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐτε ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Lib. i. de Cœlo, c. 12. [t. i. 635.] Metaphys. lib. v. c. 30. [t. iv. 345.]

I. The  
difference  
between  
things con-  
tingent and  
necessary.

same effects commonly, yet not always. Some things do that at one time or other, which they never or very seldom do again: some things at all times are equally uncertain what their issue or event will be till they come to pass. In which variety of *contingents*, that which altereth not often differeth but little from that which possibly cannot alter. The greatest part of things in this world have a mixture of causes necessary with contingent; so that where both kinds concur unto any one effect, the effect doth follow the weaker side and is contingent; inasmuch as the nature of every effect is according to the nature of those causes totally presupposed which do give it being; and therefore if the causes be in part *contingent*, the effect through their uncertainty is likewise made doubtful. Whereupon some, considering how far this mixed contingency of causes reacheth, have imagined all things in the world to be casual: others on the contrary part, because they evidently see how unvariable and uniform the principal causes of all things are, deny that any thing is subject to such indefinite contingency as we imagine. But most manifest it is, that some causes, in regard of those effects which follow from them, have *δύναμιν ἀντιφάσεως*, a possibility to produce or not produce the same. And whatsoever doth in that sort issue from any cause, it is in relation thereunto contingent. So that contingency and necessity of events do import a different kind or manner of operation in the causes out of which they spring.

[21.] The motion of the sun is a necessary effect of the sun, because it is not in the power and possibility of the sun to move or not to move. But the walking of *Socrates* is a thing which either might be, or not, therefore this effect is contingent. In like manner, for living creatures to be endued with sense, and for men to have the faculty of reason, is necessary; it is a thing which proceedeth originally from that disposition of causes in the bosom of nature, which disposition changeth not: and therefore it no where falleth out that we find a living creature without sense, or a man, and the faculty of reason wanting. Contrariwise, to be learned or virtuous, because some men have attained and not all, it appeareth that these two qualities in man proceed from no natural or necessary cause, they are contingent, and do happen only. Things necessary have definite and set causes; whereas the causes of things contingent are indefinite. The future effects of causes contingent are only *τὰ μέλλοντα*, things not present, and such as either may be, or not till the time that they come to pass: but of necessary causes the future effects are *τὰ ἐσομένα*, such as must be.

[22.] To be, and not to be, are terms of contradiction which never

fall together into one and the same thing: but where the one of them taketh place, the other utterly is excluded. Things no way subject to not being are therefore necessary; and things altogether incapable of being are impossible: contingent those things, which sith they may as well be, as not be, are consequently neither necessary nor impossible, of an indifferent constitution between both: for during the time while as yet they are not, it is but possible that they shall be; when once they are, their not being is then impossible. It being therefore presupposed that things which before were but possible, are now actually fallen out, they are by virtue of this supposal become necessary, as far as concerneth the bare and naked act of their being, which is irrevocable, howsoever the manner of their efficiency were contingent, and such as might have before been hindered from taking effect. So that apparently we see how those things which only are possible beforehand, and only casual at the time when they come to pass, do for the time forward so long as they shall endure, continue necessary, not absolutely necessary, yet necessary by virtue of this supposal, that they have attained actual being. For where the one term of contradiction taketh place, that there the other should take place at the same time, is a thing impossible. The being therefore of all things that actually are is necessary, because then of their not being there is no possibility; unless we should grant that one and the same thing may together be and not be. Whereupon it followeth, that when contingents are said to have *δύναμιν ἀντιφάσεως*, a possibility unto either term of contradiction, this only is true while they yet remain in that indefinite power of causes out of which they may either grow or not grow. Again, it followeth that to things casual two properties are incident; the one, that while as yet they are future, no wit of man can either determinately affirm or deny they shall be: the other, that being made once actual, they are then so necessary, that God himself cannot possibly cause them not to have been. And it thirdly followeth, that whereas contingency is especially considered between effects and efficient causes; which causes efficient are either natural or voluntary agents: natural, if in them there be no power to stay or refrain their own actions; voluntary, if they be lords and masters of that they do: the effects of the one are contingent only by means of external concurrents with them, not in all times and places alike: the effects of the other, both that way contingent, and also in regard of the very perfection which is incident into the nature of those agents, and implieth as it were a kind of authority and power to take which part itself listeth in a contradic-