with some restraint of signification oftentimes in their writings likewise note those visible signs only which in the exercise of religion God requireth every man to receive, as tokens of that saving grace which himself thereby bestoweth. It is therefore required to the nature of a sacrament in this sense, First, that it be a perpetual duty in religion; and of a Christian Sacrament, that it be proper to Christian Religion: Secondly, that Christ be author thereof: Thirdly, that all men be bound to receive it: Fourthly, that it have a promise from God for the effect of some saving grace to be thereby wrought in the person of the receiver: Fifthly, that there be in it a visible sign, both tockenning the grace wrought, and the death of our Saviour Christ, to us the foun of all grace: Lastly, that all these things concerning it be apparent in holy Scripture, because they are supernatural truths which cannot otherwise be demonstrated.

[15.] True definitions are gathered by that which men consider in things particular; a man defined by that which is seen to be in all men, together with that which only men, and no other have in them. Wherefore because in Baptism and in the Eucharist only, as much as hath been before declared is most manifest, what should forbid us to make the name of a sacrament, as St. Augustine doth, by way of special excellency proper and peculiar to these two, when the Fathers note the paucity of Christian in comparison of Jewish Sacraments, when they teach that our Sacraments have flowed out of the side of Christ, from whence only water and blood issued, which are resembled and represented, the one in Baptism, the other in the Supper of our Lord, it should seem by this they confined their opinion touching the number of holy sacraments, with stricter limits sometime than the Church of Rome liketh. Which therefore hath broken

1 August, de Doctr. Christ. lib. iii. c. 9. ["Posteaquem resurrectio tione Domini nostri manifestissimum indicium nostris: libertatis illuit, nec eorum quidem signum, quo jam intelligimus operationem facilitatis mis, significatione praeantissimam societatem novi populi colligavit, sicut est Baptistismi Trinitatis nostro nomine consecratus, communicato corporis et sanguinis Dominii."]
2 [two? When]
3 August, Epist. 118. [al. 54. t. ii. 124. Tenere te volo, quod est hujus disputationis caput, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, sicut ipse in Evangelio locutur, lenienti suo nos subdidi et salutare.
4 August. in Evangel. Johan. Tract. 15. [c. 8. "De laterre in cruce pendentis lancia perccus sacramento Ecclesiae profuxerunt."]
down those narrow pales, and made the territory of Sacraments more ample by extending the same to divers exercises men, wherein it is not possible to prove, either that force or that necessity which in the other two is evident of itself. Yet would we not stand with them about the use of words however; were it not, that by labouring to bring all unto one measure, they attribute to divers rites and ceremonies surely more than the truth can bear, by means whereof there are brought into Christian faith many intricate strifes and questions wherewith the better days of the Church were never troubled. For having made so many sacraments, it is strange to see how extremely they toil, and what pains they take, to frame every supposed Sacrament unto the general rules, which they give concerning all: wherein their dexterity and edge of wit is many times exceeding fine, but in this argument still accompanied with this error, that they speak without book, they tie not their understanding to that which they evidently learn from God, but what he delivereth in terms, framable unto different expositions, they so construe as themselves list, they wrest antiquity to the bolstering of their own construction and sentence, what things their wits can imagine possible, and draw out any thing wherewith to colour them, the same they stiffly maintain as true: they urge them as doctrines of Christian belief; if any of their own vary from them, they [have?] plaisters in a readiness to salve the matter; but for us to make question or doubt thereof, is always held a damnable heresy. Such is their partial affection, even in matters of faith, where nothing but the fear of God and conscience ought to sway.

[16.] Touching Sacraments, whether many or few in number, their doctrine is, that ours both signify and cause grace: but what grace, and in what manner? By grace we always understand, as the word of God teacheth, first, his favour and undeserved mercy towards us: secondly, the bestowing of his Holy Spirit which inwardly worketh: thirdly, the effects of that Spirit whatsoever, but especially saving virtues, such as are faith, charity, and hope; lastly, the free and full remission of all our sins. This is the grace which Sacraments yield, and whereby we are all justified. To be justified, is to be made righteous. Because therefore, righteousness doth imply first remission of sins; and secondly a sanctified life, the name is sometime applied severally to the former, sometimes jointly it comprehendeth both. The general cause whereof hath procured our remission of sins is the blood of Christ, therefore in his blood we are justified, that is to say cleared and acquitted from all sin. The condition required in us for our personal qualification hereunto is faith. Sin, both original and actual, committed before belief in the promise of salvation through Jesus Christ, is through the mere mercy of God taken away from them which believe, justified they are, and that not in reward of their good, but through the pardon of their evil works. For albeit they have disobeyed God, yet our Saviour's death and obedience performed in their behalf doth redound to them, by believing it they make the benefit thereof to become their own. So that this only thing is imputed unto them for righteousness, because to remission of sins there is nothing else required. Remission of sins is grace, because it is God's own free gift; faith, which qualifieth our minds to receive it is also grace, because it is an effect of his gracious Spirit in us; we are therefore justified by faith without works, by grace without merit. Neither is it, as Bellarmine¹ imagineth, a thing impossible, that we should attribute any justifying grace to Sacraments, except we first renounce the doctrine of justification by faith only. To the imputation of Christ's death for remission of sins, we teach faith alone necessary: wherein it is not our meaning, to separate thereby faith from any other quality or duty, which God requireth to be matched therewith, but from faith to conclude in justification the fellowship of worth through precedent works as the Apostle St. Paul doth.

For in Children God exacteth but baptism unto remission of sin: in converts from infidelity, both faith and penitency before baptism: and for remission of sins actual after baptism, penitency in all men as well as faith. Nor doth any faith justify, but that wherewith there is joined both hope and love. Yet justified we are by faith alone, because there is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither martyr nor saint, no man whose works in whole or in part clear can make him righteous in God's sight. Now between the grace of this first justification, and the glory of the world to come, wherof we are not capable, unless the rest of our lives be qualified with the righteousness of a second justification consisting in good works, therefore as St. Paul doth dispute for faith without works to the first, so St. James to the second justification is urgent for works with faith. To be justified so far as remission of sins, it sufficeth if we believe what another hath wrought for us: but whosoever will see God face to face, let him shew his faith by his works, demonstrate his first justification by a second as Abraham did: for in this verse Abraham was justified (that is to say, his life was sanctified) by works.

[17.] The Schoolmen which follow Thomas, do not only comprise in the name of justifying grace, the favour of God, his Spirit and [an?]

¹ [De Justificatione, lib. i. 16.]
effect of that favour, and saving virtues the effects of his Spirit, but over and besides these three a fourth kind of formal habit or inherent quality which maketh the person of man acceptable, perfecteth the substance of his mind, and causeth the virtuous actions thereof to be meritorious. This grace they will have to be the principal effects of Sacraments, a grace which neither Christ nor any Apostle of Christ did ever mention. The Fathers have it not in their writings, although they often speak of Sacraments and of the grace we receive by them. Ye they which have found it out are as doubtful as any other what name and nature they should give unto it: besides inasmuch as whatsoever doth belong to our spiritual perfection on earth, the same is complete in that grace which was first mentioned; their new scholastic invention must needs be vain and unnecessary. Let it therefore suffice us to receive Sacraments as sure pledges of God's favour, signs infallible, that the hand of his saving mercy doth thereby reach forth itself towards us, sending the influence of his Spirit into men's hearts, which maketh them like to a rich soil, fertile with all kind of heavenly virtues, purgeth, justifieth, resoreth the very dead unto life, yea raiseth even from the bottomless pit to place in thrones of everlasting joy.

[18.] They pretend that to Sacraments we ascribe no efficacy, but make them bare signs of instruction or admonition; which is utterly false. For Sacraments with us are signs effectual: they are the instruments of God, whereby to bestow grace: howbeit grace not proceeding from the visible sign, but from his invisible power. *God by "Sacraments giveth grace:"* (saith Bernard) "even as honors and dignities are given, an Abbot made by receiving a staff, a Doctor by a book, a Bishop by a ring;" because he that giveth these preminences declareth by such signs his meaning, nor doth the receiver take the same, but with effect; for which cause he is said to have the one by the other: albeit that which is bestowed proceed wholly from the will of the giver, and not from the efficacy of the sign.

They, to derive grace in Sacraments from the very sign itself as a true coefficient with God, are so wrapped about with clouds and mists of darkness, that neither other men's wits can follow, nor theirs lead to any manifest and plain issue. It was offensive to the elder Schoolmen that the Master of Sentences defined Sacraments of the new law, to be signs which cause grace. Thomas, in defence of the Master, declared after what sort they are causes of grace, namely by producing a preparative quality in the soul, but what quality he could not tell, only his opinion was, that something doth ensue from God himself, creating the same. Which sentence of Thomas very few have allowed, but they are neither few, nor meanly accounted of, that have oppugned him in that point. Wherefore even they which at this present pretend his name, are yet of another mind than he was concerning Sacraments: inasmuch as they hold the very elements and words for causes which immediately produce grace by being moved with the hand of God till an effect infinite degrees above them in excellency proceed from them. The motion of God is, as they themselves expound it, an application of the sign together with the charge and commandment given it, to convey an intimation of his will to the soul, which presently thereupon conceiveth and bringeth forth grace, through that obedience which all creatures yield to God's word, when they once hear it. An explication more obscure than the thing itself which they would explain; and all because they affect metaphors, where nothing but exact propriety of speech can plainly instruct.

> *Aqua in Baptismo ut applicata et mota a Deo per ministrum, non solum lotionem corporis attingit, sed etiam ipsam ablationem animae et gratiae productionem.... In quo non partem operatur Deus, et aliam partem sacramentum, sed ut fit in actionibus naturalibus, ut quando sol et homo generant hominem totum hoc et tumult ille uno atque individuo operae peragunt... Aqua a Spiritu Sancto habet eandem potentiam quam ipse Spiritus Sanctus, respectu animarum nostrarum.*

Allen: de Sacram. in gen. cap. 35: Sacramenta sunt causae efficientes, etiam physicae, sed instrumentales; virtus autem divinitus indita non est aliqua nova qualitas in heres, sed solum motus sive usus Dei.... Motio illa qua Deus movet sacramenta, est sola applicatio sacramenti ad opus... Educitur autem gratia de potentia animae non naturali, sed obsequentiali... qua potest in ea fieri et ex ea produci quicquid Deus vult.*

bellachs. de Sacram. in gen. lib. ii. cap. 11. (in substance.) [De Controv. t. iii. p. 180 C.D. 182 D. 183 C.] "Virtus Sacramentorum non est altud quam usus seu motus quo per ministrum recte et ex insitutione divina

1 [In Cena Domini Serm. ii. t. i. 187. Paris 1586. *Sicut in exteriore diversa sunt signa, &c... variae sunt inventione secundum ea de quibus investitum; v. g. in vestitum canonicum per librum, abbas per baculum, episcopus per baculum et annulum simul; sicut in quam in hujusmodi rebus est, shall be translated as: "bas per baculum, episcopus per baculum et annulum simul; sicut in quam in hujusmodi rebus est, sic et divisiones gratiarum diversis sunt traditae sacramentis."]
556 A Difference in God's Will implied in Predestination.

BOOK V.  Appendix I.  [19.]

"fungentem suo munere adhibentur et usurpantur a Deo principali agente ad producendum illum effectum qui est gratia." Greg. de Valenti, in 3 part. Thom. disp. 3. de Sacram. in gen. qu. 3. puncto 1. [t. iv. p. 507 C. Venet. 1600.]

"Sacramentum comprocut gratiam quia intimat imperium Dei... Huic enim instrumento, vicem Dei tenenti, et denuntianti imperium efficiæ Dei, obedit subjecta creatura ut transmutetur, sicut Pro-Regi obedienti cives tanquam ipsi Regii... Imperium Dei, quod per scriptum aut instrumentum assumptum intimat, est simul causa physica et efficax. Omnis enim creatura etiam inanimata censetur audire et sentire imperium Dei... Sic in creatione Deus per imperium producit res, in Evangelio imperavit Christus ventis ac mari... Atque ita Baptismum comproducere gratiam nihil aliud videtur, quam gratiam educi de potentia hominis obedientis imperio Baptismi." Henric. Summ. lib. i. cap. 17. [p. 43, 44. Ven. 1596.]

Were they not as good to say briefly that God's omnipotent will causeth grace, that the outward sign doth shew his will, and that Sacraments implying both are thereby termed both signs and causes, which is the selfsame that we say? Their motions and intimations to make signs in themselves seem causes do amount to no more in very deed than that they are signs. And as we understand not how, so neither can they express in what manner they should be more.

The Tenth Article touching Predestination.

[19.] To make up your first decade of Articles, you cast yourself headlong into a gulf of bottomless depth, God's unsearchable purpose, his eternal predestination and will; moved as you pretend thereunto by words of mine concerning a general inclination in God towards all men's safety, and yet an occasioned determination of the contrary to some men's everlasting perdition and woe. Wherein how strange your proceedings are, I willingly forbear to lay open before you, till it be first made manifest touching man's eternal condition of life and death not only that there is in the will of God that very difference which you in no wise can digest, but further also how the same distinction doth as a ground sustain and pass as a strong principle throughout all the parts of that doctrine, which delivereth rightly the predestination of Saints: whereinto because you compel me to enter, I may not in a cause of so great moment spare any requisite labour and pain: but, God's most gracious Spirit assisting me, declare to the uttermost of my slender and poor skill what I think is true.

Differences of Things necessary and contingent. 557

To begin therefore with that foundation which must here be laid, forasmuch as the nature of the matter in question is contingent, neither can be understood as it ought unless we foreconceive the difference between things contingent, and such as come necessarily to pass; let it be first of all considered what the truth is in this point.

[20.] We have not for the course of this world any one more infallible rule, than that besides the highest cause wherein all dependeth, there are inferior causes, from which, since the first creation, things all things (miracular events excepted) have had their being. The nature of which inferior causes is express in the nature of their effects: for if the cause be uniform and constant in operation, the effects of that cause are found always like themselves; if it be variable, they alter and change. And by this we are led to distinguish things necessary from contingent, respecting how diversly they issue from their true immediate peculiar and proper causes.

Of which causes we have perfect sensible experience, we know and see in what sort they work; and we are thereby out of doubt that all things come not necessarily to pass, but those effects are necessary which can be no other than they are, by reason that their next and nearest causes have but one only way of working; from which as it is not in their power to swerve, so they are not subject to any impediment by opposition, nor unto change by addition of any thing which may befall them more at one time than at another, nor to defect by losing any such habilitie or complement as serveth to further them in that they do.

On the other side, those contingent, which in regard of the very principal inferior causes whereupon they depend, are not always certain; inasmuch as the causes whereof they come, may divers ways vary in their operation. Things aptest to suffer are always least certain in that they do. Again, whatsoever hath any thing contrary unto itself, the same, when it meeteth therewith, is evermore subject to suffering, and so in doing consequently hindered. For the more subject that causes are to impediment or let, the further their effects are oft from the nature of things necessary. And apparent it is, that some things do bring forth perpetually the same effects; whereby it appeareth they are never hindered; some things, the

1 [See Chr. Letter, p. :5.]
same effects commonly, yet not always. Some things do that at one time or other, which they never or very seldom do again: some things at all times are equally uncertain what their issue or event will be till they come to pass. In which variety of contingents, that which altereth not often differeth but little from that which possibly cannot alter. The greatest part of things in this world have a mixture of causes necessary with contingent; so that where both kinds concur unto any one effect, the effect doth follow the weaker side and is contingent; insomuch as the nature of every effect is according to the nature of those causes totally presupposed which do give it being; and therefore if the causes be in part contingent, the effect through their uncertainty is likewise made doubtful. Whereupon some, considering how far this mixed contingency of causes reacheth, have imagined all things in the world to be casual: others on the contrary part, because they evidently see how variable and uniform the principal causes of all things are, deny that any thing is subject to such indefinite contingency as we imagine. But most manifest it is, that some causes, in regard of those effects which follow from them, have δύο μέρες ἀντιφάσεις, a possibility to produce or not produce the same. And whatsoever doth in that sort issue from any cause, it is in relation thereunto contingent. So that contingency and necessity of events do import a different kind or manner of operation in the causes out of which they spring.

[21.] The motion of the sun is a necessary effect of the sun, because it is not in the power and possibility of the sun to move or not to move. But the walking of Socrates is a thing which either might be, or not, therefore this effect is contingent. In like manner, for living creatures to be ended with sense, and for men to have the faculty of reason, is necessary; it is a thing which proceedeth originally from that disposition of causes in the bosom of nature, which disposition changeth not: and therefore it no where falleth out that we find a living creature without sense, or a man, and the faculty of reason wanting. Contrariwise, to be learned or virtuous, because some men have attained and not all, it appeareth that these two qualities in man proceed from no natural or necessary cause, they are contingent, and do happen only. Things necessary have definite and set causes; whereas the causes of things contingent are indefinite. The future effects of causes contingent are only τὰ μὴ-
λογικά, things not present, and such as either: may be, or not till the time that they come to pass; but of necessary causes the future effects are τὰ ἐφαρμοῦ, such as must be.

[22.] To be, and not to be, are terms of contradiction which never fall together into one and the same thing: but where the one of them taketh place, the other utterly is excluded. Things no way subject to not being are therefore necessary; and things altogether incapable of being are impossible: contingent those things, which sith they may as well be, as not be, are consequently neither necessary nor impossible, of an indifferent constitution between both: for during the time while as yet they are not, it is but possible that they shall be; when once they are, their not being is then impossible. It being therefore presupposed that things which before were but possible, are now actually fallen out, they are by virtue of this supposal become necessary, as far as concerneth the bare and naked act of their being, which is irrevocable, howsoever the manner of their efficiency were contingent, and such as might have before been hindered from taking effect. So that apparently we see how those things which only are possible beforehand, and only casual at the time when they come to pass, do for the time forward so long as they shall endure, continue necessary, not absolutely necessary, yet necessary by virtue of this supposal, that they have attained actual being. For where the one term of contradiction taketh place, that there the other should take place at the same time, is a thing impossible. The being therefore of all things that actually are is necessary, because then of their not being there is no possibility; unless we should grant that one and the same thing may together be and not be. Whereupon it followeth, that when contingents are said to have δύο μέρες ἀντιφάσεις, a possibility unto either term of contradiction, this only is true while they yet remain in that indefinite power of causes out of which they may either grow or not grow. Again, it followeth that to things casual two properties are incident; the one, that while as yet they are future, no wit of man can either determinately affirm or deny they shall be: the other, that being made once actual, they are then so necessary, that God himself cannot possibly cause them not to have been. And it thirdly followeth, that whereas contingency is especially considered between effects and efficient causes; which causes efficient are either natural or voluntary agents: natural, if in them there be no power to stay or refrain their own actions; voluntary, if they be lords and masters of that they do: the effects of the one are contingent only by means of external concurrents with them, not in all times and places alike: the effects of the other, both that way contingent, and also in regard of the very perfection which is incident into the nature of those agents, and implieth as it were a kind of authority and power to take which part itself listeth in a contradic-