

that thereby we, which cannot move ourselves, may be drawn, but amiably drawn. If the grace of God did enforce men to goodness, nothing would be more unpleasant unto man than virtue: whereas contrariwise, there is nothing so full of joy and consolation as the conscience of well-doing. It delighteth us, that God hath been so merciful unto us as to draw us unto himself, and ourselves so happy, as not to be obstinately bent to the way of our own destruction. Yet what man should ever approach unto God, if his grace did no otherwise draw our minds than Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians¹ imagined? They knew no grace but external only, which grace inviteth, but draweth not: neither are we by inward grace carried up into heaven, the force of reason and will being cast into a dead sleep. Our experience teacheth us, that we never do any thing well, but with deliberate advice and choice, such as painfully setteth the powers of our minds on work: which thing I note in regard of *Libertines* and *Enthusiasts*, who err as much on the one hand, by making man little more than a block, as *Pelagians* on the other, by making him almost a god² in the work of his own salvation.

[3.] In all such sentences as that which St. John's Revelation hath, *I stand at the door and knock*, the *Pelagian's* manner of construction, was, that *to knock* is the free external offer of God's grace; *to open*, is the work of natural will by itself, accepting grace and so procuring or deserving whatsoever followeth. But the *Catholic exposition* of that and all such sentences was, that *to stand and knock* is indeed a work of outward grace, but *to open* cometh not from man's will without the inward illumination of grace; whereupon afterwards ensueth continual augmentation thereof; not because the first concurrence of the will itself with grace, much less without, doth deserve additions after following; but because it is the nature of God's most bountiful disposition to build forward where his foundation is once laid. The only thing that Catholic Fathers did blame, was the error of them who ascribed any laudable motion or virtuous desire tending towards heavenly things *to the naked liberty of man's will*³, *the grace of God being severed from it.*

¹ "Quid est attrahere, nisi prædicare, nisi Scripturarum consolationibus excitare, increpationibus detertere, desideranda proponere, intendere metuenda, iudicium comminari, præmium polliceri?" Faust. de lib. Arbitr. lib. i. c. 17. [in Bibl. Patr. Paris. 1610. t. iv. p. 822.]

² [So Lord Bacon; "deaster quidam." Medit. Sacræ, de Hæres. Works, x. 329. Lond. 1803. But see also Davison on Prophecy, p. 478. ed. 1824.]

³ "Nudæ libertati arbitrii remota Dei gratia." Prosp. con. Colla. c. 8. [ad calc. Cassian. ed. Atrebatii

[4.] In a word therefore, the manner of God's operation through grace is, by making heavenly mysteries plain to the dark understanding of man, and by adding motive efficacy unto that which there presenteth itself as the object of man's will. *Howbeit, many things which the Scripture hath concerning grace will remain obscure, unless we also consider with what proportion it worketh. That which was spoken to the Apostle St. Paul did not belong unto him only, but to every communicant of grace.* "My grace," saith Christ, "is sufficient for thee¹." Grace, excluding possibility to sin, was neither given unto angels in their first creation, nor to man before his fall; but reserved for both till God be seen face to face in the state of glory, which state shall make it then impossible for us to sin, who now sin often, notwithstanding grace, because the providence of God bestoweth not in this present life grace so nearly illustrating goodness, that the will should have no power to decline from it. Grace is not therefore here given in that measure which taketh away possibility of sinning, and so effectually moveth the will, as that it cannot.

[5.] "Behold," saith *Moses*, "I have set before you good and evil, life and death²." Now when men are deceived and choose evil instead of good, where shall we say the defect resteth? May we plead in our own defence, that God hath not laid the way of life plain enough to be found, or that good things are so lapped up within clouds, that we have no possible means whereby to discern their goodness? Who seeth not how vain, and unto God himself how injurious, it were, thus to shift off from ourselves the blame of sin³, and to cast it where it hath no place? We cannot therefore

(Arras) 1628, p. 889. The passage objected to in Cassian is, "In his omnibus et gratia Dei et libertas nostri declaratur arbitrii; et quia etiam suis interdum motibus homo ad virtutum appetitus possit extendi, semper vero a Domino indigeat adjuvari." Prosper answers, "Et ubi est, quod regulari definitione præmissum est, Non solum actuum, verum etiam cogitationum bonarum a Deo esse principium, qui et incipit quæ bona sunt et exsequitur et consummat in nobis? Ecce hic etiamsi bonis cœptis necessarium Dei fateris auxilium, ipsos tamen laudabiles motus appetitusque virtutum, remota gratia Dei, nudæ libertati adscribis ar-

"bitrii: ut boni salubresque conatus nequeant quidem proficere nisi Deus adjuvet; possint tamen, etiamsi non a Deo inspirentur, incipere."

¹ [2 Cor. xii. 9.]

² [Deut. xxx. 15.]

³ "Vide rationes quibus peccatores seducti delinquant," Philo Jud. p. 109. [πάντα γὰρ, τὸ τοῦ λόγου δὴ τοῦτο, κινουσι λίθον, φάσκοντες, οὐκ οἰκία ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα; διὰ τί οὖν οἰκίας, ὡς μὴ γένοιτο ἐρείπιος, οὐκ ἐπιμελησόμεθα; οὐκ ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ ὄτα καὶ ὁ τῶν ἄλλων χορὸς αἰσθήσεων ὥσπερ ψυχῆς δοροφόροι καὶ φίλοι; συμμαχους οὖν καὶ φίλους οὐκ ἐν ἴσφ τιμητέον ἐαντοῖς; ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ ἀπολαύσεις, καὶ τὰς παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον

in defence of evil plead *obscurity* of that which is good. *For there is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough whereby to manifest itself, if reason were diligent to search it out*¹. So that our ignorance we must impute to our own slough [sic]: we suffer the gifts of God to rust, and but use our reason as an instrument of iniquity: our wits we bend not towards that which should do us good: yea oftentimes the cause of our error is, for that we study to deceive ourselves. *Wisdom is easily seen of them that love her, and found of such as seek after her: she preventeth them, and strives rather to offer herself, than to answer their desires: whoso waketh unto her betimes, shall sustain no tedious labour; whoso watcheth for her, shall be soon without care.* Sap. vi. 12.

[6.] Is our reason then by diligence, although unassisted with God's grace, yet able of itself to find out whatsoever doth concern our good? Some things there are concerning our good, and yet known even amongst them to whom the saving grace of God is not known². But no saving knowledge possible, without the sanctifying spirit of God. You will have me tell you which way you should perceive by my writings that thus I think³: and I fear, that if I shew you the way you will not follow it: read them with the same mind you read Mr. Calvin's writings, bear yourself as impartial in the one as in the other: imagine him to speak that which I do: lay aside your unindifferent mind, change but your spectacles, and I assure myself that all will be clearly true: if he make difference,

τέρψεις, τοῖς τεθνεώσιν ἢ τοῖς μὴδὲ
γενομένοις τὸ παράπαν ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῖς
ζώσιν ἢ φύσιν ἐδημιούργει; . . . τοιου-
τοῦ τινα δόλιχον ἀπομυκνάντες λόγῳ,
νικᾶν τοὺς οὐκ εἰωθότας σοφιστεῖν
ἔδοξαν." "Causa cur tales rationes
"prævalent non est obscuritas sed
"imbecilitas naturæ." ib. [αἰτία δὲ
τῆς νικῆς, οὐκ ἡ τῶν περιγεγενημένων
ισχύς, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀντι-
πάλων ἀσθένεια.] Ib. "Causa imbe-
"cilitatis imperitia," p. 143. [ἀρ-
μόττει δὲ τοῖς πᾶσι, ἀρχομένοις,
προκόπτουσι, τετελειωμένοις, βιοῦν
ἀφιλονείκως, καὶ μὴ τῷ τῶν σοφιστῶν
ἐπαποδύεσθαι πολέμῳ. . . εἰ γὰρ εἰς
τοῦτον ἀφίξονται τὸν ἀγῶνα, πρὸς
ἐμπειροπολέμου ἰδιώται, παντελῶς
ἀλώσονται.] "Imperitiæ segnitia:
"offert n. sese sapientia volentibus
"eam acquirere: causa est segnitiae
"originalis corruptela: corruptelæ
"hujus medicina gratia."

¹ [See E. P. i. vii. 7.]

² "Vultis Deum ex animæ ipsius
"testimonio comprobemus, quæ li-
"cet carcere corporis pressa, licet
"institutionibus primis [pravis] cir-
"cumscripita, licet libidinibus et
"concupiscentiis evigorata, licet fal-
"sis diis exancillata, cum tamen
"resipiscit, ut ex crapula, ut ex
"somno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, et
"sanitatem suam patitur, et Deum
"&c. [et sanitatem suam patitur, et
"Deum nominat." Tertull. cont.
Gent. [c. 17. Compare the treatise
De Testimonio Animæ.]

³ [See Chr. Letter, p. 11. "Shew
"us . . . how your positions agree
"with our church and the Scrip-
"tures. If you say you understand
"reason and will helped by the grace
"of God, then tell us how we may
"perceive it by your writing, which
"putteth difference betwixt naturall
"and supernaturall truth and laws."

as all men do, which have in them his dexterity of judgment, between natural and *supernatural truth* and *laws*¹, I know that against him you will never thereupon infer, that he holdeth not the grace of God necessary unto the search of both, so far forth as they serve to our soul's everlasting good.

[7.] To find out *supernatural laws*, there is no natural way, because they have not their foundation or ground in the course of nature. Such was that law before Adam's fall, which required abstinence from the tree of knowledge touching good and evil. For by his reason he could not have found out this law, inasmuch as the only commandment of God did make it necessary, and not the necessity thereof procure it to be commanded, as in natural laws it doth. Of like nature are the mysteries of our redemption through the blood of Jesus Christ, which presupposeth the fall of Adam, and was in that respect instituted, nor would ever have been imagined by any wit of man or angel², had not God himself revealed the same to both. But concerning such laws and truths as have their ground in the course of nature, and are therefore termed by all men laws of nature, [they?] were necessary for Adam although he had kept, and are for us which have lost, the state of that first perfection, necessary also even in themselves. These truths and laws our first parents were created able perfectly both to have known and kept; which we can now neither fully attain without the grace of God assisting us in the search, nor at all observe availably to our salvation, except in the exercise thereof, both grace do aid, and mercy pardon our manifold imperfections. I cannot help it, good sir, if you in your angry mood will spurn at all these things, and reject them either as subtle, or as frivolous and idle matter. My meaning in them is sincere, and I thought them pertinent: to you it appeareth they seem otherwise: yet, till you be able to prove them erroneous, other defects may be forgiven if it please you: for you must think that yourself in all things cannot write to every man's contentment, though you write well.

[8.] But in the closing up of all, if it is your pleasure that I should declare, how this discourse may stand with St. Paul's meaning, where he saith that the *wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, because it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be*³: That which here you call a discourse⁴, is but two poor sentences⁵;

¹ [See his Institutions, i. 3.]

² [See Ephes. iii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 12.]

³ Rom. viii. 7.

⁴ [Ch. Letter, p. 11. "May we
"not suspect that your whole dis-
"course is subtle and cunning?"

And p. 12. "Shew us the true mean-
"ing of St. Paul, and how he fitteth
"your discourse in this place, namely
"when he saith, Rom. viii. 7, &c."]
⁵ [See E. P. i. vii. 6. "There is
"in the will of man naturally that

the one, shewing the nature of will in itself, without consideration had either of sin or of God's grace; the other, the evidence of goodness in itself, and the sluggishness of man's reason to search it out. We have therefore a will, the nature whereof is apt and capable as well to receive the good as the evil; but sin is fraudulent, and beguileth us with evil under the shew of good: sloth breeding carelessness, and our original corruption sloth in the power of reason, which should discern between the one and the other. On the contrary side let precedent grace be a spur to quicken reason, and grace subsequent, the hand to give it; then shall good things appear as they are, and the will, as it ought, incline towards them. The first grace shall put in us good desires, and the second shall bring them to good effect¹. Out of which principles, if I declare the reason of that which the Apostle saith, and shall deduct from thence his words by way of conclusion, your barely objected and no way manifested surmises of contradiction, thereunto will, I hope, give place.

[9.] That which moveth man's will, is the *object* or thing desired. That which causeth it to be desired, is either true or apparent goodness: the goodness of things desired is either manifest by sense, gathered by reason, or known by faith. Many things good to the judgment of sense, are in the eye of right reason abhorred as evil, in which case the voice of reason is the voice of God. So that they, who, being destitute of that spirit which should certify and give reason, follow the conduct of sensual direction, termed the *wisdom* of the flesh, must needs thereby fall into actions of plain hostility against God. Such wisdom neither is, nor can be, subject to his law, because perpetually the one condemneth what the other doth allow, according to that in the Book of Wisdom², *We fools thought the life of the just madness*. Again, as the wisdom of the flesh, man's corrupt understanding and will not enlightened nor reformed by God's spirit, is opposite and cannot submit itself unto his law, but followeth the judgment of sensuality, contrary to that which reason might learn by the light of the natural law of God: so in matters above the reach of reason, and beyond the compass of nature, where only faith is to judge by God's revealed law what is right or good, the wisdom of the flesh, severed and divided from

"freedom, whereby it is apt to take
"or refuse any particular object
"whatsoever being presented unto
"it." And vii. 7. "There is not that
"good which concerneth us, but it

"hath evidence enough for itself, if
"reason were diligent to search it
"out."

¹ [See Collect for Easter Day.]

² [V. 4.]

that spirit which converteth man's heart to the liking of God's truth, must needs be here as formal adversaries to him, and as far from subjection to his law as before. Yet in these cases not only the carnal and more brutish sort of men, but the wittiest, the greatest in account for secular and worldly wisdom, *Scribes, Philosophers, profound disputers*, are the chiefest in opposition against God: such in the *primitive Church* were *Julian, Lucian, Porphyry, Symmachus*¹, and other of the like note, by whom both the natural law of God was disobeyed, and the mysteries of supernatural truth derided.

I conclude therefore, the natural aptness of man's will to take or refuse things presented before it, and the evidence which good things have for themselves, if reason were diligent to search it out, may be soundly and safely taught without contradiction to any syllable in that confession of the Church, or in those sentences of holy Scripture by you alleged, concerning the actual disability of reason and will, through sin, whereas God's especial grace faileth.

[10.] And lest ignorance what I mean by the name of grace should put into your head some new suspicion, know that I do understand grace so as all the ancient Fathers did in their writings against *Pelagius*. For whereas the grace of Almighty God² signifieth either

¹ [See especially among his Epistles, lib. x. 54, the memorial addressed to Theodosius and Valentinian for the restoration of the altar of Victory. It may be read in St. Ambrose's works, t. ii. 828. ed. Bened. and St. Ambrose's answer, p. 833.]

² Vide Thomam, 1, 2. qu. 109, art. 2. "De Gratia. Deus respectu boni actus eliciendi a libero arbitrio potest infundere triplex auxilium. 1. Auxilium universale sicut causa prima influit in secundam, qui influxus modificatur in secunda causa secundum materiam causæ secundæ. Aliter enim recipitur in causa naturali, aliter in causa libera. In causa naturali sic influit, quod cooperatur ei determinate ad unum: causæ m. liberæ cooperatur ad opposita secundum quod ea sese determinat; quare hoc auxilium est necessarium in omni actu liberi arbitrii tam bono quam malo. 2. Auxilium speciale influit ad actum moraliter bonum, et est ne-

cessarium tempore corruptæ naturæ, propter declinationem causatam in viribus animæ, ex culpa originali, non autem erat necessarium in natura integra, propter tranquillitatem quæ erat in viribus animæ, ex justitia originali, unde tempore illo sufficiebat universale auxilium ad eliciendos bonos actus moraliter: Potentiæ motivæ actus in sano et infirmo. 3. Auxilium speciale supernaturale necessarium est ad eliciendum meritum et condignum fælicitate, vel potius si fuse loqui volumus, ad actum Deo acceptabilem et gratiosum inter quos principalis actus est credere, fides autem non per se tanquam qualitas, sed ratione objecti Christi. s. et ipsa redditur acceptabilis, et reddit alios actus omnes. Solus enim Christus meruit fælicitatem quam nos in ipso obtinemus ex gratuito favore Dei, non propter operum dignitatem. Remunerantur quidem opera, sed gratiose non propter ipsorum dignitatem. Cum

his undeserved love and favour; or his offered means of outward instruction and doctrine; or thirdly, that grace which worketh inwardly in men's hearts; the scholars of Pelagius denying original sin did likewise teach at the first, that in all men there is by nature ability to work out their own salvation. And although their profession soon after was, that without the grace of God, men can neither begin, proceed, nor continue in any good thing available unto eternal life, yet it was perceived that by grace they only meant those external incitements unto faith and godliness, which the Law, the Prophets, the Ministers, the works of God do offer; that is to say the second grace, whereby being provoked and stirred up, it is, as they supposed, in our own power to assent to seek after God, and to labour for that, which then in regard of such our willingness, God willingly doth bestow, so that partly holpen by his grace, but principally through the very defect ["desert" or "effect"?] of our own travail we obtain life.

[11.] Touching natural sufficiency without grace, Pelagius generally was withstood, and the necessity of that third kind of grace which moved the heart inwardly, they all maintained against Pelagius. Only in this, there were a number of the French especially, who went not so far, as to think with St. Augustine¹ that God would bestow his grace upon any, which did not first procure and obtain it by labour proceeding from that natural ability which yet remaineth in all men. Hilary therefore, informing St. Augustine what the French churches thought thereof, declareth² their steadfast belief

"sint enim in nobis duo principia agendi, Dei gratia et natura nostra, sapiunt actus nostri etiam optimi utrumque principium." [This note contains the substance, but not the words, of the place in Aquinas.]

¹ "Ex voluntate perversa facta est libido, et dum servitur libidini facta est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non resistitur facta est necessitas." August. Confess. [viii. 5.] "Quomodo habitus boni et mali necessitant voluntatem."

² [Inter Ep. Aug. t. ii. p. 825. "Consentiant omnem hominem in Adam periisse, nec inde quinquam posse proprio arbitrio liberari. Sed id conveniens asserunt veritati, vel congruum prædicationi, ut cum prostratis et nunquam suis viribus surrecturis annunciatum obtinendæ salutis occasio; eo me-

"rito quo voluerint et crediderint a suo morbo se posse sanari, et ipsius fidei augmentum et totius sanitatis suæ consequantur effectum. Quod enim dicitur, 'Crede et salvus eris,' unum hominum exigi asserunt, aliud offerri; ut propter id quod exigitur, si redditum fuerit, id quod offertur deinceps tribuatur. . . . Quod autem dicit sanctitas tua, neminem per severare, nisi perseverandi virtute percepta; hactenus accipiunt, ut quibus datur, inertes licet, præcedenti tamen proprio arbitrio tribuatur: quod ad hoc tantum liberum asserunt, ut velit vel nolit admittere medicinam. Cæterum et ipsi abominari se et damnare testantur, si quis quidquam virum in aliquo remansisse, quo ad sanitatem progredi possit existimet."]

to have been, that in Adam *all men were utterly lost*, and that to deliver them which never could have risen by their own power *the way of obtaining life is offered: that they which desire health, and believe that they may be cured, do thereby obtain augmentation of faith, and the whole effect of safety.* For in that it is said, "believe and live," the one of these is required at our hands, and the other so offered, that in lieu of our willingness, if we perform what God requireth, that which He offereth is afterwards bestowed. That freedom of will we have so far only, as thereby to be able without grace to accept the medicine which God doth offer. But, saith he, we *worthily abhor and condemn them which think that in any man there is remaining any spark of ability to proceed but the least step further than this, to the recovery of health.*

[12.] Now although they did well maintain that we cannot finish our salvation without the *assistance of inward grace*; yet because they held that of ourselves by assenting to grace externally first offered, we may begin and thereby obtain the grace which perfecteth our raw and insufficient beginnings, the French were herein as *Demipelagians* by St. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and sundry others gainsayed, at length also condemned by the Arausican Council¹, as the Council of Milevis² had before determined against that first opinion of Pelagius which the French themselves did condemn. So that the whole question of grace being grown amongst the ancient unto this issue, *whether man may without God seek God, and without grace either desire or accept grace first offered, the conclusion of the catholic part was No*, and therefore in all their writings, the point still urged is grace, *both working inwardly, and preventing the very first desires, or motions of man to goodness.* Which unless we every where diligently mark, there is no man but may be abused by the words whereby Pelagians and Demipelagians seem to magnify the grace of God, the one meaning only *external grace*, the other *internal*, but only to perfect that which our own good desires without grace have begun. The diviner sort of the heathens themselves saw, that their own more eminent perfections in knowledge, wisdom, valour, and other the like qualities, for which sundry of them were

¹ [Namely, the second council of Orange, held A. D. 529, at which Cæsarius of Arles presided: the occasion of it being the work of Faustus Regiensis, quoted above, p. 540. See Concil. iv. 1666.]

² [The second council of Milevis in Numidia, at which St. Augustin

assisted, who appears to have drawn up the canons there enacted: the eight first relate to the Pelagian controversy, and are armed with an anathema; which is not the case with those of Orange, mentioned above. Conc. ii. 1537. A. D. 416.]

had in singular admiration, did grow from more than the ordinary influence which that supreme cause instilleth into things beneath. No mervaille then in the school of Christ to hear from the mouth of a principal instructor, "*not I, but the grace of God which is with me.*" Now amongst the heathens, which had no books whereby to know God besides the volumes of heaven and earth, that small *vital odor* which (as Prosper noteth¹) breathed upon them to the end they might live, became notwithstanding the *odor* of death: so that even by those visible testimonies, it might be plainly perceived, *how the letter killeth where the Spirit quickeneth not.*

But of heathens what should we speak, sith the first grace saveth not the Church itself by virtue of the second without the third. Saving grace is the gift of the Holy Ghost, which lighteneth inwardly the minds, and inflameth inwardly the hearts of men, working in them that knowledge, approbation, and love of things divine, the fruit whereof is eternal life. In grace there is nothing of so great difficulty as to define after what manner and measure it worketh.

[13.] Thus of the three kinds of grace; the grace whereby God doth incline towards man, the grace of outward instruction, and the grace of inward sanctification, which two work man's inclination towards God, as the first is the well-spring of all good, and the second the instrument thereof to our good, so that which giveth effect to both in us, who have no cause at all to think ourselves worthy of either, is the gracious and blessed gift of his Holy Spirit. This is that baptism with heavenly fire, which both illuminateth and enflameth. This worketh in man that knowledge of God, and that love unto things divine, whereupon our eternal felicity ensueth. This is the grace which God³ hath given to restrain insatiable desires, to beat

¹ [De Voc. Gent. ii. 4. in Bibl. Patr. Colon. t. v. part. 3, p. 175. "Cælum ergo cunctaque cælestia, "mare et terra, omniaque quæ in "eis sunt, consono speciei suæ ordinationis que concentu protestantur gloriam Dei, et prædicatione perpetua majestatem sui loquebantur auctoris; et tamen "maximus numerus hominum, qui "(al. quia) vias voluntatis suæ ambulare permissus est, non intellexit, nec secutus hanc legem est, "et odor vitæ, qui spirabat ad vitam, "factus est ei odor mortis ad mortem; ut etiam in illis visibilibus "testimoniis discerneretur, quod *litera*

"*occideret, spiritus autem vivificaret.* Quod ergo in Israel per constitutionem legis et prophetica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in universis nationibus totius creaturæ testimonia et bonitatis Dei miracula semper egerunt."

² [This is apparently a reference to the Christian Letter, p. 11.]

³ Tertull. [Novatian] de Trinitate, [c. 29. "Hic est qui inexplebiles cupiditates coercet, immoderatas libidines frangit, illicitos ardores extinguit, flagrantem impetum vincit, ebrietates rejicit, avaritiam repellit, luxuriosas comessiones fugit; caritates nequit, affectiones

down those lusts, which can in no sort moderate themselves, to quench lawless fervours, to vanquish headstrong and unruly appetites, to cut off excess, to withstand avarice, to avoid riot, to join love, to strengthen the bonds of mutual affection, to banish sects, to make manifest the rule of truth, to silence heretics, to disgorge miscreants, and inviolably to observe the *Gospel of Jesus Christ.* "This grace" (saith Hilary¹) "*remaineth with us* till the world's end, it is the stay of our expectation, the things that are done by the gifts thereof are a pledge of our hope to come. This grace therefore we must desire, procure, and for ever entertain, with belief and observation of God's laws." For let the Spirit be never so prompt, if labour and exercise slacken, we fail. The fruits of the Spirit do not follow men, as the shadow doth the body, of their own accord. If the grace of sanctification did so work, what should the grace of exhortation need? It were even as superfluous and vain to stir men up unto good, as to request them when they walk abroad not to lose their shadows. Grace is not given us to abandon labour, but labour required lest our sluggishness should make the grace of God unprofitable. Shall we betake ourselves to our ease, and in that sort refer salvation to God's grace, as if we had nothing to do with it, because without it we can do nothing? *Pelagius* urged labour for the attainment of eternal life without necessity of God's grace: if we teach grace without necessity of man's labour, we use one error as a nail to drive out another. David, to shew that grace is needful, maketh his prayer unto God, saying, "²Set thou, O Lord, a watch before the door of my lips:" and to teach how needful our travail is to that end, he elsewhere useth exhortation, "³Refrain thou thy tongue from evil, and thy lips that they speak no guile." Solomon respecting the use of our labour giveth counsel, "⁴Keep thy heart with all the custody and care that may be." The Apostle, having an eye unto necessity of grace, prayeth, "⁵The Lord keep your hearts and understandings in Christ Jesus."

Διὸ καὶ τὸν εἰκαῖον τῶν πολλῶν οὐκ ἀποθεζόμεθα λόγον, οἱ χρεῖναι φασὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν καὶ ἀκόνας ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγεῖν, τὸ γὰρ φθεῖραι φύσιν οὐκ

"constringit, sectas repellit, regulam veritatis expedit, hæreticos revincit, improbos foras expulit, "evangelia custodit." ad calc. Tert. p. 742. ed. Pamel.]

¹ Hilary. de Trin. lib. 2^o. [in fine p. 807. "Hoc usque in consummationem sæculi nobiscum, hoc expectationis nostræ solatium, hoc

"in donorum operationibus futuræ spei pignus est, hoc mentium lumen, hic splendor animorum est. "Hic ergo Spiritus Sanctus expectendus est, promerendus est, et deinceps præceptorum fide atque observatione retinendus."]

² Ps. cxli.
⁴ Prov. iv.

³ Ps. xxxiv. 13.
⁵ Philipp. iv.