we grow to some ripeness of years, the soul of man doth only store itself with conceits of things of inferior and more open quality, which afterwards do serve as instruments unto that which is greater; in the meanwhile above the reach of meaner creatures it ascended not. When once it comprehended any thing above this, as the differences of time, affirmations, negations, and contradictions in speech, we then count it to have some use of natural reason. Whereunto if afterwards there might be added the right helps of true art and learning (which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor greatly regard), there would undoubtedly be almost as great difference in maturity of judgment between men therewith inured, and that which now men are, as between men that are now and innocents. Which speech if any condemn, as being over hyperbolical, let them consider but this one thing. No art is at the first finding out so perfect as industry may after make it. Yet the very first man that to any purpose knew the way we speak of and followed it, hath alone thereby performed more very near in all parts of natural knowledge, than sithence in any one part thereof the whole world besides hath done.

[4.] In the poverty of that other new devised aid two

things there are notwithstanding singular. Of marvellous quick despatch it is, and doth shew them that have it as much almost in three days, as if it dwell three scores years with them. Again, because the curiosity of man's wit doth many times with peril wade farther in the search of things than were convenient; the same is thereby restrained unto such generalities as every where offering themselves are apparent unto men of the weakest conceit that need be. So as following the rules and precepts thereof, we may define it to be, an Art which teacheth the way of speedy discourse, and restrainteth the mind of man that it may not wax over-wise.

[5.] Education and instruction are the means, the one by use, the other by precept, to make our natural faculty of reason both the better and the sooner able to judge rightly between truth and error, good and evil. But at what time a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those Laws, whereby he is then bound to guide his actions; this is a great deal more easy for common sense to discern, than for any man by skill and learning to determine; even as it is not in philosophers, who best know the nature both of fire and of gold, to teach what degree of the one will serve to purify the other, so well as the artisan, who doth this by fire, discerneth by sense when the fire hath that degree of heat which sufficeth for his purpose.

VII. By reason man attaineth unto the knowledge of things that are and are not sensible. It resteth therefore that we search how man attaineth unto the knowledge of such things unsensible as are to be known that they may be done. Seeing then that nothing can move unless there be a guide.

theory the following was Bacon's opinion: "De Unica Methodo, et "dichotomis perpetuis nihil attinet "dicere; fuit enim nubecula quaem "dam doctrinæ, que cito transit; "res simul et levis et scientis dam "hosissimæ. Etenim hujumodi "hominem, cum methodo sicut legi "bus res torqueat, et quæcumque "in dichotomias illas non apte ca "dunt, aut omittant, aut præter "naturam infectant, hoc efficiunt, "ut quasi nuclei, ipsi arida scientia "rum exsillant, ipsi arida scientia "et desertas siliquas stringent." Further on in the same chapter he "specifies Ramus as the patron of the "method alluded to. De Augm. "Sect. VI. 2. In his Impetus Phil "osophici, c. 2, he says, "Nullum "mihic commercium cum hoc igno "rantiae latibus, perniciosissima "literarum tinea, compendiorum "patre," &c. Works, IX. 304. "E. Lond. 1803. Andrew Melvin was a pupil of Ramus. Zouch's "Walton, II. 134.]
some end, the desire whereof provoketh unto motion; how should that divine power of the soul, that “spirit of our
“mind” as the apostle termeth it, ever stir itself unto action, unless it have also the like spur? The end for which we are moved to work, is sometimes the goodness which we conceive of the very working itself, without any further respect at all; and the cause that procureth action is the mere desire of action, no other good besides being thereby intended. Of certain turbulent wits it is said, “Illis quieta
“movere magna merces videbatur”; they thought the very disturbance of things established an hire sufficient to set
them on work. Sometimes that which we do is referred to a further end, without the desire whereof we would leave the same undone; as in their actions that gave alms to purchase thereby the praise of men.

[2.] Man in perfection of nature being made according to the likeness of his Maker resembleth him also in the manner of working: so that whatsoever we work as men, the same we do wittingly work and freely; neither are we according to the manner of natural agents any way so tied, but that it is in our power to leave the things we do undone. The good which either is gotten by doing, or which consisteth in the very doing itself, causeth not action, unless apprehending it as good we so like and desire it: that we do unto any such end, the same we choose and prefer before the leaving of it undone. Choice there is not, unless the thing which we take be so in our power that we might have refused and left it. If fire consume the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before another. And to will is to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding. And the light of that eye, is reason. So that two principal fountains there are of human action, Knowledge and Will; which Will, i.e. things tending towards any end, is termed Choice. Concerning Knowledge, “Be
“hold, (saith Moses) I have set before you this day good
“and evil, life and death.” Concerning Will, he addeth

1 Eph. iv. 23. 3 Sallust. [Cat. 21.] 4 Matt. vi. 2. 6 Deut. xxx. 19. 8 [See Arist. Eth. III. 2, 3. VI. 2.]

immediately, “Choose life;” that is to say, the things that
tend unto life, then choose.

[3.] But of one thing we must have special care, as being a matter of no small moment; and that is, how the Will, properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred unto the end that man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferior natural desire which we call Appetite. The object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of Will is that good which Reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and forms of Appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no: whereas actions which issue from the disposition of the Will are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, Appetite is the Will’s solicitor, and the Will is Appetite’s controller; what we covet according to the one by the other we often reject; neither is any other desire termed properly Will, but that where Reason and Understanding, or the show of Reason, prescribeth the thing desired.

It may be therefore a question, whether those operations of men are to be counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sensible provoketh Appetite, and Appetite causeth action, Reason being never called to counsel; as when we eat or drink, and betake ourselves unto rest, and such like. The truth is, that such actions in men having attained to the use of Reason are voluntary. For as the authority of higher powers hath force even in those things, which are done without their privity, and are of so mean reckoning that to acquaint them therewith it needeth not; in like sort, voluntarily we are said to do that also, which the Will if it listed might hinder from being done, although about the doing thereof we do not express use our reason or understanding, and so immediately apply our wills thereunto. In cases therefore of such facility, the Will doth yield her assent as it were with a kind of silence, by not dissenting; in which respect her force is not so apparent as in express mandates or prohibitions, especially upon advice and consultation going before.
Limits of voluntary Action.

[4.] Where understanding therefore needeth, in those things Reason is the director of man’s Will by discovering in action what is good. For the Laws of well-doing are the dictates of right Reason. Children, which are rot as yet come unto those years whereby they may have; again, innocents, which are excluded by natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right Reason to guide themselves, have for their guide the Reason that guideth other men, which are tutors over them to seek and to procure their good for them. In the rest there is that light of Reason, whereby good may be known from evil, and which discovering the same rightly is termed right.

[5.] The Will notwithstanding doth not incline to have or do that which Reason teacheth to be good, unless the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit the Appetite, being more general, may wish any thing which seemeth good, be it never so impossible; yet for such things the reasonable Will of man doth never seek. Let Reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the Will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest.

[6.] There is in the Will of man naturally that: freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it. Whereupon it followeth, waters, because what they mean you do not indeed as you ought apprehend. You have heard that man’s Nature is corrupt, his Reason blind, his Will perverse. Whereupon under colour of condemning corrupt Nature, you condemn Nature, and so is the rest.


[7.] Men’s Will free to choose or refuse. [223]
Immoral Choice, through Error, inexcusable.

persuasion what way soever. Reason therefore may rightly
discern the thing which is good, and yet the Will of man not
incline itself thenceunto, as oft as the prejudice of sensible
experience doth oversway.

[7.] Nor let any man think that this doth make any thing
for the just excuse of iniquity. For there was never sin
committed, wherein a less good was not preferred before a
greater, and that wilfully; which cannot be done without the
singular disgrace of Nature, and the utter disturbance of that
divine order, whereby the preeminence of chiefest accepta-
tion is by the best things worthily challenged. There is not
that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough
for itself, if Reason were diligent to search it out. Through
neglect thereof, abused we are with the show of that which
is not; sometimes the subtlety of Satan inveigling us as it did
Eve¹, sometimes the hastiness of our Wills preventing the
more considerate advice of sound Reason, as in the Apostles²,
when they no sooner saw what they liked not, but they
forthwith were desirous of fire from heaven; sometimes the
very custom of evil making the heart obdurate against what-
soever instructions to the contrary, as in them over whom our
Saviour spake weeping³, “O Jerusalem, how often, and
“thou wouldest not!”⁴. Still therefore that wherewith we
stand blameable, and can no way excuse it, is, In doing evil,
we prefer a less good before a greater; the greatness whereof
is by reason investigable and may be known. The search of
knowledge is a thing painful; and the painfulness of knowl-
edge is that which maketh the Will so hardly inclinable
thereunto. The root hereof, divine malediction; whereby
the instruments⁵ being weakened wherewith the soul
(especially in reasoning) doth work, it preferreth rest in
ignorance before wearisome labour to know. For a spur of
diligence therefore we have a natural thirst after knowledge
ingrafted in us. But by reason of that original weakness in
the instruments, without which the understanding part is not

¹ 2 Cor. xi. 3. ² Luke ix. 54. ³ Matt. xxiii. 37.
⁴ “A corruptible body is heavy
unto the soul, and the earthly
mansion keepeth down the mind
that is full of cares. And hardly
“can we discern the things that are
upon earth, and with great labour
“find we out the things which are
“before us. Who can then seek
out the things that are in heaven?”
Sap. ix. 15, 16.

Double Standard of Moral Goodness.

able in this world by discourse to work, the very conceit of
painfulness is as a bridle to stay us. For which cause the
Apostle, who knew right well that the wearness of the flesh
is an heavy clog to the Will, striketh mightily upon this key,
“Awake thou that sleepest; Cast off all which presseth
“down; Watch; Labour; Strive to go forward, and to
“grow in knowledge.”¹

VIII. Wherefore to return to our former intent of dis-
covering the natural way, whereby rules have been found
out concerning that goodness wherewith the Will of man
ought to be moved in human actions; as every thing naturally
and necessarily doth desire the utmost good and greatest
perfection whereof Nature hath made it capable, even so good
man. Our felicity therefore being the object and accomplish-
ment of our desire, we cannot choose but wish and covet it.
All particular things which are subject unto action, the Will
doth so far forth incline unto, as Reason judgeth them the
better for us, and consequently the more available to our bliss.
If Reason err, we fall into evil, and are so far forth deprived
of the general perfection we seek. Seeing therefore that for
the framing of men’s actions the knowledge of good from
evil is necessary, it only resteth that we search how this may
be had. Neither must we suppose that there needeth one
rule to know the good and another the evil by². For he
that knoweth what is straight doth even thereby discern
what is crooked, because the absence of straightforwardness in
bodies capable thereof is crookedness. Goodness in actions is like
unto straightforwardness; wherenof that which is done well we term
right. For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that
travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey’s
end; so in action, that which doth lie the evenest between
us and the end we desire must needs be the fittest for our
use. Besides which fitness for use, there is also in rectitude,
beauty; as contrariwise in obliquity, deformity. And that
which is good in the actions of men, doth not only delight as
profitable, but as amiable also. In which consideration the
Grecians most divinely have given to the active perfection of

¹ Eph. v. 14; Heb. xii. 1, 12; πόλιον γυμνόσκομεν, κρατῆς γήρ ἐμ-
¹ Cor. xvi. 13; Prov. ii. 4; Luke
xiii. 24. ² Τοῦ εἰθεί καὶ οὐκό καὶ τὸ καμ-
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men a name expressing both beauty and goodness, because goodness in ordinary speech is for the most part applied only to that which is beneficial. But we in the name of goodness do here imply both.

[2.] And of discerning goodness there are but these two ways; the one the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such; the other the observation of those signs and tokens, which being annexed always unto goodness, argue that where they are found, there also goodness is, although we know not the cause by whereof it is there. The former of these is the most sure and infallible way, but so hard that all shun it, and had rather walk as men do in the dark by haphazard, than tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge's sake. As therefore physicians are many times forced to leave such methods of curing as themselves know to be the fittest, and being overruled by their patients' impatience are fain to try the best they can, in taking that way of cure which the cured will yield unto; in like sort, considering how the case doth stand with this present age full of tongue and weak of brain, behold we yield to the stream thereof; into the causes of goodness we will not make any curious or deep inquiry; to touch them now and then it shall be sufficient, when they are so near at hand that easily they may be conceived without any far-removed discourse: that way we are contented to prove, which being the worse in itself, is notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecility the fitter and likelier to be brooked.

[3.] Signs and tokens to know good by are of sundry kinds; some more certain and some less. The most certain token of evident goodness is, if the general persuasion of all men do so account it. And therefore a common received error is never utterly overthrown, till such time as we go from signs unto causes, and shew some manifest root or fountain thereof common unto all, whereby it may clearly appear how it hath come to pass that so many have been overseen. In which case surmises and slight probabilities will not serve, because the universal consent of men is the perfectest and strongest in this kind, which comprehendeth only the signs and tokens of goodness. Things casual do vary, and that which a man doth but chance to think well of cannot still have the like hap. Wherefore although we know not the cause, yet thus much we may know; that some necessary cause there is, whencesoever the judgments of all men generally or for the most part run one and the same way, especially in matters of natural discourse. For of things necessarily and naturally done there is no more affirmed but this, "They keep "either always or for the most part one tenure." The general and perpetual voice of men is as the sentence of God himself. For that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught; and God being the author of Nature, her voice is but his instrument. By her from Him we receive whatsoever in such sort we learn. Infinite duties there are, the goodness whereof is by this rule sufficiently manifested, although we had no other warrant besides to approve them. The Apostle St. Paul having speech concerning the heathen saith of them, "They are a law unto themselves." His meaning is, that by force of the light of Reason, wherewith God illuminateth every one which cometh into the world, men being enabled to know truth from false,

1 Καλοκαψιφα. Carrodell: "καλός ὁδὸν Ἰησοῦ γε θανάτου