

we grow to some ripeness of years, the soul of man doth only store itself with conceits of things of inferior and more open quality, which afterwards do serve as instruments unto that which is greater; in the meanwhile above the reach of meaner creatures it ascendeth not. When once it comprehendeth any thing above this, as the differences of time, affirmations, negations, and contradictions in speech, we then count it to have some use of natural reason. Whereunto if afterwards there might be added the right helps of true art and learning (which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor greatly regard), there would undoubtedly be almost as great difference in maturity of judgment between men therewith inured, and that which now men are, as between men that are now and innocents. Which speech if any condemn, as being over hyperbolical, let them consider but this one thing. No art is at the first finding out so perfect as industry may after make it. Yet the very first man that to any purpose knew the way we speak of¹ and followed it, hath alone thereby performed more very near in all parts of natural knowledge, than sithence in any one part thereof the whole world besides hath done.

[4.] In the poverty of that other new devised aid² two

ὄψηλά, ποῖα δὲ ταπεινά, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀκριβῶς μαθηθεῖ. Καὶ τὸ πάντων μείζον, οὐδὲ τὴν γῆν καταλιπὼν ἄνω γίνεται. Merc. Tris. [c. 10 fin.] lib. iv. f. 12.

¹ Aristotelical Demonstration.

² Ramistry. [Peter Ramus was born in Picardy, 1515. He was a kind of self-taught person, who rose to eminence in the university of Paris. In 1543, he published "Institutiones Dialecticæ," and about the same time "Animadversiones Aristotelicæ." He was silenced after disputation, but allowed the next year to lecture in Rhetoric, and in 1552 was made Professor of Eloquence and Philosophy, probably through the Cardinal of Lorraine's influence. In 1562 he was ejected, and continued more or less unsettled till 1572, when he lost his life in the massacre of St. Bartholomew. (Brucker, Hist. Phil. v. 548-585.

Lips. 1766.) Strype, Ann. III. i. 500, says, "About this time (1585) and somewhat before, another great contest arose in both universities, concerning the two philosophers, Aristotle and Ramus, then chiefly read, and which of them was rather to be studied." See also Ann. II. ii. 405. (1580.) Everard Digby had writ somewhat dialogue-wise against Ramus's *Unica Methodus*, which in those times prevailed much; and perhaps brought into that college (St. John's, Cambridge) to be read; the rather, Ramus being a protestant as well as a learned man." His institutes of Logic, expanded and illustrated, may be seen in Milton's Prose Works, by Symmons, VI. 195-353. He seems to have fallen into the common error of confounding rhetorical arrangement with logic. Of the value of his

things there are notwithstanding singular. Of marvellous quick despatch it is, and doth shew them that have it as much almost in three days, as if it dwell threescore years with them. Again, because the curiosity of man's wit doth many times with peril wade farther in the search of things than were convenient; the same is thereby restrained unto such generalities as every where offering themselves are apparent unto men of the weakest conceit that need be. So as following the rules and precepts thereof, we may define it to be, an Art which teacheth the way of speedy discourse, and restraineth the mind of man that it may not wax over-wise.

[5.] Education and instruction are the means, the one by use, the other by precept, to make our natural faculty of reason both the better and the sooner able to judge rightly between truth and error, good and evil. But at what time a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those Laws, whereby he is then bound to guide his actions; this is a great deal more easy for common sense to discern, than for any man by skill and learning to determine; even as it is not in philosophers, who best know the nature both of fire and of gold, to teach what degree of the one will serve to purify the other, so well as the artisan, who doth this by fire, discerneth by sense when the fire hath that degree of heat which sufficeth for his purpose.

—VII. By reason man attaineth unto the knowledge of things that are and are not sensible. It resteth therefore that we search how man attaineth unto the knowledge of such things unsensible as are to be known that they may be done. Seeing then that nothing can move unless there be

theory the following was Bacon's opinion: "De Unica Methodo, et dichotomiis perpetuis nihil attinet dicere: fuit enim nubecula quædam doctrinæ, quæ cito transiit; res simul et levis et scientiis damnosissima. Etenim hujusmodi homines, cum methodi suæ legibus res torqueant, et quæcumque in dichotomias illas non apte cadunt, aut omittant, aut præter naturam inflectant, hoc efficiunt, ut quasi nuclei et grana scientiarum exsiliant, ipsi aridas tantum

"et desertas siliquas stringant." Further on in the same chapter he specifies Ramus as the patron of the method alluded to. De Augm. Scient. VI. 2. In his Impetus Philosophici, c. 2, he says, "Nullum mihi commercium cum hoc ignorantia latibulo, perniciosissima literarum tineæ, compendiorum patre," &c. Works, IX. 304. 8°. Lond. 1803. Andrew Melvin was a pupil of Ramus. Zouch's Walton, II. 134.]

Of man's Will, which is the thing that Laws of action are made to guide.

some end, the desire whereof provoketh unto motion; how should that divine power of the soul, that "spirit of our "mind¹," as the apostle termeth it, ever stir itself unto action, unless it have also the like spur? The end for which we are moved to work, is sometimes the goodness which we conceive of the very working itself, without any further respect at all; and the cause that procureth action is the mere desire of action, no other good besides being thereby intended. Of certain turbulent wits it is said, "Illis quieta "movere magna merces videbatur²:" they thought the very disturbance of things established an hire sufficient to set them on work. Sometimes that which we do is referred to a further end, without the desire whereof we would leave the same undone; as in their actions that gave alms to purchase thereby the praise of men³.

[2.] Man in perfection of nature being made according to the likeness of his Maker resembleth him also in the manner of working: so that whatsoever we work as men, the same we do wittingly work and freely; neither are we according to the manner of natural agents any way so tied, but that it is in our power to leave the things we do undone. The good which either is gotten by doing, or which consisteth in the very doing itself, causeth not action, unless apprehending it as good we so like and desire it: that we do unto any such end, the same we choose and prefer before the leaving of it undone. Choice there is not, unless the thing which we take be so in our power that we might have refused and left it. If fire consume the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before another. And to will is to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding. And the light of that eye, is reason. So that two principal fountains there are of human action, Knowledge and Will; which Will, in things tending towards any end, is termed Choice⁴. Concerning Knowledge, "Behold, (saith Moses⁵;) I have set before you this day good "and evil, life and death." Concerning Will, he addeth

¹ Eph. iv. 23.² Sallust. [Cat. 21.]³ Matt. vi. 2.⁴ [See Arist. Eth. III. 2, 3. VI. 2.]⁵ Deut. xxx. 19.

immediately, "Choose life;" that is to say, the things that tend unto life, them choose.

[3.] But of one thing we must have special care, as being a matter of no small moment; and that is, how the Will, properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred unto the end that man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferior natural desire which we call Appetite. The object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of Will is that good which Reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and forms of Appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no: whereas actions which issue from the disposition of the Will are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, Appetite is the Will's solicitor, and the Will is Appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one by the other we often reject; neither is any other desire termed properly Will, but that where Reason and Understanding, or the show of Reason, prescribeth the thing desired.

It may be therefore a question, whether those operations of men are to be counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sensible provoketh Appetite, and Appetite causeth action, Reason being never called to counsel; as when we eat or drink, and betake ourselves unto rest, and such like. The truth is, that such actions in men having attained to the use of Reason are voluntary. For as the authority of higher powers hath force even in those things, which are done without their privity, and are of so mean reckoning that to acquaint them therewith it needeth not; in like sort, voluntarily we are said to do that also, which the Will if it listed might hinder from being done, although about the doing thereof we do not expressly use our reason or understanding, and so immediately apply our wills thereunto. In cases therefore of such facility, the Will doth yield her assent as it were with a kind of silence, by not dissenting; in which respect her force is not so apparent as in express mandates or prohibitions, especially upon advice and consultation going before.

[4.] Where understanding therefore needeth, in those things Reason is the director of man's Will by discovering in action what is good. For the Laws of well-doing are the dictates of right Reason. Children, which are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have; again, innocents, which are excluded by natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right Reason to guide themselves, have for their guide the Reason that guideth other men, which are tutors over them to seek and to procure their good for them. In the rest there is that light of Reason, whereby good may be known from evil, and which discovering the same rightly is termed right.

[5.] The Will notwithstanding doth not incline to have or do that which Reason teacheth to be good, unless the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit the Appetite, being more general, may wish any thing which seemeth good, be it never so impossible¹; yet for such things the reasonable Will of man doth never seek. Let Reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the Will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest.

[6.] There is in the Will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it². Whereupon it followeth,

¹ O mihi præteritos referat si Jupiter annos! [Virg. Æn. viii. 560.]
² [Chr. Letter, p. 11: "Heere we pray your helpe to teach us, how will is *apt* (as you say) free lie to take or refuse anie particular object whatsoever, and that reason by diligence is able to find out any good concerning us: if it be true that the Church of England professeth, that without the preventing and helping grace of God, we can will and doe nothing pleasing to God."

Hooker, MS. note. "There are certaine wordes, as Nature, Reason, Will, and such like, which wheresoever you find named, you suspect them presently as bugs

* ["These are bugs words." Beaum. and Fletch., Tamer tamed, Act. I. Sc. 3.]

that there is no particular object so good, but it may have the shew of some difficulty or unpleasant quality annexed to it, in respect whereof the Will may shrink and decline it; contrariwise (for so things are blended) there is no particular evil which hath not some appearance of goodness whereby to insinuate itself. For evil as evil cannot be desired¹: if that be desired which is evil, the cause is the goodness which is or seemeth to be joined with it. Goodness doth not move by being, but by being apparent; and therefore many things are neglected which are most precious, only because the value of them lieth hid. Sensible Goodness is most apparent, near, and present; which causeth the Appetite to be therewith strongly provoked. Now pursuit and refusal in the Will do follow, the one the affirmation the other the negation of goodness, which the understanding apprehendeth², grounding itself upon sense, unless some higher Reason do chance to teach the contrary. And if Reason have taught it rightly to be good, yet not so apparently that the mind receiveth it with utter impossibility of being otherwise, still there is place left for the Will to take or leave. Whereas therefore amongst so many things as are to be done, there are so few, the goodness whereof Reason in such sort doth or easily can discover, we are not to marvel at the choice of evil even then when the contrary is probably known. Hereby it cometh to pass that custom inuring the mind by long practice, and so leaving there a sensible impression, prevaileth more than reasonable

"destituta nullum. Habet tamen
"omne bonum satis quidem in se
"quo probare se possit homini se-
"dulo diligenterque attendenti. Sed
"nostra nos alio segnitie avertit,
"donec studium virtutis Spiritus
"Sanctus excitat. Vide Cyprianum
"de sua conversione." (Ad Dona-
"tum, Opp. p. 3. ed. Fell.) "Item ea
"quæ Sapientia de se profitetur in li-
"bro Proverbiorum atque alibi. Est
"itaque segnis humana ratio propter
"summam bonarum rerum investi-
"gandarum difficultatem. Eam dif-
"ficultatem tollit lumen divinæ gra-
"tiæ. Hinc alacres effcimus, alioqui
"a labore ad libidinem proclives.
"Habet virtus vitio et plura et
"fortiora quæ hominem alliciant.

"Sed ea latent maximam partem
"hominum. Quid ita? Quia Ratio,
"quæ est oculus mentis, alto in nobis
"somno sepulta jacet otiose. At ex-
"citata et illuminata Sancti Spiritus
"virtute omnia dijudicat, et quæ
"prius ignota fastidio fuerunt, ea
"nunc perspecta modis omnibus
"amplectenda decernit."

¹ Εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ κακίαν ὀρμῆν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ κακίαν αὐτὴν ὀρμήσει, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν. Paulo post: Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὀρμῆν ἐπὶ κακὰ βουλόμενον ἔχειν αὐτὰ, οὔτε ἐλπίδι ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε φόβῳ μείζονος κακοῦ. Alcín. de Dog. Plat. [c. 38. ed. Oxon. 1667.]

² [Arist. Eth. Nic. VI. 2: Ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτο ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή.]

persuasion what way soever. Reason therefore may rightly discern the thing which is good, and yet the Will of man not incline itself thereunto, as oft as the prejudice of sensible experience doth oversway.

[7.] Nor let any man think that this doth make any thing for the just excuse of iniquity. For there was never sin committed, wherein a less good was not preferred before a greater, and that wilfully; which cannot be done without the singular disgrace of Nature, and the utter disturbance of that divine order, whereby the preeminence of chiefest acceptation is by the best things worthily challenged. There is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough for itself, if Reason were diligent to search it out. Through neglect thereof, abused we are with the show of that which is not; sometimes the subtilty of Satan inveigling us as it did Eve¹, sometimes the hastiness of our Wills preventing the more considerate advice of sound Reason, as in the Apostles², when they no sooner saw what they liked not, but they forthwith were desirous of fire from heaven; sometimes the very custom of evil making the heart obdurate against whatsoever instructions to the contrary, as in them over whom our Saviour spake weeping³, "O Jerusalem, how often, and "thou wouldest not!" Still therefore that wherewith we stand blameable, and can no way excuse it, is, In doing evil, we prefer a less good before a greater, the greatness whereof is by reason investigable and may be known. The search of knowledge is a thing painful; and the painfulness of knowledge is that which maketh the Will so hardly inclinable thereunto. The root hereof, divine malediction; whereby the instruments⁴ being weakened wherewithal the soul (especially in reasoning) doth work, it preferreth rest in ignorance before wearisome labour to know. For a spur of diligence therefore we have a natural thirst after knowledge ingrafted in us. But by reason of that original weakness in the instruments, without which the understanding part is not

¹ 2 Cor. xi. 3. ² Luke ix. 54.

³ Matt. xxiii. 37.

⁴ "A corruptible body is heavy unto the soul, and the earthly mansion keepeth down the mind that is full of cares. And hardly

"can we discern the things that are upon earth, and with great labour find we out the things which are before us. Who can then seek out the things that are in heaven?" Sap. ix. 15, 16.

able in this world by discourse to work, the very conceit of painfulness is as a bridle to stay us. For which cause the Apostle, who knew right well that the weariness of the flesh is an heavy clog to the Will, striketh mightily upon this key, "Awake thou that sleepest; Cast off all which presseth down; Watch; Labour; Strive to go forward, and to "grow in knowledge¹."

VIII. Wherefore to return to our former intent of discovering the natural way, whereby rules have been found out concerning that goodness wherewith the Will of man ought to be moved in human actions; as every thing naturally and necessarily doth desire the utmost good and greatest perfection whereof Nature hath made it capable, even so man. Our felicity therefore being the object and accomplishment of our desire, we cannot choose but wish and covet it. All particular things which are subject unto action, the Will doth so far forth incline unto, as Reason judgeth them the better for us, and consequently the more available to our bliss. If Reason err, we fall into evil, and are so far forth deprived of the general perfection we seek. Seeing therefore that for the framing of men's actions the knowledge of good from evil is necessary, it only resteth that we search how this may be had. Neither must we suppose that there needeth one rule to know the good and another the evil by². For he that knoweth what is straight doth even thereby discern what is crooked, because the absence of straightness in bodies capable thereof is crookedness. Goodness in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that which is done well we term *right*. For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey's end; so in action, that which doth lie the evenest between us and the end we desire must needs be the fittest for our use. Besides which fitness for use, there is also in rectitude, beauty; as contrariwise in obliquity, deformity. And that which is good in the actions of men, doth not only delight as profitable, but as amiable also. In which consideration the Grecians most divinely have given to the active perfection of

¹ Eph. v. 14; Heb. xii. 1, 12; πύλον γνώσκομεν κριτής γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανὼν. Arist. de An. lib. i. xiii. 24. [cap. 3. t. 85.]

² Τῷ εὐθείῃ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμ-
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men a name expressing both beauty and goodness¹, because goodness in ordinary speech is for the most part applied only to that which is beneficial. But we in the name of goodness do here imply both.

[2.] And of discerning goodness there are but these two ways; the one the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such; the other the observation of those signs and tokens, which being annexed always unto goodness, argue that where they are found, there also goodness is, although we know not the cause by force whereof it is there. The former of these is the most sure and infallible way, but so hard that all shun it, and had rather walk as men do in the dark by haphazard, than tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge' sake. As therefore physicians are many times forced to leave such methods of curing as themselves know to be the fittest, and being overruled by their patients' impatience are fain to try the best they can, in taking that way of cure which the cured will yield unto; in like sort, considering how the case doth stand with this present age full of tongue and weak of brain, behold we yield to the stream thereof; into the causes of goodness we will not make any curious or deep inquiry; to touch them now and then it shall be sufficient, when they are so near at hand that easily they may be conceived without any far-removed discourse: that way we are contented to prove, which being the worse in itself, is notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecility the fitter and likelier to be brooked².

[3.] Signs and tokens to know good by are of sundry kinds; some more certain and some less. The most certain token of evident goodness is, if the general persuasion of all men do so account it. And therefore a common received error is never utterly overthrown, till such time as we go from signs unto causes, and shew some manifest root or fountain thereof common unto all, whereby it may clearly appear how it hath come to pass that so many have been overseen. In which case surmises and slight probabilities will not serve, because the universal consent of men is the perfectest and strongest in this kind, which comprehendeth

¹ Καλοκαγαθία.

Cardwell: "Ἰσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων."

² [Arist. Eth. Nic. I. 4, 5. ed.]

only the signs and tokens of goodness. Things casual do vary, and that which a man doth but chance to think well of cannot still have the like hap. Wherefore although we know not the cause, yet thus much we may know; that some necessary cause there is, whensoever the judgments of all men generally or for the most part run one and the same way, especially in matters of natural discourse. For of things necessarily and naturally done there is no more affirmed but this, "They keep either always or for the most part one tenure¹." The general and perpetual voice of men is as the sentence of God himself². For that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught³; and God being the author of Nature, her voice is but his instrument. By her from Him we receive whatsoever in such sort we learn. Infinite duties there are, the goodness whereof is by this rule sufficiently manifested, although we had no other warrant besides to approve them. The Apostle St. Paul having speech concerning the heathen saith of them⁴, "They are a law unto themselves." His meaning is, that by force of the light of Reason, wherewith God illuminateth every one which cometh into the world, men being enabled to know truth from false-

¹ * Η αἰεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁσαύτως ἀποβαίνει. Arist. Rhet. l. i. [c. 10.]

² ["Vox populi, vox Dei." The origin of the saying is obscure. It was current in the middle ages, as "Scripture:" v. Eadmer, Hist. Nov. i. 42.]

³ "Non potest error contingere ubi omnes idem [ita] opinantur." Montecat. in i. Polit. [p. 3] "Quicquid in omnibus individuis unius speciei communiter inest, id causam communem habeat oportet, quæ est eorum individuorum speciei et natura." Idem. "Quod a tota aliqua specie fit, universalis particularisque naturæ fit instinctu." ["Meminisse debemus vaticinium illud, Quod a tota aliqua animalium specie fit, quia universalis particularisque fit instinctu, verum existere."] Ficini de Christ.

Rel. [cap. 1.] "Si proficere cupis, primo firme id verum puta, quod sana mens omnium hominum attestatur." Cusa in Compend. cap. 1. [D. Nicolai de Cusa Cardinalis, utriusque juris Doctoris, omnique philosophia incomparabilis viri Opera. Basil. 1565. Compendium; Directio veritatis, p. 239. See Cave Hist. Lit. t. I. App. 130.] "Non licet naturale universaleque hominum iudicium falsum vana numque existimare." Teles. [Bernardi Telesii, Consentini, de Rerum Natura juxta propria principia Libri ix, Neapoli 1586. On this writer's method of philosophizing see a dissertation in Bacon's works, ix. 332.] * Ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτο εἶναι φαιμέν. Ὁ δὲ ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ. Arist. Eth. lib. x. cap. 2. ⁴ Rom. ii. 14.

* [Antonio Montecatini, Professor of Civil Law at Ferrara (1568-1597), published Comm. on Aristot. Politics. Ferrara, 1587. Marsilius Ficinus, Florentine Platonist (1433-1499). De religione Christiana. Flor. 1474. Cardinal Nicolas Cusa (1401-1464). Bernardino Telesio of Cosenza (1509-1588), a reformer of natural philosophy.]

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