

CHAPTER ONE ROMANTICISM AND THE OXFORD MOVEMENT: TOWARDS A TRACTARIAN AESTHETIC

INTRODUCTION

In his late nineteenth-century novel *Jude the Obscure*, Thomas Hardy refers to Christminster (his fictionalized Oxford) as “that ecclesiastical romance written in stone” (31). Within the economy of the novel, this comment reflects on more than the architectural riches of the University. By emphasizing the university’s medieval architecture, Hardy recalls the tide of gothic church building and restoration undertaken in England from the middle of the nineteenth century until its end.¹ Hardy’s emphasis on the *ecclesiastical* dimension of Oxford’s architecture also gestures towards the revival of liturgical “medievalism” in Church of England Ritualist parishes which embraced pre-reformation and contemporary Roman Catholic ceremonial in the celebration of Holy Communion and the Divine Office. Seen thus, Hardy’s comments point to the deeply romantic impulse that infused the Church of England’s Catholic Revival (centred in Oxford), and its subsequent architectural and liturgical movements. The Revival was a reaction against the aridity of eighteenth-century rationalist discourse, a movement that explored “the subjective and the place of imagination and deep feeling in relation to both faith and reason” (Rowell 6).

In this thesis, I will discuss such resonances between romance (and by extension Romanticism) and the movement in the Church of England commonly

¹ Much of this work was performed by the Cambridge Camden Society which sought to refurbish churches in accordance with fourteenth-century gothic architecture. The young Tractarian J.M. Neale for a time directed the group’s work.

called the Oxford, or Tractarian, Movement.² To link Romanticism and a theological movement is, perhaps, to conflate supposedly distinct discourses – the literary and the theological. But, as much criticism of the period has shown and, indeed, as the Fathers of the Movement themselves demonstrate, the Oxford Movement was from its inception deeply indebted to British Romanticism and distinguished by the literary accomplishments of its members. Indeed, two of the Movement’s three leaders wrote and published poetry thematically indebted to the Romanticism of Coleridge and Wordsworth. For example, John Keble’s phenomenally successful book of devotional poems, *The Christian Year*, re-articulates Wordsworthian conceptions of nature in relation to the feasts and fasts of the Church year.³ Through such works, the Movement developed a distinctive aesthetic vision that wedded aesthetic concerns with doctrinal principles.

If it is possible to discern a peculiarly Tractarian aesthetic, there has been a critical tendency to limit discussions of it to a relatively normative set of figures. Of the Oxford Fathers, Keble and John Henry Newman have received the most critical attention. For poetry, critics favour Keble, whose *Praelectiones Academicae* constitute perhaps the most definitive statement of Tractarian aesthetic principles. The less well-known Tractarian poet Isaac Williams is also given critical attention for his extremely significant elaboration of the principle of

² Generally speaking, the Oxford Movement dates from the year 1833 to 1845, beginning with John Keble’s sermon “On National Apostasy” and ending with John Henry Newman’s secession to Rome. The Tractarian period, properly speaking, only extends as far as 1841, at which point the *Tracts for the Times*, which were one of the main means of communicating the Movement’s vision, were stopped at the request of the Bishop of London after the publication of Newman’s infamous Tract 90. After 1845, though one may still speak of the Oxford Movement, there was a new generation of clergy and laity who extended the Movement beyond the initial vision of the Oxford Fathers (Keble, Newman and Pusey), and thus new appellatives arose, such as the Ritualist Movement.

³ It is worth noting that this book was for many years a central vehicle for disseminating the Movement’s distinctive theological vision.

Reserve – one of the three central concepts of Tractarian aesthetic theory. However, Newman is the only Tractarian to have received consistent critical attention not only for his theological thought, but for his sermons as well (though his poetry has been neglected). However, as Robert Ellison notes in *The Victorian Pulpit: Spoken and Written Sermons in the Nineteenth-Century*, Newman's sermons are often eclipsed by critical attention to his theological texts. Hence Ellison's claim that there is a paucity of sustained critical commentary on nineteenth-century preaching (12). This has left the writings of E. B. Pusey largely neglected, despite the fact that he is arguably the most significant of the Oxford leaders, both in terms of his extensive influence on the Movement and for the quality and significance of his publications.

In this thesis I will attempt to redress the absence of critical commentary on Pusey and his role in the formation and articulation of the Oxford Movement's aesthetic vision, including its debts to Romanticism. Specifically, I will look at Pusey's sermons and their relation to characteristic elements of Tractarian aesthetics, in particular, the principles of Reserve, Typology and Analogy. I will argue that these principles find their precursors in the work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth and their attempts to articulate an epistemology that redresses the eighteenth-century's division of subject and object, mind and nature. As well, I will suggest that the most significant aspect of the Tractarian aesthetic vision is its translation into theological and pedagogical, or pastoral, principles. Hence, it is in the sermon – that literature in which aesthetic form meets doctrinal principle and pedagogical intent – that we can best locate the clearest expression of the Movement's vision.

Through an examination of Pusey's sermons, I will also substantiate the claim that whatever its philosophical, dogmatic or literary aspects, the Oxford Movement was primarily a movement of *devotion*. Its aesthetic and theological concerns were consistently interpreted in relation to devotional practice so that, for example, Coleridge's epistemology is translated into a means of experiencing God in nature. As Owen Chadwick writes, the Oxford Movement was,

more a Movement of the heart than of the head ... It was not concerned for religious experience, while being unconcerned about religious language – on the contrary, it was earnestly dogmatic. But the Movement, though dogmatic, was not dogmatic simply because it possessed or shared a particular theory of dogma. It always saw dogma in relation to worship, to the numinous, to the movement of the heart, to the conscience and the moral need, to the immediate experience of the hidden hand of God – so that without this attention to worship or the moral need, dogma could not be apprehended rightly. The Creed was creed – the truth ... But it roused the mind to prayer, and only through prayer and life was it known to be truth (1)

Of central importance to this thesis will be the status of language in Tractarian aesthetics. I maintain that language is a contested site for the Tractarians and that, particularly in Pusey's sermons, it is characterized by a series of tensions that exist in a dialectical relation to one another. Both Coleridge and Wordsworth valorize language's ability to communicate the divine, representing poetic and religious discourse as sources of fulfilment and inexhaustible signification. But both are also beset by anxieties about the "waywardness" of language – its ability to be employed improperly and its susceptibility to misinterpretation. Their attempts to negotiate the tension between language's "plenitude" and its "lack" are rearticulated in Pusey's sermons, and the relationship between fulfilment and lack is the central dialectic

in his *Sermons on Solemn Subjects*. This tension is perhaps the result of Coleridge's, Wordsworth's and the Tractarians' use of an incarnational model for their linguistic theories. They contend that language "incarnates" divine mysteries following the pattern of Christ's incarnation, which revealed the hiddenness of God. This is a moment of fulfilment. But the incarnation also involved the violent death of Christ, and this is mirrored in language's susceptibility to misuse and misunderstanding. However, Christ's death must be read within the economy of the Resurrection, and I will argue that the dialectic of lack and fulfilment in Pusey's sermons can be properly understood only upon this horizon.

I will proceed in three chapters. In the first I will outline the particular ways in which the Movement is indebted to Coleridge and Wordsworth. With respect to Coleridge, I will argue that the Movement gained a language in which to articulate the relationship of the individual to the Church, as well as a way of "thinking" the natural world sacramentally through his conception of the symbol. In an extension of this discussion, I will argue that the Movement derives from Wordsworth a way of reading nature as a visible and prophetic sign of God's creative will. Though it is difficult to isolate particular moments of influence between the Tractarians and these two poets, one can easily demonstrate that Coleridge and Wordsworth contributed to a culture in which the Tractarians could develop their theological and aesthetic vision.

The second chapter will attempt to expound a theory of pulpit oratory by considering the nineteenth-century sermon as a species of "oral literature" as developed chiefly by the twentieth-century critic Robert Ellison. I will consider his comments in relation to discussions of pulpit oratory both prior to and during

the nineteenth century, including critical work that has been done on other prominent Anglican preachers (for example, John Donne and Newman), in order to develop a critical method with which to read Pusey's sermons. Central to this endeavor will be a consideration of the tensions in the Tractarian use of Coleridge's linguistic theory. Though Coleridge celebrated Romanticism's liberation of feeling and sentiment, I will argue that this liberation was also a source of considerable anxiety. Coleridge and the Tractarians felt a need to temper the Romantic valorization of subjectivity and emotion with assurances of dogmatic truth. Attendant on this discussion will be a consideration of the status of sermons and sermon publishing in nineteenth-century England.⁴

The final chapter will involve a reading of Pusey's *Sermons on Solemn Subjects*, in which I will revisit the aesthetic claims of Tractarianism discussed in the first chapter, and the homiletic theory of the second chapter, in considering Pusey's sermons as, on the one hand, examples of the Tractarian literary ethos, and, on the other hand, as expressions of the doctrinal and pastoral aspects of that ethos.

I. THE INFLUENCE OF COLERIDGE

The influence of Samuel Taylor Coleridge on nineteenth-century aesthetics, philosophy and theology is pervasive. As the primary popularizer of German Idealism in England, and as a key explicator of a symbolic theory of knowledge, he instigated a reformation of eighteenth-century rationalism through both his prose writings and poetry. The Oxford Movement was no less influenced by his

⁴ Its interesting to note that the sermons under consideration, Pusey's *Sermons on Solemn Subjects*, were preached at the end of October, 1845, and published before the end of the year, attesting to the literate public's significant demand for and consumption of sermons.

thought than any other area of nineteenth-century culture. Indeed, as G.B. Tennyson points out, “Coleridgean ideas permeate Tractarian thinking on aesthetic subjects and, except on the question of nature, probably color Tractarian poetics more than those of any other single figure” (*Victorian* 17). As I have argued above, however, aesthetic principles and theological doctrine are not distinct spheres for the Tractarians, and so Tennyson’s claim must be extended to include Coleridge not simply as an aesthetic influence, but also as a theological one. Moreover, as I will demonstrate, his influence on the Oxford Movement was in many respects primarily theological and philosophical.

It is interesting to note, however, that the Tractarians often limited their acknowledgement of the Movement’s indebtedness to Coleridge. John Henry Newman’s reserved comments in his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* are a typical Tractarian assessment of Coleridge’s importance to the Movement. Their hesitancy most likely stems from the highly speculative character of Coleridge’s later thought on Biblical exegesis (which was much influenced by his study in Germany with the proponents of Higher Criticism and his reading of Idealists like Friedrich Schiller) and which the Tractarians would have viewed with suspicion as bordering on heterodoxy if not explicitly heretical.⁵ Newman writes:

Then I spoke of Coleridge, thus: ‘While history in prose and verse was thus made the instrument of Church feelings and opinions, a philosophical basis for the same was laid in England by a very original thinker, who, *while he indulged in a liberty of speculation, which no Christian can tolerate, and advocated conclusions which were often heathen rather than Christian*, yet after all instilled a higher philosophy into inquiring minds, than they had hitherto been accustomed to accept. In this way he made trial of his age, and succeeded in interesting its genius in the cause of Catholic truth.’ (94; my emphasis)

⁵ For an example of the quality of this thought see Coleridge’s *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, pages 1-102.

Tilottama Rajan provides another possible explanation for the Tractarian's hesitant acknowledgment of Coleridge. According to Rajan, characteristic nineteenth-century perceptions of Coleridge *vis-à-vis* Wordsworth were based upon a set of distinctions. Rajan lists the distinctions between the two as such: Wordsworth represented for the Victorian reader the imagination, the country, an affinity with nature, the ability to overcome dejection, and both propriety and Englishness; Coleridge, on the other hand, represented metaphysics, the city (inherently deviant), self-consciousness, a greater affinity with the Continent than with Englishness, a spirit of dejection, and a general spirit of impropriety (125). No doubt the Tractarians' extremely vocal commendation of Wordsworth's poetry (witness Keble's dedication of his lectures on poetry to him) stemmed from their general valorization of country over city and nature over artifice. And perhaps more explicitly than any other Tractarian, Keble's misgivings about the city reflect Rajan's claims. Keble saw "the townsman as the arrogant, irreligious democrat who measures all things by the standard of his own enjoyment", as opposed to the countryman, who "lived close to Nature and [was] satisfied with the things that were familiar and common to all men, such as ... the changes of the seasons and the frailty of human life" (Beek 76, 77).

However, despite the Movement's ambiguous relationship to Coleridge, and despite its hesitancy concerning the Continental aspects of his thought, it – and Pusey in particular – was deeply affected by his work. In conjunction with the other primary influences on the Tractarians (the seventeenth-century Anglican Divines, Bishop Butler's *Analogy of Religion*, written in the eighteenth century, and Patristic scholarship), I contend that Coleridge offered the Movement both a

language and a theory of knowledge in which to articulate its increasingly sacramental vision of the world, and one which corresponded closely with its notion of God's "reserved" manifestation of Himself in nature, the Sacraments, and the Church. Interestingly, given the Tractarians' opinion of German Higher Criticism, Pusey himself studied in Germany in 1825 and again in 1826.⁶ He attended Johann Eichorn's lectures as had Coleridge thirty years before, and was deeply influenced by the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher (Rowell 73). He saw in Schleiermacher less the German rationalist "who indulged in a freedom of speculation for which he was chiefly known in England, thanks to Connop Thirwall's translation of his minor treatise, *St Luke*" than "the great regenerator of the pietist impulse in German Lutheranism":

Schleiermacher had located the grounds of religious assent in the feelings rather than the reason, or rather in the 'feeling' (*Empfindung*), religious reason, which he distinguished from 'feelings' (*Gefühl*), religious sentiment or emotion, as well as from the critical faculty. The distinction became important to Pusey as to others, for it provided an answer both to religious rationalism and 'enthusiasm' by locating religious conviction neither in the formal reason nor in the affective sentiments but in a distinct faculty which partook of elements of both and which Coleridge, following his German masters, called the 'Understanding'. (Frappell 9-10)

Frappell, it should be noted, seems to mistakenly identify this "distinct faculty" with Coleridge's "Understanding". Rather, for Coleridge the faculty that mediates between reason and feeling, or mind and sentiment, is the Imagination (which I will discuss shortly).

Pusey would later distance himself from the work he wrote concerning the state of German theology, *An Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the*

⁶ See Henry Parry Liddon's *Life of E.B. Pusey*, vol. 1: 70-114, for a detailed account of his time in Germany.

Rationalist Character Lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany, in which he offered a sympathetic reading of the development of German theology. In it he did not attempt to defend the rationalism rampant in German critical thought, but rather to defend the simultaneous pietistic resurgence that he found in a figure like Schleiermacher. He retained throughout his life the conviction he gained from Schleiermacher that religious experience could never be a purely intellectual response to the Divine, but that it proceeded in large part from the sentiments, especially a feeling of dependence upon God (Rowell 73). For Pusey, faith has a “compound character”:

In Divine things, awe, wonder, the absorbing sense of infinity, of purity, or of holiness, infuse conviction more directly than reasoning; nay reasoning in that it appeals to one faculty only, and that for a time is erected into a judge, and so, as it were, sits superior, constantly goes directly counter to the frame of mind wherein belief is received. (cited in Rowell 11-12)

Here Pusey writes against the possibility of “deliberating” one’s way to God. And clearly in this he saw Coleridge as an ally. Pusey noted in 1827 that “Coleridge, in his *Aids to Reflection*, had ... given ‘seasonable advice to those, who think that in the reception of Christianity the intellect alone is concerned’” (Forrester 222-23). Moreover, like Coleridge, he defended (though with distinct reservations about the application of philosophy to theology) Immanuel Kant for

indicating the inadequacy of speculative reason to pronounce on matters outside the scope of the intellect alone, ‘[leading] many who were not bound by the fetters of the new philosophy, to listen to the voice of nature, the revelation of God within them, and to seek as the direct result of consciousness, the truths which speculation was unable scientifically to justify.’ (Forrester 223-24)

It is in relation to those truths that are “the direct result of consciousness” that I wish to consider more closely Pusey’s, and the Oxford Movement’s, indebtedness to Coleridge. What I want to suggest, following Martin Roberts’s essay “Coleridge as a Background to the Oxford Movement”, is that Coleridge provides a theory of knowledge that accounts for the formation of self-consciousness as dependent upon the *prior* existence of a Supreme Being. The most fundamental truth that arises from consciousness, then, is knowledge of God. This is an important development in Coleridge’s thought because it

makes significant departures from the man-centred subjective individualism of many romantic and idealist thinkers. It is perhaps this new perspective which can be regarded as one of the background influences on the Oxford Movement ... as far as the supernatural is seen to be indispensable to the achievement of the ‘good’ life, or growth in holiness.⁷ (Roberts 40)

As I discuss the way in which Coleridge formulates this view of consciousness, I will also suggest how it informs his idea of the Imagination and the symbol, paying attention as well to his conception of the Church.

“One of the aims of the Romantics,” writes Albert S. Gérard,

was to find a substitute for the outdated and, to them, unsatisfactory philosophy that sees the world as a mechanism and God as the great watchmaker, and so emphasizes the dualism of matter and spirit. They were deeply aware of the unity of the cosmos ... As a result, they were trying to express this intensely felt unity, either through poetic images or in philosophical statements. (43)

⁷ It is worth noting that the “good” life was a topic of contention during the nineteenth century. From Benthamites to J.S. Mill, and even to T.H. Huxley, the characteristics of, and the motivations for, virtuous living were a source of debate.

Coleridge, no less than other Romantics, was attempting to articulate his experience of unity in the world as he formulated his theory of consciousness. It bears the marks of his other theorizations – of the relationship of the Imagination to the material world, of nature’s relationship to the supernatural, and even of the visible Church’s relationship to the invisible Church – in that it attempts to resolve binary oppositions of, for example, subject and object, into a more dialectical and dynamic vision. Coleridge outlines his struggles with the idea of a Supreme Being in his *Biographia Literaria*:

I retired to a cottage in Somersetshire at the foot of the Quantock, and devoted my thoughts and studies to the foundations of religion and morals. Here I found myself all afloat ... The idea of the Supreme Being appeared to me to be as necessarily implied in all particular modes of being, as the idea of infinite space in all geometrical figures by which space is limited. I was pleased with the Cartesian opinion that the idea of God is distinguished from all other ideas by involving its reality; but I was not wholly satisfied. (111)

As Martin Roberts points out, what Coleridge here claims about the Divine is by no means speculative (36). The Divine Being he envisions is “implied in all particular modes of being” and functions as the presupposition of his own self-consciousness, constituting and informing his subjectivity. Coleridge

cannot *be* the Coleridge he is, apart from his dependence upon the Supreme Being; for it is only by beginning to ascend to the latter ... that Coleridge can start to make some sense of his own life ... The point is, it is not only the coherence of consciousness which is at stake with his concern for the supernatural, but more fundamentally, the ability to *form* consciousness at all. Coleridge seems to be feeling his way towards a ‘centre’, around which he can form himself and thereby establish his own coherence. For Coleridge, the supernatural is crucial not merely for arriving at a religious faith, but more importantly, for the formation of consciousness in its most essential and basic requirements. (Roberts 36)

What Roberts succeeds in deducing from Coleridge's *Biographia* is the dialectical relationship Coleridge envisions between the Divine Mind and his. According to Coleridge, consciousness is ordered through the admission of the priority of the Divine Mind. Coleridge's articulation of this relationship is striking because it locates the proof of God's priority *internally*. God does not manifest himself as an object of thought outside the mind, but rather as a constitutive aspect of consciousness.

Though Roberts reads the passage cited above from Coleridge's *Biographia* adeptly, he excises from his citation of it Coleridge's expression of *dissatisfaction* with the Cartesian response to his skepticism – "I was not wholly satisfied". Nonetheless, the rhetoric with which Roberts excavates Coleridge's thought suggests the means by which Coleridge overcomes his nagging uncertainties. Roberts is right that Coleridge is "feeling" his way towards the Divine. He, like Pusey, rejects the possibility that reason can deduce the reality (or the unreality) of God, and instead locates the evidence for such a claim firstly in the constitution of his own consciousness, as has been shown, and secondly in both the sentiments and nature. According to Coleridge

Nature excites and recalls [belief] as by a perpetual revelation. Our feelings almost necessitate it; and the law of conscience peremptorily commands it. The arguments that at all apply to it are in its favour; and there is nothing against it but its own sublimity. It could not be intellectually more evident without becoming morally less effective; without counteracting its own end by sacrificing the life of faith to the cold mechanism of a worthless because compulsory assent. (*Biographia* 113)

So for Coleridge, then, belief in God not only logically follows from the very nature of our consciousness, but also demands an activity of the will, facilitated

by the evidence of the feelings and nature which attest to God's presence.⁸ The resonance between his and Pusey's formulation of faith is striking: both reassert the importance of feeling in the development of religious faith, and both find in nature imprints of the Divine. As well, Pusey particularly stressed the role of the will in his articulation of the Christian life (against the Evangelical emphasis on "faith alone"), just as Coleridge stressed the need for assent. Pusey "felt able to use strong language, indeed the strongest language, about the responsibility of the human will for its choice between good and evil" (Chadwick 39-40).

But consciousness is not only ordered by the Divine. It is also able to identify signs and symbols of the Divine in the material world, and does so through the faculty of the Imagination. The Imagination, writes Coleridge, is

that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths, of which they are the *conductors*. (*Consitution* 228-29).

Imagination is the faculty of mediation by which Reason, the faculty capable of apprehending the noumenal, is made consubstantial with the Image, or the Real (i.e. Nature). And this is what Coleridge means when he says that human creativity is the repetition of the Divine I AM in the human soul – as Christ's Incarnation reconciled the Ideal and the Real (or the Divine and the material) so too we recapitulate the Incarnation in our imaginative perception of the world, which sees in the material the lineaments of its Divine maker (*Biographia* 167).

⁸ One suspects that both Coleridge and Pusey would locate unbelief in an unruly will and/or intellect. An intellect given to excessive speculation would contravene Pusey's and Coleridge's continual assertions that one believes *by* believing. They make faith, in part, the result of active habituation. A disordered will would be unable to act on the abundant sensory and intellectual evidence of God's existence.

As Ronald Wendling writes, “Reason’s apprehension of the noumenal is constantly *reenfleshed* in images of sense and understanding, while perceived phenomena are themselves restored through awareness of the noumenal reality saturating them” (153; my emphasis). What must be emphasized is that the Imagination does not simply “create” the image of the Divine it traces in nature. Though the perceiving mind is a necessary aspect of noting the Divine, what it traces inheres in the object it identifies. Hence Wendling emphasizes the way in which sensible material is *restored to itself* when perceived by the Imagination, insofar as the created or material is itself a trace of the Divine. Proper perception “divines” the invisible noumenal.

The Imagination, as Coleridge says, perceives the world symbolically, and it is his conception of the symbol, perhaps, that has most deeply influenced the Oxford Movement. The common contemporary tendency, especially in the wake of Paul de Man’s influential essay “The Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image”, is to conflate the symbolic with the allegorical or the emblematic, which may denote other objects but which never claims to participate in those realities. But according to Coleridge, the symbol is characterized “above all by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It *always partakes* of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part of that Unity, of which it is the representative” (*Constitution* 230; my emphasis). As Thomas McFarland points out, de Man does a disservice to Romantic conceptions of the symbol by claiming it as a literary convention or rhetorical figure and ignoring its primarily religious signification, thus reading it as a failed allegory – precisely what Romantics such as Coleridge are arguing

against (43).⁹ Instead, for Coleridge and the Tractarians, the symbol is “the coincidence of sensible appearance and supra-sensible meaning”, archetypally so in the Church’s Sacraments, in the constitution of the Church itself and in nature (Gadamer 69). Perhaps the clearest of Coleridge’s explanations of the symbol comes in his defence of the Anglican doctrine of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist:

There is, believe me, a wide difference between symbolical and allegorical. If I say that the flesh and blood (*corpus noumenon*) of the Incarnate Word are power and life, I say likewise that the mysterious power and life are verily and actually the flesh and blood of Christ. They are the allegorizers who ... moralize these hard sayings, these high words of mystery, into a hyperbolic metaphor.... (cited in McFarland 42)

It is a symbolic conception of the world that most deeply marks the Tractarian ethos, in which bread and wine, duly consecrated, become the Body and Blood of Christ, and in which nature can speak of the hidden mysteries of God:

Whatever else can be said about the the theological vision of the Oxford Movement, it most certainly celebrated the universe as a marriage of love. The world was a sacrament, an epiphany of God’s beauty, and comprehending that beauty was the reception of Grace ... And although sacraments are only fully manifest in the life of the Church, the *perichoresis* (coinherence) between God and Creation is not limited to the bread and wine laid upon the altar at the mass but extends to the entire universe. (Brittain 8, 19)

⁹ Moreover, de Man’s contention that Romantic Imagination represents “a possibility for consciousness to exist by and for itself, independently of all relationships with the outside world” misreads, it seems to me, the constitutive role nature plays in the formation of consciousness (16). The “Symbols” of nature convey to the mind impressions of the Divine, and it is by no means clear that the mind could know these things in and for itself without acting upon the material world. To suggest otherwise ignores the incarnational model that Coleridge employs, which presupposes an active engagement with the material world.

Much of what has been said thus far offers a highly affirmative assessment of Coleridge's theories. What has yet to be discussed are the multiple sites of tension in Coleridge's linguistic theory. These will be explored at length in the following chapters, though I wish to note briefly the characteristics of some of his concerns. In the texts considered so far, Coleridge's rhetoric often betrays an anxiety over the validity of his linguistic theory. His discussion of the symbol employs an assertive rhetoric (it "always" participates in the reality it signifies) and is often less systematic in its articulation than declarative (*Constitution* 230). As well, his discussion of the doctrine of Christ's presence in the Eucharist cited above is extremely polemical. In both of these instances his rhetoric betrays his concern over competing theories of language and knowledge, and he appears to write with a view to destabilizing these other theories. But whatever Coleridge's concerns over the ideas expounded by his contemporaries, his central concern is with the inadequacies of language itself. As previously mentioned, the susceptibility of language to misinterpretation is a spectre that haunts his theory of the symbol. How, if the symbol communicates the Eternal through the temporal, is the Eternal to be apprehended properly? How does one safeguard orthodox interpretations of Divine revelation? How can language both symbolically signify Divine truth and appear to be an inadequate means of representing the Divine? These are the concerns that manifest themselves in Coleridge's writing, and they will be examined in detail in chapters two and three. In chapter three, particularly, the tense relationship between language's adequacy and inadequacy will be discussed in relation to Pusey's *Sermons on Solemn Subjects*.

In the following section, as I turn to consider the influence of William Wordsworth on the Movement, more attention will be given to the symbol in

nature. For now, however, I wish simply to recapitulate the main influences that Coleridge exercised on the Tractarians. Firstly, he elucidated a vision of the subject as necessarily constituted in relation to and dependent upon the Divine, resonating strongly with what Pusey took from his studies in Germany. Secondly, he articulated the characteristics of a faculty that can mediate between reason and emotion, and apprehend the spiritual in the material, not unlike Schleiermacher's "religious reason". Thirdly, he popularized a concept of the symbol which corresponds with the Tractarians' sacramental view of the world, and which contributed to the formation of a language in which to express this view. In addition to these three things, Coleridge also proposed a vision of the Church deeply resonant with the Tractarian vision. In his *On the Constitution of the Church and State* he argues for the supernatural authority of the Church, which is not subject to the dictates of political authority. Coleridge writes:

As Bishops of the Church of Christ only they can possess, or exercise ... a spiritual power, which neither King can give, nor King and Parliament take away. As Christian Bishops they are spiritual pastors, by power of the spirits ruling the flocks committed to their charge (135).

Coleridge's comments are striking given that Keble's Assize Sermon of 1833, with which the Movement began, was responding to precisely such a perceived infringement of the State in ecclesiastical affairs. Much of the Oxford Movement was given to reasserting the sacred commission and authority given to deacons, priests and bishops in their ordination. That authority derives directly from God and extends to the governance of the Church, the faithful administration of Word and Sacrament, and the Absolution of penitents. Moreover, in asserting the Divine origins of the Church's authority, he also asserted its "Heavenly

composition” as a single Body, made up of many members, in whom Christ dwells entirely individually, and all of whom together dwell in one Christ. The image of the Church as Christ’s body on earth becomes an important focus for the Oxford Movement both as a means of encouraging holy living and as a site of contention as Anglicans begin to leave the Church of England for the Church of Rome, particularly following Newman’s secession.¹⁰

Having considered the substantial influence of Coleridge on the Movement, I will turn now to Wordsworth.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF WORDSWORTH

The Oxford Movement’s indebtedness to Wordsworth is two-fold. On the one hand, he was a contemporary proponent of the vision of nature that the Tractarians were rediscovering in the writings of the Church Fathers, and which had come to them through Bishop Butler’s seminal eighteenth-century text, *The Analogy of Religion*. On the other hand, I want to suggest, he expounded an *incarnational* theory of language that saw the process of linguistic (primarily poetic) expression as akin to, and also a participation in, the Divine mystery of Christ’s incarnation. He located in language the lineaments of the Divine as the Tractarians had in nature. For Wordsworth the translation of thought to word mirrors the process by which the Logos (Christ as the Word of God) is made flesh. Indeed, it is the incarnation that furnishes both Wordsworth and the

¹⁰ Debates arose concerning the sense in which the Church Catholic – the true Body of Christ – requires *visible* union. The Tractarians developed a “branch” theory of the Church, locating catholicity in those parts of the Church that had the essentials of the Catholic faith: the Creeds; Bishops, Priest and Deacons in the Apostolic Succession; and (an extension of this) valid Sacraments. They included the Church of England, the Church of Rome and the Eastern Orthodox Church in their model. Many who seceded felt that this position was untenable. Visible unity, they argued, was only evident in the Roman Catholic communion and entailed submission to the Bishop of Rome.

Tractarians with the central dogmatic principle around which to organize their theories of language and nature.

It is the first chapter of St. John's Gospel that points the way for Wordsworth's and the Tractarians' (not to mention centuries of Christian writers and theologians) suggestions about the nature of language.¹¹ For Wordsworth, "the incarnational theory of language" is an attempt to find a theory of poetry that "remained rooted in experience yet refused to accept the compromise of a system of meaning to be paid for by renunciation of access to anything beyond the limits of our categories of understanding" (Haney 13). Perhaps as well it is an attempt to locate in thought and speech an activity corresponding with

his own idea of nature as a volume containing, in addition to phrases reminiscent of the Bible and suggestive of grace, and in conjunction with columns and paragraphs on the greatness of God, lengthy passages and entire chapters given over to the inculcation of moral emblems and the intimation of types of things to come. (Brantley 141)

What Brantley claims is that the world itself, created in and through the Word, appears to Wordsworth *as* word: as a textual site constituted by a *material* language. This appropriately expresses the Tractarians' conception of the visible world as a natural testament to God's spiritual reality where all is, to quote Pusey, "one great picture *language*", aspects of the "one great *alphabet* of that condescending language in which God reveals himself to man" (*Presence* 30-31; my emphasis).

The most explicit parallels between Tractarian thought and Wordsworth are found in the work of John Keble, for whom Wordsworth was both poet and prophet of the Divine. What Keble

¹¹ See St. John 1. 1-18.

welcomed more than anything else in Wordsworth's poetry was his new approach to the real charms of nature, his way of giving a moral and mystical interpretation to concrete objects and everyday situations, which, he thought, agreed so strikingly with the views on life and Nature of the early Fathers. (Beek 82)

Keble's own poetry in *The Christian Year*, though taking as its subject matter the structure of the liturgical calendar, bears marked thematic resemblance to Wordsworth's nature poetry, discerning in nature references to the Divine. For the Tractarians, for whom human creativity mirrors Divine creativity, the production of nature poetry is "doubly religious: religious in the first instance because the very impulse to create is religious; religious again because nature poetry treats as its subject that which already bears the imprint of God and which reveals God by Analogy" (Tennyson, *Victorian* 67). Indeed, it is Wordsworth who in part informs the very principles of Tractarian aesthetics previously mentioned, particularly Analogy. As he writes in "Tintern Abbey":

... and I have felt
 A presence that disturbs me with the joy
 Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
 Of something far more deeply interfused

 A motion and a spirit, that impels
 All thinking things, all objects of all thought.
 (Wordsworth l. 96-99, 103-04)

In this we can read a prelude to the Tractarian's conceptualization of Analogy, in which nature images the Divine. But it is the poem's *own* ability to gesture towards the Divine that caused the Tractarians to valorize the usefulness of poetry for instilling moral and religious sentiments. As Keble writes, "the very practice and cultivation of Poetry will be found to possess, in some sort, the power of

guiding and composing the mind to worship and prayer” (*Lectures 2*: 482-83).

Poetry, then, is a precursor to religious practice, and may even be seen as catechetical. Keble felt that the

poetical interpretation of natural phenomenon in which all things are invested with higher associations might help smooth the way for the acceptance of the *moral interpretation* of nature, in which all visible things are regarded as means intended for the ‘healing’ of the soul. In its turn, the moral interpretation might lead to the acceptance of the *mystical* or *prophetic interpretation*, in which all visible objects are regarded as ‘shadows of the good and true things to come’. (Beek 96)

In his description of poetic language Keble constructs a dialectic of sorts between religious and poetic truth:

And in this regard it is marvellous how Piety and Poetry are able to help each other. For, while Religion seeks out, as I said, on all sides, not merely language but also anything which may perform the office of language and help to express the emotions of the soul; what aid can be imagined more grateful and more timely than the presence of poetry, which leads men to the secret sources of Nature, and supplies a rich wealth of similes whereby a pious mind may supply and remedy, in some sort, its powerlessness of speech ... Conversely ... it is Religion [by which] ... men come to realize that the various images and similes of things, and all other poetic charms, are not merely the play of a keen and clever mind, nor to be put down as empty fancies: but rather they guide us by gentle hints and no uncertain signs, to the very utterances of Nature, or we may more truly say, of the Author of Nature ... In short, Poetry lends Religion her wealth of symbols and similes: Religion restores these again to Poetry, clothed with so splendid a radiance that they appear to be no longer merely symbols, but to partake (I might almost say) of the nature of sacraments. (*Lectures 2*: 481)

What’s striking about Keble’s description of poetic language is that it is not only figured as a representational discourse. Rather, he lends to it a certain “materiality” implied by his equation of poetic symbols and sacraments. In the

Catechism of the *Book of Common Prayer*, a Sacrament is described as “an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace”, and in the twenty-fifth Article of Religion, Sacraments are “not only badges or tokens of Christian men’s profession, but rather certain sure witnesses, and effectual signs of grace” (*BCP* 550, 707-08). But the “materiality” of poetic language (the sense in which Keble figures language as the “material” vehicle of grace like the bread and wine in Holy Communion) does not exhaust the attributes Keble ascribes to it. He also proposes that language is an event, leading us to the “very utterances of ... the Author of Nature.” Poetic language *itself* has “effectivity” in the world and is not simply a composite of signifiers approximating with more or less success a signified object. Keble’s language is a “sign” of God’s utterances. But like Coleridge’s symbol that always participates in the reality it communicates, it is not a sign that gestures *away* from itself towards an absent signified, but rather one that gestures *into* itself as an agent of revelation. This formulation of a theory of poetic discourse is essentially incarnational and is, I contend (following David Haney’s argument in *William Wordsworth and the Hermeneutics of Incarnation*), in large part indebted to Wordsworth’s incarnational poetics.

Wordsworth writes:

If words be not ... an incarnation of the thought but only a clothing for it, then surely will they prove an ill gift ... Language, if it do not uphold, and feed, and leave in quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air we breathe, is a counter-spirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work to derange, to subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve. (*Prose* 2: 84-85)

Central to this vision of language is a peculiar conceptualization of words as efficacious objects. Wordsworth’s theorization is not unlike Coleridge’s, for

whom words are “living educts of the Imagination”, nor unlike Newman’s who, speaking of Holy Scripture, writes:

Every word of Revelation has a deep meaning. It is the outward form of a heavenly truth, and in this sense a mystery or Sacrament. We may read it, confess it; but there is something in it which we cannot fathom, which we only, more or less, as the case may be, not perfectly enter into. Accordingly when a candidate for Baptism repeats the Articles of the Creed, he is confessing something incomprehensible in its depth, and indefinite in its extent. (*Via Media* 1: 254)

Coleridge’s and Newman’s statements helpfully elucidate Wordsworth’s.

Coleridge’s words are “educts”, which is to say passageways or translators, of the Imagination’s perceptions. To use Wordsworth’s terminology, they are an incarnation of thought. They mediate between the Imaginative faculty and the articulation of its activities in the world. But clarity is not the necessary corollary of this articulation. Rather, as Newman demonstrates, words offer the possibility of *participating* in a mystery (“heavenly truth”) which language “materializes” (is even a gate through which to enter), but does not exhaust. For Wordsworth, Newman and the Tractarians, the words of faith (i.e. Scripture, the Creeds, Conciliar definitions, sacred poetry and sermons) are,

together with the symbols and sacraments of the Church, the ‘keys and spells’ ... which enable us to enter and dwell in a Christian universe. In their origin they are both to be conceived as the stammering attempts of human language to acknowledge God’s presence and activity, and as the chosen economy by which God condescends to our finitude. (Rowell 64)

Like Coleridge, however, there is an anxiety present in Wordsworth’s conception of language. As well as being an incarnation of thought, language can be an “ill gift” or a “counterspirit” which, Wordsworth suggests, is what it

becomes when functioning purely as a representational discourse – as “clothing”. Far from being a consistently realized aspect of language, the symbolic character of language is subject to dissolution and decay, misuse and misappropriation. Wordsworth’s anxiety over words that fail to signify “properly” can in part be explained by the dual function Bishop Geoffrey Rowell attributes to language (cited above). Rowell characterizes language as both humanity’s “stammering” to God and as God’s “condescension” to people. It is both revelatory of God and a sign of our incapacity; it is both, to borrow from Wordsworth, clothing *and* incarnation. This tension in the nature of language will be explored in the second chapter in relation to nineteenth-century homiletics.

What I am suggesting is that Wordsworth’s incarnational poetics figures language as a symbolic structure (in the Coleridgean sense). Furthermore, I want to suggest that the Tractarians adopt this conception of language inasmuch as it offers a way to articulate the efficacy of religious language for revealing Divine truth. Such a vision of language differs markedly from nineteenth-century philology and its fears about language’s arbitrary qualities, as well as from Saussurean and post-Saussurean linguistics that rely upon a signifier/signified distinction. The influence of Wordsworth on the Tractarians is chiefly to be found in these areas of nature and linguistics, wherein he furnished them both with a theory of language and with a contemporary account of nature that resonated with the accounts they were excavating in the works of the Church Fathers and Scripture.

III. TRACTARIAN AESTHETICS AND ROMANTICISM: AN OVERVIEW

The relationship between Tractarianism and Romanticism is one of influence and one of articulation. As G.B. Tennyson writes, “Tractarian aesthetic theory is ... more than a simple continuation of Coleridge and Wordsworth; it is rather *Romanticism in a new key*” (*Victorian* 22; my emphasis). The question, then, is in what ways are the Tractarians indebted to Romantic figures such as Wordsworth and Coleridge for the formulation of their aesthetic principles, and how do they re-articulate that Romantic vision in relation to their theological concerns? What I wish to accomplish in the following pages is to briefly outline the lineaments of the Romantic impulse in Tractarian aesthetics as well as the general characteristics of that aesthetic. Central to this chapter will be the consistent attempt to locate Pusey in relation to the aesthetic developments of the nineteenth century.

In considering the influence of an ostensibly aesthetic movement such as Romanticism on a theological movement like Tractarianism, it is best to begin by considering how figures such as Pusey, Keble and Newman negotiate the difference between art and theology. Indeed, their ability to reconcile these two apparently distinct discourses, following Coleridge, is integral to their visions of God and of nature. As Stephen Prickett notes, the influence of Coleridge and Wordsworth on nineteenth-century culture cannot be limited to either aesthetics or theology. Rather, their influence was “in [Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s] sense of the word, ‘poetic’ ... an indivisible union of the two” (Prickett, *Romanticism* 6). As Coleridge notes in his *Biographia Literaria*, the act of poetic creation (the aesthetic) mirrors the Divine act of creation (the theological) in that it is a “repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM”

(167). Thus, Coleridge figures aesthetic activity as a participation in the Divine activity: not only does he dissolve any apparent distinction between theology and aesthetics, but he also renders aesthetics contingent upon God's prior actions and model.¹²

Similarly, one of the most striking features of Tractarian discourse is its alignment of poetry and the spiritual life, even using poetry as a trope through which to describe the life of the Christian. As Newman writes:

revealed religion should be especially poetical – and it is so in fact. While its discourses have an originality in them to engage the intellect, they have a beauty to satisfy the moral nature ... It brings us into a new world – a world of overpowering interest, of sublimest views, and the tenderest and purest feelings ... *With Christians, a poetical view of things is a duty* – we are bid to colour all things with hues of faith, to see a divine meaning in every event and a superhuman tendency. (“Poetry”; my emphasis)

Strikingly, Newman and Coleridge align poetic and religious *perception*. Poetry becomes a Christian faculty, or disposition, that can “read” in the finite traces of the Divine. John Keble extends this image of the poetical as an attribute of the Christian life to describe the way in which God acts in the world : “So may it not be affirmed that He condescends in like manner to have *a poetry of His own*, a set of holy and divine associations and meanings, wherewith it is His will to invest all material things?” (Tract 89, 144). Between Keble and Newman we find a notable re-articulation of Coleridge's theory of creative activity. Newman's poetic “faculty” is an image of Keble's description of Divine creativity. Following

¹² As has been discussed, this relationship between human labour and God's labour informs an epistemological vision that challenges, through the faculty of the imagination, attempts to divorce subject and object, or mind and nature.

Coleridge they are proposing a theory of “correspondances”: they locate in the subjective consciousness a faculty corresponding to a Divine attribute, the primary function of which is to perceive the Divine. Poetry becomes a means of perceiving God’s presence in the world, and in this sense the Tractarians conclude that reading poetry is “almost a devotional exercise” (Tennyson, *Victorian* 29).

The Tractarians’ valorization of poetry not only elevates the Christian poetic disposition and the poetic activity of God, however, it also elevates the poet. For Keble, in particular, the poet is a moral guide and a prophetic witness of God’s will. He became convinced that his “studies of the Old Testament, of Hebrew poetry and of the Classics . . . supplied him with sufficient evidence in support of his contention that there has seldom been a revival of religion without some ‘noble order of poets’ first leading the way” (Beek 73). And his dedication of his Oxford Lectures on Poetry (the *Praelectiones Academicæ*) to Wordsworth voices a similar view of the poet’s moral and religious function:

To William Wordsworth, True Philosopher and Inspired Poet, who by special gift and calling of Almighty God, whether he sang of man or of nature, failed not to lift up men’s hearts to the holy things, nor ever ceased to champion the cause of the poor and simple, and so in perilous times was raised up to be a chief minister, not only of sweetest poetry, but also of high and sacred truth – this tribute, slight though it be, is offered by one of the multitude who feel ever indebted for the immortal treasure of his splendid poems in testimony of respect, affection and gratitude. (*Lectures* 1: 8)

But if this is the vision that Keble had of the poet, it was coupled with a rigorous conception of what constitutes “true” poetry, and for this the Movement was indebted yet again to Coleridge and, especially, to Wordsworth. The Movement

found in both authors a conception of nature that paralleled its own, which saw that

the visible and tangible were but symbols of a transcendent life, the vesture of the spirit, through which its motions made themselves felt. They rejected absolutely the notion of a material earth, isolated and complete, working by cast-iron laws, in the mechanical deadness of unintelligent force. On the contrary, it was alive, with a life not its own, which alone gave it meaning; and this life was personal, intelligent, sympathetic, communicable to man. In and through nature, spirit spoke with spirit, man came in touch with God. (Forrester 82)

This conception of the natural world as sign and symbol of the supernatural was central to the Tractarian aesthetic (as well as to its dogmatic and pastoral theology). True poetry articulated a Divine presence in the natural world so that the inward life of the soul could be guided by the hidden life of God in His external works. As Pusey writes in an unpublished lecture,

[God] mirrors Himself in the works of His hands. He stamps in the book of His Word the meaning of the book of his works ... All is one great picture language, to present to our sense and minds what is invisible, intangible, inconceivable. (*Presence* 30-31)

Pusey “textualizes” nature and creates a parallel between the text of Holy Scripture, which functions as an interpretive key, and the text of the world. The centrality of Scripture to the interpretive process (which is to say, by extension, the centrality of Christ) is characteristic of the Tractarian world view.

The notion of God’s hiddenness in the material world constitutes the most definitive characteristic of Tractarian poetics. As has been mentioned, there are three general principles, or guiding ideas, that make up the Tractarian aesthetic – Reserve, Typology and Analogy. All of these relate to the traces of God’s

presence that the Tractarians saw impressed upon the natural world. They argued that the mysteriousness of this presence in nature corresponds with the way that God reveals Himself in sacred Scripture and in the Incarnation: in the one, He appears as a pillar of fire, or a cloud, or preaches by parable; in the other, He appears with His Divine glory veiled by human flesh. They concluded from their study of Scripture and the Church Fathers that God manifests himself to the world primarily through means of suggestion, indirection, and intimation. God's practice in the communication of His being finds expression in the Tractarian principle of Reserve, which is a re-articulation of a patristic practice commonly called the *disciplina arcani*.¹³ Reserve characterizes the way in which God reveals Himself to the world. It is also, as Tennyson suggests, a pedagogic method whereby individuals are introduced gradually to the truths of the faith. Simply put,

the idea of Reserve is that since God is ultimately incomprehensible, we can know Him only indirectly; His truth is hidden and given to us only in a manner suited to our capacities for apprehending it. Moreover, it is both unnecessary and undesirable that God and religious truth generally should be disclosed in their fullness at once to all regardless of the differing capacities of individuals to apprehend such things. God Himself in His economy has only gradually revealed such things as we know about Him. (Tennyson, *Victorian* 45)

But if Reserve characterizes “methodologically” how God relates to world, then the “material” of that methodology is Analogy. Analogy implies the way in which the visible things of the world speak of the hidden mysteries of God. This does not function, however, as a random attribution of theological

¹³ The most comprehensive explanations of this principle are Isaac Williams's Tracts 80 and 87, *On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge*.

signification to various natural phenomenon. Rather, the Tractarians stress that the eternal truths attested to by nature are more than fabrications of the mind – they are inherent properties of the objects themselves. David Forrester cites Pusey’s unpublished “Lectures on Types and Prophecies”:

instances of ... nature conveying moral and religious truth will have been felt by everyone; and they will have felt also, that these religious meanings were not arbitrarily affixed by their own minds, but that they arose out of and existed in the things themselves ... A proof that this expressiveness really lies in the object and is not the work of imagination (otherwise than as imagination is employed in tracing out the mutual correspondance of images with their reality) is furnished by this, that when the religious poets (as Wordsworth or the author of *The Christian Year*) have tried out such correspondance, the mind instantly recognizes it as *true*, not as *beautiful* only, and so belonging to their minds subjectively, but as actually and really existing. (101)¹⁴

Following from this conception of Analogy is the third of the Tractarian principles: Typology. Though difficult to distinguish from Analogy in that it too attempts to discern the relationship between things of this world to the Divine, Typology and Typological readings are most often associated with the study of Scripture in which the “type” of the Old Testament (say, for example, the manna in the wilderness), is taken to pre-figure the New Testament’s anti-type (in this case, the institution of the Holy Communion, the Bread from Heaven). But the Tractarian use of Typology was by no means novel.¹⁵ It was preceded by a long Evangelical tradition of reading the types of the Old Testament as prophecies and figures of the New. Where the Tractarians differed, however, was in their return

¹⁴ Note the clear Coleridgean resonances in Pusey’s description of the faculty of the Imagination.

¹⁵ For a brief but helpful account of Typology in the nineteenth century see G.B. Tennyson’s “‘So careful of the type?’ – Victorian Biblical Typology: Its Sources and Applications.”

to the Patristic practice of Typological reading. Unlike the Evangelical practice that tended to favour discovering *individual* correspondances between the type and anti-type, the Tractarians allowed the type to figure a multiplicity of anti-types, and extended Typological readings to include not only those types that were fulfilled in Christ, but those that seemed to be figures of the Church and its ministry as well (as, for example, the “type” of the manna and the “anti-type” of the Holy Communion cited above). It is important to note, however, that the proper reading of types, and, indeed, of nature as the book of God’s works, means reading them through Christ. In this sense, as W. David Shaw points out, Tractarian Typology reverses the order of cause and effect. The anti-type indwells and interprets the type, so that we must “read backwards,” as it were, if we are to understand the world, or Scripture, as revelations of God (Shaw 190). As Clark M. Brittain writes:

The created order is filled with types we do not recognize until we learn to read them through Christ. With the advent of the Incarnation we learn the complete meaning of nature. Everything utters Christ. Accordingly, when Pusey speaks of a ‘sacramental union between the type and anti-type’ he is affirming the presence of Christ in the type and fulfilment. (9)

Brittain’s equation of perception with reading is an apt description of Pusey’s perspective. For Pusey the world is a series of words informed and sustained by the uncreated Word. Nature is an “alphabet” of divine utterances, as it were, and Christ provides the interpretive framework. But, in an intentionally circular argument, what we read *through* Christ *is* Christ. Pusey clearly articulates this in a comment that juxtaposes Typology and Analogy:

...there is a beauty in this universal relation of the most distant and minutest things and words of Holy Scripture, with the most central and greatest, even those of Him, our Lord ... It is analogous to His scheme of creation, in which the lowest things bear a certain relation to the highest, attesting the unity of their author; that it is agreeable to the connection of His Word and His word, that this should, even in what seems the most incidental and insignificant detail of it, speak of Him, who spoke it, be penetrated with Him, who is its and our life (Tract 67, 389-90)

God's utterances (his works) speak his Word.

Reserve, Analogy and Typology, then, refer to God's means of communicating His being to the world, and were archetypally represented for the Tractarians in the Sacraments, wherein materials of the world (water in Baptism; bread and wine in the Holy Communion) become the means of conducting Divine grace mystically – and actually – to the recipient. This relationship between the Sacraments and the Tractarian aesthetic will be expanded upon later.

Having summarized briefly the general characteristics of the Tractarian aesthetic, and its indebtedness to Coleridge's conceptions of imagination and symbol and Wordsworth's reading of nature, I will now turn to a closer consideration of nineteenth-century homiletics in an attempt to elucidate a methodology for reading Pusey's sermons. I will further explore the ramifications of an incarnational theory of language for sermon writing and pulpit oratory. For Wordsworth to "draw on the Christian idea of incarnation for his theory of language is for him to acknowledge that this paradigmatic translation of spirit into event entailed the violent death of the God become man" (Haney 11). In the following chapter I will consider the ramifications of the necessary "death of the word" (within, of course, the economy the Resurrection) on homiletic theory.