MISSIONARIES, MURDER AND DIPLOMACY
IN LATE 19th CENTURY CHINA: A CASE STUDY

A Paper presented to the
2nd ANU Missionary History Conference
Asia-Pacific Missionaries: At Home and Abroad,

Australian National University
Friday 27 – Sunday 29 August 2006

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"The Christian ideal —— abstract and altruistic"
To view the [Huashan Massacre] from the prudential point of view
Is to raise the whole question of foreign missions and the aims and
motives in which they have their origin. This being the case it is right
to remember what these aims are. Setting Christianity aside for the moment
they will be seen to be based on the most abstract and altruistic of motives,
with which the ordinary prudential considerations that govern life
has admittedly little or nothing to do.

The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 1895

The confusing status of Australians is best illustrated by the London "Times correspondent
in Peking from 1897 to 1912, and 'Political Adviser to the President of the Republic of
China (Yuan Shih-k'ai) until 1916, was an Australian and, as a premature obituary
put it, 'the best kind of colonial Englishman'."

G E Curwen, Review of Lo Hui-min (ed.): (1976),

The whole of the missionary interests in Fuhkien province were vitally concerned
in the general outcomes of the Huasang investigation: and it may be said, indeed,
that all missionary interests in China were more or less involved.
There is no gainsaying the fact that at one time during the investigation
the proximate safety on not only missionaries but also of other
foreigners in this consular district was practically dependent upon the
success of the committee [Commission] charged with holding the inquiry
into the causes of the massacre. Moreover, the matter largely concerned the
future of missionary work throughout all China.

Hixson, J Courtney, US Consul, Fuzhou, Report on the Huashan-Gutian Massacre,
State Department, Despatches from United States Consuls in Fuzhou, 1849-1906
Microform No 150, Roll 8.

During the TPSM (Three Self Patriotic Movement - from 1950) criticism of the use of religion
as an agent of imperialism, many Christian writers prefaced mention of missionaries with
the phrase, "agents of imperialism." That had changed by the 1980s, with the feeling that
missionaries should not be lumped together but should be judged on an individual basis. . . .
We should differentiate among missionaries on the basis of their actions during historical events.
Any actions of theirs which benefitted the Chinese people will not forgotten . . .
Many missionaries came to China with a mission of spreading the Gospel and many gave
their lives for it. They translated the Bible and did much for cultural exchange, medicine
and health, worked to transform social traditions and social service work.

Luo Guangzong, (2004), 'Remembering the Past as a Lesson for the Future,'
pp 1-16 in Chinese Theological Review, 2004
The response of British, American and Chinese officials to the Huashan Massacre of 1 August 1895 exemplifies the complex relationship between Imperial (Qing Dynasty) China and the rest of the 19th century world, including Australia through its colonial dependence upon Great Britain. The forcible entry of the Western powers into Asian trade networks created, over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, the first economic globalization by which Asia was aligned with the wider world. An extraordinary volume of information about China poured into Europe and North America during the 18th and 19th centuries influencing many aspects of European culture. The 19th century was not a happy period in Chinese national history and continues to influence relationships with the outside world.

I must say frankly that the first introduction of international law in China from the western world in the late 19th century left the Chinese with little fond memories, as it was done through cannons and warships.

Foreign commercial access, imposed by military force, facilitated Protestant Christian enterprises in which the ideals of Christendom were ‘marketed’ to the Chinese. Missionary work resulted in an ever-expanding popular Christian literature that helped shape the views of millions of ordinary people in Australasia, Europe and North America. Much of the missionary literature brought very negative views of the people and societies to whom the missionaries sought to bring Western enlightenment.

3 Catholic missionaries preceded the Protestants by more than 200 years. Protestants were slow to take up the concept of the evangelisation of non-Europeans. The standard and most comprehensive survey is Latourette, K S, (1929), A History of Christian Missions in China, London, SPCK
4 Hevia includes the contribution of missionaries in such matters as education, health, social institutions, etc.
The relationship between Protestant missionaries in the field (with varied countries of origin, values, and beliefs), mission field committees in China, home committees in Europe and America and the governments and diplomats of missionary sending countries resulted in the accusation of ‘cultural imperialism’. Contemporary Chinese Christian writing is reappraising this representation of the contribution of foreign missionaries to modern Chinese Christianity. Cultural imperialism views Christian missions as imposing foreign values upon indigenous populations and ignores the fact that foreigners and Chinese at the time were well aware of the cultural dimension involved in evangelism. Missionaries were undeniably change agents given that their primary objective was to change lives and values but their actual numbers and their relative lack of conversions counsels against over-emphasizing their impact. A Chinese Anglican minister in Ningpo wrote to the Church Missionary Society in London:

“The missionaries who come from the honourable country [i.e. England] however advanced in learning, and however strong in faith they may be, it is impossible for them when they are but recently come to remove the existing difficulties. Not only are they ignorant of the written character and spoken language, but also are unacquainted with our customs and our characteristics. Hence within the Church hypocrisy is apt to arise, and outside the Church useless books are distributed. From these causes idle rumours arise, slanders are intensified, sincere inquiries are lessened in number. These are difficulties which must lie in the way of those who first come to preach the Gospel. The Lord indeed knows how their best efforts are...


7 The accusation of ‘cultural imperialism’ is discussed in Dunch, Ryan, (2002), ‘Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Cultural Theory, Christian Missions and Global Modernity,’ pp 301-325 in History and Theory, No 41, October 2003. American, and British missionaries were required to approach local officials only through their consul and this reinforced Chinese belief that the missionaries and their governments were in concert. Denby to Secretary of State, 29 October 1895. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101. For a personal account of missionary political involvement outside the framework of evangelism see Reed, James Eldin, (1972), ‘American Foreign Policy, The Politics of Missions and Josiah Strong, 1890-1900, pp 230-245 in Church History, Vol 41 No 2. For a more recent family focussed account of the involvement of American missionaries in political issues see Christensen, Erleen J, (2005), In War and Famine: Missionaries in China’s Honan Province in the 1940’s, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press. A characteristic expression of modern Chinese Christians views of this era is Luo Guanzong, (2004), ‘Remembering he Past as a Lesson for the Future,’ pp 1-16, Chinese Theological Review, 2004.


given to it, alas owing to he faults of the people generally, these efforts are to a great extent expended in vain.\textsuperscript{11}

Without the ‘unequal’ treaties imposed on China by foreign powers, especially the Treaty of Tientsin (1860), there would have been very limited opportunities for Christian missionary work in 19\textsuperscript{th} century China.\textsuperscript{12} Whether or not missionary influence was subversive depends on the response of local elites at specific times and places.\textsuperscript{13} Concern about cultural change came to focus on missionaries because they were, by and large, the only foreigners to reside inland and inevitably Chinese anti-foreignism fell upon them and their Chinese converts.\textsuperscript{14} An English Anglican missionary remarked that ‘if (foreign) merchants (lived) in the interior, the people would never think of attacking the missionary first’.\textsuperscript{15} The pattern of Chinese elite opposition to foreign missionaries varied widely and for twenty years before the Huashan Massacre there is no evidence of active anti-missionary activity by the local elite in Gutian district.

From the Treaty of Tientsin (1858) onwards, the policies of the United Kingdom and the United States towards China\textsuperscript{16} centred on expanding commercial relationships and maintaining Chinese sovereignty.\textsuperscript{17} For foreign diplomats the protection of their missionary nationals\textsuperscript{18} in China was a...
secondary task to their primary political, military and economic concerns. On the Chinese side, the primary goal of the Chinese Imperial Government and provincial officials was to manage effectively within tradition while seeking to contain foreign incursions and suppress internal unrest.

The majority of 19th century Protestant evangelical missionaries hoped that converted Chinese individuals would contribute to the reconstruction of China in which an ‘enlightened’, i.e., essentially European, Christian worldview would replace ‘heathen’ values. Missionaries initially focused on individual conversions but increasingly became involved in major educational and welfare ventures as a means of making Christianity a relevant factor in people’s daily lives. From the late 19th century onwards the Americans brought a strong emphasis on higher education arising from a long frontier tradition of self-improvement through colleges established by religious denominations. Few ‘British’ missions or missionaries shared the American belief in the reconstructive power of higher education.

18 US Minister Charles Denby reported in 1895 that missionaries were the ‘only Americans residing in the interior.’ Denby to Secretary of State, 14 November 1895. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101.

19 ‘By 1868 the China Station had emerged as the largest single station in the Royal Navy in terms of ships. The station was divided into four divisions: South China, North China, Japan and the Straits of Malacca. A coaling station was located at Singapore, a coal station at Kowloon and coaling facilities at Swatow, Amoy and Foochow. The need for a station was self-evident. In 1880, British vessels had made almost 12,400 entries and clearances at China ports carrying over 9.6 m tons of cargo. The total value of foreign and coastal trade carried in British vessels was over £665m.’ Harding, R., A Jarvis and A Kennerley (eds), (2005), British Ships in China Seas: 1700 to the Present Day, Society of Nautical Research & National Museums of Liverpool, Review in Journal of Maritime Research, February 2005.


21 A defence of the Chinese social order is given by Wu ting-Fang, (1903), ‘Chinese and Western Civilization,’ pp 190-192 in Harper’s Monthly Magazine, Vol CVI, January 1903. The writer was China’s Minister to the United States. He asserted that: ‘The Chinese as a people are, on the whole, satisfied with their lot, and the tendency of Chinese civilization is to bring peace and contentment.’ (p 192).

22 The majority of Protestant missionaries, and virtually all the Australians, irrespective of the mission they belonged to, were evangelicals. Bebbington identifies four hallmarks: individual conversion; the gospel needs to be taken to all people (evangelism); Biblical authority in all matters of faith; and emphasis on Christ’s death on the cross to atone for the sins of all humankind (substitutionary atonement). Bebbington, D W, (1989), Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, A History from the 1730s to the 1980s, London, Unwin Hyman. See Yang Fenggang, (1998), ‘Chinese conversion to evangelical Christianity: the importance of social and cultural contexts’ pp. 237-258 in Sociology of Religion, Vol. 59, Iss. 3, Fall 1998.

23 See discussion of diffusion (appeal to individuals) and acculturation (changing society) as two strands in Protestant missionary styles. Cavalcanti op cit, pp 383-384.


It did not take long before even the most blinkered evangelicals realized that their converts, many from marginalized elements in society, would never succeed in transforming China as a whole. If the term ‘cultural imperialism’ is defined in terms of an emphasis on foreign learning and foreign concepts of state and society then perhaps the American educational contribution comes closest but overseas Chinese with experience in the wider world community, as well as many Chinese reformers inside China, also helped to create ‘modern’ higher education along foreign, predominantly American, lines. The emphasis upon higher education was not an entirely foreign idea.

Foreign diplomacy in China became a more complex occupation as the Protestant missionary movement expanded in the last half of the 19th century. Initial Protestant missionary efforts in China beginning in 1807 were inconsequential. The Treaty of Nanking (1842) granted foreign Protestant missionaries the right to live in five coastal Treaty Ports. After the Treaty of Tientsin (1860), Protestant missionaries spread across inland China. Article IX of the Tientsin Treaty, common to all language versions, allowed for transient activities in inland districts by foreign businessmen and travellers. The US State Department reflected the general diplomatic assessment, shared by the British, when it stated in 1886 that ‘the privilege of temporary residence (in the interior) would not justify any assertion of the right to rent or purchase premises for permanent occupation.’ Nonetheless Protestant missionaries used the Treaty to legitimize their presence across China creating problems for their diplomatic compatriots who had to deal with the consequences of their actions. Many missionaries would have shared the views of the Rev. John Mahood of the Church Missionary Society:


The standard work is Stauffer, Miller T, (1922), The Christian Occupation of China, Shanghai, China Continuation Press.

The first Protestant missionary was the Rev. Robert Morrison, an Englishman. A brief introduction will be found at http://www.mundus.ac.uk/cats/4/1078.htm Another summary is at http://uk.geocities.com/Morrison1782/Morrison/Biography.html There are many biographies of Morrison.


US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking. Tsungli Yamen to Denby, 31 August 1895. Denby’s despatch set out the various statements issued from 1882 onwards by successive Secretaries of State.
I believe it is much better for missionaries to have as little to do with the Consuls as possible, yet there are times when our lives may be placed in such danger that we are compelled to ask for that protection which the Government at home professes to give us.\textsuperscript{31}

Many Chinese officials opposed property transactions involving inland missions in vain efforts to limit the foreign missionary presence.\textsuperscript{32} The Chinese intelligentsia believed that if the missionaries succeeded in placing their European Christian values on an equal footing with traditional Chinese teachings a decline in their status was inevitable.\textsuperscript{33} In 1906, the American Consul in Fuzhou, Samuel F Gracey, gave this assessment of the feelings of the scholar-gentry:

They find the ground slipping from under them by the impact of Western civilization, which is forcing upon them reforms, the trend of which is all towards great changes in their cherished beliefs, customs, learnings, and methods, and they cannot see whereunto all this is leading them.\textsuperscript{34}

Missionaries often sought to avoid local obstruction by using Chinese names or those of Chinese intermediaries, including Chinese Christian converts, when buying or renting mission properties.\textsuperscript{35}

The difficulties which missionaries experience in securing the enjoyment of their Treaty rights in leasing land or houses in the interior are largely attributable to the factious opposition of the literati, too often acquiesced in, if not actively supported, by the local authorities.\textsuperscript{36}

Property disputes were a factor in many anti-missionary riots between 1860 and 1900.\textsuperscript{37} The payment of compensation following destruction of missionary property indicates that the Chinese

\textsuperscript{31} Mahood had personal experience of danger while itinerating in the Gutian District. He was nearly murdered near Gutian in September 1871 as a result of a report that foreign missionaries had been issuing a white powder to kill Chinese (The Shan Sin Fan plot). Mahood to Fenn, CMS London, 8 September 1871, C CH o 60 CMS East Asia Archives.

\textsuperscript{32} Tsungli Yamen to Denby, US State Department Archives Despatches from US Legation, Peking. 31 August 1895. Colonel Charles Denby was the United States Minister in China from 1885-1898.

\textsuperscript{33} China was administered by an intellectual elite selected from the ranks of those who undertook lengthy studies in Chinese classical literature at district, provincial and national level. From the successful candidates, men were chosen for administrative positions. The terms ‘literati’ or ‘scholar-gentry’ are common terms. In or out of office, the literati were at the top of the status ladder irrespective of personal wealth. They formed a highly influential leadership core in Chinese society. See Chang Chung-li, (1967), The Chinese Gentry: Studies in Their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society. Seattle, University of Washington Press. Chang Chung-li, (1962), The Income of the Chinese Gentry, Seattle, University of Washington Press. Gernet, Jacques, (1985), China: The Christian Impact, A Conflict of Cultures, Cambridge University Press.

\textsuperscript{34} Gracey to Robert Bacon, Assistant Secretary of State, 6 December 1906, cited in Varg, 1968, op cit, p 747.

\textsuperscript{35} The use of Chinese intermediaries is reported from Catholic missions in Sichuan. Daigle op cit, p 23. A helpful discussion of the development of the rights of missions in property matters will be found in Sweeten, op cit, Ch 5.

\textsuperscript{36} O’Conor to Mansfield, 19 January 1895. See also Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194 1895, letter by G Owen of the London Missionary Society, 17 January 1895 explaining how Protestant missions sought to overcome the problem of securing property.

\textsuperscript{37} Denby had previously advised the US Secretary of State that in his opinion, ‘an international commission to consider all questions touching the residence of Christians in China is desirable.’
Government accepted, however reluctantly, inland missionary residence.\textsuperscript{38} US Minister to China, Charles Denby, stated:

Since [1886] the Government of China has, in the most emphatic manner, recognized the right of missionaries to go anywhere in the interior, to buy land and reside on it. The recent amendment to the Berthemy Convention has settle this question. To open it again would be reactionary.\textsuperscript{39}

Where Chinese elite obstruction did not dissuade missionaries some sections of the literati chose other means to stir up local opposition.\textsuperscript{40} Cohen has described some of the more flagrant examples.\textsuperscript{41} A common practice was the deliberate spreading of stories intended to bring the missionaries into disrepute such as these examples in Gutian.

Slanderous reports (were) spread by a man who came to the chapel as a professed enquirer, obtained copies of the books, and then went about telling absurd stories of what went on there, affirming that he had been admitted to the secrets of ‘the religion,’ in proof of which he produced the books. For instance, he affirmed that at the Fuchow [Fuzhou] mission-house there was a pond or tank containing water brought from a wonderful place called the Pool of Bethesda; that converts, under the pretence of being cleansed from all sin [baptism] were required to wash in this pond; that those who did so suddenly disssolved, and were no more seen; but that from the dregs consequently deposited the foreigners extracted opium!\textsuperscript{42}

The accusation of ‘cultural imperialism’ mentioned earlier linked the citizenship of individual missionaries with an imperialist conspiracy between missionaries and foreign diplomats.\textsuperscript{43} In reality

\textsuperscript{38} US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Tsungli Yamen to Denby, 31 August 1895.

Denby’s despatch makes it clear that irrespective of a formal agreement such as the Berthemy Convention, the United States would not negotiate on the issue of the right of American missionaries to reside anywhere in China once the local officials had consented to their presence and approved the purchase of property. If the local officials changed their mind, the United States would not agree to the use of force to remove American citizens and reserved the right to protect Americans living in China. Denby told the Zongli Yamen that: ‘The missionary is simply a citizen and the sacred character of his object and purposes does not enter into the determination of his rights.’ The response of the Zongli Yamen was that Denby’s argument was: ‘based upon that which is right and just, for which we hold the highest respect.’

\textsuperscript{39} US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Tsungli Yamen, 31 August 1895. See discussion in Daigle op cit, p 4.


\textsuperscript{42} Stock, Eugene, (1877), op cit, p 95.

\textsuperscript{43} US Minister Denby observed that Chinese officialdom regarded Chinese converts to Christianity as seeking to take advantage of ‘foreign protection to bully their fellow-citizens.’ Denby to Secretary of State, 26 November 1895. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101. See discussion in Varg, Paul A, (1954), ‘Motives in Protestant Missions, 1890-1917, pp 68-82 in Church History, Vol 23 No 1, March 1954, especially p 73.
most diplomats regarded missionaries and their activities as a ‘troublesome’ nuisance. A later British minister wrote:

I hope I may be left to pursue my own line in respect of missionaries, and to say to my colleagues: as I did yesterday, that tho’ I have no prejudices against the missionaries, I regard the insertion in the Tientsin treaty of clauses about mission work as the most impolitic thing ever done in China.

The United States Government instructed its officers not to interfere in missionary affairs other than to protect American citizens from physical danger. Wehrle summarized the different worldviews of British missionaries and diplomats in China:

The encounter of missionary and diplomat pitted men [and women] of burning ardor against men of slow deliberation. It was a conflict of enthusiasm against sophistication, of dedication against detachment. But the odds against the dispassionate diplomats rose steadily. Once the missionaries . . . began to pour into China, the studied cautions of the [British] Foreign Office would have little effect upon the movement as a whole.

In 1858, there were less than 100 Protestant missionaries (and some wives) living in China. By the mid 1890s there were more than 1000 missionaries with their wives and families. (See Tables 1.1 to 1.3). Between 1860 and 1900, Protestant Christians in Great Britain and North America together with other foreign Protestant societies opened mission stations in places where no foreigners had ever been seen before. In 1860, there were 35 Protestant mission stations in 14 cities. Between 1861 and 1888, 132 mission stations were opened in 65 cities. By 1890, there were 498 stations located in 345 cities. Despite this growth foreigners were an insignificant presence throughout the 19th century when seen against the five hundred million Chinese (1900 estimate) and the tens of thousands of

44 Brown, op cit, Ch XX.
46 Denby to Secretary of State, 14 November 1895. Reed, op cit, p 239.
47 Wehrle, Edmund S, (1966), Britain, China, and the Anti-missionary Riots, 1891-1900, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p 46. Brown was an American Presbyterian minister who served as General Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions.
48 Latourette, p 405.
49 The extent to which foreign missionaries, and especially single women, took up the evangelization of inland China, and the methods used, is discussed in: Welch, Ian, (2005), Women Missionaries in 19th Century China: Their Life and Work, Paper for the Eighth Women in Asia Conference, Asian Studies Association of Australia, 26-28 September 2005, University of Technology, Sydney. The total 19th century foreign missionary presence did not exceed 5000 people (including wives and children), and about half of all missionaries resided in the main coastal treaty ports. For most of the 19th century there were less than 500 Protestant missionaries (including wives and children) residing inland. By the end of the 19th century, estimates suggest that less than 100,000 Chinese had accepted Protestant Christianity. Protestant higher education institutions, mostly American staffed, had influence among young, western educated Chinese. See Lutz, Jessie Gregory, (1971), China and the Christian Colleges, 1850-1950, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. Lutz, Jessie G. (1976), Chinese Nationalism and the Anti-Christian Campaigns of the 1920s, pp 395-416 in Modern Asian Studies, Vol 10 No 3, 1976.
villages, towns and cities across a vast geographical area.\textsuperscript{50} The situation changed remarkably in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century when the number of foreign missionaries exploded (See Tables 1.6 and 1.6b).

The growing missionary presence in China from 1880 onwards produced administrative uncertainty for Chinese and foreign officials alike.\textsuperscript{51} Consular work increased as the number of missionaries grew stimulating Chinese literati resistance to foreign penetration.\textsuperscript{52} The Zongli Yamen was disliked by Chinese provincial officials who saw the establishment of a ‘foreign office’ in Beijing to facilitate dealing with foreign powers as an offensive outcome of the ‘unequal treaties.’\textsuperscript{53} British diplomats were determined to establish the Zongli Yamen as the principal point of contact with foreign governments to bring China into a conventional (for Europeans) model of international relations. The daily conflict between the foreign consuls and Chinese provincial officials in Gutian during the Huashan Massacre trials demonstrated how officials from the Viceroy downwards sought to ignore or evade instructions from the Zongli Yamen.


\textsuperscript{51} Wehrle, op cit, p 52.

\textsuperscript{52} Hevia, 1968, op cit, discusses the foreign relations issue in some detail. The Rev. Arthur Judson Brown said that reports from consuls suggested that missionaries did create work simply because they were the largest group of nationals with whom consuls had to deal. A contemporary US minister in Thailand said that he had more trouble with 15 traders than with 150 American missionaries. Brown, op cit., Ch XX. As a result of recent research (Sweeten op cit) it is now possible to identify the existence of missionary cases in the archives of the Zongli Yamen.

\textsuperscript{53} In a review of Cohen’s \textit{China and Christianity (op cit)}, Elena Songster wrote that there were three kinds of anti-foreign sentiment that affected missionaries: ‘Simple disdain for Christianity as superstitious;’ a view of ‘Christianity as integrally linked to imperialism;’ and deep-rooted emotional feeling of resentment and fear of loss of status among the Chinese elite. (http://orpheus.acsd.edu/chinesehistoryogp/cohen/htm). In a speech celebrating the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in China’s President Jiang Zemin said: ‘The Treaty of Nanking was the first unequal treaty imposed by a big Western power upon the Chinese people.’ \textit{Xinhua}, 1 July 1997. The English missionary Samuel Couling noted that between 1842 to 1901, there were ninety-eight treaties between China and foreign powers, Couling, S. (1917), The Encyclopaedia Sinica. Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, Reprint Taipei 1964, pp 570 ff. (Reprinted 2004).
### Table 1.1
Protestant Missionaries 1840-1889

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Single Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>c20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>c81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>including wives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated Population of China 1900—500 million i.e. one missionary to every 40 million Chinese in 1900

### Table 1.2
China: Nationality of Protestant Missionaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 1.3
China: Arrival of Protestant Missionaries c 1842-c1900
(Excluding wives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842-1857</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855-1867</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868-1877</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878-1887</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888-1897</td>
<td>*1272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 1880 onwards marked by increasing numbers of single women

### Table 1.4
Mission Stations in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mission stations</th>
<th>Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860:</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880:</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890:</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 1.5
CMS Statistics for Fujian Province, China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ORDAINED MINISTERS</th>
<th>TOTAL CHINESE EMPLOYED</th>
<th>COMMUNICANT MEMBERS</th>
<th>TOTAL ADHERENTS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SCHOOLS</th>
<th>TOTAL STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>633</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>3556</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5704</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>2267</td>
<td>8489</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>3062</td>
<td>13111</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>2399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>4327</td>
<td>21478</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>3354</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.6a**

Foreign Missionaries in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>c 20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>c 81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>including wives</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>1296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>5338</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>6204</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>8158</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>6500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latourette, K S, (1929),

*A History of Christian Missions in China*, London, SPCK.
Diplomats were well aware of the impossibility of reacting strongly to every incident involving missionaries. US Minister Charles Denby, who supported the ‘civilizing’ role of missions, said that by the time consuls heard of an anti-missionary event the missionaries on the spot would have already taken whatever action was necessary to protect themselves and their families. Unlike British officials in China, who made the issue of an internal passport conditional on obeying consular instructions to withdraw to the nearest Treaty Port, the Americans imposed no restrictions on their citizens. In the view of the American Minister ‘they should be left . . . to determine for themselves what to do.’

Foreign governments were under constant pressure from churches and religious groups at home to protect missionaries even when they behaved inaccurately and there is no doubt that some missionaries were, in the vernacular, a ‘pain in the neck’ to the diplomats. Almost all foreigners in China believed that diplomats were ineffective in preventing anti-foreign events and even slower in securing restitution from the Chinese. Few foreign residents, missionary or merchant, had any interest in or understanding of the problems faced by diplomats trying to deal with a resentful Chinese Government and intellectual class. As one American newspaper reported: ‘It is evident that at present nothing that diplomats can do will satisfy their countrymen.’

Despite the negative image often gained there are many accounts in missionary letters of Chinese officials acting effectively to prevent attacks on missionaries and their families. Actual killings of

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54 A useful introduction to the evolution of the ‘civilizing’ views of Americans is Varg, 1954 op cit.
55 US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101, Denby to Secretary of State, 14 November 1895.
56 British and Chinese officials deplored the tendency of missionaries to use their protected status to seek advantage for their converts in circumstances that were actually non-religious in origin. See Brown, Arthur Judson, (1904, 2nd edn), New Forces in Old China an inevitable awakening, New York, Chicago, F H Revell Co, Ch. XIX. An important outcome of the Huashan Massacre was the ‘Pastoral letter to the Christians in the Fuhkien Province’, condemning the insincere adoption and use of Christianity to advance personal or family interests. The Chinese Recorder, October 1896, pp 479-483. Accusations against missionaries of inappropriate interventions ignore documents such as this. Reed op cit, p 232 suggests that American missions ‘recommended candidates for diplomatic and consular positions where missionary interests were substantial.’ See also McClellan, op cit for a discussion of missionary influence on American attitudes to China.
57 The goals of missionaries and diplomats were not the same. Missionaries found the motivations and methods of diplomats outside their experience and understanding while diplomats were often concerned when missionaries went well outside what diplomats regarded as religious activities.. Daigle op cit pp 10. A modern account of this latter point is the behaviour of an American Presbyterian missionary in Brazil in the 20th century in Cavalcanti, op cit.
58 The Brooklyn Eagle, New York, 4 September 1895.
59 In 1871, when Mahood was at risk of being killed by a mob in Gutian District, the local magistrate allowed him to live in the yamen for nearly a month. In March 1895, when the ‘Vegetarians’ threatened to attack Gutian City the District Magistrate invited Stewart and the British missionaries, whose compound was across the river outside the city walls, to move into the city for safety.
foreigners (See Table 2) were rare but riots often left missionaries and their families traumatized. After six successful years in China during which he experienced a serious threat to his life in Gutian District, the Rev. John Mahood of the CMS is an example of a well-motivated and successful missionary who was forced to seek recuperative leave in England but did not live to reach home. Some fifty percent of foreign Protestants served for less than five years before leaving China. Many experienced health problems, either personally or with members of their families.

Tensions between elements of Chinese society and foreign missionaries increased significantly during the 1890s with serious anti-foreign riots in several parts of the country. Anti-foreign sentiment boiled over on 1 August 1895 when eleven British subjects, members of the evangelical Anglican Church Missionary Society and the Church of England Zenana Missionary Society, including three young single Australian women, were killed in a carefully orchestrated assault by ‘Vegetarian’ (Ts’ai hui, Siah Chai) rebels at Huashan [Huasang, Whasang], a ‘hill-station’ near the hsien city of Gutian [Kucheng, Kutien]. The British and American diplomatic response to the largest cohort of British nationals to be killed in China has not been examined in any detail nor has its relevance to the later Boxer Episode been pursued.

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64 Archival sources include: United Kingdom, Foreign Office, Papers, China, 1894-5 United Kingdom, Foreign Office, Papers, China, 1894-5. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101.
Mansfield, R W, Report on the Conduct of the Chinese Authorities in Fuhkien in connection with the massacre of Haching in the Ku’tien District on Aug. 1, 1895, by which 11 British subjects lost their lives and three were wounded. Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194. 8 September 1895. Enclosed with Denby to Secretary of State, 15 October 1895, US State Department, Despatches from United States Legation, Beijing, Peking, 1849-1906 NLA mfm 1723.1C Microform No 150, Roll 8
US State Department, Despatches from United States Legation, Beijing, Peking, 1849-1906 NLA mfm 1723.1C Microform No 150, Roll 8.
US State Department, Despatches from United States Consuls in Foochow, 1849-1906 NLA mfm 1723.1C Microform No 150, Roll 8.
Hixson, J Courtney, US Consul, Fuzhou, Report on the Huashan-Gutian Massacre, State Department, Despatches from United States Consuls in Fuzhou, 1849-1906 Microform No 150, Roll 8. Hereafter cited as Hixson. (Hixson was in Gutian from August to October 1895 but subsequently contracted typhoid. As a result of his illness his report was not submitted 15 August 1896, a year later).
### Table 2

**Missionary Murders in 19th Century China**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>Walter M Lowrie,</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>Karl Josef Fast</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Lutheran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>J L Homes</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Southern Baptist Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H M Parker</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Protestant Episcopal Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Samuel Johnson</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>British &amp; Foreign Bible Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869 Aug 25</td>
<td>J Williamson</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>London Missionary Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891 June 5</td>
<td>Rev. W Argent</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Wesleyan of ‘Joyful News Mission’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893 July 1</td>
<td>Mr. Wickholm</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish Lutheran Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894 Aug</td>
<td>Mr. Johanssen</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish Lutheran Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895 Aug 1</td>
<td>Rev. J Wylie</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Free Church Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev. Robert W Stewart</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Church Missionary Society, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mrs. Louisa K Stewart</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Church Missionary Society, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master Herbert Stewart</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>(six years), Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss H Sylvia Stewart</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>(eleven months) Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss Helena Yellop</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>(children’s nurse), Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss Nellie Saunders</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Church Missionary Assoc of Victoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss Topsy Saunders</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Church Missionary Assoc of Victoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss M Annie C Gordon</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>CEZMS, Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss Elsie Marshall</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>CEZMS, England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss Hessie Newcombe</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>CEZMS, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miss F Lucy Stewart</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>CEZMS, England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898 -1900</td>
<td><strong>BOXER REBELLION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898 Nov 4</td>
<td>Mr. W S Fleming</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>China Inland Mission, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>c200 foreign missionaries</td>
<td></td>
<td>mostly British, killed across North China.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ROMAN CATHOLIC MARTYRS CHINA**

There were approximately 30 foreign Roman Catholic martyrs in 18th and 19th century China.

By national origin: Italy 14; France 11; Belgium 1; Netherlands 1; Spain 6.

Up to 20,000 Chinese Catholics may have died during the Boxer episode.
The Australians killed at Huashan were Nellie and Topsy Saunders of Melbourne, Victoria, and Annie Gordon of Ipswich, Queensland. They died with their mentors, the Rev. Robert and Mrs Louisa Smyly Stewart of Dublin, Ireland; the Stewart children’s nurse (Helena Yellop of Dublin); two of the Stewart children (Herbert—six years exactly and Sylvia—13 months); and three other single female Anglican missionaries. Three other Stewart children (Mildred—twelve years, Kathleen—eleven years, and Evan—three years) survived, although Kathleen suffered a terrible knee wound that handicapped her for life. Two British missionaries and one American escaped death although the face of Flora Codrington of the CEZMS was scarred permanently.

The Americans were involved because one ‘Vegetarian’ broke away from the main assault and attacked Mabel Hartford of the Methodist Episcopal Mission slightly cutting an ear and bruising her face. The United States Consul in Fuzhou, Colonel James Courtenay Hixson from Alabama, was the most active foreign diplomat in the events that followed and subsequently wrote a lengthy report. A more succinct American viewpoint is found in the report of Commander J Newell USN, who attended the trials in Gutian with Hixson in August-October 1895. The Rev. William Banister of the CMS, who worked in Gutian District from 1882 to 1895, was the official interpreter to the British Consul, R W Mansfield, and published reports on the trial and subsequent events.

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65 An introduction to the British and American missions and missionaries at the heart of this discussion will be found in Welch, Ian, (2004), ‘Nellie, Topsy and Annie: Australian Anglican Martyrs, Fujian Province, China, 1 August 1895,’ Paper presented to the First TransTasman Conference on Australian and New Zealand Missionaries, At Home and Abroad, Australian National University, Canberra, 8-10 October 2004. Online at: rspas.anu.edu.au/pah/TransTasman/papers/Welch_Ian.pdf

66 The term ‘Vegetarian’ (Ts’ai hui) was the name given by foreign residents of Fujian Province in the 1890s to a dissenting movement of ethnic Chinese. No ‘Vegetarian’ organization has been identified from Chinese archives. The archival sources above suggest that it might have been the Gelaohui, (Elder Brother Organization), a group of Chinese opponents of the ruling dynasty associated with other anti-foreign and anti-dynastic actions in late 19th century China.


68 Newell, op cit.

69 Rev. W Banister, Reports and Letters in Church Missionary Society East Asia Archives, Reel 245. See Welch, Ian, Ed, (in preparation), Rev. William Banister, Letters from China, Church Missionary Society, Fujian Province, Canberra, ANU Missionary History Project. Banister’s participation was later queried by the CMS in London as risking identification of a missionary with government, something that the CMS avoided. Rev. B Baring-Gould to Rev. W Banister, 25 October 1895, See also Wolfe to Banister 3 November 1895, and Mansfield to Banister, 3 November 1895. CMS Archives.
Mansfield also made a short final report. No English language accounts from the Chinese side are accessible to this writer.  

A common demand by foreign residents in China when trouble arose was that foreign governments resort to ‘gunboat diplomacy.’ Foreign warships intruded into Chinese coastal ports and inland along navigable rivers such as the Yangtze (Yangzi), as a threat to Chinese officials. An Australian newspaper reprinted reports from China advocating a British response to the Huashan Massacre as strong as that of France at Fuzhou in 1884 during the Sino-French War over the suzerainty of Vietnam.

Eleven years ago Admiral Courbet dailed up the Min River and sank the Chinese fleet, bombarded Fuzhou and Tamsui, destroyed forts and batteries wherever he went, and in various ways taught the Chinese authorities that the flag of his country at all events was not to be treated with disrespect, whether it waved over soldiers or missionaries. The Chinese have never forgotten that lesson.

United States Minister Denby told Washington in the wake of the Huashan episode that he favoured immediate bombardment if a foreign warship was present. If a warship was not present, he suggested that the ‘nearest seaport’ be bombarded at the first opportunity. British Consul Mansfield reported to British Minister O’Conor in Beijing on 6 August, just five days after the massacre at Huashan, that he had asked for a warship to be sent to Fuzhou.

Circumstances in the wake of the Huashan Massacre soon produced demands for a ‘gunboat’ response. When British Minister O’Conor became infuriated with the inadequate (in his view)
response from the Zongli Yamen in regard to June 1895 anti-missionary riots in Sichuan Province the Royal Navy moved a squadron up the Yangtze (Yangzi) River to the river port of Wuchang. Following the Huashan Massacre American warships moved into the Pagoda Anchorage on the Min River just below Fuzhou. What was not obvious to most foreign residents was that the display was not matched by gunfire. Britain and the United States had no interest in outright war with China. During 1895 foreign diplomats were aware of a growing anti-dynastic movement across China. There were rumours of rebellion in Fujian and reports that munitions were being smuggled into Fuzhou. There was an unsuccessful Chinese nationalist rebellion in Guangdong led by Sun Yat-sen that strengthened concerns of a national uprising against the dynasty. Some Chinese hoped that provoking British intervention in Fujian province might end Qing rule in China. The possible overthrow of the dynasty was, not surprisingly, of greater concern to the diplomatic corps in Beijing than the anti-missionary riots that marked the 1890s.

Advocates of military force in China had little or no understanding of the difficulties in physically protecting mission stations or missionaries living in inland districts. Marching a modest punitive force overland in the face of Chinese opposition was a practical impossibility as the foreign powers learned in their initial military response to the Boxer episode in 1899. An attack in Fujian Province meant confronting one the most modern military forces in 19th century China. The movement of British (and possibly American) troops to Gutian and Huashan would have involved small groups (as few as ten or twenty) in small boats up the Min River to the river port of Shuikou followed by a thirty mile march in single file to Gutian. To sustain a numerically sufficient force

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77. Wehrle, op cit, pp 84-85.
78. This view was put to the Zongli Yamen by the American Minister at Beijing, Charles Denby, when following up many previous requests that the Viceroy of Fujian Province cooperate fully with the British and American Consuls investigating the Huashan Massacre during August-October 1895. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Zongli Yamen, 1 October 1895. See also Hixson to US State Department, Dispatches from US Consul, Foochow, 29 September 1895. See also Hixson Report, op cit, p 172. See Welch, Ian, (2006), 'The 'Vegetarians': A Secret Society in Fujian Sheng (province), China, 1895, 'A Paper Prepared for the Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, University of Wollongong, New South Wales, 26-29 June 2006.
79. The belief that rebellion was incipient permeates the US archives.
80. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101. Denby to Secretary of State, 30 & 31 October 1895; Zongli Yamen to Denby, 30 October 1895; Wehrle, op cit, pp 82-92.
81. Wehrle, op cit, pp 82-92.
82. There are a number of online WWW sites dealing with foreign naval forces in China. Several are mentioned in other footnotes (14, 19, 92). For descriptions of the international naval forces see Jacobs, Paul, 'On China Station: Gunboat Diplomacy in China.' http://www.steelnavy.com/1250ChinaStation.htm
83. An outstanding visual presentation of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, relying on propagandist Japanese woodblock art widely circulated in Japan, will be found at: http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia/index.html It presents a very biased view but the core aspect of the ineffectiveness of the Chinese Imperial Armies in Korea, Liaoning and Taiwan reflects the reality.
84. A substantial modern Chinese military force was present in Fuzhou and Fujian Province because of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. It would have had to be dealt with before any advance to Gutian could begin. The carrying capacity of most vessels on the River Min was perhaps twenty people. Fully armed foreign troops and their
would have required costly and lengthy preparation and reinforcements from outside China. By the time the force arrived anyone with any culpability would have long gone and any missionaries dead or relocated.

How far was the British government to undertake responsibility for the enforcement of treaty provisions and local order whenever British subjects were involved in China? Using gunboats to overawe local officials and Chinese mobs led straight down the road to empire. If this practice continued, Britain would eventually be trying to govern China—an impossible prospect, especially as foreigners moved inland beyond the reach of gunboats . . . The Clarendon Declaration of December 28, 1868 elaborated this theme. Consular and naval officers in China were sharply commanded to avoid all warlike acts—blockade, reprisal, landing armed parties, or other forms of coercion.

The first British notice of impending trouble in Gutian District appeared in a confidential consular intelligence report from Fuzhou for the three months ending 31 December 1894 that specifically identified the ‘Vegetarian’ as part of the Gelaohui network that it was believed had been fomenting anti-foreign troubles since the early 1890s.

**VEGETARIAN MOVEMENT KUTIEN**

Two months ago a somewhat sensational report was sent to the Consulate by a missionary at K’ut’ien of the rapidly increasing power of a Sect, known as the Vegetarians which was supposed to be a political one and affiliated to the Ko Lao Hui. They were said to have overawed the Magistrate of the District but further enquiry showed that the matter had been very greatly exaggerated. It does not appear that there is any unusual activity among members of secret societies in this province, and so far nothing has occurred to give rise to any fears for the safety of missionaries in the interior.

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85 The truth of this observation was seen during the Boxer Uprising. The first attempt of the foreign powers to attack Beijing in 1900 was a fiasco. The risks of Chinese reaction were demonstrated in the Siege of the Beijing Legations and the killing of hundreds of British missionaries and thousands of Chinese Christians. There is a valuable discussion of the limitations of British naval and military power in Wehrle, op cit, pp 30-31.


87 K’ut’ien (Gutian). The missionary was the Rev. Robert Stewart.


89 Mansfield’s comments reflect the Chinese official position that in any difficulties involving Chinese Christians, the Christians were invariably to blame, having abandoned their own traditions for the evil religion of the foreigners. The American Consul in Fuzhou, James Courtney Hixson, reported that Christianity was not, at least before the Huashan Massacre, a significant issue in the Vegetarian uprising, which he believed was part of a wider provincial conspiracy to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. Hixson, J Courtney, US Consul, Fuzhou, *Report on the Huashan-Gutian Massacre*,
missionaries number twenty-five males and sixty-two females in this Consular District causes of complaint are extremely few and far between. Mansfield.\textsuperscript{90}

British and American missionaries in Gutian were increasingly aware of ‘Vegetarian’ inspired unrest and sent messages of concern to the consuls in Fuzhou.\textsuperscript{91} US Consul Hixson was receiving reports from an American Methodist Episcopal Church medical missionary in Gutson, Dr. James J Gregory, mirroring the Rev. Robert Stewart’s notes to British Consul Mansfield and Archdeacon Wolfe.\textsuperscript{92} Mansfield was influenced by Wolfe’s view that Stewart exaggerated the risks but by the end of March 1895 was sufficiently concerned that he summoned all the British missionaries in Fujian Province to withdraw to Fuzhou.\textsuperscript{93} Hixson suggested that the Americans also come to Fuzhou. The British women and children were sent down from Gutian while Stewart and Gregory remained at their posts in the belief that their presence offered some protection to local Chinese Christians.\textsuperscript{94} Mrs. Gordon was already in Fuzhou for medical reasons and two other Americans normally stationed at Gutian, the Rev. and Mrs. Wilcox, had left Gutian earlier on furlough. The decision by Gordon and Stewart to stay arose from their concerns about the potential impact on their Chinese church members if every foreign missionary left Gutian. Mansfield’s Fuzhou Consulate Intelligence Report for the January-March 1895 quarter stated:

\textbf{THE VEGETARIANS THREATEN TROUBLE}

At the end of March news of a disquieting nature reached this Consulate from Kutien, a district lying about a hundred miles to the Northwest of Fookow. The Church of England Mission is there represented by the Rev. R. W. Stewart who wrote to H. M. Consul on the 28\textsuperscript{th} March that the Kutien Magistrate had the night before received information of such a nature as to lead him, after consultation with the gentry to order the gates of the city to be walled up. The men worked hard and before long two of the gates were blocked. The whole city prepared for a siege, as the Vegetarians in large numbers were said to be on their way. Mr. Stewart felt bound to order the women and children away, but there were no chairs to be procured, and as

\textsuperscript{90} Foreign Office Archives FO228/1194, Fuzhou Consulate, 10 January 1895.
\textsuperscript{92} Throughout all the troubles in Gutian District, including the massacre, the Americans were not targeted. Had the trouble been solely an anti-foreign matter there is no reason why the Americans should not have been targeted as well. The singling out of the British alone suggests that a broader provincial agenda was in play.
\textsuperscript{93} British consular officials could enforce their order by withdrawing the internal passports required by British subjects living outside the Treaty Ports. American consuls did not have such authority.
\textsuperscript{94} Hixson Report, op cit, p 26.
they could not walk 30 miles to Shui K’au [Shuikou] a place on the Min River and the point of departure for Foochow, it was proposed to send them to the mountain house of the mission distant some 11 miles and on the way to the river [i.e. Huashan]. This plan could not be carried out, as again there were no chairs to be procured and heavy rain had set in. There was not a soldier in Kutien through there were supposed to be a hundred. The anger of the Vegetarians was not directed against the Christians but against their own authorities. In a further letter dated March 29th, Mr. Stewart goes on to say that the magistrate told the people that if they would guard the walls themselves for five days at the expiry of that time the soldiers he had sent for would have arrived. The people agreed and bodies of the citizens were stationed at short distances apart along the walls day and night, being paid at the rate of 20c per 24 hours . . . The Magistrate requested Mr. Stewart and his family to come into the city which they did. On receipt of this information H. M. Consul wrote to the Viceroy direct asking him to send troops to Kutien. A day or two afterwards Mrs. Stewart’s children arrived in Foochow and the news became more reassuring. . . . [The District Magistrate] is to be removed95 and things are now quiet; the gates are unblocked and business goes on as formerly.96

In mid-April, Stewart and Gregory advised their consuls that the situation was quiet and this assessment was included in Mansfield’s Intelligence Report for the April-June 1895 quarter.97 During April, May and June 1895, the threat of ‘Vegetarian’ actions against the Gutian District Magistrate continued and some Christians were among those incidentally affected by some of the 150 criminal acts of the ‘Vegetarians’. With the situation in Gutian still unsettled Viceroy ordered Deputy Prefect (Chih-fu) Ho Ting and 200 soldiers under the command of Col. T’an Yu-te to Gutian but the soldiers proved ineffective in controlling the ‘Vegetarians’ who retreated into their mountain ‘fastness’ at Kungshanshi.98 As a result of his inefficiency and for not informing his superiors of the gravity of the situation, District Magistrate Wang Yu-yang was dismissed on 2 May and was replaced by District Magistrate Wang Yu-lin.99 District Magistrate I Chien replaced Wang Yu-lin four days after the murders. The dismissals of Wang Yu-yang and Wang Yu-lin reflected the traditional duty of Chinese officials to keep the peace by whatever means available to them which

95 District Magistrate Wang Yu-yuan and his successor were dismissed and degraded, the only Chinese officials to be affected by the events at Gutian/Huashan. Hixson Report, op cit, p 28.
96 Foreign Office Archives FO 228/1194 10 April 1895. Mansfield repeated his assessment that the ‘Vegetarians’ were anti-government in a report from Gutian enclosed with Denby to /Secretary of State, 15 October 1895. US State Department, Despatches from United States Legation, Beijing, Peking, 1849-1906 NLA mfm 1723.1C Microform No 150, Roll 8.
97 Hixson Report, op cit, pp twenty-three and 27. Foreign Office Archives FO 228/1194 8 July 1895.
98 This was a high pasture area with a couple of sheds some miles northwest of Gutian. It was so isolated that the rebels could have dispersed long before any attack on them could be mounted by Chinese troops. Isolated locations (fastnesses) are reported in accounts of most Chinese rebel groups.
100 Despite the similarity in the family and generation names of the two District Magistrates, it is not known if they were related.
usually involved securing the support of the local literati and through them, over lineage elders and groups throughout their area of administrative responsibility.101

On the 27th July 1895, just three days before the attack on the British missionaries at Huashan, a man named Chang Chiu-chiu [nickname Long Fingernails], unknown to local people, arrived from Fuzhou and took command of the Gutian ‘Vegetarians’.102 Chang Chiu-chiu was 32 years old, educated and claimed to be a fortune-teller. The new leader used his skills by having the men draw lots for either an attack on Gutian, the village of Anchang or the missionaries at Huashan. The consensus of subsequent foreign reports was that Chang Chiu-chiu ensured that only the characters for Huashan were written on the lots.

US Consul Hixson later said that Chang Chiu-chiu had been sent by a secret society in Fuzhou to lead an attack on the missionaries and to capture Gutian as a base for a provincial rebellion in Fujian supposedly planned for October 1895.103 According to Hixson Chang’s objectives included attacks on officials, the destruction of property and the murder of citizens of Great Britain, the major foreign power.104 Evidence obtained from the ‘Vegetarian’ leaders at the post massacre trials ‘revealed’ associations between an unidentified secret society in Fuzhou and leading people in Gutian including the City Magistrate (Li Ch’i Ts’eng).105 Evidence was given that spies had been sent to Huashan to report on the missionary holiday houses and to find out whether or not the foreigners were armed.106

Some of the ‘Vegetarian’ members had family ties to the British mission and the idea of killing the foreigners was not universally or enthusiastically received. Seven hundred members were summoned to the Kungshanshi fastness but less than half remained throughout the three days

101 Sweeten’s (op cit) account of local management in Jiangxi Province provides valuable insights into the activities of local officials in Qing China
102 One of the founders of the ‘Vegetarian’ sect in Gutian, Lau Ing Cheng, from Kiangsi Province, stated before the Chinese Court that the leading figure or head of the ‘Vegetarian’ movement was a Kiangsi man, Lui Hok-ing then living in the Kwang Seng Prefecture. Rev. W Banister, Report, 2 September 1895, CMS East Asia Archives, Reel 245.
103 Hixson Report, op cit, pp 183 and 192.
104 Hixson Report, op cit, p 163.
105 Mansfield, R W, Report on the Conduct of the Chinese Authorities in Fuhkien in connection with the massacre of Hashing in the Kut’ien District on Aug. 1, 1895, by which 11 British subjects lost their lives and three were wounded. Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, 8 September 1895. Enclosed with Denby to Secretary of State, 15 October 1895, US State Department, Despatches from United States Legation, Beijing, Peking, 1849-1906 NLA mfm 1723.1C Microform No 150, Roll 8. See also Hixson Report, op cit, pp 34-35. Evidence given during the Gutian sessions of the Chinese courts trying the ‘Vegetarian’ leaders revealed that Chang Chiu-chiu was sent by a ‘Vegetarian Hall’ in Fuzhou that had long enjoyed vice-regal protection. The connection was confirmed by a provincial ‘raid’ on the hall, situated on Sanxian zhou (San Hsien Chou) in the Min River at Fuzhou. This may be the location identified in other sources as ‘Pagoda Island.’
106 Hixson Report, op cit, p 36.
leading up to the attack. The superseded local leader, Chang Ch’ih, who had reactivated the society in Gutian after his arrival in 1892, sent a warning to Stewart through a relative but by the time the message arrived in Gutian the massacre was over. A majority of the 300 or so men who took part in the march to Huashan deserted along the way and less than a hundred finally arrived. Most estimates suggest that perhaps thirty men took an active part in the attack that began just before 7 a.m. on Thursday, 1 August 1895 and was over in less than an hour.

A villager from Huashan, or possibly one of the British mission servants who had disappeared at the moment of the attack, reported the massacre to Dr. Gregory in Gutian about midday on 1 August. Gregory immediately told the District Magistrate (I Chien) and after considerable argument chair coolies were provided and an escort of sixty soldiers. Gordon arrived in Huashan around eight p.m. Dr. Gordon and the Rev. Hugh Stowell Phillips of the CMS worked for the next twenty-four hours attending the wounded and recovering the bodies of the dead and placing them in coffins brought up from Gutian. Phillips had been staying in a Huashan house some distance from the CMS and CEZMS houses and upon hearing the ‘Vegetarians’ at 7 a.m. he went to a scrub-covered hill overlooking the missionary houses where he observed events without being able to do anything to help. The two men and the survivors left Huashan at 3 p.m. on 3 August and travelled all night to Shuikou on the Min River where four riverboats had been secured. The Stewart’s six-year-old son, Herbert, who celebrated his birthday on 1st August, died from his injuries on the way to Shuikou. The Stewart’s eleven-month-old daughter, Hilda Sylvia, died just after reaching Fuzhou. The following day, 4 August, Gordon and Phillips, travelling down river, met US Consul Hixson and a relief party coming upstream from Fuzhou. The

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107 Estimates of the total number of ‘Vegetarians’ in Gutian and the adjoining District of Ping Nang range from 10,000 downwards. If the estimates given for the numbers involved in the movement generally and in the specific instance of the Huashan Massacre are believable, and the latter were confirmed several times during the trials in Gutian during August-October 1895 there is little reason to believe that the ‘Vegetarian’ movement had any significant following, much less that it could have mounted a successful revolution.


109 The best estimates of the number who attacked Huashan came from Phillips, who saw he even, and Gregory, who spoke with the survivors immediately after the attack. Both gave estimates of under a hundred men in the area and perhaps thirty who actually joined in the direct attack. Confusion over the actual number of men involved in the attack varies from one to two over hundred. O’Conor expressed concern that too many arrests of ‘Vegetarians’ would provoke a strong anti-foreign reaction. See O’Conor to Mansfield, 9 October 1895, Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194.

110 Rev. H S Phillips, Statement, North China Herald Supplement, August 9, 1895, p v. Five separate reports emerged from people involved in the immediate events and aftermath of the Huashan Massacre. The reports appear to have been taken by the American Consulate and later copies were supplied to the British Consul. The Reports were by Rev. H S Phillips CMS; Miss Kathleen Stewart, 12 year old daughter of Rev. Robert and Mrs. Louisa Smyly Stewart; Miss Flora Codrington CEZMS; Dr. James J Gregory, American Methodist Episcopal Mission; Miss Mabel Hartford, American Methodist Episcopal Mission.

111 Dr J J Gregory, cited in The Brooklyn Eagle, New York, 8 August 1895.
The Viceroy in Fuzhou was told of the killings by telegram from Shuikou on 1 August but did not inform the British or American Consuls. Acting Prefect Ch’in Peng-chih was dispatched by steam launch to investigate and report.\textsuperscript{112} On the afternoon of Friday 2 August, news of the massacre was delivered to the Rev. William Banister’s cook in a short letter from Phillips.\textsuperscript{113} The Rev. William Banister and Archdeacon John Wolfe were at Kuliang, a missionary-founded hill-station about nine miles from Fuzhou, when Phillips’ message, along with a note for the American Consul by Miss Mabel Hartford of the American Methodist Episcopal Mission who was on holiday at Huashan in a Chinese house less than a hundred metres from the British dwellings.

Just after tea my servant rushed in . . . [and] gave me a crumpled letter written by Mr. Phillips in a trembling hand with the brief but awful news. . . . I immediately went to the Archdeacon’s house about half an hour away.\textsuperscript{114}

Wolfe met Mansfield as the consul arrived at Kuliang to join other foreigners for a weekend break from the summer heat of Fuzhou. Mansfield subsequently attracted wide criticism for not immediately returning to Fuzhou although Archdeacon Wolfe sought to defend the Consul’s reputation.\textsuperscript{115} Mansfield’s slow response was reported across China. A New York newspaper reported private letters from Shanghai that stated:

The messenger who brought the news reached Mr. Banister’s, one of the English mission, who has lived at Kucheng [Gutian]. Friday night, August 2, and he and Archdeacon Wolfe started Saturday morning for the English consulate at Foochow and met Mr. Mansfield, the consul, on the way up the mountain to spend Sunday. They told him the errand and he would do nothing; said he wouldn’t till Monday, but kept on up the mountain. They went to the American consul and, in an incredibly short time, he was knocking on the viceroy’s gate in Foochow (Fuzhou). He demanded an interview, thorough he was told the viceroy was sick. He insisted on an interview, and asked for a launch to bring down the wounded . . . which was granted. . . When the English consul was convinced there was serious business he seems to have repented and sent down to Foochow, but the American consul had done the work, and

\textsuperscript{112} Hixson \textit{Report, op cit}, p 62. The Viceroy was not particularly concerned. He later claimed to have no knowledge of the ‘unequal treaties’ but later admitted he knew of the treaties but had never bothered to read them. As a Viceroy, reporting to the central authorities only of the Qing regime, he felt that his authority was, as it seems to have been in practice, superior to that of the officials of the Zongli Yamen.

\textsuperscript{113} Mrs. W Banister, Foo-Chow, describes the arrival of the letter and subsequent action by her husband, the Rev. W Banister 12 August 1895. Dublin University Missionary Magazine, Memorial Edition, October 1895, pp 45-47.

\textsuperscript{114} Rev. W Banister to Rev. Baring Baring-Gould, Church Missionary Society London. CMS East Asia Archives. Wolfe later wrote to CMS London, defending Mansfield but claiming that he only (i.e. excluding Banister) had met Mansfield at Kuliang. ‘All these reports of the Consul’s conduct are greatly exaggerated and misrepresented although acknowledging that perhaps the Consul had made a ‘small mistake’. ‘I was the only person who met him on the morning in question, and though he did not return at once he did what was necessary in a much shorter time by going to the house on the hill than could have been done by returning to his office.’ Wolfe also wrote scathingly about Phillips this time implying that Wolfe was the only one who was in full control of his feelings: ‘Our own dear Brother Phillips too lost his head and too violently spoke against the Consul. After all his not returning till evening is a very small mistake if a mistake at all’ Wolfe to Baring-Gould, 5 November 1895.
dispatched the boat and received the papers from the English missionaries. Our consul was in the [US Civil] war and acted with credit to himself in the eyes of all foreigners.\textsuperscript{116}

An American missionary in Sichuan Province wrote to his mission board shortly afterwards:

> You have seen the Shanghai paper and know that there is considerable ill feeling among Foreigners residing in China in regard to the way Foreign Ministers [diplomats] tried these outrages. You may wonder why there has not been an outburst before but the fact is that there is a gulf between the British Officials and their Nationals and the main portion of the Foreigners are British. A Minister and the Secretaries at Pekin have a life position and are simply transferred from one country to another. The Consuls are here in China for life simply transferred from one Port to another. They don’t as a rule care a snap for the interests of the Foreigners here in China and are usually quite opposed to Missionary work. It is not regarded proper to criticize or question either the actions or non-actions of the Consuls or Ministers. American Consuls do more for us and are more approachable and care more for the good opinion of their nationals. . . Have you read what the paper say about Mansfield the British Consul in Foo Chow. How he would not give up his holiday to try and send some one to bring down the dead and the wounded from Kucheng but the American Consul gets a launch and sends it off.\textsuperscript{117}

When Banister arrived in Fuzhou from Kuliang he informed the senior British Consulate clerk, Pitzipios, who immediately cabled the British Legation in Beijing and the Foreign Office in London.\textsuperscript{118} Banister next delivered Mabel Hartford’s letter to the United States Consulate. US Consul Hixson immediately went to the Viceroy’s Yamen where after some argument he obtained an official Chinese steam powered launch and with his nephew, US Marshall George Hixson, left Fuzhou at 7 p.m. on the evening of Saturday 3\textsuperscript{rd} August, with Wolfe and Banister, to meet the survivors being brought downriver from Shuikou. Wolfe arranged the burial service at dawn on Tuesday 6\textsuperscript{th} November in the British/Protestant cemetery in Fuzhou.\textsuperscript{119} No Chinese officials attended.

After receiving Pitzipios’ message on Saturday 3\textsuperscript{rd} August, British Minister O’Conor in Beijing ordered Mansfield to proceed to Huashan under a Chinese military escort authorized by the Zongli Yamen not knowing that the Viceroy had refused to supply the escort. Without consulting the CMS Committee in London, Banister accepted Mansfield’s request to accompany him to Gutian as an

\textsuperscript{116} The Brooklyn Eagle, New York, 22 September 1895.
\textsuperscript{117} H Olin Cady, American Methodist Episcopal Mission, Chungking, 9 October 1895. From Methodist Episcopal Missionary Correspondence, 1846-1912, China, Wilmington Del, Scholarly Resources Inc, (2000). 10 microfilm reels, Reel 5, held by Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria.
\textsuperscript{118} Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194 3 August 1895.
\textsuperscript{119} British Minister O’Conor asked Consul Mansfield on 13 August if any Chinese officials attended the funeral. Mansfield responded that there was insufficient time to inform to notify the officials. Foreign Office Archives FO228/1194 13 August. It was a very different story in Shansi Province a few years later when the Viceroy, local Governors, and many senior Chinese officials attended funerals for the missionaries murdered by the provincial governor, Yu Hsien in the city of Taiyuan. See overview in Gittings, John, The Guardian, Saturday 5 August 2000.
official interpreter. On 9th August, more than a week after the murders, Mansfield was still in Fuzhou. He responded to O’Conor’s cable on 12th August stating that: ‘unless accompanied by strong guard of foreign soldiers there would be, as the missionaries tell me [i.e. Wolfe], dangers in my going to Kucheng [Gutian]’. Mansfield cabled O’Conor seeking Zongli Yamen agreement to an escort of twenty-five British sailors although he was willing to ‘take risk of going with Chinese escort only.’ O’Conor told him that there was no possibility of a British escort knowing that any use of foreign troops could lead to war. Mansfield obtained a pledge from the Viceroy that 1000 Chinese soldiers would be sent to secure the Gutian District but none were sent.

Rumour followed rumour as journalists competed for an audience. A London report republished in Australasia and America falsely stated that the British Government had decided to send 200 Sikh sepoys from the Hong Kong garrison to escort Mansfield to Gutian. Later reports, including one from Hixson, suggested that a party of British Royal Marines would escort Mansfield. The Australian press improved on that by suggesting that 1000 US marines with Gatling guns were on their way. The Chinese authorities issued a categorical rejection of any foreign troops escorting the Consuls. Finally, under pressure from the Zongli Yamen, the Viceroy agreed to supply a Chinese military escort of 100 soldiers.

O’Conor was well aware that open correspondence between Mansfield and the legation in Beijing sent through the Chinese telegraph system would immediately reach the Zongli Yamen and the Viceroy. He told Mansfield, ‘Report from day to day any matters of importance and unless delay inconvenient send telegrams through Chinese’. O’Conor calculated that using the Chinese telegraph system would give Chinese officials, notoriously slow decision-makers, sufficient early warning to assess the consequences of not responding adequately to demands for the punishment of the ‘Vegetarians’. The British and American Ministers in Beijing were advising their home

120 Foreign Office Archives FO228 1194, 12 August 1895. Mansfield to O’Conor, O’Conor to Mansfield.
121 The Age, Melbourne, 9 August 1895 report filed from London. Also reported in The Brooklyn Eagle, New York, 8 August 1895.
122 Hixson Report, op cit, 68.
123 The Age, Melbourne, 12 August 1895.
124 US State Department, Despatches from United States Legation, Beijing, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 15 August 1895 makes specific reference to a ‘concurreunt’ investigation and refers to a similar arrangement concerning the Chengtu riots in Sichuan Province in May 1895. By twenty-three July, a joint Anglo-American (originally proposed by British Minister O’Conor) commission was specifically refused by Minister Denby. The US State Department had informed Denby that Hixson might ‘cooperate so far as conducive to security and welfare of United States citizens. Otherwise you will act and carefully abstain from joining in any course or policy which, however important to British interests, does not concern those of the United States.’ US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Adee (acting) to Denby, 15 August 1895. Hixson Report, op cit, p 67
126 Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 11 August 1895.
governments of the unfolding events while trying to ensure, through the Zongli Yamen, the arrest and trial of the Gutian ‘Vegetarians.’ On 11 August, after weighing up with Washington the extent to which the United States should become involved, US Minister Denby issued Hixson with orders to proceed to Gutian with a Chinese escort. An American cruiser, the USS Detroit, had arrived at Fuzhou and the captain, Commander J S Newell, USN, acting under the orders of US East Asia fleet commander, Admiral Carpenter, but not the US Legation in Beijing, instructed Ensign Waldo Evans USN to accompany Hixson. On August 13, as Hixson and his party were preparing to leave Fuzhou for Gutian Mansfield arrived at the wharf asking for a three day delay until the rumoured Royal Marine escort arrived. Hixson refused and the ‘Commission,’ as the consular party was described, boarded the boats late in the afternoon but the Chinese crews refused to move until early the next day. There were three houseboats accommodating the Europeans, five river junks, and six small boats. This flotilla was towed by three steam launches and moved at a snail’s pace

127 An escort of 1500 Chinese soldiers was frequently mentioned in the Australian press reports. The actual escort for Mansfield and Hixson and their colleagues was ‘80 first class troops from the Viceroy’s Guard’ under the command of Vice-Prefect Chu Tsung-ping. Hixson Report, op cit, pp 68-72. The Zongli Yamen had issued an instruction to the Viceroy of Fukien Province that the rioters were to be arrested and punished according to law. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking. Tsungli Yamen to Denby, 7 August 1895.

128 US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Hixson, 11 August 1895. Hixson Report, op cit, p 67. On 12 August, the State Department cabled Denby that Hixson should not proceed without a specific direction from the US Minister.

129 Newell subsequently replaced Evans on what was became an unofficial Anglo-American ‘Commission of Enquiry on 27 August. The US State Department used the term ‘Kutien Investigating Committee.’ US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Adee (acting) to Denby, 15 August 1895. Hixson Report, op cit, p 83; pp 125-126 states: ‘When the committee was about to start for Kutien [Gutian] the British Consul proposed to the United States Consul that the two should act jointly in everything so long as their instructions permitted and the United States Consul accepted the proposition.’ This arrangement led to the joint mission being referred to in some records as a ‘Commission of Enquiry’ whereas it was never more than a working arrangement between the two countries. On later evidence, Mansfield, a career diplomat, was seeking to contain Hixson, a short-term political appointee, to ensure that British policy was not diverted by what Mansfield viewed as American enthusiasm just as the US State Department was concerned to avoid pursuing British ends. Chinese objections to Newell’s participation were conveyed to American Minister Denby in Beijing and were rejected.

130 The term ‘Commission’ was incorrectly used in relation to the Anglo-American investigation of the Huashan Massacre and the subsequent trials and executions. It was adopted because of the use of the term Commission in regard to an enquiry instituted by the British and American Ministers in Beijing into the riots in Chengtu (Sichuan Province). British Minister Nicholas O’Conor, writing to the China Association: ‘I am to add that the Chengtu Commission inquiry will be held as soon as possible. The general scope of this inquiry will be gathered from the following extracts from the instructions addressed by H M’s Minister to Acting Consul Tratman who will represent British and American interests at the inquiry. After directing Mr. Tratman to proceed to Chengtu as soon as circumstances will permit, H M’s Minister continues: —Your duty there will be in conjunction with the Chinese officials mentioned and the Missionaries who will probably also be placed on the Commission to inquire in the first place into the origins of the riots and the adequacy or otherwise of the measures taken to suppress them by the officials concerned.... The findings of the Commission will not have a final character, its object being mainly to throw light on the causes of the outbreak and supply material for consideration here.’ Supplement to the North China Herald, 9 August 1895, pp vi-vii. The US Minister subsequently advised the US Secretary of State that he had never agreed to acting British Consul Tratman, stationed at Chungking, to represent American interests in the Chengtu matter. Such an arrangement had been made in a case in 1886 and although it was considered in 1895 Denby decided not to proceed. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 19 August 1895. There is a lengthy discussion of events in Sichuan in Paulsen, George C, (1969), 'The Szechwan Riots of 1895, and American Missionary Diplomacy, pp 285-298 in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 28, No 2, February 1969.
upstream.\textsuperscript{131} The initial members of the ‘Commission’ were: Mr. Robert William Mansfield, British Consul at Fuzhou; Col. James Courtenay Hixson, United States Consul at Fuzhou; Mr. E L B Allen, British Vice-Consul at Fuzhou stationed at the Pagoda Island Anchorage; Rev. L H Star, Church Missionary Society; Rev. William Banister, Church Missionary Society;\textsuperscript{132} Lieutenant (actually Ensign) Waldo Evans, United States Navy (USS Detroit);\textsuperscript{133} Dr James J Gregory, American Methodist Episcopal Mission, Gutian and Dr E H Hart, American Methodist Episcopal Mission, Fuzhou, [from 27 August]. On 16 August, the ‘Commission’ finally arrived at the American Methodist Episcopal Mission compound inside the walls of Gutian City.\textsuperscript{134} Over two weeks had passed since the first news of the massacre had reached Fuzhou and an already intricate mental, cultural, legal and political struggle between Chinese and foreigners centred on the courtroom in the Gutian District Magistrate’s yamen.

Prefect (Chih-fu) Chu of the Fuzhou ‘Board of Foreign Affairs’ who had the administrative responsibility for the ten districts of Fuzhou Prefecture including Gutian made a formal visit to the ‘Commissioners’ on Saturday 18 August. The Prefect was accompanied by Acting Prefect Ch’in Peng-shu whose nominal responsibility was to liaise with the foreigners and report to the Viceroy.\textsuperscript{135} Expectant Taotai Hsu Hsing-yi was later appointed in response to a request from the British and American Ministers that a ‘high’ official be appointed with delegation from the Viceroy to immediately approve decisions of the Gutian court.\textsuperscript{136} Taotai Hsu made his first visit on 10 September, five weeks after the trials had begun, when he offered to execute as many men as the

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\item \textsuperscript{131} Hixson \textit{Report, op cit}, pp 68-72.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Rev. W Banister, \textit{First Report}, \textit{CMS East Asia Archives}, Reel 245 and \textit{North China Herald}, 20 September 1895, pp 484-489.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Commander K S Newell, USN, Commanding Officer USS Detroit, replaced Evans, a very junior officer, from 27 August. The US State Department directed that only two Americans were to serve on the ‘Kutien Investigating Committee,’ i.e. Hixson and a naval officer nominated by the US Admiral Carpenter. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Adee (acting) to Denby, 15 August 1895. A strong protest was received from the Tsungli Yamen. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Tsungli Yamen to Denby, twenty-three August 1895. Denby did not know of the appointment of a navy officer until the Zongli Yamen informed him while protesting that the American Government was ‘taking too much interest’ and asking that the inclusion of a naval officer in the American party be rescinded. Denby did not think it necessary for a ‘naval commander’ to go to Gentian. Initially, the officer appointed, Ensign Evans, was the lowest rank of US Navy commissioned officer. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 27 August 1895.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Foreign Office Archives FO228/1194 16 August 1896. Hixson \textit{Report, op cit}, p 72. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 17 August 1895.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Hixson \textit{Report, op cit}, pp 73-75 and 236-243.
\item \textsuperscript{136} US Minister Denby had advised the Zongli Yamen of the importance attached by the US Government to the appointment of senior Chinese officials in the Gutian trial and specifically requested the ‘names and ranks’ of such officials. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Tsungli [Zongli] Yamen, 22 August 1895.
\end{itemize}
Consuls required so that the hearings could be closed. Hsu proposed a closed Chinese judicial hearing but the ‘Commissioners’ insisted that they should be present at the pretrial examination of the prisoners but the Chinese responded that this was contrary to Chinese practice. The two Consuls cabled their Ministers and home governments requesting that the Chinese be instructed to agree to their request but it all proved pointless when it was revealed that no effort had been made to quarantine the men to stop them concocting a common story. The prisoners had unlimited access to people from the local community and Chinese officials present at the pretrial examinations were actively advising them about their ‘confessions’.

All the prisoners are so confined that outsiders can have interviews with them and the runners and underlings are all bribed by relatives and friends of the prisoners. There is not a single individual in the Yamen who does not take bribes. It is possible to get any document and any information by paying money to the proper persons.

The usual Chinese judicial practice was to examine prisoners in private before their court appearance, using a variety of techniques to secure an agreed confession upon which sentence could be pronounced. Rewards to the families of people prepared to confess and receive punishment for crimes with which they were in no way connected was a regular practice in China. Experienced diplomats familiar with Chinese courts believed that too active a role by the ‘Commissioners’ might later be interpreted as tacit approval of the methods by which Chinese courts extracted confessions. The British and Americans were determined that anyone convicted should be proved to be responsible for the killings of the British missionaries and the attack on Mabel Hartford. The US and British Ministers continually warned the Consuls to take no part in the decision-making of the Court or in the execution of any of the accused if found guilty. From the British and American perspective, the entire court process was corrupt, confusing and deliberately obfuscating.

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138 Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 21 August 1895, 30 August 1895. The Viceroy initially insisted that foreigners could have no part in any pretrial examination of the prisoners.
140 Rev. W Banister, Report, CMS East Asia Archives, Reel 245, 18 September 1895.
141 In his summation of the work of the ‘Commission; the Rev. William Banister stated that the depostitions of the Chinese prisoners were revised in accordance with the official view that the local ‘Vegetarian’ movement had less than 1000 members (other views suggested more than 5000) and that it was not connected with ‘larger bodies of the same sect in the northern parts of the province and Kiangsi.’ Banister observed that the officials were very anxious to play down any suggestion that the Gutian affair was part of a wider anti-government rebellion and tried to present the whole affair as the product of rivalry with Chinese Christians. Rev. William Banister, ‘Report of the Kucheng Commission of Enquiry,’ North China Herald, 20 September 1895, pp 484-489. See the handwritten report in CMS East Asia Archives, Reel 245, 12 October.
142 Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 5 September 1895.
consuls’ complaints about the conduct of the trials were met with threats of retaliation against the Chinese Christians.\textsuperscript{143} The Chinese officials declared, without any evidence and contrary to the facts known to the Commissioners, that the massacre was an outcome of a general disagreement between the ‘Vegetarians’ and Christians.\textsuperscript{144} This was totally at variance with the information sent months earlier by the British and American missionaries at Gutian who identified the ‘Vegetarians’ with anti-dynastic activity rather than threatening Christians.\textsuperscript{145} As far as trial and punishment was concerned, the Ministers agreed that it was a matter entirely within Chinese jurisdiction and consuls were not to become directly involved.\textsuperscript{146} Arguments about the real intentions of the ‘Vegetarians’ prompted angry interchanges between the British and American Ministers and the Zongli Yamen.\textsuperscript{147}

Gordon and Banister were familiar with the local dialect and known favourably to many local people who willingly provided them with information about the ‘Vegetarians.’\textsuperscript{148} Junior officials of the yamen provided ‘inside’ information to the Consuls including copies of the written reports being sent by the Prefect to the Viceroy.\textsuperscript{149} Local people issued posters denouncing the behaviour of the Viceroy’s representatives and accused them of stealing money allocated for the payment of rewards leading to the arrest of ‘Vegetarians.’\textsuperscript{150}

The one common desire, shared by the British and American Legations in Beijing (although not by Consul Hixson) and the Chinese officials, was to get the matter dealt with as soon as possible. Hixson told Denby that Tao-Tai Hsu said: ‘Tell me how many heads are wanted and I will cut them

\textsuperscript{143} Hixson Report, \textit{op cit}, pp 87-88.  
\textsuperscript{144} Mansfield, R W, \textit{Report on the Conduct of the Chinese Authorities in Fukhien in connection with the massacre of Hashing in the Kut’ien District on Aug. 1, 1895}, by which 11 British subjects lost their lives and three were wounded. FO228/1194, 8 September 1895. Enclosed with Denby to Secretary of State, 15 October 1895. US State Department, Despatches from United States Legation, Beijing, Peking, 1849-1906 NLA mfm 1723.1C Microform No 150, Roll 8.  
\textsuperscript{145} Hixson \textit{Report, op cit}, pp 85-86.  
\textsuperscript{146} State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 21 December 1895. State Department Archives, Denby to Hixson, twenty-three September 1895.  
\textsuperscript{147} Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 15 September 1895. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 16 September 1895 enclosing cable from Hixson & Newell to Denby, 13 September 1895. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Zongli Yamen to Denby, 6 October 1895.  
\textsuperscript{148} Hixson referred to the ‘soreness’ felt by the Chinese officials because they could not, due to the information given by the Chinese Christians, achieve their objective of blaming the Christians, rather than the Vegetarians (and whoever was assisting them in Fuzhou, for the Gutian problems and the massacre at Huashan. Hixson again declared that the ‘Vegetarians’ were plotting to overthrow the Qing dynasty with the implication that ethnic Chinese administrators were assisting them. State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 15 October 1895. Mansfield later told Banister that: ‘Without your intimate knowledge of the country and your thorough acquaintance with the local dialect, a satisfactory result of my task would have been very difficult to arrive at. Mansfield to Banister, 3 November 1895.  
\textsuperscript{149} Banister mentioned that one report (among other official statements) tried to place the blame for the Vegetarian unrest on Robert Stewart and the local Christians but when the Prefect found that the Consuls had already seen the offensive statement, he quickly had it withdrawn before it reached the Viceroy.  
\textsuperscript{150} Hixson \textit{Report, op cit}, p 89.
off at once provided the case is thereby finally settled.' From the British side O’Conor told Mansfield yet again that death should be sought only for those directly involved in the killings and that he did not want a ‘barbarous holocaust.’ Capital punishment was to be sought only for those directly involved in the killings for fear of provoking anti-Christian riots. There were serious difficulties in determining exactly how many men had been involved: Hixson reported that Mansfield had advised the British Government that:

Those who actually wounded and killed were many more than the Consul first supposed. For instance, three men (all in custody) are proved to have shared in Mr. Stewart’s murder, two joined in killing Mrs. Stewart, and there was much indiscriminate cutting and slashing at the five of the ladies who were all together. Only three ladies seemingly met their deaths at the hands of a single assailant.

The Chinese plan was that after the trials in Gutian the convicted men would be sent to Fuzhou for execution although there were indications that the ringleaders expected a pardon once removed from the spotlight in Gutian. O’Conor told Mansfield to insist that the men be executed in Gutian to avoid such risks. Once the murderers were executed the foreign diplomats were privately prepared that the others present at Huashan would be given lesser but still severe punishments, such as banishment for life. By 27 August, thirteen men had been condemned to death.

Mansfield initially agreed to these executions but Hixson refused to become involved in the Chinese judicial process. The Viceroy approved seven executions and the other six condemned men were released without consultation with the consuls.

151 Rev. W Banister, First Report, CMS East Asia Archives, Reel 245 and North China Herald, 20 September 1895, pp 484-489. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 16 September 1895 enclosing cable from Hixson & Newell to Denby, 13 September 1895. Hixson stated that Mansfield had sent a similar report to O’Conor.
152 Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 5 September 1895.
153 Foreign Office Archives, FO228 1895, O’Conor to Mansfield, 9 October 1895.
154 US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101. Denby to Secretary of State, 15 October 1895.
155 Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 3 September 1895. State Department Archives, Denby to Secretary of State, 3 December 1895.
156 Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 2 September 1895.
157 US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 16 September 1895 enclosing cable from Hixson & Newell to Denby, 13 September 1895. Denby to Hixson, 19 September 1895. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 21 September 1895.
158 Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 31 August 1895.
159 Hixson Report, op cit, p 85. Hixson was claming wisdom well after the event. As early as 28 August the American and British Ministers had instructed their respective consuls to take no part in the formal Chinese judicial process. Given Hixson’s later anger that many more prisoners were not executed, his claim to caution should not be taken at full face value.
160 It is possible the release of the six men may have resulted from a misunderstanding following a visit to the Zongli Yamen by the British Minister, Sr. Nicholas O’Conor. The Zongli Yamen claimed that O’Conor had stated that the British Government believed that: ‘it was not necessary to execute large numbers’ and this was assumed to mean that no more executions were demanded by the British Government. Denby was told by O’Conor that: ‘The Yamen statement ...is a travesty of what I said. I did not pronounce an opinion as to the relative guilt of some or others of the
O’Conor informed the Zongli Yamen, and hence the Viceroy, that the foreign governments would not accept a few symbolic executions as an acceptable outcome and insisted that the six released men be re-arrested and executed. The first seven executions by decapitation took place on 17th September. Only one professional executioner was available and he removed the head of his prisoner with one stroke of his sword. Six amateur executioners took nearly half an hour to kill the other men. The severed heads were displayed in Huashan village but unusually; the crime for which they had died was not displayed.

After two months of hearings at Gutian the British Government was anxious that the trial and executions end before long-term British political and economic arrangements in East Asia and the Pacific were adversely affected. The Viceroy added to the ongoing ferment by issuing a proclamation blaming Christians for all the trouble that had occurred in Gutian District. He declared that the Huashan affair was no more important than a street brawl. Banister wrote that the Prefect in charge of the trial process had stated that the Chinese Christians, ‘a troublesome sect’, would be dealt with, presumably after the public fuss had faded. Arrests of ‘Vegetarians’ had ended and Taotai Hsu told the ‘Commissioners’ that the case was closed. When told that the consuls would advise their Ministers in Beijing, Hsu simply laughed. Hixson described the position of the ‘Commission’ in Gutian at the end of September as helpless and the foreign presence as a ‘farce.’
Denby responded that the Viceroy should be reminded yet again of the fate of the Viceroy of Sichuan who had eventually lost his position and barred for life from future official employment.168

The execution of twenty-three ordinary Chinese over the killings at Huashan was, in the end, a very small matter for the foreign governments and their diplomats in China compared with protecting the integrity of China. The British Government thought there was a genuine risk of a rebellion against Qing rule.169 With the broader issues of British relationships with China foremost in his mind O’Conor instructed Mansfield to return to Fuzhou to consult with the Viceroy and to conclude the work of the ‘Commission.’ Mansfield left Gutian on 11 October, arriving in Fuzhou on 12 October. The ‘Commission’ continued without him but it was obvious to US Consul Hixson that after two months of hearings, some executions and punishments, the British were now determined to bring the trials to an end. All that was outstanding was the Viceroy’s agreement to the execution of the seventeen men condemned to death for their part in the actual assault on the missionaries. On 15 October Denby advised Washington that the seventeen ‘Vegetarians’ would be executed, and all participants subjected to punishment, after which it was likely that the ‘Commission’ would end.170 To encourage this final step and bring matters to a close the USS Detroit, the French cruiser Forfait and five British warships assembled in Fuzhou.171 Banister told CMS London that the arrival of the gunboats brought about a rapid change in the attitude of the Viceroy who, he said, ‘ceased to offer further obstructions.’ British Admiral Buller was under orders to insist that the executions proceed with the implication of a bombardment if diplomatic reasoning failed.172 The Viceroy approved the seventeen executions with appropriate punishments for others involved.173 A total of twenty-six men were finally executed for their leading role in the killings.174

168 State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Hixson, 30 September 1895. In his report, Hixson states that the degradation of the Viceroy of Sichuan tipped the balance and the Viceroy and his officials were now cooperating fully with the ‘Commission.’ Hixson Report, op cit, p 122. O’Conor told Mansfield that ‘any complaint against Chinese officials should be definite and precise.’ Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 29 September 1895. US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 21 September 1895.

169 Foreign Office Archives, FO228/1194, O’Conor to Mansfield, 2 October 1895. See also Denby to Secretary of State, 5 July 1895, 15 October 1895. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906, NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101. Hixson stated unequivocally, and presumably Mansfield agreed, that “The Vegetarians are a political society which is plotting the overthrow of the [Chinese]Government.”

170 US State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 15 October 1895.


172 Hixson Report, op cit, p 123.

173 Foreign Office Archives, FO228ii94, O’Conor to Mansfield, 17 October 1895.

174 State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 25 October 1895 enclosing Hixson to Denby 20 October 1895.
On October 15 O’Conor told Mansfield that the Gutian episode was concluded as far as Britain was concerned.\(^{175}\) Mansfield returned to Gutian on 18 October without discussing British intentions with Hixson signalling the end of British official interest in the Huashan Massacre.\(^{176}\) Denby wrote:

> I will instruct Messrs Hixson and Newell to discontinue proceedings when the British Commission withdraws. In view of the fact that we have been so energetic and pressing in standing by the nation whose citizens were murdered I do not think that we should be expected to continue the investigation when that nation has abandoned it.\(^{177}\)

Hixson believed that Mansfield’s agreement, under instructions from British Minister O’Conor, to twenty-six executions was ‘a most damaging concession to the Chinese officials’ and ‘a surrender and concession to Viceroy’\(^{178}\) On 25 October the ‘Commission’ left Gutian and arrived in Fuzhou two days later. Mansfield’s conduct at Gutian was approved by the Foreign Office and the Gutian enquiry was over.\(^{179}\) Nineteen men were banished or imprisoned for life, twenty-seven imprisoned for between ten and fifteen years and twenty others imprisoned for lesser periods. In all, 102 were punished for their involvement in the massacre. Another 94 were held for further investigation but seem to have been released without penalty.

Hixson asked that he be relieved of any further involvement as his ‘limited powers are futile’ and he wished to complete his report.\(^{180}\) Denby replied that he had no authority to relieve Hixson but his report was essential. On November 19 Commander Newell rejoined the USS Detroit and his report on the Gutian affair was sent to Denby in early December. Hixson described it as ‘full and exhaustive’ although Denby indicated that he preferred a combined Hixson/Newell report.\(^{181}\) Hixson remained as US Consul in Fuzhou although he was too ill for active work for nearly a year.\(^{182}\) After official complaints by the Viceroy that he was still meddling he was directed by Denby

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175 Foreign Office Archives, FO228, O’Conor to Mansfield, 15 October 1895. State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 15 October 1895.
176 Hixson Report, op cit, pp 127-128.
177 File note, Foreign Office Archives, FO228, O’Conor to Mansfield, 23 October 1895. State Department Archives, Despatches from US Legation, Peking, Denby to Secretary of State, 25 October 1895.
178 Hixson Report, op cit, p 127-128. Twenty-three men executed might seem a very strong response from the Chinese authorities. The Rev. William Banister mentioned the execution in Shanghai, about the same time, of eleven men who were arrested for robbery with violence. Rev. William Banister, ‘Report of the Kucheng Commission of Enquiry.’ North China Herald, 20 September 1895, pp 484-489. See the handwritten report in CMS East Asia Archives, Reel 245, 12 October. Under ‘normal’ Chinese law, all of the one hundred or so men who had participated in the ‘Vegetarian’ expedition to Huashan were liable to be executed and mass executions on this scale were not uncommon.
179 Banister to Baring-Gould 5 November 1895.
180 US State Department, Despatches from United States Consuls in Foochow, 1849-1906 NLA mfm 1723.1C Microform No 150, Roll 8, Hixson to Denby 9 December 1895.
181 Denby to Secretary of State, 18 December 1895. On 23 December the State Department informed Hixson of the need for a joint report. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101.
182 Hixson Report, op cit, p 154.
not to seek further interviews in relation to the massacre.\textsuperscript{183} He went on extended sick leave after contracting typhoid fever and finally submitted a lengthy report late in 1896.

The wider implications of the ‘Vegetarian’ movement were not settled as far as the Viceroy and his subordinates were concerned. On November 7\textsuperscript{th}, provincial officials raided Sanxian-zhou, a temple island in the Min River, (Wade-Giles—San Hsien Chou and in Fujianese-Min dialect—Sun Hseng-sien) situated between two bridges over the river and only a few hundred yards away from the US Consulate on Nantai Island.\textsuperscript{184} The temple had been identified by Hixson as the ‘Vegetarian’ provincial headquarters in Fuzhou. According to Hixson at least one Viceroy, Ho Ching (1870s had issued a proclamation protecting the ‘Vegetarians’ that was on view in the temple for more than a decade but conveniently disappeared after the Huashan Massacre. Three men in charge of the temple were detained but not subsequently imprisoned or tried.\textsuperscript{185} Hixson stated that a book was recovered listing all the leading Vegetarians in the province but all knowledge of such a book was officially denied.\textsuperscript{186} Hixson again suggested the Gelaohui as the real force behind the ‘Vegetarians’ and said that many Chinese officials supported the organization.\textsuperscript{187} Foreigners in Fuzhou were not the only foreigners to identity the ‘Vegetarians’ with the Gelaohui. Frank Burden was in the first Australian party to join the China Inland Mission and wrote to his uncle in Adelaide:

I told you some time back about some secret societies trying to overthrow the present Dynasty & now the time seems to have come for the outburst. The large secret society called Ko-lau-huei has caused enough riots to compel the foreign powers to take action against the government & no doubt if they could get the foreigners to declare war while the government were thus engaged they would just get the people to rise in rebellion & so carry out their plan. Several men in connection with the Ko-lau-huei have been captured and beheaded. Last Saturday morning two were executed just outside our north gate & as I went out for my walk this afternoon what should I see but their heads each in a small wooden cage hanging to a post, a sickening sight. If I had the time to spare I might tell you much about riots etc but I daresay you have news in the home papers.\textsuperscript{188}

The Americans remained uneasy about the possibility for further murders as anti-foreign incidents continued across China. Admiral Carpenter suggested to US Minister Denby that all Americans in the interior of China should be instructed to withdraw to the Treaty Ports. Denby wrote to the

\textsuperscript{183} Denby to Secretary of State, 26 December 1895. On 23 December the State Department informed Hixson of the need for a joint report. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101
\textsuperscript{184} Hixson Report, p 9. The island is now a public park, with no temple site. A photograph of a ‘Temple’ or ‘Pagoda’ Island, taken by the British photographer, John Thompson, appears on a number of websites. No firm identification of the photograph with Sanxian zhou has been established although research is continuing.
\textsuperscript{185} Hixson Report, p 9.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid p 152.
\textsuperscript{187} Hixson Report, p 10.
\textsuperscript{188} Frank Burden, Ganking, to Charles Good, Adelaide, 12 October 1891.
Secretary of State advising that the only Americans inland were missionaries and that he was convinced that the Chinese officials would interpret any significant withdrawal as a sign of weakness, resulting in many more anti-foreign events. He suggested that supporters of foreign missions in the United States leave missionaries and others to make their own decisions in order to avoid any subsequent criticisms of the actions of American officials.\textsuperscript{189}

In his Report, Hixson sought to sum up the impact of the Huashan Massacre on foreigners in China as a whole. He pointed out that the American interest through the attack on Miss Hartford was of small importance in the wider situation.

The whole of the missionary interests in Fuhkien province were vitally concerned in the general outcomes of the Huashan investigation: and it may be said, indeed, that all missionary interests in China were more or less involved. There is no gainsaying the fact that at one time during the investigation the proximate safety on not only missionaries but also of other foreigners in this consular district was practically dependent upon the success of the committee [Commission] charged with holding the inquiry into the causes of the massacre. Moreover, the matter largely concerned the future of missionary work throughout all China.\textsuperscript{190}

Although Hixson was critical of many aspects of the Commission’s work he understood that there were wider foreign interests than simply those of missionaries and concluded that murderous attacks on foreign missionaries were unlikely to occur again.

There is not much probability that anything closely resembling the Huashan tragedy will take place, considering that the affair was a massacre resulting from slow and deliberate plans, that these plans were executed with the same deliberation with which they were conceived, and the additional fact that almost the whole proceedings were public. The next troubles in line will doubtless be of a more secret nature, both as to plans and execution, and they will therefore be on a much smaller scale than was the Huashan massacre.\textsuperscript{191}

The British and American diplomats involved believed that national economic and strategic interests in East Asia were more important in the long run than the murders of the British missionaries that were, as Table 2 indicates, rare occurrences in 19\textsuperscript{th} century China, at least until the end of the century. The British and American Ministers worked assiduously not to allow the Huashan Massacre to threaten wider British and American interests in China. As the dramatic increase in missionary numbers evidenced in Tables 1.6a and 1.6b demonstrate, missionaries were in no way deterred by events at Huashan from pursuing their idealistic goals any more than they were

\textsuperscript{189} Denby to Secretary of State, 14 November 1895. US State Department, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906. NLA mfm 3773-3903 Rolls 100, 101.

\textsuperscript{190} Hixson Report, \textit{op cit}, p 269.

\textsuperscript{191} Hixson Report, \textit{op cit}, p 181.
deterred by the even greater calamity of the Boxer Uprising and the deaths of some two hundred foreigners and thousands of Chinese Christians in 1899-1900.