Episcopal Dissidents, African Allies:
The Anglican Communion and the Globalization of Dissent

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Abstract

In recent years, conservative dissidents within the Episcopal Church in the United States have felt alienated by the Episcopal Church’s liberal policies, especially acceptance of homosexuality. In response, these Episcopal dissidents have increasingly sought and received help and support from Anglican bishops in the global South (Africa, Asia, and Latin America). In this dissertation, the development and dynamics of these transnational Anglican alliances are examined anthropologically, on the basis of ethnographic research with Anglican communities involved in such relationships in Uganda and the United States. These relationships are often explained, by both supporters and critics, through narratives of increased global conflict between liberal Northern Christianity and conservative Southern Christianity (with which conservative Northerners are said to have a natural affinity). This work questions such narratives, first, by presenting the situations, concerns, and motives of the Northern and Southern Anglicans involved and calling into question assumptions of homogenous Southern conservatism or natural affinities. Secondly, this work demonstrates that these alliances are the outcome of cooperative globalizing endeavors undertaken beginning in the mid-1990s by Episcopal conservative dissidents and a number of sympathetic Southern leaders. These allies have globalized Episcopal conflicts by framing them in terms of discourses of Anglican globalism, and pursuing projects of global intervention in the Episcopal Church, such as placing dissident Episcopal parishes under the authority of African bishops. Chapter topics include the history and character of the Church of Uganda and the Episcopal Church; the international meetings organized by conservative Episcopalians to develop relations with Southern allies in preparation for the 1998 meeting of all the world’s Anglican bishops; and the outcomes of that meeting, especially the passage of a non-binding resolution affirming the conservative view on homosexuality. Subsequent chapters examine the development of a conservative globalist vision of the Anglican Communion united through networks of mutual moral accountability, and the increase in relationships linking disaffected American conservatives with Southern bishops. Discourses about the characteristics of Northern and Southern Christianity are analyzed, as are critics’ accusations concerning monetary influences in these North/South alliances. The conclusion examines the growing currency in public discourse of ideas about North/South Christian conflict, and questions such ideas in light of the evidence presented here.
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A crisis in global Anglicanism?

In the autumn of 2003, as I was finishing my first draft of my dissertation, aspects of my dissertation topic seemed to be in the news all around me. Whenever I told anyone—not just clergy, not even just Episcopalians, but anyone—what I was writing on, he or she would nod and say, “Oh, yes, I’ve been hearing about all that.” Inter-Anglican conflict and rumors of schism were dominant themes in news sources related to the Episcopal Church in the United States, and the worldwide Anglican Communion—the church body of which the Episcopal Church is the American province. Even the secular press gave these conflicts considerable attention, during the summer and fall of 2003. News agencies like NPR and the *New York Times* frequently carried the latest Anglican news.

The first event that brought the Episcopal Church into the national spotlight to this unprecedented degree was the ‘gay bishop’ controversy. At the Episcopal Church’s national convention in August, a majority of the bishops and delegates confirmed Gene Robinson, an openly-gay and partnered Episcopal priest, as bishop-elect of the diocese (or regional jurisdiction) of New Hampshire. The Episcopal Church thus became the first mainline denomination to publicly accept a partnered gay person in a high leadership position. The prominence of the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion in the news continued with the unfolding of reactions to Robinson’s election. Nearly three thousand conservative Episcopalians who oppose acceptance of homosexuality in the church met in Texas in early October to discuss how to proceed, given that they now regard the Episcopal Church as hopelessly separated from Scriptural truth and morality. At the same time, the Archbishop of Canterbury, England, as official head of the worldwide Anglican Communion, called a conference for the head bishops of
the world’s 38 Anglican national or regional churches. The purpose of this conference was to decide on an international response to the Episcopal Church’s controversial move—a response which Episcopal conservatives hoped would require the Episcopal Church to turn away from acceptance of homosexuality, or else be expelled from the worldwide Communion of Anglican churches.

As the implications of Robinson’s election and consecration continued to unfold, many American Episcopalians and observers shared a sense that a moment of global crisis has arrived in the Episcopal Church. The language surrounding all these meetings has emphasized that what is at stake is not merely the peace and unity of one of the Anglican Communion’s member churches, the Episcopal Church. What is at stake, instead, is the shape and character of the entire worldwide Anglican Communion. Conservative Episcopalian leaders speaking at the Texas meeting argued that the Episcopal Church has abandoned “the Global Anglican Tradition,” and called for “a dramatic realignment of Anglicanism reaching both north and south of ECUSA,” separating the “archbishops of the dynamic Global South and the archbishops of the disintegrating Old West” (Anderson 2003; Virtue 2003e). Liberals in the church, too, see current Episcopal Church conflicts in global terms. A piece on the progressive Anglican website Everyvoice.net stated, “The threat of schism over the election of a gay bishop is like nothing the Church has ever seen before. The response isn't just larger and more organized. It's also global” (O’Connor 2003). The secular press, as well, has focused on the global implications of current struggles in the Episcopal Church. An editorial in the Dallas Morning News, covering the Texas meeting of conservatives, explained the global dimensions of this intra-Episcopal conflict clearly: “[Conservatives] may be on the losing end of this particular issue within the Episcopal Church, but their meeting is worth considering in the context of a worldwide struggle that may transform Christianity in this century.”

Why has the controversy over Gene Robinson’s election as bishop drawn such a global
response? Why do conflicts over doctrine and morality in the Episcopal Church attract the attention and the intervention of Anglican leaders around the world? Past seasons of conflict in the Episcopal Church’s history have not been ascribed such global significance. For example, in the late 1970s a number of traditionalist Episcopalians broke away from the Episcopal Church in response to the church’s revision of the Book of Common Prayer and decision to ordain women to the priesthood. The dissidents of that era issued no global appeals and received no global responses. Even as recently as the mid-1990s, such appeals to the wider Anglican world were not yet among the rhetorical and practical resources of conservative dissidents within the Episcopal Church. But in the past six years, conservative dissidents in the Episcopal Church have called repeatedly on the leaders of the worldwide Anglican Communion to intervene in the Episcopal Church, by forcing it to change its policies, or replacing it with a more orthodox American Anglican province. What is more, these American dissidents have found sympathetic and more-or-less willing allies among the bishops of the worldwide Communion, especially the global South—Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Visions of global polarization

Current conflicts within the Episcopal Church are widely understood, not merely as internal divisions to be handled within the United States, but as carrying a global significance that demands the attention and action of Anglican leaders all over the world. Further, they accept a particular interpretation of this global import: events in the Episcopal Church are of global significance because they represent the triumph of the orthodox, zealous Christian South over weak and degenerate Northern Christianity. Most accounts of recent events in the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion presume similar visions of a bifurcated world Christendom, divided between the global North–Europe and North America in particular—and the global South.¹ Southern Anglicanism (and Christianity overall) is described as ‘dynamic,’ ‘exploding,’ ‘aggressively conservative,’ ‘fundamentalist,’ ‘orthodox.’ This rising Southern Christianity
constitutes the force with which Northern Christians must reckon—what Philip Jenkins calls “the next Christendom.” Northern Anglicanism (and Christianity overall) is, for its part, characterized as ‘liberal’, ‘progressive,’ ‘revisionist,’ ‘post-modern,’ ‘disintegrating’—in short, a waning breed of Christianity, in danger of being either overrun or consigned to isolation and irrelevance. Northern conservatives describe themselves as essentially ‘opting out’ of Northern Christendom, on the basis of their presumed greater affinity with orthodox Southern Christians. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the ‘Culture Wars’ language of orthodox/progressive polarization was often invoked to name and explain ideological and other conflicts within the Episcopal Church. Today, though ‘Culture Wars’-type rhetoric is still often used in Episcopal Church debates, this vision of societal polarization has been subsumed in a new vision of global moral polarization. Conservative versus liberal is re-figured as South versus North—and by most accounts, the South is winning. Both threats by American conservatives to involve Southern Anglican leaders in disciplining the Episcopal Church, and threats by Southern Anglican leaders to confront the Episcopal Church, are generally interpreted as signs of the orthodox global South’s righteous/fundamentalist rebellion against revisionist/progressive Northern Christian leaders. Many received Philip Jenkins’ widely-read book and article on the rise of Southern Christianity (2002) as the perfect description of this trend. The vision and language of ‘global shift,’ of rising Southern Christendom and worldwide realignment, so pervades talk about and perceptions of current events in the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion that it is difficult to step back and recall that this interpretation is not inherent to the events themselves. Indeed, the degree to which this vision of the Anglican Communion now seems natural masks another perspective from which it appears quite surprising. When American Episcopal conservatives and Southern Anglican leaders first began to work collaboratively to oppose the Episcopal Church, many observers expressed perplexity or cynicism at the startling convergence of interests between these constituencies. American social conservatives, not generally known for their interest in
including the marginalized, and Southern church leaders, with their sharp criticisms of Northern culture and morality and demands for greater representation and power, seemed strange bedfellows indeed.

My own original interest in studying these alliances was motivated in large part by a desire to understand how these very different constituencies had managed to come together and forge common positions and goals. Though when I began this work, these alliances still appeared anomalous rather than obvious to most observers, today the wide circulation of the discourse of the imminent triumph of conservative Southern Christianity has so naturalized these alliances between conservative Northerners and Southern Anglicans that many no longer question how these alliances came about or make sense. Throughout these broader shifts in how these alliances are seen, however, the central task of my research and writing has remained the same: to develop and present an account of the development and dynamics of these global inter-Anglican alliances, and their implications for global-scale debates within the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion. In this dissertation, I offer a critical perspective on the premise that the Anglican Communion has reached a moment of crisis in North/South relations. I argue that the globalization of Episcopal Church conflicts is not due to the natural and inevitable rise to global prominence of a monolithically orthodox and zealous Southern Christian force. Rather, the global significance ubiquitously ascribed to events in the Episcopal Church today is primarily due to the cooperative globalizing work of American conservative dissidents and a number of sympathetic Southern Anglican leaders, from the mid-1990s to the present.

Since 1996, conservative American Episcopalians, alienated from the Episcopal Church, have strengthened their ties with Southern Anglican leaders and churches, soliciting these leaders’ assistance in their struggles. At the same time, these American conservatives have re-framed their understanding and talk about Episcopal Church conflicts in terms of the global Anglican Communion. These groups now see themselves as natural allies of Southern Christians, riding
the wave of the rise of Southern Christianity to a renewed and realigned global Anglicanism that reflects their values and convictions. Simultaneously, many Southern Anglican leaders, inspired by the idea that they might be the vehicles for renewal and reform of the Northern church, have made common cause with Northern conservatives and come to share their view of world Christianity divided between apostate North and orthodox South. In this work, I examine the development of these alliances and their corresponding discourses and ideologies, in order to offer an account of how the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion have arrived at the point where conflicts within the Episcopal Church are almost universally perceived and described as of global significance. In examining this case of Episcopal and Anglican globalization, I am laying out a history of discursive and concrete projects which, in spite of its recentness, seems now in danger of being forgotten as current global alliances and visions become increasingly widespread and naturalized.

This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the processes and projects of globalization undertaken since the mid-1990s by disaffected American conservative Episcopalians and their Southern sympathizers and allies. This ‘globalization’ consists of an increased trend towards describing events in the Episcopal Church as of worldwide relevance, especially in terms of a particular understanding of the Christian world as bifurcated between Northern and Southern Christianities. This ‘globalization,’ furthermore, is not merely manifest in descriptions and other talk, but also in the growing involvement of Anglican leaders from outside the United States in Episcopal Church conflicts. This globalization consists not merely in the exporting of American conflicts to the rest of the world, but has involved cooperation and collaboration between Northern and Southern Anglicans in developing shared identities and agendas which articulate, in complex but important ways, with the particular concerns, ideas, and situations of Anglicans in Africa as well as in the United States.
Anglican globalization in context

This Anglican/Episcopal globalization has emerged in the context of widespread excitement around the concept and vocabulary of the global (Tsing 2000:327). Corresponding with the popularity of global language and the tremendous proliferation of globalisms—Tsing’s term for “endorsements of the importance of the global”—in contemporary economy, politics, culture and religion, there has been a proliferation of scholarly interest in the global and globalization (Tsing 2000:330). Gille and O Riain find that there were twenty-nine sociological studies which listed “globalization” as a keyword between 1985 and 1990, 410 in 1995 alone, and 985 in 1998, suggesting a dramatic increase in sociological attention to this subject (Gille and O Riain 2002:272). Similar trends could doubtless be tracked in anthropology; Susan Brin Hyatt, in a review essay on anthropological studies of globalization, remarks, “Based on a partial survey of current work in anthropology, one might almost be tempted to argue that ‘globalization’ has become the master trope that now threatens to supplant the bedrock concept so crucial to the practice of anthropology, ‘culture’” (Hyatt 2001:206). Tsing takes this scholarly enthusiasm as her departure point, arguing that scholars have become too much a part of the phenomenon they should be studying—that very proliferation of global discourses and projects. She proposes analytical principles and departure points for a more effective and critical scholarly approaches to globalization.

The program which Tsing outlines, and which I take up in this work, is perhaps aptly named by Susan Hyatt in the review essay cited above, which she entitles “Writing Against Globalization.” Hyatt suggests that we might take cues for a critical approach to globalization from the ways some anthropologists have questioned the concept of ‘culture.’ She writes,
Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) suggests that what anthropologists need to do is not write about culture, but, rather, to write against culture. She argues that since culture has been used as the lens through which the ‘native’ is viewed and by which the ‘native’ is constructed, and as it is a conceptualization that continues to reify the divide between the anthropologist as ‘self’ and the native as ‘other,’... it is a notion to be textually resisted..... In a similar spirit of mind, I would submit that the notion of globalization as it is frequently deployed these days also perpetuates a series of somewhat artificial oppositions between the ‘self’ as the ‘first world’ or metropolitan west [or North], and just about everywhere else as ‘the other,’ thereby reinforcing this artificial dichotomy and blurring the complex outlines of the local.... I am proposing that the challenge we might take on in the present historical moment is not to write about globalization but to write against it. [Hyatt 2001:206-207]

The Episcopal/Anglican globalization I study does rest upon and reify oppositions between the global North and South. Analysis of this situation, then, indeed calls for a ‘writing against globalization,’ by means of an analytical approach which will move beyond these oppositional categories and overarching global narratives into an examination of how these categories and narratives have been constructed and deployed, by whom, to what ends, and with what effects. This examination will lead away from ‘North’ and ‘South’ as fixed entities and into the situations, motives, and relationships of particular Anglican agents and groups, Northern and Southern.

This approach to globalization differs significantly from many other recent scholarly approaches. Some scholars have been preoccupied with questions of the newness or antiquity of globalization, and the continuity and/or discontinuity of current developments with past world-systems and circulations. In the Anglican Communion contexts, some elementary observations on these issues are easily offered: current developments are certainly continuous in important ways with over a century of the Anglican Communion’s history as a worldwide, interconnected polity, though current developments also have much to do with media and telecommunications developments of the past twenty years (see chapter 4). However, Anna Tsing’s approach, and my own, to globalization turns the analytical focus away from whether ‘globalization,’ as a process
named and described by various scholars, is old or new. Instead, this approach to globalization
starts from the unquestioned empirical reality of an explosion in talk about the global over the
past decade, and moves from there into analysis of the context and content of particular
globalisms.

This approach to globalization differs, too, from that of scholars who are concerned with the
interplay of the local and the global—the impact of globalization or ‘global forces’ on local sites
and cultures, the resistance of the local against the global, and so forth (see Hyatt 2001:211).
Like the debates over globalization’s vintage, these accounts tend to start with an a priori
definition of globalization or global forces, or present such a definition early on. This is
important work; my own exploration, in the course of this research, of how Ugandans think and
talk about Northern cultural and economic power brought home to me the importance of
attending to local negotiations of outside forces. However, my approach, informed by Tsing’s
work, involves looking at people fundamentally as authors, and not only subjects, of
globalization. As Simon Coleman writes in his account of globalization among Swedish
Pentecostals, “I am arguing that processes of globalization do not simply happen to believers;
they also create them in their own image” (Coleman 2000:6). He explains how he sees
globalization in action among his consultants:
The orientations towards the world displayed by these Christians involve
not merely a set of ideas, but also engagement certain physical and material
activities.... My proposal is therefore that the global culture of these christians
does not simply involve communicating across territorial boundaries....
Globalisation is not merely a broad sociological process; it is also a quality of
action, a means of investing an event, object or person with a certain kind of
translocal value. [Coleman 2000:6]

Like Coleman, I understand globalization, not merely as “communicating across territorial
boundaries” (though such communication is, indeed, centrally important), nor primarily as some
sort of “broad sociological process,” but as an orientation, a “realm of action and identity,”
shared by the people I study and manifest in multifaceted ways in their talk and activities.

Coleman’s approach foreshadows Tsing’s prescription for writing against globalization, the analytical program which I have found useful in shaping my account. Tsing calls anthropologists and other scholars to turn their analytical attention to the discourses and projects which construct the global as a relevant configuration of scale in particular contexts and conflicts. Noting the relevance of attention to scale in contemporary movements, Tsing writes, “Contestants form themselves in shifting alliances, mobilized for reasons of power, passion, discipline, or dis-ease and mounting campaigns for particular configurations of scale” (Tsing 2000:327). This general description corresponds remarkably well to the particular situation of globalization I examine in this work. Northern and Southern Anglicans have formed into a diverse and loosely-bounded set of alliances, organized around concerns about doctrinal orthodoxy, and have used a range of statements and actions to campaign for the relevance of the global scale as a frame of reference for decisions and policies in the Episcopal Church.

In their article “Space and contentious politics,” Deborah Martin and Byron Miller cast some additional light on the salience of contests over scale in contemporary social movements and other movements or contentious situations. They explain scale as follows:

One of the most common conceptualizations of scale is as jurisdictional hierarchy such as the nested relationships of city, county, state, national, and transnational governance. This hierarchy and others like it have implications for contentious politics, as each jurisdictional scale represents a semi-cohesive political territory with institutional powers to coerce, regulate, tax, and invest.... Defining a social conflict involves conceptualizing its spatial scale, and this attribution itself may be a significant point of contention.... Shifts in the scalar definition of the conflict inevitably entail changes in the...relative power and standing of contestants. Thus scalar definitions of a conflict may themselves be a locus of contention. [Martin and Miller 2003:148-49]

The structure of the worldwide Anglican Communion consists of nested jurisdictional structures (parish, diocese, province), and indeed, scalar definitions of inter-Anglican conflicts have certainly become a locus of contention in recent years. Is a conflict between a priest and the
bishop who oversees her or him contained by the boundaries of that bishop’s diocese, can other bishops in the same provincial church become involved, and do church leaders from elsewhere in the Anglican world ever have the right or the ability to intervene and have their say in the matter? The recent history of the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion is very much a history of contention over relevant scales, over what people, places, and connections can or should come into play in efforts to resolve a conflict or impose a policy within a given church context. Thus the global scale is politicized and “the choice of geographical scale at which the battle should be waged becomes a crucial strategic issue” (Gille and O Riain 2002:284).

**Projects and discourses of globalization**

I approach Anglican/Episcopal globalization, then, as a study in contentious scale-making; and I do so guided by Tsing’s analytical program. Tsing’s suggested approach involves giving critical attention to both ideologies of scale and projects of scale-making. Tsing defines ideologies of scale as “cultural claims about locality, regionality, and globality; about stasis and circulation; and about networks and strategies of proliferation.” Tsing’s choice of the vocabulary of ideology highlights the elements of belief and motivational power which surround globalist (or other scale-making) claims and visions. Gille and O Riain, in contrast, write about approaching the study of globalization by attending to global imaginations. In contrast to Tsing’s term ‘ideology,’ the idea of ‘global imagination’ hints at globalism as an ideal world, which may become real through its enactment by people and groups invested in its vision: “The construction of a global vision has tangible implications for the outcome of a conflict” (Gille and O Riain 2002:283).

In addition to ideology or imagination, the term ‘discourse’ can be—and, in the following pages, often will be—applied to the ideational/rhetorical aspect of globalisms. In contrast to the other terms, ‘discourse’ draws attention to the way globalist visions and ideas are constructed and disseminated through text and talk. As used by scholars in the social sciences and
humanities, the term ‘discourse’ does not imply that something is in any sense merely talk and not reality. Rather, discourses can be powerfully constitutive of reality. Widely-circulated and accepted discourses can shape and even determine how people understand situations, identities, and actions, and what people count as salient problems and rational solutions. Perspectives and actions which don’t make sense in terms of the dominant discourse may be misinterpreted or ignored altogether. To refer to globalization as a discourse (or, more accurately, as a wide range of interrelated discourses) is emphatically not to suggest that globalization isn’t ‘real’. It is, instead, to indicate that the reality of globalization is located in the ways people and institutions think and talk globalization, and in the myriad ways that thinking and talking produces projects of making globalization concrete. In sum, all three of these terms—ideology, imagination, and discourse—carry important connotations for a full appreciation of the ways globalisms work: globalisms are motivational, compel or attract belief, function as imagined worlds, and are articulated, constructed, and spread in discourse.

In this work on Anglican and Episcopal globalization, I attend to the development, elaboration, circulation, and contestation of global visions and discourses. I draw on my critical reading of recent Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion history, and my ethnographic work with Anglicans in the U.S. and Africa, to offer an account of arguments for the appropriateness of the global scale as a frame for events in the Episcopal Church. I show how the ideal of ‘globalness’ as a characteristic of the worldwide Anglican Communion has been invoked with increasing frequency since the mid-1990s, as that concept and vocabulary gained in salience in the wider society and economy. I illustrate the development of contests over what Anglican ‘globalness’ should look like, between liberal and moderate Northern church leaders who endorse a multiculturalist globalism and Northern conservatives who propagate a globalism founded on the Episcopal Church’s accountability to Southern Anglican leaders. I describe, too, how Southern Anglican leaders have endorsed elements of this conservative globalism, arguing
for accountability among Anglican provinces and greater inclusion of Southern Anglicans in Anglican Communion affairs. These Northern and Southern globalisms articulate as an overarching Anglican globalism, held in common by conservative Episcopalians and their Southern allies and sympathizers, and centering on concepts of orthodoxy, accountability, and the moral authority of the global South.

In addition to calling for analytical attention to ideologies/discourses of scale, Tsing calls for a focus on globalist projects, or “relatively coherent bundles of ideas and practices as realized in particular times and places” (Tsing 2000:347). In describing (approvingly) analytical approaches to modernity, which inspire her suggestions for how to approach globalization and globalisms, Tsing observes that “analysts attend to the social practices, material infrastructure, cultural negotiations, institutions, and power relations through which modernization [or globalization] projects work—and are opposed, contested, and reformulated” (Tsing 2000:329). Globalist projects, in particular, are likely to involve endeavors to build connections with individuals or groups beyond the local context. Gille and O Riain note that the pursuit of global connections is often the counterpart of the development of globalist imaginations and discourses: When local actors wage their battles with claims about the global, to acquire more credibility they themselves build connections to outside actors and enter globally circulating discourses. This not only sends an important signal that the concrete local meaning of globalization is up for grabs, but it also strongly shapes the circle of potential allies and enemies. [Gille and O Riain 2002:283]

In examining Anglican and Episcopal globalization in this work, I have described some of the cultural negotiations, social practices, institutional structures and material resources through which Episcopal and Anglican globalist projects of connection have been forged. In particular, I focus on the long-distance travels and interactions involved in Anglican conservative globalist projects, such as Anglican leaders and laity coming together from around the world for conferences and consultations, or visiting parishes and colleagues outside their jurisdictions. The
most notable of these projects are those involving direct interventions by Southern Anglican leaders in parishes and dioceses within the American Episcopal Church. Such Southern leaders have taken charge of American conservative parishes or their clergy, visited the parishes to preach and offer other ministries, and sometimes confronted Episcopal Church authorities on the parishes’ behalf. These conservative Anglican globalist projects enact the globalism envisioned in conservative Anglican discourses, and strengthen that discursive globalism by providing examples which appear to demonstrate its validity: ‘It must be true that Episcopal Church conflicts have global relevance, because African bishops are intervening in the Episcopal Church!’

My dissertation consists of a description and analysis of the evolution of these discourses, and these concrete connections, from around 1997, when these ideas and actions began to intensify, through the end of my fieldwork in mid-2002. In this task of description and analysis, I write against globalization by revealing how this Anglican globalism works—how it has developed and spread, and been enacted, negotiated, and challenged along the way. As Anna Tsing observes, “The task of understanding planet-wide interconnections requires locating and specifying globalist projects and dreams, with their contradictory as well as charismatic logics and their messy as well as effective encounters and translations” (Tsing 2000:330). The charismatic logic, the effective encounters, and the messy translations involved in the development of this Anglican globalism constitute a story much more complex, and much more interesting, than the grand narrative of Northern moral collapse and Southern Christian triumph told in the newspaper articles and other accounts quoted above. It is this complex and interesting story which I seek to tell in the pages that follow, in hope of unsettling that grand global narrative, which is so easy in the telling, so dramatic in its sweep, and so bereft of historical or ethnographic grounding.

**Wider relevance**

These current developments in the Anglican Communion are of interest not only to scholars of
world Christianity, but also to anthropologists and other social scientists interested in globalization and transnational social movements. Existing work on globalization and religion largely focuses on religious traditions defined as ‘other’ by scholars in the Northern academy, such as fundamentalist Islam and Pentecostal Christianity. Through this work, I contribute to this literature an analysis of globalization in relation to a mainline Protestant religious body, the Anglican Communion. My work offers an informative study of a worldwide, but traditionally Northern-based and Northern-headed, institution, the Anglican Communion, as its leaders and members struggle to re-envision and re-create it as a ‘global’ institution, encompassing a diversity of cultures, experiences, and perspectives. Through my examination of the debates and challenges involved in this process for the Anglican Communion, I present a new perspective on the complexity of living into the ideal of ‘globalness,’ given the openness of that ideal to competing definitions.

Further, my examination of the movement constituted by Northern conservatives and their Southern allies adds a unique case to the literature on transnational social and religious movements. The literature on social movements, in particular, tends to focus on progressive movements, reflecting an assumption that modern transnational social movements must be progressive movements, like the international women’s movement or the movement for international debt relief. The cooperative transnational Anglican activism I study, while not strictly comprising a social movement because of its limited focus on change in the church rather than the broader socio-political sphere, still offers a fascinating counterexample to such assumptions by confounding any simple conservative/progressive distinction. Likewise, the explicitly global orientation of the American Episcopalian conservatives involved in these alliances challenges scholars’ assumptions that religious conservative activism represents a reaction against cultural or economic globalization.
Finally, given the increase among church leader, members, and commentators of reliance on models of world religion and politics founded on North/South divisions, I feel it is important to offer this ethnographic account of the salience of such models. A grounded, qualitative approach quickly reveals the inadequacy of ‘North’ and ‘South’ as categories, or ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ as explanatory factors. Instead, my work reveals the way ideas of North and South operate in relationships between Anglicans from the global North and South. Through my analysis I hope to offer, not a further reification of these categories, but an illustration of how their simple and charismatic logic is propagated and enacted, and becomes part of people’s understandings of the world.

**Approach and methods**

Analysis of the transnational Anglican alliances I focus upon in this work reveals the profound entanglement of two processes: first, the growing power and assertiveness of Southern Anglicans in the worldwide Anglican Communion, still struggling with decolonization; and second, American conservatives’ search for Southern allies to discipline or replace the Episcopal Church. These alliances effectually elide the meaning and implications of Southern Anglicans’ involvement in the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion, respectively. As a result, Episcopal Church politics over doctrine and morality have become wrapped up with Anglican Communion politics over inclusion, decolonization, and power. That entanglement, in large part, constitutes the conditions under which the Episcopal Church’s vote to accept a gay bishop is seen as having—and, perhaps, actually has—the potential to provoke a total realignment of the worldwide Anglican Communion.

This complex entanglement of Northern and Southern aspects, and Episcopal Church- and Anglican Communion-level dynamics and implications, demanded a multi-sited ethnographic approach. The empiricism and potential for nuanced qualitative analysis of ethnographic study makes it the ideal method to get into and beyond the totalizing binary North/South vision of
contemporary Anglicanism. My approach has been to focus on people, relationships, and people’s views of relationships, by way of ethnographic participant-observation, interviewing, and careful reading of relevant texts. Rather than taking the categories of Northern and Southern Christianity, and their generally-ascribed characteristics, as given facts, my ethnographic approach leads into an analysis of how ideas about Northern and Southern Christianity play into these relationships, sometimes challenged, sometimes confirmed; sometimes enabling, sometimes constraining. Through my focus on the development and dynamics of alliances between conservative American Episcopalians and sympathetic African Anglicans, I offer a grounded perspective on the globalization of Episcopal Church conflicts which has taken place over the past seven years. Critical analysis of these cross-cultural Anglican alliances reveals that they are not the result of some natural and exclusive affinity between Northern conservatives and a monolithic, orthodox Southern Christendom. Rather, these relationships must be understood as the work of particular people and groups striving to live their faith and create new ways to be Anglican together.

My research on these inter-Anglican relationships was multi-sited, in order to capture most effectively the complexity of these relationships and their wider situation. A number of anthropologists, qualitative sociologists, and others have remarked upon the needfulness of multi-sited research designs for studies of global institutions and relations. In their review of ethnographic approaches to the global, Gille and O Riain observe,

> Multisited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations.... What ties together fieldwork locations is the ethnographer’s discovery of traces and clues, her logic of association. The methodological imperative of being there is replaced by that of chasing things around. [Gille and O Riain 2002:286-7]

Most concretely, the connections I followed in structuring my fieldwork were those between an American parish, now under African ecclesial leadership, and one of its African associations,
though not the central one. At the first service I attended at St. Timothy’s, the parish which I had chosen as my American fieldsite, the visiting preacher was a priest and former conservative Episcopal activist who had since moved to Uganda to work for the church there. The presence of this American priest, bringing greetings from Uganda to an American parish now under the authority of the Archbishop of Rwanda, is a direct connection between the sites I chose for my ethnography; but it also represents a much wider range of travels and circulations of people, objects, and discourses which connect the Church of Uganda—together with a number of other African, and some Asian, Anglican provinces—with the Episcopal Church, and especially with conservative Episcopal dissidents.

By the time I heard that sermon at St. Timothy’s, I had already chosen the Church of Uganda as the site for my African fieldwork, on the basis of the frequency with which the names of Ugandan bishops, Ugandan sites, even Ugandan martyrs came up in textual materials associated with American Episcopal conservative activism. Though the Province of Rwanda is the African Anglican church most known as involved with the conservative Episcopal cause (see chapter 6), Uganda was clearly another African church with multiple lines of connection to the conservative Episcopal movement. A 2001 analysis of conservative Americans’ growing relationships with African Anglicans noted, “Ugandan bishops make up the largest contingent in the ECUSA right wing’s growing international network” (Daly 2001:3).

Thus in moving between St. Timothy’s and my central sites in Uganda, both literally through my fieldwork and now metaphorically in my writing and analysis, I follow the trails of a number of ethnographically-visible connections, in order to clarify such connections’ meanings, dynamics, and implications. What I ‘chased around,’ as the unifying theme in this multisited research, was talk and ideas about the Northern (or American) and Southern (or African, or Ugandan) Anglican churches, their respective strengths and weaknesses, and how they do and should relate to one another, bilaterally or as co-members of the worldwide Anglican
Communion. Thus, in order to cast light on the charged relations between Northern and Southern Anglicans in the contemporary Communion, I pursued ethnographic research with two distinct, but interconnected, Anglican communities, one Northern, one Southern.

**Fieldsites and data sources**

The American component of my fieldwork consisted of four months with St. Timothy’s Church, a formerly-Episcopal parish in the southeastern United States, which has now broken from the Episcopal Church and placed itself under the authority of the Archbishop of Rwanda by way of an organization called the Anglican Mission in America. At St. Timothy’s, I participated in worship services, prayer groups, discussions, and other events, paying particular attention to the congregation’s self-understanding in relation to the Episcopal Church in the U.S., the Anglican Church in Rwanda, and American and African Christianity more generally. I also interviewed approximately sixty leaders and members of this congregation, and several other leaders in conservative parishes or organizations involved in transnational alliances, focusing on how they see their relationship with Southern churches as providing solutions to their conflicts with the Episcopal Church.

Besides my work in this American field site, I also spent approximately six months in central Uganda, conducting ethnographic research on the Anglican Church of Uganda. I felt that fieldwork at an African site was essential for many reasons. First, the differences and similarities that exist between the situations and perspectives of Northerners and Southerners involved in these alliances are best understood through ethnographic fieldwork in both contexts; Southern perspectives on these alliances are under-represented in available documents, partially due to limited access to the Internet. Secondly, I felt it was important to perform fieldwork at a Southern site because the degree and character of lay support for Southern leaders’ involvement in international church politics was all but impossible to gauge without observing and talking with Southern lay Anglicans. Finally, ethnographic study of a Southern fieldsite seemed
especially important given the centrality of discourse about Southern Christianity, its character and role, in current Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion politics. In offering, through this work, a portrayal of one particular African Anglican province, my intent is to bring some specific realities into conversation with the generalizations about Southern or African Christianity widely voiced by Northern Anglicans on all sides of current debates. However, where I feel my research justifies contesting more strongly the dominant generalizations about Southern Christianity, I may extrapolate out from my work in Uganda to offer my own counter-generalizations about African Christianity and, by extension, Southern Christianity.\(^6\)

In Uganda, I focused my attention on the services, other events, teaching, and talk at Uganda Christian University (UCU), an Anglican seminary and college located twenty miles outside the capital city, and on the Anglican cathedral next to the campus. I also spent some time observing at significant sites involved in transnational Anglican alliances, elsewhere in Uganda and, briefly, in Rwanda. In all these locations, I interviewed both lay and clergy consultants, focusing on their experiences and views of these alliances and of Northern and Southern Christianity, and seeking their perspectives on the characteristics and challenges of the Anglican church in Uganda. I completed about seventy interviews during my Ugandan research, including interviews with bishops from nine of the Church of Uganda’s twenty-two dioceses. Given the necessity of focusing my ethnographic study in one particular region of the country, the central region of Uganda (known as Buganda) was the best choice. I had ready access to the provincial offices, leaders, staff, and main cathedrals of the Church of Uganda, all located in Kampala. In addition to the nexus of North/South relationships represented by the provincial headquarters, I had access to another such nexus on the campus of UCU, a stop on the itinerary of many visiting Northerners. However, I did not limit my research to the central region; I also traveled to other significant sites of North/South connections, and interviewed clergy and laity from all over the country, in order to achieve some sense of how typical my findings in the central region were for
the church as a whole. What I found was that, concerning the questions of North/South relationship I was pursuing, there seemed to be little regional variation in how Ugandans viewed these issues. The only patterned differences I observed were in how aware people were of current inter-Anglican conflicts and North/South issues (often, people farther from the central urbanizes region were less exposed to news or rumors about Episcopal Church or Anglican Communion events). Hence, in the pages that follow, I offer my findings as generally descriptive of the Church of Uganda as a whole.

The Ugandan sources I quote in this text represent a much broader range of individuals than the Episcopalians I quote, who are largely committed members of the AMiA movement or otherwise actively involved in dissidence, with the exception of a few moderate or liberal leaders I also interviewed for their perspectives. I am able, and feel called, to quote a wider range of Ugandans partly because the Ugandan social, cultural, and religious scene will be less familiar to many of my readers; and, more significantly in terms of my analysis, because the Ugandan church is not sharply divided on questions of morality or the relative merit of Northern and Southern Christianity in the way the American Episcopal church is divided. While I certainly discovered a range of opinion on these issues among Ugandans, a generally coherent sense of the quality, position, and power of African Christianity emerged from my Ugandan interviews. My account of Ugandan attitudes, thus, integrates the views of a wide range of Ugandans of various liturgical and social ranks and leanings, while my account of American attitudes is focused only on the dissident conservative wing of the American church.

In both the Ugandan and American conservative contexts, I have sought to offer the perspectives of both lay membership and leadership (whether clergy or non-ordained organizational leaders). While many of the controversial actions and relationships I will cover in the following pages primarily involve a limited number of church leaders and activists (both Northern and Southern), I started this research with the presumption that the statements and
actions of leaders and activists do not represent only leaders’ and activists’ perspective, but articulate in significant ways with the salient discourses and concerns of their home contexts and lay supporters, and that lay perspectives would both reflect, and inform, leaders’ statements and actions. In the course of my research, I have found lay perspectives to be an important part of the whole picture of how and why these new transnational Anglican relationships developed, and what they mean for the present and future of the worldwide Communion and its member provinces.

In addition to my ethnographic data, I have drawn heavily on textual data sources in this dissertation. My analysis integrates critical reading of the wide variety of texts dealing with Episcopal Church, Church of Uganda, and Anglican Communion politics, produced by sources of various leanings (conservative, moderate, or liberal within the church, as well as the outside press) and in various genres (expository, persuasive, and declaratory). These texts have been used both as sources of historical data, to fill in the record of events from the years preceding my ethnographic study, and as sources of data concerning the development and contestation of particular discourses about the Episcopal Church, the Anglican Communion, the global South, homosexuality, and so on. I draw extensively on the wide range of texts produced and distributed (frequently by means of the Internet, though also as mailings, press releases, and so on) by conservative Episcopal individuals and organizations. In keeping with their situation as a vocal minority seeking wider support, conservative Episcopalians are particularly prolific in producing and circulating such texts, not only among their immediate allies but also, where possible, to larger audiences, including Southern Anglicans. These conservative Northern sources, then, both provide a vast body of data for tracking the development of particular ideas and discourses, and also represent a significant channel for the spread of such ideas and discourses. In sum, the analysis of such relevant texts, in addition to the observational and interview data gathered during my ten months’ field research, provided a substantial body of data to draw upon in my
description and analysis of these alliances.

**Personal background**

As I have conducted this research and writing, I have often thought of a line by Agha Shahid Ali, from the introduction to Faiz’s *The Rebel’s Silhouette*, which I noted down long ago: “Someone of two nearly equal loyalties must lend them, almost give them—a gift—to each other and hope that sooner or later the loan will be forgiven and they will become each other’s” (Faiz 1991:xii). I began this research as I complete it, as both a cultural anthropologist and an Episcopalian, someone with two nearly equal loyalties—to the analytical perspectives and central questions of my discipline, and to the Anglican tradition in which I was raised. I took up what would become the first threads of this project during my first year of graduate study in anthropology, as a project for an ethnography class. I had then only recently learned of the existence of the Continuing Church movement—the body of small breakaway American Anglican churches formed in the late 1970s. I decided to try my ethnographic skills at a local Continuing Church congregation, in order to reach an understanding of why people would want to leave the church in which I had been raised.

Now, after following those threads of discord from the Continuing Churches to the study of more recent divisions and alliances, after reading countless documents, holding countless conversations, hearing countless sermons and discussions, I have arrived at a thorough and nuanced understanding of why people are angry at, and choose to leave, the Episcopal Church. But I have also gained a more thorough and nuanced understanding of why people love it, and choose to stay. Both burdened and enlightened by all that I have learned of loyalty and loss, I offer this account of recent conflicts in the Episcopal Church. This work is too partial, no doubt, in both senses of the word—in some areas, too incomplete; in others, too much informed by one or another of the contested positions in the current Anglican world. I assure my readers that throughout this work I have tried, sometimes with conscious struggle against my own eagerness
to offer my own anthropologically-informed solutions to some of these contentious issues, to avoid adjudicating on matters of debate. Instead, I have striven to use my data and analysis to cast light on the terms of debate themselves, how Episcopalians and Anglicans came to be arguing about these issues, in these particular ways, among these particular parties. In an incisive piece on the anthropology of Islam, Talal Asad concluded with a note on the challenges of writing about contemporary religion: “There clearly is not, nor can there be, such a thing as a universally acceptable account of a living tradition. Any representation of tradition is contestable” (Asad 1986:17). My account of current debates in the Anglican tradition will no doubt be contested; my only hope is that people on both sides of current debates will find an equal measure to take issue with. I ask that my readers, especially those with hearts and minds invested in these disputes, will accept this work in the spirit in which it has always been intended—as a gift.

Chapter outlines

In chapter 2, I present relevant background and history for understanding the rest of my account and analysis. I describe the history, character, and current issues in the Church of Uganda and the Episcopal Church in the United States, respectively. I use the issue of homosexuality to illustrate the divergent perspectives of moderate-to-liberal Episcopalians, and conservative Episcopalians, regarding Scripture, orthodoxy, and morality. I conclude with the suggestion that, while evangelical Anglicanism in Uganda and the United States are quite different in many respects, certain shared elements of evangelical Christian identity provided an initial sense of commonality and the foundation for the further development of relationships between these constituencies.

Chapter 3, “Taking Africa Seriously,” presents the beginning of conservative Episcopalians’ scale-making projects, in cooperation with Southern Anglican leaders. Frustrated by their failure to maintain or restore orthodoxy, as they understand it, in the Episcopal Church by their own
resources, and inspired by hints that Southern Christians might share their views on key issues like homosexuality, certain Episcopal conservatives began in 1996 and 1997 to reach out to Southern church leaders. At meetings in Dallas, Texas, and Kampala, Uganda, American conservatives and Southern church leaders developed networks, shared their concerns and prepared their plan of action for the upcoming 1998 Lambeth Conference, which American conservatives hoped might provide an opportunity for the worldwide church to establish clear moral guidelines for the Episcopal Church.

The events of Lambeth 1998 provide the material for chapter 4, entitled “Global South Rising.” I present the ways in which the Conference was experienced and portrayed as a North/South battle, in spite of efforts by organizers to stress themes of global inclusiveness and unity in diversity. I describe the passing of the Lambeth resolution on human sexuality, which condemned homosexual practice as ‘incompatible with Scripture,’ and offer some analysis of why Southern bishops were willing to support this resolution, and were less motivated by the issue of international debt relief.

In Chapter 5, “From African/Asian Juggernaut to Global Orthodox Majority,” I examine reactions to the Lambeth Conference, with specific attention to the way it was described after the fact in terms of Southern, and especially African, moral triumph. I recount Northern conservatives’ post-Lambeth efforts to seek international assistance in enforcing the Lambeth sexuality resolution. I conclude with an analysis of Northern conservative globalism, a scale-making ideology which was first fully articulated and elaborated in talk about Lambeth immediately following the conference.

Chapter 6, “More than Just Companions,” describes the proliferation of globalizing projects in the form of North/South alliances in the period following Lambeth 1998, as it became clear that the Episcopal Church would not turn away from tolerance of homosexuality. I offer an ethnographic account of St. Timothy’s path to leaving the Episcopal Church to place itself under
the authority of the Archbishop of Rwanda. I describe some of the many transnational Anglican relationships which developed in this period. I also demonstrate how these transnational relationships are experienced by Northern participants, through an analysis of how St. Timothy’s congregation sees its African allies and itself. This chapter completes my analysis of how, from the late 1990s through 2002, the Anglican globalist ideologies and projects endorsed by conservative Northerners and many Southern Anglicans developed, spread, and mutually reinforced one another.

Chapter 7, “Who Wants to be In the Ugandan Communion?,” consists of an examination of some of the discourses used to explain and justify such transnational Anglican relationships. An analysis of assumptions about the degree, character, and source of African Christian moral authority, or spiritual capital, provides the substance for this chapter. I lay out the commonly-made arguments that African Christian moral authority derives from African Christian youth, zeal, numbers, suffering, and poverty, giving particular attention to the ways Ugandan Christians question these discourses.

Money, power, and influence are the topic of chapter 8, “Integrity for Sale?” In this chapter, I start with an account of mutual accusations, exchanged between Northern liberals and conservatives, that the other side is trying to buy off or otherwise inappropriately influence Southern bishops to take their side. I move on to spend the rest of the chapter on the implications of such accusations in the African context, and in Uganda in particular. I describe the general cultural-economic predicament of the Ugandan church and society in relation to American cultural and economic power. I use the case study of Integrity-Uganda to explore the dimensions and dynamics of influence and agency which emerge in Ugandan talk about North/South relationships, arguing finally that the question Americans tend to ask—Are African leaders doing this for money, or not?—is too stark and too simple a question to be useful in the Ugandan context.
In chapter 9, I conclude my analysis by returning to the North/South battle thesis, and particularly to the ways Philip Jenkins’ work has been taken up by conservatives in the Episcopal Church as a description and justification of current developments in the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion. I restate my argument that current alliances between American conservatives and Southern Anglicans is not due to a natural convergence of interests and concerns, but is the result of concerted work on the part of many to develop these relationships.
CHAPTER 2
RENEWAL AND CONFLICT

Renewed Anglicanism around the globe

The English-language Sunday service at the cathedral near our home in Uganda begins with a session of praise music, led by a praise team of local young adults. Today one young man fires up the synthesizer that stands below the pulpit. Another young man takes up a microphone and warms up the crowd a little, reminding us to praise God for the day and for all our blessings before offering a brief prayer of thanksgiving himself. The man at the synthesizer plays quietly behind his words, and picks up the tune immediately when the man at the microphone begins to sing: “What a mighty God we serve, what a mighty God we serve....” One young woman in the worship team plays tambourine, and a couple of young boys keep the rhythm on traditional drums. The congregation claps enthusiastically along with the music, and most sing heartily.

The lively music is one of the biggest draws of this particular weekly service. Services of this type are becoming increasingly common in Ugandan Anglican churches, responding to demand from young people for an English-language, lively, less Prayer-Book-bound service, more like the services at the big Northern-style Pentecostal churches in the nearby capital city, Kampala. The *ex tempore* prayers and the lively rhythms and simple lyrics of the praise songs are elements of what one young clergyman described to me as the “renewed Charismatic Anglican” style of worship which is currently gaining popularity in Uganda. The more traditional style of Ugandan Anglican worship may be observed at the other Sunday services held at this church. These are based on the 17th-century English prayer book and a 19th-century English hymnal, both of which were translated into local languages during the colonial period. Older Anglicans who attend such services defend the quiet, solemn tone of traditional Anglican worship, often remarking, “Our God is a God of order.” But many young people describe the older worship style as boring or, worse, spiritually dead. Instead, they prefer the freedom to jump and clap and pray aloud that
they find here in the English service.

“What a mighty God we serve, what a mighty God we serve...” Standing in a pew among Ugandan worshipers, I sing along gamely and reflect on the fact that I learned this song at Praise and Worship sessions at my American fieldsite, St. Timothy’s Church. There, it was a common selection at both the informal Sunday evening charismatic worship service and the 9am Sunday morning service, which features praise music as well as hymns and is described as the more renewed, evangelical, and/or charismatic service, in contrast to the 8am and 11am services, which stick to the Episcopal hymnal and were described to me by the rector as ‘pretty much traditional Episcopal’ services.

This song isn’t in either the Episcopal hymnal, nor the Luganda version of *Hymns Ancient and Modern* used at the traditional Anglican service at the cathedral. It would be no particular surprise to find myself singing some of the same traditional Anglican hymns in Uganda and at St. Timothy’s. After all, both American and Ugandan Anglicanism are offshoots of the Church of England, and likewise both the Luganda version of *Hymns Ancient and Modern* and the Episcopal hymnal have roots in English hymnals. The same traditional English hymn might end up in both post-colonial Anglican contexts by a simple process of dissemination outward from a common source. But finding myself singing the same praise songs in both contexts requires more explanation–more “chasing around” of links between common features in disparate locations.

This music has entered both Anglicanisms in the relatively recent past as part of a worldwide blossoming and spread of praise music—a genre of Christian music which is heavily pop-influenced in melodies, rhythms, and instrumentation, is usually lyrically simple, and stresses themes like submission to God and personal faith experiences. Borne by the international media, the informal circulation of tapes and songbooks, and the efforts of Northern evangelicals, praise and worship music has not only become a massive industry in the global North but also spread around the world (*Christianity Today* 1999). In both the American and Ugandan Anglican
contexts, the use of this music plays a role in defining a renewed Anglicanism against the traditional Anglican liturgy and hymnody. What are the differing meanings and implications of this renewal in the Ugandan and American Anglican contexts?

**Contemporary Anglicanisms: Roots of a tradition**

The Episcopal Church in the United States of America (ECUSA) and the Church of Uganda are both national branches of the worldwide Communion of Anglican churches. The Anglican church, or Church of England, was founded when the English church under the monarchy of Henry VIII broke from Rome in 1534 and threw off the Pope’s authority. Thomas Cranmer, the Archbishop of Canterbury at the time, oversaw the production of the first Book of Common Prayer, a simple liturgical manual in English to be used by all members of the church (Mead 1990:100-1; *Lesser Feasts and Fasts* 1998:392). Though the Anglican reformation made the liturgy more accessible to the laity, it retained much of the Catholic pattern of worship. Anglicans also carried on the Catholic understanding of Christian identity and church membership as rooted in participation in the sacramental rites of the church, rather than viewing church membership as primarily a matter of doctrinal belief, where some other Protestant traditions place emphasis. The nascent Church of England also kept up the doctrine and practice of the apostolic succession. This consists in the idea that “bishops derive their power from an unbroken succession of ordinations going back to the apostles,” meaning that each bishop is consecrated by a bishop (or bishops) who is him or herself part of that apostolic lineage, which can theoretically be traced back to the early church leaders in the Book of Acts (Holmes 1993:104). The Anglican tradition shares this doctrine, and the corresponding sense of the sacredness of church polity, only with the Orthodox and Roman Catholic traditions.

The Anglican tradition, with its distinctive commitments to liturgy and polity which suspend it somewhere between Roman Catholicism and the rest of Protestantism, spread around the globe on the coattails of, or occasionally as the vanguard to, British colonialism. English missionaries
planted local Anglican churches wherever British political or economic involvement opened a path, and sometimes even beyond the reach of the British crown and pound. As the colonial period passed away, these Anglican missions grew into independent Anglican churches and provinces around the world. The Anglican Communion today is a worldwide communion of national or regional Anglican churches, united by their roots in the Church of England; their common loyalty to the Archbishop of Canterbury; their common faith and praxis embodied in their prayer books, all based upon Cranmer’s Book of Common Prayer; and their common participation in the decennial Lambeth bishops’ conference and other occasions which bring together leaders from all over the worldwide Communion. Yet in spite of all this shared heritage, Anglicanism today is far from a uniform tradition globally. Local cultural, political, and economic factors, and particular histories of missionization and revival, have created significant diversity among the provinces of the Anglican world.

Before I move on to describe the particular Anglican provinces central to this work, it is necessary to say a word about the dual character of Anglicanism as both a tradition, and a polity. As a tradition, Anglicanism consists of an interrelated set of meaningful elements, such as institutions (such as parishes and dioceses), practices (baptism, consecration, Lambeth Conferences), artifacts (prayer books, albs), roles (Primate, rector), and discourses (of Anglican tradition, of liturgical order). Identification with the Anglican tradition indicates that some assortment of these elements are held as essential aspects of that person or group’s spiritual, social, or ecclesiastical identity. But there is no guarantee that any two individuals or groups who hold to the Anglican tradition will show much uniformity in practice or conviction. In defining Anglicanism as a tradition, I am not only using an indigenous terminology (Anglicans often cite ‘the Anglican tradition’ in argumentation and explanation) but also invoking Talal Asad’s argument for tradition as the most useful way to conceptualize Islam, a religious tradition which manifestly includes a tremendous variety of doctrinal positions and practices. Asad writes:
A tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice... It [is] the practitioners’ conceptions of what is *apt performance*, and of how the past is related to present practices, [which is] crucial for tradition. [Asad 1986: 14-15]

It is important to stress, however, that any person or group who self-defines as Anglican through adherence to the Anglican tradition is not necessarily Anglican in the ‘official’ sense—that is, in terms of the worldwide Anglican polity. In a recent published interview, Episcopal priest and scholar Ian Douglas offered these observations on international Anglican polity:

The 38 churches in the Anglican Communion are regional or national churches that basically are autonomous or sibling churches. We're not highly centralized, but we're not radically decentralized. Our organizational structure stands somewhere between, if you will, Protestant churches as federations [and] a strong, centralized church like the Roman Catholic Church.... The Archbishop of Canterbury... has the power of recognition and invitation to the family members to come together around the table. So, as a family, our communion... is convened, is hosted, if you will, by the See of Canterbury, the Archbishop of Canterbury.... The Archbishop of Canterbury does not have canonical authority or the power to tell any one church of the 38 churches in the Anglican Communion what to do. The power that he does have is the power of invitation and recognition.... Who's in or who's out of the Anglican Communion depends on who the Archbishop of Canterbury wants to recognize as being in communion with him. In other words, if you don't get invited to the party, you're not an Anglican. [ACNS 2003]

For example, the Continuing Churches—the various groups who broke away from the American Episcopal Church in the late 1970s, strongly self-identify as Anglican, and are certainly within
the Anglican tradition by any standard; but they are not recognized as Anglican bodies by the office of the Archbishop of Canterbury, nor, for the most part, by any Anglican body which is itself so recognized. This distinction between belonging to the Anglican tradition, and to the official Anglican polity, will be significant in the pages to come, since the disaffected groups within the Episcopal Church who began seeking assistance from Southern Anglican leaders in the late 1990s were explicitly seeking a way to break ties with the Episcopal Church without breaking away from the worldwide Anglican polity, by establishing alternate ties with legitimately Anglican African and Asian provinces. In the next chapter, the initial making and breaking of such ties will be discussed; but first, I offer an introduction to the Anglican provinces which are the subjects of this work, the Church of Uganda and the Episcopal Church in the United States of America.

**Anglicanism in Uganda**

In 1875, Henry Morton Stanley, the English journalist and explorer, found himself in Buganda, an East African kingdom, in the course of his explorations. He was deeply impressed by Kiganda manners and culture, and sent a letter back to England which was published in the *Daily Telegraph*, calling for missionaries to come to Africa and convert these highly civilized and intelligent African peoples: “O that some pious, practical missionary would come here! What a field and a harvest ripe for the sickle of the gospel!” (Hodge 1997). Today, a photocopied excerpt from Stanley’s letter hangs on the wall of the offices of Namirembe Cathedral in Kampala, Uganda, a reminder of the roots of Anglicanism in East Africa. The church’s origins lie in the response of Anglican missionaries, from the British Church Missionary Society (CMS), to Stanley’s call. The first CMS missionaries arrived in Uganda in 1877; Roman Catholic missionaries from France arrived shortly after the Anglicans, in 1879. Islam had entered the Baganda region a few decades earlier, in the 1840s.

The history of religion in the proto-colonial period in Uganda can be roughly sketched as
follows: first, traditional local religions struggled with the new monotheistic religions from outside; the Martyrs of Uganda were famous casualties of this battle (see chapter 4). The deaths of these martyrs, however, encouraged rather than quenched the growth of Christianity in the region, as native converts carried the new religion far and wide. A struggle between Baganda Muslims and the growing Christian community soon developed. Muslim Baganda triumphed briefly in 1888, and the Christians went into exile in a neighboring kingdom, returning in 1889 to reclaim Buganda in a bloody battle. Christianity having gained the upper hand, conflicts between the Anglican Protestants and the Roman Catholics ensued. When British troops arrived in 1891 to claim Uganda as a British protectorate, the status of Anglicanism as the dominant sect was assured, settling the major conflicts but not lessening the tensions between Roman Catholics and Anglicans (Hansen 1984; Anderson 1981). Ugandan Christianity continued to grow in the wake of these conflicts; scholar of Ugandan Christianity Louise Pirouet observes, “Probably in few areas [of Africa] was there an indigenous expansion of Christianity comparable to that in Uganda between 1890 and 1914” (Pirouet 1978:195).

Though British colonial officials from the start staunchly refused to treat Anglicanism as an established religion in the colonial state, Anglicanism has from the start served as the de facto state or established church, as even the name for the Anglican church there suggests—simply ‘the Church of Uganda,’ paralleling the Church of England, which is an established church. The Church of Uganda has been both benefitted and injured by its association with the centers of power, and especially with the Baganda, who, favored by the British, were educated and sent to neighboring regions and tribes to help spread both British rule and religion throughout the territory which would become the state of Uganda. It took the colonial state many years, and the church even longer, to realize how much these Baganda leaders were resented by the neighboring peoples they were sent to instruct or rule. The resultant tinge of past and present domination associated with Anglicanism for many Ugandans may account for a slight but
consistent majority held by Roman Catholicism in Uganda from the early 20th century onwards (Pirouet 1978:16). Today, however, members of the Church of Uganda come from all regions, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic positions in the country. Figures from the 1990s suggest approximately 35% of Uganda’s population were Roman Catholic, about 33% Protestant (perhaps 25% of which are Anglican), 15% Muslim, and the rest non-religious or adherents of indigenous or minority religions (such as Hinduism).

In terms of doctrine and liturgy, the Church of Uganda has been evangelical right from the start.9 Much of East Africa was missionized by the Church Missionary Society (CMS), an English missionary agency which had been founded by Anglican churchmen influenced by evangelical revivalism in the Church of England, a movement within the church which stressed a message of sharing the Gospel with the people of the world and encouraging all to seek relationship with Jesus Christ as Savior. Louise Pirouet explains of the CMS:

Its members, as well as distrusting ritual, set less store by the sacraments, the apostolic succession in the episcopacy, and other apparent corner-stones of Anglicanism than do the Anglo-Catholics or even the more ‘central’ members of the church.... For evangelicals, the distinguishing mark of a true, as opposed to a nominal Christian, is not good works or habits of devotion, but the ability to look back to some definite moment in life when the person became overwhelmingly aware of himself as a sinner and of God’s complete and undeserved forgiveness. [Pirouet 1978:22-23]

The Anglican mission church in Uganda thus was founded on evangelical theology and a low-church liturgical style, involving a more austere and simple style of worship, without much liturgical complexity or paraphernalia. A low-church orientation was further reinforced by aspects of the African mission context. For one thing, a low-church style in worship becomes something of a practical necessity for a poor church, which cannot afford the full array of
liturgical vestments and other accouterments, as one Ugandan priest pointed out to me. Secondly, British leaders in the mission church apparently used the restriction of access to the sacraments of the church as a way to encourage Ugandans to conform to British cultural ideals. For example, couples who were not married in church could not take Communion, nor could their children be baptized as infants, in spite of the fact that church weddings were expensive and accessible to relatively few Ugandans. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Church of Uganda should develop a relatively weak focus on the sacramental rites, and instead develop a strong sense of Christian identity centered around Scripture (read or otherwise learned) and personal piety.

The evangelical character of the nascent Church of Uganda, however, was well and truly sealed by the great East African Revival of the 1930s and 1940s, which began in Rwanda and rapidly spread into Uganda. The East African Revival emphasized conversion from being a ‘nominal’ Christian or non-Christian through an experience of being convicted of one’s sins, repenting, and trying to correct one’s past sins (or ‘put things right’). Christian life, according to Revival principles, involves continued confession of sins and sharing of one’s struggles with sin with one’s fellowship community (often called ‘walking in light’); prayer, Bible reading, and clean living (e.g., no smoking or drinking, modest dress) are also very important. In 1941, 26 young men were expelled from Bishop Tucker Theological College, the main Anglican seminary, because their Revivalist practices—praying and singing at all hours, urging their companions to confess their sins and repent—were disturbing the life of the community (Ward 1989). However, in spite of this and other examples of oppression of the revival movement by church officials (most of whom were English missionaries, at that point), the East African Revival did not break off and become an independent church. The Balokole, or ‘saved ones’, as those affected by the Revival were called, formed their own separate fellowships which met (and still meet) weekly for the support and encouragement of the brethren, but have staunchly
remained within the institutional church and devoted their energies to its revival.

The loyalty of the Balokole to the Church of Uganda has been rewarded; over the past sixty years, the spirituality of the East African Revival has thoroughly permeated the Church of Uganda, as well as the Anglican church in Rwanda, which shares the Revival’s roots with Uganda. Ward writes, “While only a minority of Church people actually belong to this fellowship, the Balokole movement has tended to provide the criteria by which all Ugandan Anglicans judge themselves as faithful Christians” (Ward 2002:11). A Ugandan churchman expressed the same idea to me, after telling me that most Ugandan bishops are “Balokole”: “The whole Church of Uganda has accepted revival, the gospel of revival. And they would sing ‘Tukutendereza’ freely without feeling that they have become [a member of a Balokole] fellowship.” Indeed, versions of the Revival song, “Tukutendereza Yesu” (Let us praise Jesus), are sung all over Uganda and beyond, in various local languages, as a regular part of church meetings and worship. The ideas of ‘walking in light’ and ‘putting things right’ are also widely accepted as central aspects of the Christian life. Likewise, it is generally understood in Uganda that Christians should not drink alcohol or smoke. Both clergy and lay members of the Church of Uganda told me, again and again, that the East African Revival is the key to understanding today’s Church of Uganda and the strength and vitality it has to offer the rest of the world.

Trends in the contemporary Church of Uganda

The historical evangelicalism of the Church of Uganda, rooted in its missionary influences and the East African Revival, in some respects dovetails, and in others conflicts, with recent renewal movement in the church. Competition with Islam is not a major issue for Uganda’s Christian churches; the relatively small Muslim community in Uganda is not particularly aggressive or politicized. However, competition with other Christians has been an increasingly pressing issue for the Church of Uganda in recent years. Since the mid-1980s, when the country opened up to the entry of new religious groups after the oppressive Amin regime of the 1970s and a
subsequent period of instability and war, a great influx of Pentecostal and other various Protestant groups have entered Uganda and taken root. These groups range from Baptists and various nondenominational evangelical churches, to Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, both of which have a significant presence in Uganda today. Pentecostal churches, some with support from American or Canadian churches and some independent Ugandan-founded groups, have provided a particular challenge to the Church of Uganda. The free style of worship and the lively music of the Pentecostal churches proved to appeal to the youth and young adults of Uganda—as does the use of English, which carries more status than local languages and which many young people prefer to use. A further influence took the form of the popular TV channel (one of only four or five) Lighthouse TV, which (presumably with considerable Northern financial support) broadcasts many American and other foreign Pentecostal TV programs.

Over the past few years, Anglican church leaders began to notice that many young people and others were leaving their congregations and joining Pentecostal churches, or attending both Anglican and Pentecostal services. One Ugandan priest explained the situation to me:

There is a lot of challenges from these other mushrooming churches around. And the main target are these two established mother churches, the Catholic Church and the Anglican Church down here in Uganda.... The only way out [for] the Church of Uganda... to survive the challenges today, is also to take that direction of the charismatic movement. Which, I am indeed happy, it is already done in the Church of Uganda.

As this priest suggests, many Anglican churches—encouraged by their archbishop and other leaders—have added or altered services to lure back those who have left the Church of Uganda by offering them (some of) the strengths of Pentecostalism within the secure confines of a historical denomination. Many Ugandans, though attracted to Pentecostal worship, harbor doubts about the reliability and stability of Pentecostal churches, especially the smaller ones, in spite of their attractive elements. Church leaders assured me that their churches have largely succeeded in
stopping the outflow of younger Anglicans to Pentecostal churches, and in some areas have even
grown dramatically. One priest told me, “Now [people who had left for Pentecostal churches] are
beginning to see the [Pentecostal] leadership is not coherent. So some of them tend to come
back. Also because we have also liberalized. We are also dancing and clapping.”

As a result of these ongoing changes, an increasing number of Anglican churches now offer
English services which are ‘renewed’ in its style, responding to the demand from young people
for English-language, lively services, featuring ex tempore prayer, a high degree of lay
leadership (often in the form of a ‘worship team’ which also leads music), healing and
deliverance ministry, in some cases, and extensive use of Northern-style ‘praise music’ like that
heard in the Pentecostal churches and on Lighthouse TV. These developments in the Church of
Uganda are supported in some instances by Anglican missionaries from Britain and America,
who tend themselves to be evangelicals and charismatics who favor freer worship styles and
praise music over, or in addition to, traditional hymns and prayers. For example, SOMA, a small
American Episcopal mission-and-renewal organization committed to encouraging evangelism
and charismatic renewal both in the U.S. and abroad, has been quite active in Uganda, and the
evangelical Episcopal seminary Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry (TESM) has also had an
impact, through its training of African and other Southern clergy who return to their home
churches influenced by American evangelical and charismatic Anglicanism. The renewal
movement in the Church of Uganda, therefore, reflects some direct influences from the renewal
movements in American and British Anglicanism.

The movement towards a more Pentecostal worship style in the Church of Uganda, and the
ongoing competition for members with the Pentecostal churches which is producing it, are
perhaps the two factors most often mentioned when Ugandans, lay or clergy, spoke to about the
Church of Uganda today. This movement is a source of some degree of conflict and worry.
Anglicans (mostly, but not all, in their forties or older) who prefer the quieter, traditional style of
worship, based on the prayer book, often feel alienated by the new styles of worship and belittled by their advocates. Tensions have arisen between some adherents to the older ways of worship who see the renewed style as a “new sect”, or as evidence that their church is turning Pentecostal and losing its Anglican heritage and distinctiveness; and some advocates of the renewed style who see non-renewed Anglicans as spiritually ‘dead’ and in need of conversion. The need to convert ‘churchgoers’—a derisive term applied to those who attend non-renewed services—to true Christian belief and commitment was often spoken of by renewed Anglican leaders and laypeople, who understand the renewed worship style as the only authentic expression of the sort of joy and thankfulness a true Christian should experience.

In response to such characterizations of traditional Ugandan Anglican worship as dry and spiritually dead, some argue that both styles are worshipful, but simply different. For example, one young woman, herself active in renewal-style worship, assured me about more liturgically-conservative Anglicans, “They love the Lord, but they don’t want this modern style of worshiping.” Thus the rise of renewed, Pentecostal-style worship, and the accompanying concepts of how Christian identity should be experienced and expressed, have caused some tensions between generations, congregations, and individuals. Further objections to the renewal trend come from some who support the idea of change in the Church of Uganda’s liturgical style, but believe it would be preferable for Ugandan Anglicans to renew their church through greater indigenization, such as developing new liturgies and songs based on local idioms and styles, rather than—or, at least, in balance with—the adoption of Northern Pentecostal worship and music styles (see chapter 9).

However, while some of these tensions over worship aesthetics and Christian identity may be significant at the individual or parish level, there are no widespread conflicts in the Church of Uganda over these new developments. Renewal in the Church of Uganda is not tied in any consistent way to other ecclesiastical or theological positions, nor to political or social issues in
the church or wider society. Unlike the parallel renewal movement in the Episcopal Church, this is a relatively non-contentious liturgical and ecclesiastical trend supported by the archbishop and a significant number of Church of Uganda bishops, and most Ugandan clergy and laity seem either enthusiastic about or resigned to these developments.

In addition to current liturgical shifts, another aspect of the Church of Uganda (and of many African churches) which is important to understand for purposes of this analysis is the role it plays in its host society. The Episcopal Church in the U.S., as an affluent church in a relatively affluent society, carries no particular burden for the care and development of its members, and undertakes service work primarily as ‘outreach’ to disadvantaged people who have little or no other connection to the church. The context and obligations of the Church of Uganda are quite different. As in many colonial and mission settings, the Christian missions in Uganda opened the first schools and hospitals, and thus have been involved from the early colonial period with the education, health, and general welfare of the Ugandan people—people who were, from the start, both members of these churches and beneficiaries of these and other services. As with many of the world’s poorer nations, colonial underdevelopment, international debt, periods of active strife, and the regulations imposed on government operations by agencies like the IMF and World Bank in the name of economic restructuring, has produced a nation with very little in the way of social, health, or development programs to serve their populations (Hansen and Twaddle 1998; Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1999; Dicklitch 1998). NGOs, including churches, have filled in the gaps as best they can, in Uganda as in countless other countries. The Church of Uganda, though itself severely underfunded, is deeply involved in working for the basic physical welfare of its members. Church projects, undertaken either by a parish or diocese on its own or in partnership with an outside church organization (such as a sister parish or diocese, or missions team) or other NGO, include such diverse efforts as providing clean water and sanitation in rural villages, installing solar lights in church buildings far off the country’s limited electrical matrix,
providing bicycles to rural clergy so that they can serve their dispersed congregations, engaging in AIDS prevention and care ministry and other health-related work,\(^{12}\) collecting money to pay the school fees of poor children, raising AIDS orphans and abandoned infants, and giving cows to needy households.

Lay and clergy leaders in the Church of Uganda stress the importance of ‘developmentalism’ and ‘holistic ministry’ for the church–both terms meaning, in short, that the church should improve people’s situations, as well as sharing the Gospel with them. A young Ugandan priest told me, “It is very difficult for a person to be happy, even if the person is saved, if there are no medical facilities, if there are no schools for literacy, if there are no developmental programs.” Another Ugandan priest further elaborated why the church needs to be able to provide for its members:

You preach, people accept the Gospel, but what do you do before they go to Heaven? They need to live their lives on earth... You know if [Christianity] has to be meaningful to them, you must address the other life aspects.... So the church has as culture of being a key player in community and social transformation.... And I think I like it that way, except that the church doesn't have the resources.

As this priest suggests, the church’s poverty limits the potential for it to provide the services its members need. The fact that the Church of Uganda can afford to do very little of this sort of work itself means that it is profoundly dependent on support and assistance from outside partners like American and British churches, dioceses, and organizations (see chapter 8 for more on this issue).

Besides being much more involved in the welfare of its members than the Episcopal Church, the Church of Uganda has a much greater public role, as a major public institution in the nation as well as one of its largest faith bodies. Church of Uganda leaders and events are regularly covered in the national media, and Church of Uganda figures regularly play significant roles in or publicly comment on non-church-related national events. In contrast, the Episcopal Church
generally only appears in the secular press when some scandal, conflict, or major change of leadership has taken place. As might be expected of an institution as numerically strong and nationally visible as the Church of Uganda, the church is neither particularly conservative nor particularly liberal vis-a-vis the surrounding society. The church has ordained women to the priesthood since the 1980s, but has no women bishops, which is much in line with a society which accepts women in positions of some power but generally expects women to fulfill traditional gender roles. As this example might suggest, the American categories of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are not terribly useful or descriptive in the Ugandan context. For example, the church’s active commitment to the poor and powerless might sound to American ears like something akin to the more liberal Christian denominations, who in the U.S. inherited the ‘social Gospel’ tradition of concern for the needy and oppressed. But the Church of Uganda is also strongly committed to sexual morality, including opposing divorce, abortion, and homosexuality, which best correspond with the conservative position in American society and churches.

The activities, social and cultural context, and pressing concerns of the Church of Uganda are for the most part quite different from those of the Episcopal Church in the United States. But the growing trend towards evangelical renewal in Ugandan Anglicanism provides a set of overlapping discourses, values and concerns which served as one important foundation for the growing alliances between African and American Anglicans to reform the Episcopal Church, since renewal-oriented American Episcopalians tend to fall on the conservative side. The coincidence of renewal orientation and conservative dissidence in the Episcopal Church differs significantly from the situation in the Church of Uganda. Tensions exist in the Church of Uganda over the renewal movement, but these tend to be manifest primarily in local contexts and rarely come out in public debate within the larger church. Nor do the lines of division over renewal correlate with lines of division on other moral, social, or political issues within Ugandan church and society. Indeed, the Church of Uganda is not significantly divided on any such issues; there
is heterogeneity, to be sure (including a very small gay rights movement), but no major or defining division, like that in the Episcopal Church between the moderate and liberal majority and the renewal-oriented minority who oppose tolerance of homosexuality. I turn now to an account of the development of the correlation between renewal and oppositional engagement with the Episcopal Church.

**Anglicanism in America**

English settlers brought the Church of England to North America, where it re-formed as an independent province, the Episcopal Church (or, as it is known today, the Episcopal Church in the U.S.A. or ECUSA), in the period following the Revolutionary War. For the next two centuries, the Episcopal Church for the most part carried on peacefully and successfully, though it has always been a relatively small denomination. The 19th century saw tensions between waves of evangelicalism within the church (corresponding roughly with waves of revival in the nation at large) and a movement of liturgically-oriented, traditionalist High Church Episcopalians, which influenced the church strongly in the direction of Anglo-Catholicism (Smith 1976:29-30; Syndor 1980:76). The rift between the Evangelicals and the Anglo-Catholic-leaning High Churchmen widened, until in 1873 a small group of Evangelicals broke from the Episcopal Church to form the Reformed Episcopal Church (Mead 1990:103). From that time on, the Episcopal Church has been dominated by what historian Allen Guelzo characterizes as an “Anglo-Catholic hegemony,” meaning that the Episcopal Church has continued to place substantially more emphasis on liturgical aesthetics and performance than many other Anglican provinces around the globe (Guelzo 1994:13). Episcopal historian David Holmes describes the liturgical orientation of Episcopalians as follows: “Of all American Christians, Episcopalians may be the most interested in the structure, language, music, colors, and millinery of worship” (Holmes 1993:92). One evangelical Episcopalian I interviewed described the Episcopal Church’s contemporary leadership as largely comprised of “liberal Catholics”–the ‘Catholic’ referring to
this heritage of liturgical traditionalism.¹⁵

As for the liberalism of those ‘liberal Catholics,’ a trend towards liberalism has fairly deep roots in the Episcopal Church as well. Church historian David Holmes writes, “Instead of a common theology, [Anglicanism] has found its identity in a tradition of common worship and prayer” (Holmes 1993:162). This permits broad variation in political, theological, social, and ecclesiastical views among Episcopalians (Mead 1990:104). Most of the Episcopal Church accepted Darwinism and the new Biblical criticism in the 1920s without the controversy and modernist/fundamentalist battles which shook some denominations, suggesting that already in that era the Episcopal Church had become a relatively modernist and doctrinally easy-going denomination. A Baptist minister who became an Episcopal priest in 1925 wrote about his new denomination, “It is the roomiest church in Christendom, in that it accepts the basic facts of Christian faith as symbols of transparent truths, which each may interpret” (Holmes 1993:148-149). The Anglican heritage of church unity through common worship and prayer, rather than through common theology and doctrinal commitments, has long been strongly manifest in the Episcopal Church (Holmes 1993:162).

The Episcopal church continued to expand, founding seminaries, schools, and countless church-based organizations along the way, well into the 1960s, when its membership, like that of many other mainline churches, peaked and began to decline (Sumner 1987:161). Today the Episcopal Church has approximately 2.4 million members, concentrated in the East, Southwest, and other urban areas (Holmes 1993:175). Church members are primarily white (92%, according to a 1987 Gallup poll), though with some primarily-minority congregations and some minority membership in largely-white congregations (Holmes 1993:177). In contrast with the Church of Uganda, whose membership consists of a reasonable cross-section of Ugandan society, the Episcopal Church is a notably elite denomination. Roof and McKinney’s American Mainline Religion states that the Episcopal church consistently ranks third, after Unitarian-Universalists
and Jews, on “all the status indicators—education, family income, occupational prestige, and perceived social class” (Holmes 1993:176). The Episcopal Church has been historically associated with wealth and prestige; Kit and Frederica Konolige’s book The Power of Their Glory (1978) details the history of this country’s Episcopalian elite—including more presidents in the 20th century than any other denomination, in spite of the Episcopal Church’s small size.

Today the Episcopal Church retains its historical reputation as the church of the wealthy elite, while also coming to be known as one of the most socially and theologically liberal of the mainline denominations (Roof and McKinney 1987). Since World War II, ECUSA, in company with other mainline denominations, has shifted its policies to engage with pressing social issues and accommodate social changes, as part of a general leftward shift in American mainline Protestantism (Wuthnow 1998; Glock 1993). The Episcopal Church, in particular, has shifted its popular image from the old stereotype of the denomination as “the Republican party at prayer” to one of the most liberal Christian institutions in the country—a status sealed when, in the summer of 2003, the Episcopal Church became one of the first denominations to accept an openly-gay man into a leadership position, by confirming Gene Robinson as bishop of New Hampshire.

**Leftward movement in the Episcopal Church**

The Episcopal Church’s move to the left may be described in terms of four main issues which have dominated the past sixty years of the church’s history, listed here in roughly chronological order—the question of civil rights for minorities in American society; revision of the Book of Common Prayer; the ordination of women; and the conjoined issues of ordination of ‘practicing’ homosexuals and blessing of same-sex unions by the church. With all of these issues, the position at which the church has eventually arrived has corresponded with the liberal or progressive view on that subject in secular society. The Episcopal Church first became involved with the issue of civil rights for black Americans and other minority groups in the 1950s. The 1964 General Convention formally prohibited racial discrimination in Episcopal churches, and
the 1967 Convention voted to give $9 million over three years from the church’s funds to advocacy groups for the African American, Native American, and Hispanic communities (Holmes 1993:165). This decision elicited strong negative reactions from some Episcopalians, but it took the issues of women’s ordination, prayer book revision, and homosexuality to incite some Episcopalians to leave the church (Holmes 1993:166).17

The issue of the role of women in the church’s leadership first arose in the 1940s, when a few dioceses sent women as lay deputies to the triennial General Convention of the Episcopal Church. Extensive debates on whether these women should be granted voice and vote followed, but women deputies were not accepted by General Convention until 1967—by which time the controversial liberal bishop James Pike had already taken the revolutionary step of ordaining a woman as a deacon (Holmes 1993:157-8; Sumner 1985:3). With the encouragement of the growing women’s movement in the larger society, other breakthroughs followed quickly. The General Convention of 1970 accepted that women could be ordained as deacons, and the 1976 Convention admitted women to the priesthood, following the unauthorized ordination in 1974 of 11 women deacons to the priesthood (Holmes 1993:167-68). The first woman was consecrated as a bishop in 1989; today there are 11 female bishops in the Episcopal Church.

During the same period, and inspired by the Second Vatican Council of 1962 (Vatican II), in 1964 the Episcopal Church undertook a major revision of its prayer book, last revised in 1928. From 1967 to 1976, numerous trial rites were shared with parishes around the country to elicit responses and suggestions. The draft revised Book of Common Prayer was passed at the 1976 convention, and fully authorized at the 1979 Convention, by strong majorities in both cases. The revised prayer book kept the forms of the 1928 Book of Common Prayer, but included both traditional and contemporary language options for the most commonly used services and prayers, as well as some additional new material and practices, such as increased lay involvement in the order of worship.
The revision of the Book of Common Prayer caused a great deal of distress to some Episcopalians. Many, especially older worshipers, felt deep anger and loss at the changes to a beloved liturgy they had been performing every Sunday since childhood. Though the extensive review process for the changed liturgies had been designed to secure general support for the changes, some, inevitably, perceived the revised liturgy as something imposed from above by a church hierarchy. Other Episcopalians objected to the 1979 BCP on ideological, rather than practice-based, reasons; they felt, according to Episcopal church historian Holmes, that “the addition of gender-free language and prayers for social concerns was troubling… [and] seemed to show that the same liberals who had led the church into social action and women’s ordination were now forcing their views on its worship life” (Holmes 1993:172). Following the 1976 General Convention, a small but vocal contingent of concerned clergy and laity met in St. Louis and formed a separate church body in the Anglican tradition, the Anglican Church of North America (APCK website; Armentrout 1985:48). Today there are at least two dozen alternative Anglican jurisdictions (mostly very small) which trace their origins to this period.

Sumner notes that most of these groups “were from Anglo-Catholic or ‘high church’ persuasions within the Episcopal Church. While they were conservative, it is a different kind of conservatism than that generally found among evangelicals. Anglo-Catholic conservatism is in relation to church tradition, while evangelical conservatism is in relation to interpretation of Scripture” (Sumner 1985:154-155). Many of the Episcopal Church’s most adamant Anglo-Catholics, then, left the church in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s over the ordination of women and the revision of the prayer book. This wave of departures was a new development in the history of a church with little experience of schism. The doctrine of apostolic succession produces a sense of the church as a sacred body, not lightly to be broken. Another factor in Episcopal and Anglican resistance to schism is the tradition’s liturgical focus and corresponding freedom of belief, as described above. As a result of these factors, Episcopalians have an image of their
church as schism-free, even schism-proof (Guelzo 1994:4). The church’s character seems to minimize the possibility of schism. John M. Krumm, in his introductory volume *Why Choose the Episcopal Church?*, praises the church’s “success in avoiding endless divisions and schisms over relatively obscure points of theology or because of geographical and cultural differences” (Krumm 1996:101). But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the connection between being Episcopalian and being Anglican became so strained, for some, that they felt obligated to leave the Episcopal Church to maintain true Anglicanism as they understood it.

The period in which the Continuing Churches were formed was only the beginning of a long period of intermittent conflict within the Episcopal Church. As the 1980s and 1990s advanced, evangelical, Biblically-based conservatism in the Episcopal Church increasingly came into conflict with Episcopal Church leadership over the issue of attitudes towards homosexuality. The roots of this issue go back to the 1970s, when the movement for gay and lesbian rights first began to develop in American society at large. The Episcopal gay and lesbian advocacy group, Integrity, was founded in 1974, and in 1977 an acknowledged lesbian was ordained as a priest in the Diocese of New York, provoking a storm of publicity and controversy. In response to that ordination, the 1979 General Convention affirmed heterosexual marriage and stated that it is “not appropriate” to ordain anyone who is sexually active outside of marriage, whether homosexual or heterosexual. However, no strong disciplinary measures were undertaken, and occasional ordinations of openly-gay or -lesbian candidates to the priesthood continued over the years, with accompanying waves of publicity and conflict. The issue of church-sanctioned blessings of same-sex unions also became controversial and was often linked, by both supporters and opponents, to the ordination issue as twin aspects of the larger question of the manner of inclusion of gays and lesbians in the life of the church (Holmes 1993:170-171).

In 1995, a group of conservative Episcopal bishops, both Anglo-Catholic and evangelical, brought heresy charges against Bishop Walter Righter for knowingly ordaining a non-celibate
gay man as a deacon, resulting in a highly-publicized heresy trial. Early in 1996, the case was dismissed, when the committee of bishops who heard the case concluded that neither the Episcopal Church’s doctrine or discipline prohibit the ordination of a non-celibate homosexual person living in a committed relationship. The Righter verdict is fairly typical of official Episcopal Church positions on this issue: stopping short of any definite statement about the acceptability of homosexual behavior, and limiting itself instead to a firm refusal to condemn or exclude. Nonetheless, for some time the movement has clearly been in the direction of acceptance. The election in 1997 of Frank Griswold as Presiding Bishop (Primate of the American church) can be seen as signaling a broad, if quiet, consensus on the sexuality issue. Griswold had ordained openly homosexual candidates to the priesthood during his tenure as bishop of Chicago, and signed the Koinonia Document, a statement affirming committed, monogamous relationships regardless of the sex of the partners, which was signed by 90 Episcopal bishops (both current and retired) at the 1994 and 1997 General Conventions (Crew n.d. a). The 2003 affirmation by the General Convention of the election of Gene Robinson, a gay man living with a partner, as bishop of New Hampshire made acceptance the clear policy of the church, though still no clear statement of tolerance of homosexuality has been passed by General Convention.

The leftward shift in the Episcopal Church has resulted in numerous conflicts over whether and how the church should change its teachings and positions, and the development of increasingly polarized liberal and conservative positions—a polarization further exacerbated by the contemporaneous rise of conservative charismatic evangelicalism in the Episcopal Church, from the 1960s on. While the end of the traditional all-male priesthood, and the modernization of the classic language of the Book of Common Prayer, proved unbearable to many strongly High Church and Anglo-Catholic Episcopalians, it is the Episcopal Church’s slow-growing but evident tolerance for homosexuality, a behavior explicitly rejected in Scripture,19 which has motivated
many of the Episcopal Church’s evangelicals to oppose and distance themselves from the national church.

**Evangelicals in the Episcopal Church**

Even as the Episcopal Church was moving, step by step, into its current position as the epitome of liberal mainline Christianity, the constituency which today offers the most active resistance to the Episcopal Church’s liberalism was taking shape through the rise of the renewal movement in the Episcopal Church in the 1960s and 1970s. Following the struggle to determine the Episcopal Church’s liturgical and theological character between Evangelicals and Anglo-Catholics in the 1860s and 1870s, evangelical Anglicanism virtually died out as an active force in the Episcopal Church by the beginning of the 20th century (Guelzo 1994; Steer 1998:347). However, as in the other mainline Protestant denominations, the 1960s and 1970s brought a new burst of evangelical and charismatic activity in the Episcopal Church, involving a renewed emphasis on receiving the gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as speaking in tongues, healing, and prophecy. Charismatic currents swept through the Episcopal Church following the rise of a few key charismatic clergy and parishes (Sumner 1985:123).

Meanwhile, and not infrequently in the same parishes and among the same people, an evangelical movement, which one observer described to me as “the most formidable movement in the church in the last 50 years, was taking root in the Episcopal Church as well. Steer comments on the successes of evangelicalism in the Episcopal Church:

Thirty years ago, Evangelicals in the Episcopal Church were defensive and survival-minded, immature, scattered, barely beginning to go public, and with no strategy to make an impact on ECUSA.... [Today] no Episcopal diocese in the USA is without three or more lively orthodox congregations of various types....There is an increasingly aware group of... biblically informed, orthodox, Evangelical and often Charismatic folk in the church.
One prominent leader in this movement, Peter Moore, describes the Episcopal evangelicalism which took shape beginning in the late 1960s as follows: “radically Biblical in theological emphasis, gently charismatic in worship, strongly mission-and-evangelism-oriented, integrating clergy and laity in joint ministry, and fuelled by a desire to expound Scripture and proclaim the gospel” (Steer 1998:359). As the mention of charismatic worship in this quotation suggests, evangelical and charismatic tendencies often co-occur, and evangelical and charismatic organizations work hand in hand (where they are not one and the same), in a movement which might broadly be called the renewal movement within the Episcopal Church.

Many charismatic and evangelical agencies and programs developed which, while existing somewhat on the margins or even in mild opposition to the mainstream of the church, are not actively engaged with advocacy or activism against the church’s mainstream or leadership. The Sharing of Ministry Abroad organization (SOMA) mentioned above for its work in Uganda is one example of such an organization. However, nearly all of the leaders and organizations involved in the conservative dissident movement which is the subject of this work come out of the charismatic and evangelical renewal movement in Episcopal Church. Church scholar Lewis Daly, writing in 2001 about the renewal/dissident movement within the Episcopal Church, noted, “The main institutional and networking components of the Episcopal right...have come out of predominantly evangelical and charismatic circles” (Daly 2001:5). More specifically, most of the relevant groups and institutions I will be discussing in what follows—e.g. Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry, Anglican Missions in America, and St. Timothy’s church itself—lean towards a primarily evangelical theology and outlook, with “gently charismatic” elements as a secondary tendency (Steer 1998:352). Their theology, churchmanship, and general outlook and rhetorical style reflect the strong emphasis on the authority of Scripture and the importance of personal conversion and relationship with Jesus Christ which characterize the evangelical
tradition in American Protestantism. These groups also accept and/or encourage the charismatic idea of seeking and using the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In what follows, I will usually refer to these individuals and groups as evangelical, using the word “charismatic” only where it is useful to distinguish between the two streams. In so doing, I follow not only my own convenience, but the usage of many conservative Episcopalians who use or accept the use of “evangelical” as something of a blanket term for all those Episcopalians who identify themselves variously as charismatic, evangelical, renewal, or orthodox, but find unity in their essential theological positions and in their shared identification of themselves over against liberalism. I will also frequently use the term “conservative,” which I intend to encompass the category of “evangelical” but to include, also, those of explicitly non-evangelical orientation (e.g., Anglo-Catholics groups like FIFNA) who nonetheless share concerns and goals with evangelicals in the Episcopal Church.

Evangelical renewal at St. Timothy’s Episcopal Church

The life story of the parish of St. Timothy’s, where I did my American fieldwork for this dissertation, epitomizes the larger story of the rise of evangelicalism in the Episcopal Church and the growing tensions between this constituency and the national church’s leadership. This parish was one of many Episcopal churches marked by the currents of evangelical and charismatic renewal which moved through the Episcopal Church in the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s and 1990s, under the guidance of strong clergy and lay leaders who had been influenced by prominent Episcopal and non-denominational evangelical and charismatic leaders on the national scene, the church developed a marked evangelical and charismatic identity.

Twenty years ago, St. Timothy’s was a mainstream Episcopal parish, perhaps a little on the traditionalist side in its liturgy and style. The rector told me about his work changing the ethos of the church: “I have discipled this congregation. I began small-group ministry here, I began to teach the vestry,... everything I knew to do to help this congregation grow in terms of their
relationship with the Lord.” Indeed, many people at St. Timothy’s identified the rector’s classes on Christian faith as major factors in drawing both individual members, and the congregation as a whole, into a more evangelical orientation, more focused on the Bible, and on personal experience of God as sovereign and Jesus Christ as savior.22

St. Timothy’s today remains solidly Episcopalian in its basic liturgical expression—all three Sunday morning services follow the order and use the prayers of the Episcopal Church’s 1979 Book of Common Prayer—but with the addition of certain evangelical and charismatic elements in worship, and strong emphases on evangelical and charismatic aspects of Christian identity and life in contexts such as sermons, newsletters, and adult education. For example, a brochure about the parish lists the Parish Purpose: “To teach Jesus Christ, preach Jesus Christ and Him Crucified, acknowledge Him as Lord and Savior and seek a personal relationship with him; we actively seek the anointing of the Holy Spirit to equip us for ministry.” This statement demonstrates an evangelical stress on personal relationship with Jesus Christ (the authority of Scripture occupies another page of the brochure), as well as the gifts of the Holy Spirit, a hint at the parish’s slightly less pronounced, but also strong, charismatic bent.

Over the past two decades, this shift at St. Timothy’s has involved attracting a large number of non-Episcopalian as new members. St. Timothy’s had grown from about 100 members in 1980 to around 700 at the time of the break from the Episcopal Church. A majority of these new members come from other Protestant churches, and many brought a more evangelical orientation to St. Timothy’s–indeed, some had left their former denominations or parishes because the latter didn’t display a sufficient commitment to evangelical Christian principles. A cradle Episcopalian who has left St. Timothy’s in response to its breaking away from the Episcopal Church described the changes in the church as having a lot to do with this shift in its membership. “There seemed
to be a shift in the make-up. A lot of people came into the church who are not in my opinion familiar with the Episcopal Church.... There seemed to be a change also in the direction of a more fundamental or evangelical program,” led by the clergy, who are “more evangelical than what you would find in a mainline Episcopal church.” At that point, he felt the changes were all right, but were “a departure from what I had experienced growing up and had come to believe was the norm of the Episcopal Church.”

As this person’s statement indicates, renewal and change at St. Timothy’s have arguably been much more challenging for the church’s longtime members, mainly cradle Episcopalians, than for its newer members who have less investment in traditional Episcopal worship and identity. One fundamental change for these longtime members has been learning and accepting an evangelical understanding of Christian identity, based on a specific, dated, personal experience of accepting Christ as your Savior. Many Episcopal churches, indeed arguably the national Episcopal Church as a whole, tend to define Christian identity more through active participation in the sacraments and in the church’s life of fellowship and outreach. An individual parishioner’s personal relationship with Jesus or God the Father is rarely the subject of inquiry or discussion in a mainstream Episcopal Church, but at St. Timothy’s, as in other evangelical congregations, such matters become the substance of sermons, adult education classes, weekend retreats, and so on. Thus cradle Episcopalians at St. Timothy’s had to accept the teaching that being a good Episcopalian does not necessarily make one a good Christian (and, in fact, is often implied to be something of a disadvantage). The rector explained to me how this teaching has gone over with the cradle Episcopalians:

You know, the ones who have sat under the teaching.... have come to realize that being Episcopalian will not get you into Heaven, but being a Christian will. And we’ve had a lot of Episcopalians who’ve become
Christians. I lovingly say to them, you know, going to church will make you a Christian about as much as going to a racetrack will make you a horse!... I think that’s been a growing edge for a lot of people to realize that, no, it’s a personal relationship with Jesus Christ that is the issue.

Many long-time Episcopalians have found these interrelated changes in worship style, theology, and understanding of Christian identity difficult to take. There have been several periods of conflict and tension over these changes during St. Timothy’s recent history. As one of the oldest members said, “We'd gotten set in our ways [before the changes began]....We lost quite a few of our older heads. The changes caused a lot of heartache at one time.” Another member tells me about a period of tensions over whether people raised their hands during the service, in the late 1980s. The problem wasn’t the gesture itself, but the fact that some of those who didn’t felt that some of those who did were acting as though they were better Christians. Today, there are still people who raise their hands during the certain songs or parts of the service, and others who don’t, but tensions over the issue seem to have dissolved.

Similar changes in the style of worship, and in how Christian identity is understood and expressed, have characterized many of the Episcopal parishes which have now left ECUSA to join AMiA–and in many of those cases, there are similar histories of tension over these changes. One account comes from an NPR report on the historic parish of Christ Church in Mobile, Alabama, which broke from ECUSA in 2002. Reporter Barbara Bradley-Hagerty interviewed one parishioner who said of the changes at Christ Church, “I just didn't like the way they waved the hands and sang, and it wasn't as devout as I thought it should be” (Bradley-Hagerty 2003). One of the ways St. Timothy’s has managed people’s likes and dislikes during these changes, at least in the realm of liturgical style, is by having the Sunday services represent different styles–the early morning and late morning services are more traditionally Episcopalian in the liturgy, while the middle service, at 9am, shows more evangelical influence in its worship style
(e.g. the use of praise music, ...), and the evening Praise and Worship gathering provides a welcoming context for charismatic expressions like speaking in tongues and prophecy. Thus, while some of the church’s longtime Episcopalians have been willing to engage with some elements of the church’s new evangelical and charismatic character, some other longtime members of St. Timothy’s have been able to continue participating in and experiencing the liturgy largely as they always had, by coming to the 8am or 11am services.

The journey out of the Episcopal Church for parishes like St. Timothy’s began with a shift to a more evangelical worship style and understanding of Christianity—but rapidly moved into the terrain of social and moral issues, where evangelical church leaders and members, reading the Bible through the lens of faith-commitments to its clarity and authority, often arrive at different conclusions from moderate and liberal Episcopalians who see the Bible as a historically-situated document and feel freer to interpret its meaning and relevance for modern lives. As in Uganda, then, renewal has swept through the Episcopal Church and caught up at least a sizeable minority of individuals and congregations. However, unlike the situation in Uganda, divisions between evangelical or renewed Episcopalians, and non-evangelicals, tended to line up with other divisions—most notably, over theological and social positions within the church. Evangelicalism thus became entangled with contentious and polarized intra-church politics in the American setting. With issues of liturgical style, compromises were possible (such as providing different services), but with these matters of morality and conscience, compromise was less of an option.

In spite of some parishes like St. Timothy’s shifting in an evangelical direction, evangelicals have remained in the minority within the Episcopal Church, and the evangelical and charismatic movements in the church have gotten an ambivalent reception from non-adherents from the start (Steer 1998:347). John Rodgers, past dean of TESM and since 2000 a bishop in the Anglican Missions in America organization, stated in the mid-1990s that evangelicals in ECUSA are “‘alarmed and frustrated.’” Steer observes, “Evangelicals feel, and probably are, relatively
powerless in the wider structures of the Episcopal Church, in many dioceses, in General
Convention, and in the committees and staff of ECUSA generally” (Steer 1998:363).

**The development of an evangelical opposition**

Beginning in the late 1980s, Episcopal evangelicals began to form organizations oriented, not
only towards mutual support and propagation of evangelical theology as in the past, but towards
engaging the Episcopal Church’s leadership more directly on issues of doctrine and morality.
Evangelical leaders expressed increasing alarm and concern about the direction of the Episcopal
Church, and became increasingly vocal and active in seeking to change that direction and restore
the church to Anglican orthodoxy, as they understood it—or, failing that, to secure the
establishment of an alternative, orthodox, Anglican province in the United States. In 1996, the
Rt. Rev. Alden Hathaway, then bishop of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, organized a group called the
American Anglican Council (AAC) (Steer 1998:365). Hathaway’s successor as Bishop of
Pittsburgh, Robert **Figure 1. Organizations in the conservative Episcopal dissident
movement.**

Duncan, who is perhaps the most outspoken evangelical bishop in the Episcopal Church, has also
been deeply involved with the AAC. Several
TESM faculty were also founding AAC members. The AAC was intended to serve as a mutual support network for conservative, mostly evangelical, Episcopalians, but also, and perhaps more significantly, as a voice for evangelicalism at the national church level. The AAC frequently issues statements, press releases, and other commentaries on events and trends in the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion, with the hope of creating greater visibility and gaining more support for the orthodox constituency. The AAC has rarely been actively combative, and until the Gene Robinson controversy of 2003 had remained committed to working within the Episcopal Church (see chapter 6).

Another evangelically-oriented organization, Episcopalians United for Revelation, Renewal, and Reformation (EURRR, or just EU) was founded late in the 1980s. Liberal Episcopal investigative journalist Jack Taylor described EU as “the biggest and often the most vocal of the
anti-progressive right wing of the Episcopal Church in terms of wealth, power, influence, longevity and unabashed homophobia,” though by the mid-1990s its dominance and size had waned considerably (Taylor n.d.). Like the AAC, EU published a newsletter (through 2000), United Voice, offering commentary on the Episcopal Church. EU publicly endorsed the presentment against Bishop Righter, and the group’s leaders and newsletter have been active in speaking out against the increasing tolerance of homosexuality within the Episcopal Church.

Some Episcopal conservatives who are more high-church or traditionalist, rather than evangelical, in their orientation have also joined the evangelicals’ struggle to reform or replace the Episcopal Church. The Episcopal Synod of America, a high-church, Anglo-Catholic leaning group, was founded in 1989, and has been active on and off in Episcopal Church politics since then. It is the sister organization of an English group named Forward in Faith, and in recent years changed its name to Forward in Faith-North America (FIFNA). The ESA was initially organized to continue opposing the ordination and consecration of women and to lobby to protect the rights of those bishops, clergy, and parishes within the Episcopal Church who shared this position. However, the ESA has also spoken out strongly on the issue of homosexuality; ESA leaders, for instance, called the Righter trial decision “an open rejection of the clear teaching of Holy Scripture” (Episcopal Synod of America).

Another contentious organization was the infamous PECUSA Inc., which may represent the last major effort to create an alternative Anglican structure for conservatives in the United States without foreign Anglican intervention or assistance. PECUSA Inc. received widespread attention in the church when it became known that William Wantland, the Bishop of Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and a board of other conservative leaders, had claimed the church’s historic name and incorporated it in 45 or more states of the union by the fall of 1997.²⁴ This action was described by some Episcopalians as the ‘hijacking’ of the church’s name.²⁵ PECUSA Inc. was described by its supporters as an effort to provide a ‘church within a church;’ in Wantland’s
words, its purpose was to ensure there would always be an orthodox Anglican province in the United States. A lawsuit against PECUSA Inc. in the Diocese of Newark, for fraud, unfair competition and trademark infringement, was settled in January of 1999 (Solheim 1999a). Bishop Wantland is now retired, and PECUSA Inc.’s webpage no longer exists. By late 1999, what was left of the PECUSA Inc. organization, the last gasp of the great effort to reform the Episcopal Church with domestic resources and personnel, had been absorbed into a new organization explicitly seeking international help—First Promise, formed in September of 1997. With the growth and success of First Promise, conservative Episcopalian struggles with the Episcopal Church entered their international phase, which will be covered in the next chapter.

Homosexuality: Tolerance versus orthodoxy

As the intensification of oppositional engagement by Episcopal evangelicals and other allies with the Episcopal Church through the 1990s indicates, homosexuality has become the defining issue in contemporary Episcopal Church (and, arguably, Anglican Communion) conflicts today. As Faye Ginsburg wrote of abortion, “The passions generated in such battles... indicate that there is more to the conflict than single-issue politics. It provides a symbolic focus for the assertion of mutually exclusive understandings of a broader range of themes” (1989:3). Like abortion, homosexuality is constructed by those involved in debate over its acceptability as possessing multiple “attendant meanings,” standing in for a number of other positions and values (Ginsburg 1989:1). For example, people who hold the conservative view on homosexuality—believing it should not be accepted as an orientation morally equivalent to heterosexuality—are generally presumed, by themselves and others, to also share pro-life beliefs, Republican political loyalties, and, often, evangelical or fundamentalist religious identities. However, homosexuality also has enough salience as an issue in itself to unite relatively diverse constituencies on the basis of positions on this single issue (Ginsburg 1989). An example is the current support of Anglo-Catholic conservative groups in the Episcopal Church for the largely evangelical-led movement
against Episcopal Church tolerance of homosexuality, in spite of past antagonisms between these groups.

Before embarking on the account of conservative activism with respect to the Episcopal Church which will comprise the rest of this work, I lay out here—briefly—the liberal and conservative Episcopal positions on homosexuality, as articulated by their advocates. In this I follow Ginsburg’s lead in her study of abortion conflicts in small-town America, and also Asad’s injunction to attend to “the kinds of reasoning and the reasons for arguing” when examining a situation of dispute (Asad, 1986:16). I will begin with some clarifying observations on the respective size and composition of the liberal and conservative ‘parties’ or ‘camps’ within the Episcopal Church, in order to avoid creating an image of a church more polarized, more divided, than I assess the Episcopal Church to be.

Essentially, my study of events in the Episcopal Church suggests that homosexuality, as an issue, defines a conservative ‘camp’ much more strongly and clearly than it does a liberal ‘camp.’ The conservative camp consists of evangelical and some Anglo-Catholic clergy (including a number of bishops, sitting and retired), lay leaders, congregations, and other dispersed laypeople, who all feel strongly that acceptance of homosexuality fundamentally threatens the moral order of society. People in this camp tend to be fairly motivated with respect to this issue—probably in part because this has become, in the Episcopal Church, the counter-hegemonic position, and thus demands more explicit advocacy from its supporters. Further, the way in which acceptance of homosexuality is constructed as a social and moral threat, as will be described below, also demands vehemence in defense of order and Christian values.

In contrast, the majority of Episcopalians probably lean towards tolerance on this issue, as suggested by evidence such as the very fact that Gene Robinson’s election as a bishop was affirmed by a majority of bishops, priests, and lay deputies, who apparently did not fear serious repercussions from their home congregations. In this predominant tendency towards tolerance,
Episcopalianians reflect their society—for among the American public, too, there appears to be an increasing trend towards a position of tolerance, as suggested by, for example, widespread negative reactions to the Boy Scouts’ discriminatory policies; the general acceptance of the Supreme Court’s 2003 sodomy decision; the proliferation of gay characters on network TV; and President George Bush’s hesitance to express anti-gay sentiment. Perhaps because of this general trend towards tolerance,\(^{26}\) many, perhaps most, Episcopalians—like most Americans—are not particularly mobilized on the issue of gay rights. Many Episcopalians do hold stronger liberal positions on this issue, certainly—but again, few apparently feel the need to be mobilized as activists around this issue. Public, outspoken activism for the full inclusion of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) Episcopalians in the life of the church is largely limited to the leaders in the Episcopal GLBT rights group Integrity, a few outspoken bishops, and a handful of other church leaders and scholars. But at the same time, many Episcopal parishes quietly welcome gays and lesbians as members and even leaders in their congregations. The high visibility of a few liberal leaders who are outspoken on this issue, and the strong sense of disenfranchisement felt by conservatives in the church, may account for conservatives’ tendency to describe the church as having been ‘hijacked’ by liberal leadership.\(^ {27}\) While there may be some truth to the idea that the church’s ordained leadership are on average more liberal than the ‘people in the pews,’ it is difficult to account for the leftward shift of the church over the past forty years by pointing only to the church’s ordained leaders, since lay leaders play important roles in the life of the Episcopal Church at all levels.\(^ {28}\)

My overall point is that the liberal ‘camp’—that is, those Episcopalians who are mobilized, vocal, and activist with regard to this issue—is not at all equivalent to the conservative ‘camp;’ it is smaller and more limited to church leaders, scholars, and activists in its composition, whereas the conservative ‘camp’ encompasses a large number of at least moderately mobilized laypeople and congregations. But the mobilized liberal ‘camp’ also represents a position which has the
general support of a majority of Episcopalians—whereas the conservative ‘camp’ includes a high proportion, probably the majority, of those who hold the conservative position on homosexuality. In what follows, I will sometimes write about ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ positions when strong opposing positions on this (or other) issues are in question, as in my description of the conservative and liberal positions on homosexuality, below. However, I will also often write about ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal/moderate’ positions—denoting, with that latter dual term, the bulk of the Episcopal Church’s membership, some of whom actively support the inclusion of homosexuals in the life of the church, but all of whom, at least, do not actively oppose inclusion, and who thus represent the body whose opinions and practices must be shifted by the conservatives if the goals of restoring orthodoxy is to be met.

Turning to the conservative and liberal Episcopal positions concerning how to respond to homosexuality and homosexuals, it is important to stress, firstly, that though the positions in the debate in many respects mirror the positions on this issue in the wider society, both sides view their positions on this issue as part and parcel of their religious identities and faith-commitments. Though conservatives sometimes describe the liberal position as simply an adoption of secular humanist values from the surrounding culture, proponents of both the conservative and liberal positions ground their arguments in understandings of God, Scripture, and the church. Following this lead and my own inclinations as an anthropologist of religion, I, too, will treat these faith-commitments and social convictions as of a piece, or at the very least strongly interrelated, separating ‘social’ from ‘religious’ issues only for the sake of clarity in writing and not because I find that separation to have much subjective significance for the people who assisted me in my fieldwork. It is important to stress, also, that both conservatives and liberals in the church assert that their positions on this issue include attitudes of love and care towards homosexual people. The conservative evangelical dean of Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry, Peter Moore, gives a perceptive introduction in a piece he wrote on the problems of reconciling liberal and
conservative views of homosexuality: “While both sides of this debate profess their concern for homosexuals as individuals and believe that the Church's pastoral practice towards homosexuals needs major overhaul, they come at the issue from fundamentally different moral reference points” (Moore 1997).

The liberal Episcopalian perspective on homosexuality rests on several different basic concepts and discourses. First, there are arguments which frame homosexuality within a discourse of civil rights and social progress. This argument states that, as ethnic and racial minorities and women have been recognized, included, and elevated to positions of (theoretically) full participation in society, so will and should gays and lesbians be recognized and included. People arguing along these lines often point out that the Bible was used to defend slavery and the oppression of women, and thereby try to defuse the use of the Bible today to argue against tolerance of homosexuality. This argument ties in with liberal Christian understandings of the Bible. Liberal Christians do not tend to take a literalist view of Scripture, and use various arguments to downplay the significance of, or dismiss, the Biblical passages which conservatives take as condemnations of homosexuality. One example comes from the well-known book *What the Bible Really Says about Homosexuality*, by Roman Catholic priest David Helminiak. Helminiak writes, “Somehow God must be behind the fact that some people are homosexual. Then why should God’s word in the Bible condemn homosexuality?.... There must be another answer. *The mistake must be in how the Bible is being read*” (Helminiak 2000:26-27).

A second basic liberal argument builds on humanistic discourses about the naturalness and goodness of the self. This argument holds that since some people experience themselves as being homosexual, and since presumably God made them that way, then expressing their sexual orientation cannot be inherently wrong. The 1994 Koinonia statement on sexuality, signed by many Episcopal bishops and other leaders, offers an example of liberal argumentation on this
issue: “We believe that homosexuality and heterosexuality are morally neutral, that both can be lived out with beauty, honor, holiness, and integrity and that both are capable of being lived out destructively.” In addition to humanist concepts, such views also rest on an incarnational theology which sees Christ’s taking on of humanity as validating humanity in a fundamental way. Human nature is thus not seen as something negative and inimical to faith and purity, but as God’s gift, sanctified by Christ’s sharing in it. An element of liberation theology is at work here, as well, in the conviction—often expressed in the course of such arguments—that the essential message of the Gospel is about freeing people from oppression.

Liberal Episcopalians and Anglicans often assert that their position on homosexuality is an authentically Anglican position, in keeping with, rather than departing from, their church heritage. They make this claim by pointing to a tradition of breadth or ‘latitudinarianism’ in the Anglican tradition, arguing that Anglicanism has never been a confessing tradition—that is, a tradition which demands of its members assent to some common set of doctrinal beliefs—but a tradition in which members find their unity through the practice of common prayer. These arguments often include explicit or implicit references to the “three-legged stool” upon which the Anglican tradition is said to rest: Scripture, Tradition, and Reason. Liberals accuse conservatives and especially evangelicals of over-emphasizing Scripture to the detriment of the role of tradition and human reason in shaping and guiding the church. An Episcopal writer, apparently endorsing the liberal position on homosexuality in a recent newspaper piece, offers an example of such an argument:

By insisting on a particular understanding of Holy Scripture, the conservatives have also abandoned a broad tolerance of different positions that goes back in the Church of England to the Elizabethan Settlement of the 16th Century.... Ironically, the Episcopal conservatives, so determined to go forward in a doctrinally pure church, call themselves defenders of tradition. They should take another look at the roots of their church. [Kincade 2003]

On the other side, the most basic argument for conservative (and especially evangelical)
Episcopalians is that certain Biblical texts appear to prohibit homosexual behavior, and that the fundamental rules and truths laid down in Scripture do not change and should not be reinterpreted to accord with the mores of a different era. One conservative document argued these points about the issue of homosexuality: “Sexuality is a matter of first-order moral principle. It involves God's revealed design for human nature and his express commands in Old and New Testaments with regard to sexual purity. It involves our Lord Jesus' express teaching about marriage.” Evangelical Episcopalians feel that tolerance towards homosexuality is only a symptom of a much more general tendency for the church, and humanity in general, to ignore God’s word and will. Steer, in *Church on Fire: The Story of Anglican Evangelicals*, demonstrates the tendency of many to assume a liberal position on the sexuality issue stands for many other theological vices in this passage:

People who accept the homosexual agenda in the USA often also deny the essence of the Trinity, the deity of Christ, the authority of Scripture, any doctrine of eschatology, any idea of transcendence or revelation. They have reinterpreted Christianity. [Steer 1998:362]

Conservative Episcopalians sometimes offer arguments about the unnatualness of homosexuality. These may be couched in the discourse of science, like the arguments heard in the wider societal debate, but for these Christians these questions of naturalness, too, leads back to the authority of Scripture. The unnaturalness of homosexuality is linked to theological understandings of creation and the complementarity of male and female. Anthropologist Constance Sullivan-Blum explains, “The Genesis narrative presents gender as one of the primary ways by which God orders creation. As such, the possibility that Christianity might embrace same-sex marriage is profoundly destabilizing to the Evangelical worldview.”

Most conservative Episcopalians accept that homosexuality does exist. But, unlike liberals, they do not take the fact that some people experience themselves as homosexual as evidence that
homosexuality is not against God’s created order after all. Rather, they point to the fact that all Christians must set aside sinful urges and behaviors and submit themselves to God’s law, and argue that for gays and lesbians, their own sexual desires must be part of what is set aside. Evangelicals also often stress the possibility of transformation, arguing that renewal of life is possible for homosexuals as for any other sinners. Evangelicals’ positive attitudes towards ‘ex-gay’ groups and healing ministries towards homosexuals are indicators of this emphasis. Those who hold the liberal view about homosexuality often hear only judgment and condemnation in calls for gays and lesbians to change their orientation. But evangelical Episcopalians describe the temptation to sin as a commonality shared between themselves and homosexuals; and indeed, while it is true that homosexuality is often singled out as a sin calling for particularly vehement opposition, it is also true that evangelical Episcopalians’ responses to homosexuals are framed in a language of sin, brokenness, and the need for healing and transformation through relationship with Jesus Christ which they also apply to their own lives and spiritual paths.

Like liberal Episcopalians and Anglicans, conservatives, too, offer arguments about the authenticity of their position on homosexuality. Conservatives are more likely than liberals, however, to argue for their position as the authentic and historic Christian, rather than Anglican, position. These arguments are implicit in the very adjectives conservatives tend to use in naming their position as the “Scriptural” or “traditional” view of homosexuality. Such descriptions imply clear and monolithic readings of both Scripture and tradition, which others (like the liberal scholars quoted above) find more problematic. But the assertion that the conservative position on homosexuality is “traditional” and “Scriptural,” though frequently contested, still reveals how conservatives conceive and construct the rightness of their position. Their stance is grounded, as they describe and understand it, in the clear message of the Bible on sexual morality, and in two thousand years of Christian tradition in which openly-gay church leaders were never accepted, nor gay unions celebrated. Some conservatives also ground their position in Anglican tradition in
particular, asserting that theirs is the authentically Anglican perspective. For example, Canon David Anderson of the conservative American Anglican Council, at the October 2003 meeting of conservative dissidents, stated: “We are the rightful heirs of all the cultural legacy and faith of the Episcopal Church. We are walking in the footsteps of the apostles.... We are true heirs of Anglicanism in the United States” (Anderson 2003).

The final concept often invoked by conservative Episcopalians to describe their position on homosexuality, and more generally, requires some special attention. That concept is ‘orthodoxy.’ Conservatives use this term often, and in a wide variety of ways. Many use it as I have used ‘conservative’ or ‘evangelical,’ as encompassing terms for those who oppose church tolerance of homosexuality, and the perceived liberal drift of the Episcopal Church more generally. Both American and overseas Anglican individuals and groups are often named as ‘orthodox;’ statements and resolutions asserting the conservative position on homosexuality (or, occasionally, other issues) are likewise identified as “orthodox” (e.g., ‘the orthodox sexuality resolution passed at Lambeth 1998’). Interestingly, the content of this orthodoxy is rarely defined. Instead, its meaning seems to be largely taken for granted, or implicit in the way it is used, since it is so rarely addressed or laid out. Taking ‘orthodoxy’ at the word’s face value—as denoting ‘right doctrine’—the observer might ask what doctrinal positions serve to define the constituency and positions labeled as orthodox. Given the wide variety of doctrinal and ecclesiastical positions within the broad conservative camp, and even among those who may be loosely described as evangelical Episcopalians, the only issue which clearly unites all these parties at this moment in Anglican history is opposition to church tolerance of homosexuality. A narrowly-defined orthodoxy, indeed; but the potency of ‘orthodoxy’ as a discourse and a self-understanding goes far beyond particular positions the term might designate.

In an essay on the anthropology of Islam, Talal Asad states:

Orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship—a relationship of power. Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold,
require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy. [Asad, 1986:15]

Orthodoxy, then, is not just, or not even primarily, about doctrine; it is about power, the power to define the boundaries of right practice and belief. This power may lie primarily in the potential of a group’s discourse to persuade or command. As scholar of religion Catherine Bell has observed, “Power refers less to physical control of people than to social prestige or the concern to secure the dominance of models of reality that render one’s world coherent and viable” (Bell 1998). Conservative Anglicans’ invocation of ‘orthodoxy,’ thus, has much more to do with power than it does with doctrine. ‘Orthodoxy’ can be a potent discourse of power, and conservatives’ deployment of this vocabulary represents an effort to claim that power, the power to establish and maintain boundaries and secure the dominance of their understandings of Christianity and morality.

The final interesting point concerning conservatives’ use of the words ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘orthodox’ (which will appear often in the following pages, as my consultants invoke the terms) is that there is no equivalent in liberal discourse and argumentation. The liberal concept of the church as unified in common worship and community-feeling is inimical to the idea of orthodoxy. The idea of orthodoxy is so irrelevant to liberal discourse and understandings of church membership and Christian identity that conservatives’ assertions of orthodoxy don’t even carry enough weight to demand a response. This is not to say that there is no ‘orthodox liberal position’ in the Episcopal Church—it would not be difficult to argue that there is such a position, or perhaps several such positions—but that these are propagated and policed implicitly and indirectly, not codified and certainly not named as orthodoxies or obligatory positions. Struggles in the Episcopal Church and larger Anglican Communion may be described as struggles over orthodoxy, but in a peculiar sense: not because competing orthodoxies are at issue, but because those committed to a particular orthodoxy are struggling to establish their understanding as the
Anglican orthodoxy, and to establish the structures of power which will maintain and enforce that orthodoxy.

**The stage set in the Episcopal Church**

To sum up, the 1990s saw movement by the Episcopal Church towards the full inclusion of non-celibate homosexuals in its life and ministry, and simultaneously the growth and growing activity of several Episcopal organizations dedicated to reforming or replacing the Episcopal Church. By 1997, there existed a significant body, scattered across several organizations, of lay and clergy Episcopalians who felt the Episcopal Church’s recent history was a story of increasing apostasy. A pamphlet written by the associate rector at St. Timothy’s offers the following tendencies of the Episcopal Church as reasons for the parish’s increasing concern:

- A steady drift away from the basics of the Christian faith....an abandonment of the historic creeds of the Christian faith....[and the spreading of] false doctrines and false teachings... [including movements towards the] ordination of practicing fornicators and homosexuals.

Groups like the AAC, EU, ESA/FIFNA, PECUSA, and First Promise saw the church as in desperate need of spiritual renewal and doctrinal reform–which they lacked the power to implement. The choice for such dissenters in the past had always been either to compromise their convictions and stay within an errant church, or to split from it and become yet another small, unofficial Anglican church body, unrecognized by the rest of the Anglican Communion. This option was unattractive to the 1990s generation of dissenters, who could easily see the continuing fragmentation and stagnation of most of the Continuing Churches founded in the late 1970s. In the late 1990s, this generation of dissenters found a new option, an untried path: involving outside powers, with the authority of the larger Anglican Communion, in their efforts to reform the Episcopal Church and call it to account. The word was spreading that there was a world out there beyond ECUSA full of evangelical, renewed, orthodox Anglicans. Unprecedented experiments in Anglican polity and politics would follow, and the Communion
will likely never be the same.

**Conclusion: Convergent evangelicalisms**

My experience of finding myself singing the same praise song in Anglican churches in Uganda and the USA was not just the result of some coincidence of diffusion, but an instance of converging developments in these two historically discrete Anglican provinces. In America, one set of resources evangelical Episcopalians have used in establishing and building up their own distinct identity in relation to the rest of the Episcopal Church is that offered by the vast interdenominational/non-denominational evangelical and charismatic subculture within American Christianity. Praise music and contemporary Christian songbooks, books like the Left Behind series, and study guides like the Prayer of Jabez and the Alpha course—all of which I heard about or encountered at St. Timothy’s—are artifacts produced by, and widely used within, American and British evangelical Protestant churches and denominations. Resources like these serve as markers of, and quite often tools in the development of, evangelical, renewed identities for individuals and communities like St. Timothy’s and the larger Episcopal evangelical movement.

Interestingly, many of these resources are in use or at least known in East African churches, as well. Ugandan church leaders and members have been exposed to Northern evangelical culture, through the media, trips abroad, or the activities of Northern evangelicals bringing such resources to Uganda and the rest of Africa. Some of the same groups who have been propagating evangelical renewal in the American and other Northern Anglican churches have also worked to spread renewal in the Church of Uganda, providing training, music books and instruments, and other resources. Many clergy and lay leaders in the Church of Uganda have taken up these Northern evangelical resources, like music and other worship elements or programs like the Alpha course, whether out of their own attraction or out of hopes to lure Ugandan youth back to the Anglican church. Such Northern elements have been widely integrated into the current
charismatic/evangelical renewal movement in the Church of Uganda. However, the contextual meanings of renewal in the Ugandan and American Anglican churches are quite different. The use of praise music in a Ugandan church tells you little about that parish’s politics, only that it is trying to be ‘modern’ and to cater to young people; whereas if you find yourself singing praise music in an Episcopal church in the US, it is not unlikely (though also not at all certain) that that parish is associated with some organization which is more or less overtly in conflict with the Episcopal Church’s leadership.

But in spite of these differences in the contextual meaning of renewed Anglican liturgies and identities, a sense of shared identity as renewed, orthodox Anglican Christians is the root from which have grown all the diverse and potent relationships between American conservatives and African Anglicans, which I begin to detail in the next chapter. When an East African Anglican visits an American evangelical church or vice versa, hearing familiar music is certainly not the least of the factors contributing to that sense of shared identity. The question of how American evangelical Episcopalians and African Anglican leaders developed a basic sense of shared identity into alliances strong enough to carry them together into battles for orthodoxy within both the Episcopal Church and the larger Anglican Communion, across the profound differences between a white, upper-middle class church in the United States and a church struggling to serve its often desperately poor constituency in the postcolonial developing world, and in spite of the profoundly differing concerns, callings, and needs of these two churches and these two constituencies, will be the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
TAKING AFRICA SERIOUSLY

Northern attention turns Southward

One evening during my fieldwork, while my husband and I were living on the campus of Uganda Christian University, we were sitting and chatting with some campus friends and acquaintances. Peter, a divinity student, shared some news with the group which he found disturbing. The Archbishop of Wales, Rowan Williams, who is also a noted theological writer, was scheduled to come speak at UCU in two weeks, right in the middle of the University’s Mission Week, a week of special preaching, music, and evangelizing programs intended to reach non-Christian students and renew those already committed to Christ. Williams was at the time one of the prime candidates to become the next Archbishop of Canterbury, the head of the whole Church of England and formal head of the entire Anglican Communion. Archbishop Carey had announced his intent to retire several months earlier, and Williams was widely known to be one of a few leaders favored to fill his seat.

Peter feared that the Archbishop’s presence and presentation, far from contributing to Mission Week’s special program of teaching and ministry, would detract from it. Indeed, most of those present that evening agreed that it was totally unacceptable for Williams to speak on their campus, once Peter had explained to the group that, from what he had heard, Williams is “the kind of liberal who would happily accept homosexuality.” Peter, implied that provincial officials were motivated, in welcoming Williams, by concern for the access to power and resources such a friendship might bring—a concern Peter felt strongly should not lead to one’s compromising of one’s orthodox beliefs. He remarked, “It’s hard to resist such people when they come with inducements, with a carrot.”

However, these objections of Peter and other UCU students (and some staff) were of no avail. On May 2, 2002, at 2pm, Archbishop Rowan Williams delivered an address at UCU to a packed
crowd in the university chapel. Williams’s address elucidated some early developments in Christian beliefs about Jesus, ending with a discussion of some contemporary challenges to the faith and how our concept of Christ should guide us through them. The atmosphere in the room, and discussions I had with people after the fact, suggested to me that members of the audience, perhaps expecting to be shocked or angered, were surprised and pleased at the Christ- and Bible-centeredness of this address.

However, the occasion was not to pass by without questions of the orthodoxy of the Northern church, and Williams himself, being raised. The very first question, asked by a young man who shot out of his seat with arm raised on high the moment the request for questions was voiced, was, “Homosexuality is becoming a problem for Anglican Christology. What is your view about it?” The third question, too, challenged Williams as a Northerner to reveal his own orthodoxy or lack thereof: “Many Western Christians and bishops no longer believe in the virgin birth of Christ. Do you? And do you believe that he had no biological father?”

Williams, responding, affirmed his orthodoxy regarding the virgin birth, but expressed—mildly, and carefully—his conviction that the Bible does not speak to sexuality issues as we understand them today. A murmur went through the crowd in response to the latter answer, but no one denounced the Archbishop or walked out in protest. Perhaps because of the Archbishop’s soft-spoken personal style, perhaps because of the Christ- and Bible-centeredness of his talk, he came through his visit to UCU without any significant eruptions of controversy. A few days later, Williams left Uganda to return to the UK, his African tour completed; four months later, he was chosen to be the next Archbishop of Canterbury.

Ugandan clergy often joke about the widespread practice of sending Ugandan bishops-elect to England before their consecrations, to visit the ‘mother church’, so to speak, and obtain her blessing—a pattern dating back to the days prior to independence in 1962, when the Church of Uganda was still a mission church subordinate to the Church of England.
Archbishop Williams’ visit to Uganda represents almost the reverse, a British churchman visiting Uganda preparatory to his own elevation to higher office. Williams’ visit to Uganda might be interpreted as being simultaneously an effort to enrich his own knowledge of the Anglican Communion to which he might shortly become heir, and to solidify relations with some of those African Anglican leaders who had been causing such a stir in the Communion of late. One might, with only slightly less charity, suggest also that the trip provided him with an excellent opportunity to demonstrate to those in England who would choose the next Archbishop of Canterbury that he had good relations with African bishops, a characteristic which by 2002 had become centrally important for Anglican Communion leaders. It is hard to judge whether Williams’ African tour helped him appear the best candidate for the See of Canterbury, but it can hardly have hurt his chances, and it is notable that the other frontrunner for the position also had strong global South connections and credentials—Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali, a Pakistani immigrant to Britain. 31 This rather remarkable reversal is only one of many clear indicators that, in the words of one of my consultants, much of the Northern church has lately come around to “taking Africa seriously.”

How did this situation come to be, in which African leaders and African churches are some of the most important agents, and some of the most powerful tools, in developments and debates within the Anglican Communion? How has the shape of world Christianity changed, such that African priests and divinity students feel comfortable challenging the orthodoxy and authority of a British theologian and archbishop? And what role did the strong alliances which now exist between disaffected Americans and African church leaders play in all these changes? By way of beginning to answer these questions, in this chapter I will describe and discuss the roots and first steps in the development of these alliances. These first steps included both an increasing discursive globalism on the part of
Northern conservatives, and some initial globalist projects (most significantly, the international meetings described below) which began to instantiate the developing discourse of orthodox Anglican globalism.

Initial International Connections

International connections of some kinds go far back into Episcopal Church history. A relatively close relationship with the mother Church of England has prevailed throughout ECUSA’s history, but relationships with the then-periphery of the Anglican world existed as well, through the deployment of missionaries. The Episcopal Church was never a major sending church for missionaries, but nevertheless it sent its share, along with other Northern Christian bodies, to Africa, Asia, and South America, to educate, heal, and preach to the peoples of those continents. In 1965, the Episcopal Church supported 459 missionaries and spouses in overseas work (Sumner 1985:163). However, the ‘60s and ‘70s saw some significant changes in Anglican concepts of mission. In the first place, this was an era in which many former ‘mission’ dioceses and provinces—essentially the equivalent of colonies, in church polity—were given their independence (like the countries in which many of them were found) and became full-fledged Anglican national and regional churches.

In response to this change, Anglican Communion leaders developed new understandings of mission that departed from the traditional “sending-receiving” model—which, as Episcopal Church historian David Sumner notes, “typically...meant that white westerners were the ‘senders’ while blacks or hispanics elsewhere were the ‘receivers’”—and instead stressed mutuality and partnership in mission (Sumner 1985:163). A meeting of Anglican leadership in 1963 came up with the idea of “companion diocese” relationships between dioceses in different parts of the Communion. These relationships were usually between one diocese from a richer province and one from a poorer province, and tended to involve visits by clergy and lay leaders and sharing of resources, often through collaborative development projects, supported by the
richer province to benefit the poorer. By 1982, 68 Episcopal Church dioceses were linked with overseas dioceses through companion relationships (Sumner 1985:167). Another popular program, Volunteers for Mission, founded in 1976, embodied the ideals of partnership in mission by sending Episcopal laity overseas for short-term missionary stints under the authority of the local Anglican bishop, doing whatever work the local church community needs—teaching, nursing, farming.

The Episcopal Church’s growing evangelical constituency, who were even more missions-oriented than the mainstream church due to their focus on spreading the Gospel, were also active during this period in developing international relationships. This early engagement probably held the roots of the later ‘globalization’ of American evangelical Episcopal concerns which would arise in the late 1990s. As a member of the American Anglican Council put it in an interview with me, “Engagement with mission has brought American conservatives and traditionalists into contact with a community of interest in the Two-Thirds World”—meaning the global South, by a world-play on ‘Third World’ which is intended to remind the listener that two-thirds of the world’s population live in those areas which we in the North habitually ignore. Relations with that “community of interest” would, in the 1990s, come to take on much more significance.

In the 1970s and 1980s, then, many Episcopal clergy, parishes, and individuals were involved in one way or another in international relationships with Anglicans in other parts of the world. However, none of these relationships, including those initiated by American evangelicals, carried any significant weight in terms of church politics. These relationships were not entered into nor used to protest and/or evade Episcopal Church policies and politics. Overseas Anglicans were not brought in, rhetorically or literally, to the debates over prayer book revision, the ordination of women, and other issues which took place in the Episcopal Church off and on throughout the 1970s and ‘80s. One exception which proves the rule can be found in the January 1978
consecrations of four bishops to lead the Continuing Church movement, the break-away movement of parishes and jurisdictions maintaining the all-male priesthood and the use of the 1928 Book of Common Prayer (see chapter 2). One of the bishops present at that service came from the Philippine Independent Church, a small non-Anglican denomination (Gallo 1989).

This incident represents an early case of the involvement of overseas bishops in protest actions against the Episcopal Church, motivated by the Americans’ desire to be able to claim Anglican legitimacy by maintaining the apostolic succession (through the consecration of the Continuing Church bishops by bishops from churches which also hold the doctrine of apostolic succession). Yet in this case the involvement of the overseas bishops seems to have gone no further than the provision of some extra hands to lay on the bishops-to-be. Involving the Filipino bishop was primarily a way of importing talent to perform a task which not enough American bishops were willing to perform. The sympathy of overseas bishops did not become a tool or argument for the Continuing Church movement, as can be seen by examining the texts of the movement. Continuing Church literature, in general, places far more stress on this movement’s sense of itself as continuing or maintaining in a traditional orthodoxy. In short, the Continuing Church movement’s sense of what is true and good for the Church was defined during this period almost exclusively in relation to an idealized ecclesiastical past, not (as becomes the case in the late 1990s) in relation to the beliefs and practices of other contemporary Anglican provinces. Furthermore, overseas bishops did not continue to play any significant role in the lives of the Continuing Churches.

**Developments in the 1990s**

As the 1990s began, the possibilities of foreign Anglican bishops becoming involved in Episcopal Church politics, or of seeking Anglican orthodoxy overseas, seems to have crossed very few minds as yet. A 1991 article written for the liberal Episcopal journal *The
Witness described the conservative groups who would be active at General Convention later that year, listing a number of significant organizations (such as ESA and Episcopalians United) and parishes, individuals associated with each, and their agendas (Erdey 1991). Nowhere in the listing nor the analysis that follows is there any hint that foreign Anglican leaders might be associated with these groups or play a role. Involving international bishops was simply not yet a tool in the repertoire of the Episcopal Church’s conservatives.

By the mid-1990s, the idea of appealing to overseas Anglican leaders to intervene in Episcopal Church politics had begun to be mentioned among Episcopalian evangelicals and other conservatives, but it still was not a common line of argument and little direct action along those lines had been taken. In 1995 and 1996, there was only passing reference to other provinces of the Anglican Communion in conservative documents relating to the trial of Bishop Righter for knowingly ordaining a gay man to the priesthood. A document responding to the dismissal of the case, and signed by all the bishops who had brought the presentment against Bishop Righter, included a declaration of intent to “network with other Provinces of the Anglican Communion who share this stance” (Thrall 1996). Though outside provinces are mentioned here, news coverage at that time made it clear that these bishops were heard to be threatening intervention in Episcopal dioceses other than their own, rather than intervention by bishops from outside the Episcopal Church in any Episcopal diocese. Overall, texts critical of the Righter decision argue that the Episcopal Church has departed from its own traditional teachings on matters of doctrine and sexuality, without strong reference to a wider context of worldwide Anglican belief and practice.

However, it was the Righter decision, among other events, which motivated evangelicals unhappy with ECUSA’s tolerance of homosexuality to look beyond the Episcopal Church for orthodox leadership. As social movement scholars Sanjeev Khagram, James Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink note, “It is [often] blockage in the domestic society that sends domestic social [in this
case, religious] movement actors into the transnational arena” (2002:19). The failure of the presentment against Bishop Righter was a clear indication of blockage to evangelicals and other Episcopal conservatives: the Episcopal Church could not be reformed from within. Ten of its orthodox bishops had given it their best effort, and had failed to have the church’s position on sexual ethics clarified once and for all. A piece printed in the newsletter of St. Timothy’s in July of 1996 gives an indication of some evangelical Episcopalians’ sense that something had gone terribly wrong:

Episcopal priests across the Triangle breathed easier after a church court ruled out a heresy trial for a bishop [Walter Righter] who ordained a practicing homosexual... They are breathing easier because they are not rightly divining the word of truth in regards to the situation.... Acceptance by Christ's church without repentance places my homosexual brothers and lesbian sisters deeper in bondage to sin.

A further indicator that social and theological conservatism were fast losing ground in the Episcopal Church was the August 1997 election as Presiding Bishop of Frank Griswold, who, the AAC noted at the time, “has ordained non-celibate homosexuals and encourages the blessing of their unions” (Steer 1998:375).

A former member of the AAC board described to me the growing sense of helplessness and despair among evangelicals in the Episcopal Church through the mid-1990s:

[The move to appeal to overseas Anglican leaders] came out of, I think, a sense in the 1990s that the Episcopal Church and its bishops were unwilling and unable to discipline themselves, in terms of credal or moral orthodoxy.... I think at that point some of the conservative people began to feel that they couldn’t, they didn’t have a place to stand in the Episcopal Church.... And so I think there were those in the Episcopal Church who said, well, it’s
unreformable, it’s going to go this way, the resistance is going to get weaker and weaker and weaker until finally they’ll just take over.

Faced with clear signs that the mind of the Episcopal Church would not easily be changed from within, a few inspired conservative and evangelical leaders began to reach out to bishops outside the United States in search of potential allies. The Lambeth Conference of 1998 was drawing nearer, raising hopes that bishops in the wider Anglican world beyond could be informed of the situation of conservatives in the Episcopal Church. If those bishops then took it upon themselves to advocate to the whole Communion gathered at Lambeth for the orthodox position on sexuality and for the disciplining of the Episcopal Church, then might there not, after all, be hope for reform?

An AAC document written late in 1996 describes a move from despair to hope among the members of this conservative Episcopalian organization at their founding meeting in 1995, as the possibilities of international alliances began to become clear.

[We realized that] our collective despondency over the state of the Church was somewhat unjustified. We were reminded that the 2.4 million member Episcopal Church does not exist in a vacuum but is the American Province of the Anglican Communion; some 80 million members worldwide.... If we looked at the health and vitality in much of the Anglican Communion, we had much reason to hope for healing and restoration in the Episcopal Church.

[AAC 1996]

Within a year after its founding, the AAC was more actively seeking the involvement of overseas bishops in Episcopal Church matters:

We have begun to make venue and travel arrangements to bring Anglican bishops from around the world for teaching missions in the USA. These will provide opportunities for AAC parishes to broaden their experience of our global Anglican fellowship within the one, holy, catholic and apostolic church. We have just begun to grasp the magnitude of this vision. The bishops, clergy
and laity of the American Anglican Council have become convinced that God has revealed a way forward, just at the moment when many faithful Episcopalians had come to the end of their capacity to hope....After so long a time seemingly becalmed on a stagnant sea, the wind is suddenly up, and we must hoist our sails quickly to be on our way. [AAC 1996]

A vision with magnitude, indeed; a vision of bringing the whole Anglican world (or at least such of it as the AAC and its allies found amenable) into the Episcopal Church.

The AAC may have been particularly likely, among American evangelical and traditionalist groups, to begin to think in international terms because of its close relationship with Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry, where many overseas Anglicans have studied and forged friendships over the years. The AAC, however, was not the only organization to begin to reach out at this time and build international connections with the intent of influencing the Episcopal Church.

Another organization, the Ekklesia Society, was founded in 1995 and rapidly became very influential through the work of its General Secretary, the Rev. Bill Atwood of Texas, on building international relationships. Atwood founded the Ekklesia Society (often abbreviated EkkSoc) after working as the American coordinator for an international conference on missions and evangelism, held by the Archbishop of Canterbury in September of 1995, to share experiences with evangelism and evaluate the progress of the worldwide Decade of Evangelism which had been declared at Lambeth 1988. Ian Douglas identifies this conference as a key starting point for American conservatives’ thinking in terms of North/South networking.

It was... at the G-CODE 2000 conference that tensions over gay/lesbian concerns in the Western industrialized nations began to be played out at the global level. Traditionalist Episcopalians in the U.S. who helped to fund and organize the G-CODE 2000 conference, began to appreciate the power and
possibility of recruiting Third World church leaders to their position.

In particular, Douglas notes, Bill Atwood “saw the gathering as the catalyst for his Ekklesia Society.” Another American evangelical and conservative who attended that conference spoke to me about the inspiration he and other Americans found there. He described the experience of coming into contact with expressions of Anglicanism from elsewhere in the world, which seemed much more familiar and right to him than most of the Episcopal Anglicanism found within the United States. He described feeling a sense of recognition: “Ah! I’m an Anglican!”

The experience of G-CODE 2000 motivated Atwood to work to expose American Episcopalians to Anglicans from the rest of the world, especially the global South, to America. With the endorsement of a few foreign bishops and other leaders, he began in late 1995 to travel around the world asking Anglican leaders for prayers, support, and visits to the U.S. to witness and minister there. An Encompass piece about Ekklesia Society observes that since founding the organization,

Bill Atwood has become an Anglican globetrotter. He has made four trips around the world, building strong ties with bishops in Latin America (especially the Southern Cone of Chile and Argentina), East Africa and Nigeria (containing 11.5 million Anglicans), and Southeast Asia (one of the fastest growing Anglican provinces). [Encompass 1997]

During the course of these travels, the article explains, Atwood was moved to see the conditions under which many of the people of faith he so admired lived and worked. The goal of the nascent Ekklesia Society became, then, to connect the spiritual resources of the global South with the materially-rich global North, both building networks of orthodox Anglicans and coordinating various small-scale development projects in Southern provinces, such as buying bicycles for rural African clergy. Ekklesia Society is open to receiving individuals, clergy, or whole dioceses or other organizations as members (the AAC is an Ekklesia Society member), but, as one source notes, “[its] membership is largely made up of the conservative Primates, Archbishops and
Bishops of the Anglican world” (Rodgers 2001), and the organizations’ most influential work essentially involves Atwood and that network of bishops (Ekklesia 1998).

One explicit aim of EkkSoc from the start was to provide encouragement and support to disaffected Americans who felt there was little space left for them in the Episcopal Church. EkkSoc’s home page explains: The ability to identify with others who share the orthodox historical faith of the church is a great encouragement to those in the portions of the communion which are straying from historic, Biblical Christianity (Ekklesia 1998). Though Atwood’s vision would eventually be sidelined as more assertive forms of transnational network developed (see chapter 6), his work networking Southern bishops with one another and with Northern conservatives played a central role in the development of conservative Anglican global relationships. One conservative American Episcopalian told me it was due in significant part to Atwood’s networking work that, by the time of Lambeth, American conservative bishops and various Southern bishops felt they knew each other and could work together. But at the time of EkkSoc’s founding in late 1995, few American conservatives were interested in Atwood’s work. A colleague familiar with Atwood’s efforts characterized the reactions of other American conservatives at the time as, “Who cares what a bunch of Africans think?” However, such indifference would not last long.

Anticipating Lambeth 1998

As 1997 began, few besides Atwood and the AAC were paying much attention to international Anglicanism or exploring the possibilities of relationships with Anglican leaders from the global South. However, by December of 1997, such relationships were sufficiently established as a point in political debates within the Episcopal Church, that one conservative leader warned the newly-elected Presiding Bishop Frank Griswold to rethink the Episcopal Church’s positions in light of “recent threats by Primates of the Anglican Churches, in Africa, Asia and elsewhere to seek [to remove] the American church from the Anglican Communion”
A significant catalyst for the rapid development of these relationships was the approach of the 1998 Lambeth Conference. The major meetings upon which these developing alliances were founded—in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Dallas, U.S.A.; and Kampala, Uganda—were explicitly intended for pre-Lambeth planning and alliance-building. The decennial Lambeth Conferences both embody and maintain the unity of the diverse worldwide Anglican Communion. Episcopal scholar John Wall, in his *Dictionary for Episcopalians*, defines it as follows:

[A] meeting of all bishops in the Anglican Communion. This meeting is convened every ten years by the Archbishop of Canterbury, who chairs the sessions at Lambeth Palace in London [the historical site] or at the University of Kent in Canterbury [used in recent decades]. As well as maintaining relationships among the member churches of the Anglican Communion, the conference also studies questions of mutual concern and passes resolutions. The conference has only advisory power, but its opinions do have great influence on the decisions of member churches of the Anglican Communion. [Wall 2000:71-72]

Past Lambeth Conferences have passed resolutions on a wide range of social, political, ecclesial and theological issues, ranging for calls for peace in particular world regions to untangling doctrinal details in the interests of ecumenical relations. Such resolutions, as Wall notes, express a general ‘mind of the church’ position, but are not binding.

The Lambeth Conference of 1998 was seen as so pivotal by American conservatives because, following the dismissal of the heresy charges against Bishop Righter, the fight for orthodoxy in the Episcopal Church seemed all but lost. However, the Episcopal Church was well-known to be among the most liberal provinces of the global Communion (in company with Canada and New Zealand), and thus it seemed possible that a more conservative resolution on sexuality might be passed at the Lambeth Conference, with sufficient preparation and strategizing. Such a resolution would be a powerful rebuke to bring home to the errant Episcopal Church, more powerful than any tool of protest wielded by earlier waves of disaffected Episcopalians against the church.
Indeed, the Episcopal dissidents of the mid-1990s seem to have been the first such body to turn to the Lambeth Conference as a resource for their domestic struggles. Perhaps inspired by the relatively strong role played by Southern bishops at the 1988 conference, some American conservatives dreamed that the Lambeth Conference of 1998 might be the most global Lambeth yet—and that if that globalness were manifest in the form of a strong showing from the evangelical Anglican South, it might well work in favor of American conservatives.

**The most global Lambeth yet?**

Many people besides American conservatives were striving, in 1997, to make the 1998 conference just that. Since the 1960s, the Anglican Communion’s leadership had been trying to shake off its old association with colonial power and re-create the Communion as, not merely a holdover of empire, but an egalitarian and multicultural worldwide institution, trading the dynamics of cultural and religious Eurocentrism for the complexities of managing diversity. Bishop Michael Marshall, describing the 1988 Lambeth Conference, indicates the somewhat fearsome power of this challenge by naming it as a ‘tiger’: “Having put the cat of imperialism firmly out through the back window in the ‘fifties, the tiger of pluralism and independence is firmly stamping up to the front door of Lambeth in the ‘eighties” (Marshall 1988:68). The history of that tiger’s rise may be traced through the Lambeth Conferences of the past few decades.

During the 1960s, the Archbishop of Canterbury and other Anglican Communion leaders began to devote greater attention to involving bishops from the Anglican churches of the many newly-independent nations of the global South in Communion affairs (Marshall 1988:16). But Marshall observes, “By 1968 the bishops from the Third World developing countries [of the global South] had yet to make a name for themselves on the field of Lambeth” (Marshall 1988:18). It was only in 1978 that simultaneous language translation facilities were provided at the Conference, so that some non-Anglophone bishops could better understand the proceedings.
Even this step helped little in furthering non-Northern bishops’ participation. Marshall quotes an analysis of Lambeth 1978 which highlighted the alienation felt there by Southern bishops, unfamiliar with the formal rules of debate employed at Lambeth. “Some Third World bishops lost hope, both in listening and speaking....One Ugandan said..., ‘This is not our way of doing things, so we just leave you to it.’” (Marshall 1988:29). Marshall further notes that, “with a few notable exceptions much of the drafting [of resolutions] was the work of the English and American bishops, who still (almost inevitably) tended to dominate, especially in the plenary sessions” (Marshall 1988:29).

But was such domination indeed ‘inevitable’? In preparation for the 1988 Conference, the Anglican Communion’s leadership went much farther than in 1978 in trying to prepare bishops around the world for informed participation in the Conference. At the 1984 meeting of Anglican Communion leaders and Lambeth Conference planners, the Archbishop of Canterbury at the time, Archbishop Runcie, stressed the Anglican Communion’s diversity and stated, “Now the truth that the Anglican church is numerically stronger in Africa than in any other part of the world begins to be seen. No longer can it be said that the Anglican church is the Church of England. Rather the Church of England is a member of the Anglican Communion” (Sumner 1985:166). Runcie’s statement shows the growth, by the mid- 1980s, of discourses and projects focused on lessening European and American dominance, and stressing the vitality and importance of Southern Anglicanism. (1988 would be the first Lambeth at which a majority of bishops attending were from Southern churches.) These commitments were reflected in the planning for Lambeth 1988. Marshall explains:

Until very recent times (and largely because of language difficulties) Lambeth Conferences have been dominated by the English bishops, with the American bishops coming in a close second. Big bucks and large representation can easily tempt a spirit of imperialism to take over. Hence the need to make sure that what was to be discussed at
Lambeth represented the heartfelt concerns and issues coming out of five continents.

[Marshall 1988:95]

In order to fulfill these aims, great efforts at international networking were made by the Anglican Consultative Council (ACC), the main Anglican Communion leadership body between Lambeth Conferences. ACC officials and other church leaders, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, held meetings all over the globe and developed and distributed information and study materials for use in provinces around the world as bishops and their churches prepared for Lambeth. Marshall states, “The preparation was on a scale hitherto unrealized at any of the earlier Lambeth Conferences” (Marshall 1988:96). This preparation seems to have been all but exclusively organized and overseen by the ACC; few non-official church organizations held preparatory meetings before Lambeth 1988, in contrast with the situation a decade later.

Coming into the Conference, Northern church leaders were at pains not to dominate as much as in the past. Marshall recounts, “Speaking a short welcome in French, Spanish, Japanese and Swahili, the Archbishop [of Canterbury] made it clear from the start that the Conference was taking seriously the wide variety of race, culture and language represented by the bishops [present]” (Marshall 1988:114-115). All this preparation and intentionality, on the part of Northern Anglican leaders, about encouraging the participation of formerly-marginalized Anglican provinces seems to have paid off. Southern Anglicans played a comparatively strong role at Lambeth 1988. With the help of the ACC, who had organized several pre-Conference meetings specifically to explore the concerns of the African churches, African bishops spoke out strongly at Lambeth 1988 for some issues of concern, such as polygamy and poverty (Marshall 1988:149,255). Marshall states that African bishops came to Lambeth “determined to...call their Anglican brother-bishops to a totally different agenda of priorities” (Marshall 1988:123). For example, he notes, “[The African bishops’] message [concerning poverty] constituted an economic and political, as well as theological, challenge to the Western nations” (Marshall 1988:123).
Marshall’s phrase about African leaders’ propagation of ‘a totally different agenda’ is significant. What the African agenda is different from is left implicit; the reader is left to assume that the African agenda is different from what the Northern churches would have talked about otherwise. The African issue agenda that arose from these ACC-sponsored meetings centered upon issues which were of profound import for many African churches, such as poverty and polygamy, but which were not issues for the Communion’s Northern churches. In short, the African message (articulated with the involvement of the ACC) at Lambeth 1988 was, essentially, ‘Africa has these problems, and the rest of the Communion and the world needs to respond to them’–and not, as it would become in 1998 with respect to homosexuality, ‘The rest of the Communion has a problem, and Africa and the rest of the global South are going to respond to it.’ Marshall refers to the African agenda at Lambeth 1988 as a challenge, but the Southern message would be much more challenging in ten years, when most of the bishops of the global South would weigh in with a controversial position on an issue of central concern to the Northern churches, as would happen ten years later.36

However, Southern bishops are credited with one of the major outcomes of Lambeth 1988: the resolution to name the years 1990-2000 as a “Decade of Evangelism” around the world. Some conservative Anglican evangelicals saw in the success of the establishment of the Decade of Evangelism, a hope for new calls to faith from the global South at Lambeth 1998. Archbishop Maurice Sinclair wrote, in 1997, “The voice of the South has already been heard at Lambeth bringing us the Decade of Evangelism. Could it be heard again reaffirming vital orthodoxy in the midst of social change?” (Sinclair 1997a). What would the voice of the South be heard to say at Lambeth 1998? The remainder of this chapter details several meetings and organizations devoted to determining just that. However, first I will offer a few observations about how Lambeth 1998 was seen, as it approached.
Organizing for Lambeth 1998

The preparations for Lambeth 1998 saw a new round of efforts to characterize and come to grips with the Communion’s diversity—now, in the dominant discourse of the 1990s, named as ‘global.’ One of the factors which made Lambeth 1998 seem important was the general awareness of the approaching millennium. Readers may recall that nearly everything which occurred in the years 1998 and 1999 was imbued with a special sense of significance, merely because the impressive turnover to the year 2000 was on the horizon. Talk about the Lambeth conference of 1998 was certainly in keeping with this general trend, describing it as the final Lambeth of the old millennium, and on the cusp of the new. This pre-millennial sense even played into the Lambeth agenda through the attention given to the issue of debt forgiveness, as part of wider campaigns to make the year 2000 a jubilee year of international debt forgiveness.

The Anglican Communion’s concern with defining itself as a *global* Communion as Lambeth 1998 approached was also in part a reflection of wider ideological trends in the Northern world through the 1990s. The idea of “globalization” as a process defining a new global era first became widespread in the early 1990s, and many religious and cultural institutions, as well as the media and the market, adopted the vocabulary of the ‘global’, albeit with widely-varying understandings of what that might mean (Tsing 2000:331). With respect to the Anglican Communion, this vocabulary seems to have carried a humanistic, cultural meaning, similar to the meaning the word seems to carry when deployed in other civic contexts, such as education or recreation. *Global* here implies a complex whole in which diverse members, representative of different parts of the world, come together in mutual understanding, appreciation, and cooperation towards shared goals.

The task of managing a meeting of a global Communion was made even more complex by the fact that Lambeth 1998 was to be the largest Lambeth Conference ever, due to the growth of the Communion, especially in the global South. Once again, as in 1988, bishops from the global
South would be in the majority. All of these factors together created the sense that the Communion, looking towards Christianity’s third millennium, faced at Lambeth 1998 a great opportunity, nay, obligation to come together as a global Communion shaped and owned by all its members around the world.

Reaching this goal demanded intense preparation on a number of fronts. Anglican Consultative Council officials, as in 1988, held meetings and distributed materials to prepare bishops around the world for the Conference, at a level exceeding even the preparations for Lambeth 1988. But this time preparation and networking among non-official Anglican groups and individuals was also prevalent in the two years preceding the conference. This networking was enabled, at least in part, by the rise of email and the Internet, developments which were still in very limited use in 1988. Most of the groups involved with such non-official preparations seem to have been evangelical or charismatic in character, and many were more or less actively opposed to the perceived liberalism of the church in the United States and other liberal Northern provinces. Documents and interviews giving accounts of these preparations indicate that these groups were motivated to organize before Lambeth out of a fear that, without organization and preparation on their part, the Lambeth agenda and the outcome of debates would be dominated, as in the past, by the moderate and liberal Northern provinces and by the ACC, which many conservatives perceive as having a liberal orientation. To the best of my knowledge, there seems to have been little comparable organization and preparation on the liberal side. Perhaps such work simply did not occur to liberal leaders; perhaps they didn’t see the need, trusting the ACC to manage the Conference’s agenda to the liking of the Northern churches. However, other agendas were in the making for Lambeth 1998, well beyond the ACC’s control, due to the growing globalist orientation of Northern conservatives and their corresponding efforts to reach out to Southern Anglican leaders.

**The Kuala Lumpur Statement: Questions of Voice**
The first significant event in the development of Southern alliances with dissident conservative Northerners took place far from the United States, and apparently with little Northern involvement. From February 10th to 15th, 1997, 80 delegates gathered in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for the ‘Second Anglican Encounter in the South’ meeting, hosted by the Province of South East Asia and its Primate, Moses Tay. South American Presiding Bishop Maurice Sinclair explained the Kuala Lumpur gathering's origin and purpose:

Anglican Missionary Agencies meeting in... 1986 were conscious that international contacts and partnerships in our Communion were almost exclusively North to North or North to South but rarely South to South....The first “Encounter” was held in Limuru, Kenya, in 1994. The movement... responds to the fact that the majority of Anglicans now live in the “Two Thirds World”. The part of the Communion which is growing numerically is bringing a shared vision into focus, communicating it with others, and seeking to make its full contribution throughout the world. [Sinclair 1997b]

The 1997 meeting was planned with preparation for the Lambeth Conference of 1998 explicitly in mind. The official Anglican Communion News Service (ACNS) press release on the meeting notes, “Because the Lambeth 1998 Conference was in view, most of the delegates [at Kuala Lumpur] were bishops or archbishops” (ACNS 1997). The implications of such a ‘south-to-south’ meeting in the context of the growing world influence of Southern Christianity was stressed by many observers. The ACNS piece states that the Kuala Lumpur meetings “[suggest] that the Churches of the South are beginning to take seriously, the challenges that came to them during their first Encounter that, as a result of the current demographic shift in the world Church, the future of Christianity... now lies with them” (ACNS 1997). Likewise, an AAC member suggested to me that this meeting represented an important moment for the political development of Southern Anglican leaders. Before Kuala Lumpur, he said, “there had been some
loose theological fellowships of Third World leaders, but in terms of a political force that would actually organize itself to achieve some goal, there hadn't been much of that.

Interestingly, while these and other remarks about the conference emphasize that it was an initiative of Southern Anglicans, some comments about the conference hint at the questions about voice and agency within the orthodox movement in the Anglican Communion, questions which would become much more prominent as transnational alliances grew. Ian Douglas writes, “It is no secret that the planning leadership for the second encounter was closely associated with traditionalist strongholds in the U.S., including the leadership of the emerging American Anglican Council” (Douglas 1998a:9). In response to such accusations, a piece in the conservative publication Encompass remarked upon how well the Kuala Lumpur conference’s outcome suited the needs and hopes of American conservatives, but stressed that Ekklesia Society head Bill Atwood, who was then the primary American conservative leader involved in international alliance-building, had not played a role at Kuala Lumpur. “The Kuala Lumpur Statement on Human Sexuality.... expresses a wide agreement among Third World Anglicans.... Bill Atwood did not foment the Kuala Lumpur revolution” (AAC 1997).

The very vehemence of this denial highlights the fact that much of the usefulness to American conservatives of the statements that came out of the Kuala Lumpur conference came from their status as independent, outside confirmation of the orthodox position. If the conference and its outcomes could be claimed to have been arranged or orchestrated by American and other Northern conservatives, then the liberals in the Northern church could, in effect, tell their opponents, ‘Of course Southern Anglican leaders agree with you; you told them what to say!’ These suspicions and denials foreshadowed ongoing debates regarding the ambiguity of Northern conservatives’ alliance with, or patronage of, Southern Anglicans (see chapter 8).

The 80-some Anglican leaders gathered in Kuala Lumpur concluded their meeting by endorsing a public statement, the “Second Trumpet from the South.” The “Second Trumpet” was
a wide-ranging document dealing with issues including “prophetic and redemptive witness, mission, people of other faiths, youth, contextualization, the family and human sexuality, church unity, and practical next steps in South-to-South relationships” (Douglas 1998a:9). Some of these issues brought Southern Anglicans into closer sympathy with Northern conservatives, and some with Northern liberals, many of whom were lobbying for international debt relief in the late 1990s.

But in spite of its status as the official statement of the gathered conference, the “Second Trumpet” is not what has gone down in history as the outcome of the Kuala Lumpur gathering. The meeting also produced two ‘study documents’, written by committees focused on human sexuality and mutual accountability within the Anglican Communion. These are in accord with, but more focused and thorough than, the corresponding sections of the full “Second Trumpet” document; and it is unclear whether these were ever voted on by the entire gathering (Sarmiento 1998a). The statement dealing with sexuality in the “Second Trumpet” simply reaffirms the sanctity of marriage and concludes:

We are aware of the scourge of sexual promiscuity, including homosexuality, rape and child abuse in our time. These are pastoral problems, and we call on the Churches to seek to find a pastoral and scriptural way to bring healing and restoration to those who are affected by any of these harrowing tragedies.

In contrast, the study group statement on human sexuality is twice as long, and explicitly takes on the issue of some Northern Anglican provinces’ increasing liberalism in matters of human sexuality.

We are deeply concerned that the setting aside of biblical teaching in such actions as the ordination of practicing homosexuals and the blessing of same-sex unions calls into question the authority of the Holy Scriptures. This is totally unacceptable to us...This leads us to express concern about mutual
accountability and interdependence within our Anglican Communion....We live in a global village and must be more aware that the way we act in one part of the world can radically affect the mission and witness of the Church in another. [Sarmiento 1998a]

These concerns about mutual accountability were taken up in the second study document, which declared the limits of doctrinal diversity within the Anglican Communion. Taken together, these two documents argue that those provinces who differ sufficiently from the norms laid out in the statement on sexuality should be disciplined under the terms of the statement on doctrine and accountability.

Within days after the Kuala Lumpur conference ended, these two statements—and especially the statement on human sexuality—were being described as the outcome of the Kuala Lumpur gathering, and the full “Second Trumpet” was all but forgotten. Ian Douglas describes this process as “the looting of the ‘Second Trumpet from the South,’” and writes, “In the hands of American traditionalist spin-doctors, what was originally presented as an eight-article ‘Second Trumpet from the South’ soon became the ‘Kuala Lumpur Statement’ on human sexuality,” a process which he compares to the looting of raw materials from Southern nations in the colonial era (Douglas 1998a:11). Six years after the Kuala Lumpur gathering, I cannot find the full text of the “Second Trumpet” anywhere online, but countless copies of the ‘Kuala Lumpur Statement’ on human sexuality are posted on various conservative Anglican websites.

The abandonment of the “Second Trumpet” in favor of the “Kuala Lumpur Statement” (the name which almost immediately came to be applied to the study group report on human sexuality, and which clearly implies that this document was the main outcome of the Kuala Lumpur conference) may not be laid entirely at the door of Northern conservatives. Only a few days after the conference ended, its host province, the Province of South East Asia, formally adopted the statement and declared itself “in communion with that part of the Anglican
Communion which accepts and endorses the principles aforesaid and not otherwise” (Steer 1998:392). Soon after the South East Asian declaration, the House of Bishops of the Church of Uganda also issued a statement, not mentioning Kuala Lumpur, but stating that “homosexual behaviour is among the most condemned practices mentioned in the Bible.” (United Voice 1997). The ‘Statement’ was even endorsed by a majority of the Primates, at one of their regular meetings in Jerusalem not long after the Kuala Lumpur gathering. The Episcopal News Service noted that the issuing of the Kuala Lumpur Statement marked the point at which “the struggles of the Anglican Communion over homosexuality [took] on a distinctly international cast” (ENS 1997). As James Solheim notes, “The Kuala Lumpur Statement was on its way to becoming the litmus test on sexual morality—at Lambeth and beyond” (Solheim 1999b:12). Thus the ‘Kuala Lumpur Statement,’ invoked just so, thus became a badge of orthodoxy for those adhering to it and a challenge for those who question it; invoked in these ways, it rapidly circled the globe.

The ‘Statement’ was very eagerly received by Northern conservatives, as Douglas described, and was rapidly incorporated into their talk and lobbying efforts. In May of 1997, the Episcopal Synod of America, “claiming to represent ‘thousands of orthodox Episcopalians,” expressed strong support for the Kuala Lumpur statement; six ESA bishops (four active, including William Wantland, and two retired) signed a letter to the Primate of the Anglican Province of Southeast Asia, Archbishop Moses Tay, which expressed solidarity with the Kuala Lumpur conference’s stand on human sexuality and affirmed “our continued communion with the Province of South East Asia and other like-minded Provinces” (Steer 1998:394). The ESA letter concluded, “Our gratitude comes to you for this encouragement to orthodox believers within the Episcopal Church in the United States of America” (ESA 1997). The ESA’s endorsement of the Kuala Lumpur Statement echoes similar expressions of joy and relief from groups like the AAC and Ekklesia Society at receiving such a clear statement issued from the global South. The Statement both opened new possibilities for appeals to the authority of Southern Christian leaders in
American conservative discourse, and held out the possibilities for future alliances between orthodox Anglicans worldwide. The idea was beginning to take hold that Anglicans might work together even across vast geographical and cultural differences, on the basis of a sense of shared doctrinal orthodoxy on the issue of human sexuality. The politics of making connections with other Anglicans who shared key convictions, instead of or in addition to breaking connections with Anglicans of different convictions, was showing increasing promise.

Several orthodox American bishops brought the Kuala Lumpur Statement to the Episcopal Church’s General Convention in July of 1997, in the form of a proposed resolution to endorse the Statement. This resolution was promptly and overwhelmingly voted to be referred to a committee—little short of a death sentence, in this case (Crew 1997). The Episcopal Church’s refusal to adopt the Kuala Lumpur statement confirmed (again) the pessimism of American conservatives. Immediately following the end of the conference, several conservative Episcopal leaders issued an “Open Letter” calling for “faithful Anglicans” in the Episcopal Church to “be out of structured fellowship” with those in the church who do not share their views on these issues.” The Open Letter hinted that sympathetic Episcopal bishops might be willing to provide episcopal oversight to parishes outside of their own dioceses who felt their fellowship with their own bishops was impaired by differences of conviction. It also stated, “We are encouraged by the support we have already received from overseas bishops and provinces of the Anglican Communion” (Jesmond Parish Church 1997). However, no mention is made of the possibility that these sympathetic overseas bishops might take oversight of American parishes. That idea, apparently, had yet to emerge—but the potential of transnational alliances was about to become much clearer, in the unfolding of a conference held in an upscale suburb of Dallas, Texas.

The Dallas Conference

The international “Anglican Life and Witness” conference was convened in Flower Mound, Texas in September of 1997, only six weeks after the end of the 1997 General Convention. With
Lambeth in mind, and growing hopes for the potential of cooperating with Anglican leaders from the global South, the AAC, Ekklesia Society, and a like-minded English institution, the Oxford Centre for Mission Studies, had planned this meeting as an opportunity to share information and build unity between Northern conservatives and Southern church leaders. As one conservative archbishop described it, “Six months [after the Kuala Lumpur conference] a conference in Dallas gave the opportunity to bring together this conviction growing in the ‘South’ of our Communion with that of those in the North committed to the reaffirmation of our Anglican orthodoxy” (Sinclair 1997a).

An invitation sent to one of the speakers at the conference summarizes the agenda:

The purpose of the conference is to... prepare for the upcoming Lambeth Conference; help people from various nations and cultures pray, reflect and articulate their concerns and values in the context of international debate; [and] update on the current perspectives on critical issues emerging for the Lambeth Conference such as international debt, relations with Pentecostals, and human sexuality. [Dallas Conference invitation]

As this text indicates, preparation for the Lambeth Conference was even more central to this conference than to the Kuala Lumpur gathering. An Episcopal Church leader who was involved at the time told me about what happened there:

One of the things [the American Anglican Council] did, along with the Ekklesia Society, Bill Atwood’s outfit, was to bring a lot of those African bishops together to a conference in Dallas.... I think at [the Africans] end, it was very important. It was sort of a landmark. And all of that is highly criticized by people on the other side, who say that with a lot of big Texas money we went in there and bribed all these people. That’s not true. But it was a lot of that big Texas money that allowed us to put on these conferences and to provide the kind of opportunities to get these people together.

Indeed, a fair quantity of ‘big Texas money’ must have gone into organizing and holding the
Dallas Conference. Travel expenses were provided for all who spoke at the conference, and probably also for most of the overseas bishops who attended, since very few Southern dioceses can afford the cost of elective travel for their bishops.  

Who came to Dallas, invited and enabled by the conference’s sponsors, to take part in the proceedings, strengthen their relationships and further their pre-Lambeth preparations? Doug LeBlanc, the head journalist of Episcopalians United’s publication United Voice, writes, “The conference united 45 bishops and four archbishops [of Kenya, Sudan, Sydney, and the Southern Cone] from 16 nations in Africa, Asia, Australia, the Caribbean and North and South America.” (Leblanc 1997a). Besides the overseas bishops, a wide array of American evangelicals, charismatics, and traditionalists attended this event, including representatives of the EU, ESA, and NAMS (LeBlanc 1997a).

The core purpose of the Dallas Conference was to bring these American and international constituencies together, to pursue the goals of updating, sharing and strategizing as outlined in the invitation. These goals were met by a conference schedule including Bible study and sharing of perspectives from around the world in small group meetings; preaching opportunities at area churches for overseas bishops; teaching sessions led by various expert presenters; plenary sessions; and ‘support group’ meetings to discuss and plan strategy. The presentations given for the bishops and other official conference attendees covered topics ranging from Scripture and Authority, Christian ethical reasoning, Pentecostals, ‘The Enlightenment Gone to Seed,’ international debt, and the role of the bishop in situations of political oppression and persecution.

One particularly significant presentation was given by the Rev. Dr. Stephen Noll, then of Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry. His talk, entitled “The Handwriting on the Wall: Why the Sexuality Conflict in the Episcopal Church Is God's Word to the Anglican Communion,” addressed the issue of why bishops from the global South should be concerned about the Northern church’s increased tolerance of homosexuality. Noll argued that the strength of
Northern cultural influences mean the South is in danger as well and that, as a defensive measure, orthodox Southern Christians need to rally and push for the acceptance of the Kuala Lumpur statement at Lambeth.

The fact is, problems in the Episcopal Church tend to become symptomatic. As one African bishop put it: when America sneezes, the whole world catches a cold. In the case of the sexuality virus, it has already spread to most Western churches of the Communion, and Southern hemisphere churches will be exposed more and more because of the financial, educational, and media influence of the West....If my analysis of the crisis facing the Episcopal Church is anywhere near accurate, it is crucial for the rest of the Anglican Communion to take notice and "come over and help us." It has frequently been said in recent years that Third World Anglicans are in a much stronger place spiritually than Westerners and that re-evangelization of the original colonizing nations is called for....In particular, I believe the Lambeth Conference in 1998 offers a decisive opportunity for the wider body of Anglicans to speak clearly on the question of Christian sexual norms.... I would hope that the Lambeth Conference would declare that the Kuala Lumpur statement represents the historic teaching and the exclusive moral norm of the Church.... If the Lambeth Conference joins the Third World Anglicans in affirming the Kuala Lumpur Statement, it will give many of us Episcopalians great encouragement. It will help us rebuff the frequent accusations that we are not true Anglicans but fundamentalists and literalists in Anglican garb. [Noll 1997]

Noll thus explained to Southern leaders that, though homosexuality was not a matter of current public debate in most of their home contexts, they must engage with the issue of homosexuality, in order to protect their own churches from the spread of negative Northern influences; in order
to help their beleaguered Northern orthodox brethren; and in order to establish sound and solid doctrine within the Anglican Communion.

Documents outlining the Dallas Conference’s schedule hint that making sure that the Lambeth Conference would fulfill these hopes was a major agenda item. One document summarizing the conference’s presentations remarked upon the necessity of bringing a clear position to the Lambeth Conference, in order to get a clear resolution passed: “Our statement needs to be reasonably well-coordinated by the time we get to Lambeth. [Otherwise] American [liberal] bishops will probably play down homosexuality at Lambeth then take eight years to pull out the stops to convince you that the American church is right” (ALW document 1997a). And the conference schedule reveals that on the last day, the support groups met to deal with two main topics, defining the two main thrusts of the nascent transnational orthodox Anglican movement in formation at Dallas: “The North American Context,” a session to plan how to support and help orthodox parishes in the United States, and “Lambeth Resolutions and Strategy,” a session to further develop Lambeth plans (ALW document 1997b).

**Outcomes of the Dallas Conference**

The primary outcome of the conference was the “Dallas Statement,” a six-page document including sections on the need for a coherent orthodox Anglican witness, Christian moral reasoning, sexual ethics (including an endorsement of the Kuala Lumpur document), international debt, and mutual accountability within the Anglican Communion (Ekklesia 1997). It begins with an affirmation of the unity of those present in Dallas:

> We 45 bishops and 4 archbishops from 16 nations gathered to take council together in Dallas from September 20-24 1997 as part of our preparation for the 1998 Lambeth Conference. We shared commitment to orthodox Anglican faith in a fast changing world and came together to affirm our common concerns and strengthen commitment to orthodox faith in the
Anglican Communion along with others committed to the same process. 
Within the context of the areas which will be addressed at the 1998 Lambeth 
Conference for Bishops, we have sought to address critical issues facing the 
Communion, in particular the issues of International Debt and Human 
Sexuality. [Ekklesia 1997] 
The issue of international debt was given equal prominence with the sexuality issue in the 
Dallas Statement; indeed, the two issues were explicitly connected. LeBlanc explains: 

The ‘Dallas Statement’ addresses concerns not only about sex, but also 
about economic justice, and suggests that the two issues are more related than 
conservatives or liberals may assume. ‘A Christian moral stand on the issue of 
international debt and sexual ethics is founded in a biblical ethic that takes 
seriously the social good and stands against unbridled liberalism. It is precisely 
unbridled economic individualism that has led both to the breakup of families 
and the escalation of international debt,’ the bishops write. [LeBlanc 1997a] 

Many Episcopalian onlookers and critics questioned the link between these two seemingly-
disparate issues, homosexuality and international debt, and looked with suspicion on the events 
and outcomes of the Dallas Conference. Such critics accused the American conservatives who 
planned and hosted the conference of buying the loyalties of Southern bishops on the 
homosexuality question by declaring their support on the debt issue—widely assumed to be a 
dominant concern for bishops from the global South. For example, in a section of an article on 
Conference which outlines how, as he sees it, American conservatives were forced to pick up the 
debt issue at that conference in response to Southern leaders’ concerns:

[At that conference] conservative theologians and biblical scholars met to 
draft a statement confirming what had been said in Kuala Lumpur on human
sexuality. What these drafters had not bargained for was that Third World bishops, who were enjoying a free trip to the U.S at the expense of the Ekklesia Society and the Diocese of Dallas, had more pressing concerns than the West’s hang-up on sex, namely the sinfulness of Western capitalism and the international baking system. In a classic case of money for sex, the bishops from the Southern hemisphere traded their concern about international debt relief for the American’s statement regarding traditional, ‘biblical’ norms of sexuality. [Douglas 1998a:11]

This view of the Dallas Conference as the site of the forging of a great alliance of convenience remains widespread among Episcopalians outside this movement, defusing the power of these alliances in the minds of those Episcopalians who would otherwise find them challenging. However, the debt-for-sex view assumes that international debt was already a strong concern of Southern church leaders before the round of meetings and conferences leading up to Lambeth 1998. In fact, there is little evidence that any but a few activist African leaders (most notably South African Archbishop Ndungane, who to the best of my knowledge was not even invited to Dallas) were politically mobilized with respect to this issue. The American planners at Dallas found themselves, not showing off their consciousness and concern to an already-aware and interested Southern audience, but instead educating Southern leaders about the impact of international debt. More on the elusive debt issue will be said below, in chapter 4.

Further, a view of the Dallas Conference as a site of quid-pro-quo arrangements assumes that Southern Anglicans had to be persuaded to support the conservative position on sexual morality. The assumption seems to be that, because homosexuality was generally not a very salient social or political issue in these leaders’ home churches and societies, they would have weak or non-existent opinions on the issue. More will be said in the next chapter about African perspectives on homosexuality; suffice it to say here that this assumption, too, does not well
reflect the realities of the situation. The persuasive task before American conservatives at the Dallas Conference was not one of convincing Southern bishops to share their views—which the Kuala Lumpur statement, among other pieces of evidence, suggests many already did (see chapter 4). Instead, Northern conservatives had to persuade them that this issue was not only a Northern problem, but had serious enough implications to concern them and to deserve time and attention at the Lambeth Conference. Noll’s presentation on sexuality, quoted above, addressed this question directly, and an American AAC bishop’s comments after the conference suggest he felt they had been successful in this regard: “What the [Dallas] statement indicates is that this concern about gay issues is not just a local matter affecting a few conservative American bishops....It’s a global concern” (Stannard 1997).

In addition to raising issues, the Dallas Statement, like the Kuala Lumpur conference, called for greater mutual accountability in the Anglican Communion. The Dallas Statement also hinted that this increased accountability might include intervention across church boundaries: “The bishops express concern for Anglican bodies that are ‘oppressed, marginalized, or denied faithful episcopal oversight by their own bishops....In such situations, a way must be found to provide pastoral support, oversight and formal ecclesiastical relationships for faithful people,’ the bishops write” (LeBlanc 1997a). This hint at the potential for new relationships among orthodox Anglicans—making new alliances—was accompanied by a lament for the sad necessity of breaking relationships with non-orthodox believers. The Statement reads in part:

Those who choose beliefs and practices outside the boundaries of the historic faith must understand they are separating themselves from communion, and leading others astray. Sadly, that reality of broken fellowship can extend to individuals, congregations or even whole dioceses and provinces. [Ekklesia 1997]

Such talk about breaking off ecclesiastical relations with insufficiently orthodox and
unrepentant church bodies—even one’s own diocese and bishop—were not new. Various groups of conservative Episcopalians (and former Episcopalians) had been discussing and debating since the 1970s whether evangelical, charismatic, and traditionalist Episcopalians should leave the Episcopal Church to join or create other church bodies; stay in, but take protest actions (like withholding funds from the diocese or refusing their bishop access to the congregation); or stay in and try to maintain good relations with the larger church in the hope of creating change from within, or at least leading an untroubled parish life. The new element, unspoken as yet at the Dallas Conference (at least in any public statements about the proceedings) but soon to be manifest, was the prospect of involving foreign bishops in alternative networks of orthodox Episcopalians and Anglicans, thereby replacing broken relationships with heterodox Anglican leaders with new relationships with orthodox ones. American conservatives rejoiced in discovering apparently willing allies from abroad, as Archbishop Sinclair noted: “We were moved by the welcome and sense of relief expressed by orthodox American Episcopalians at their discovery that they were not alone in upholding traditional beliefs” (Sinclair 1997a).

The Dallas Conference’s greatest significance is in the opportunity it gave these two constituencies—conservative Americans unhappy with their domestic church leadership, and church leaders from the global South unimpressed with the moral character of the Northern church—to discover one another and explore the possibilities of relationship and concerted action. Prior to Dallas, a few American figures and groups, like some of the AAC leadership and Bill Atwood of the Ekklesia Society, had had some vision of such inter-Anglican collaboration. The Dallas Conference exposed far more Americans to this vision, as well as beginning the work of alliance-building with Southern Anglicans. Indeed, while the Kuala Lumpur statement continued to serve as a banner for Anglican orthodoxy up through the Lambeth Conference in a way the Dallas Statement did not, the Dallas Statement is in many respects a more remarkable document precisely for the work of articulation it accomplishes—articulation in both senses: joining
disparate constituencies concerns to one another in the process of expressing a position capable of defining a global orthodox Anglicanism.

What happened at Dallas might be summarized this way: Both a wide range of American conservative Episcopalians, and of Southern Anglican church leaders, began to take seriously the idea that Southern Anglican church leaders could be an effective force in the worldwide Communion and potentially have an impact at Lambeth and on the Episcopal Church. While the aim of spreading this vision among Episcopalians was generally implicit in the events of the Dallas Conference, the aim of encouraging and equipping Southern leaders to be such a force was often explicit. American conservatives knew full well, from long experience, how easy the rest of the Episcopal Church found it to ignore them and their opinions. However, if Southern bishops could be mobilized to speak out against tolerance of homosexuality at Lambeth, the Episcopal Church might be forced to listen.

A central goal of the Dallas Conference, then, was to provide information and strategizing assistance to Southern bishops in preparation for Lambeth. The conference schedule listed a theme of the first plenary discussion as, “Empowering Others’ Voices.” One American bishop who was present explained to me how American conservatives began the work of empowering Southern bishops’ voices:

They were simply briefed. And they were also given to get to know each other and to get to understand how a strategy had to be put together. So that when they did get to Lambeth, they had some caucuses in place and they learned how to work that parliamentary structure so that the things they were interested in got a proper hearing, and also got supported....They simply began to learn how to play the game.

Southern Anglican leaders heard in the presentations and pleas of Northern conservatives in Dallas a call to claim a stronger, determining role as a united force in world Anglicanism. Many bishops and others whom I interviewed agreed that before Dallas they had been somewhat ignorant of the gravity of the worldwide situation, and insufficiently organized to address it,
before American conservatives set out to inform, encourage, and mobilize them. One Ugandan bishop, when I asked him about the Dallas Conference, told me:

It gave us understanding of what in the Communion was going on.... In that conference, we were able to understand the politics of the Episcopal Church. When we came to Lambeth the following year, we saw it happen. But I think for some of the orthodox believers in the Episcopal Church, their concern was that it would be wrong for the bishops of the other parts of the Anglican Communion to be led astray by the very clever debates that the American bishops will offer during Lambeth, and not understand the background information of how those debates would be. We appreciated that very much.... And when we went to Lambeth, we were more or less aware of the background information, which will not of course come during Lambeth. I mean, during Lambeth you meet for so short a time, you’re a big body of people, everything can be skimmed through and you won’t understand. But the people who called us in Dallas did give us a lot of information about that, so we were able to help ourselves to understand what was going on in the Episcopal Church.

While this bishop stresses that African leaders were agents, and not pawns of American conservatives, in their Lambeth actions—“We were able to help ourselves to understand”—he also freely acknowledges that he and other African bishops needed the assistance of “orthodox believers in the Episcopal Church” to understand the proceedings and make a difference at Lambeth.

The Kampala Meeting

This work of unifying and mobilizing Southern leaders to take their full part in international Anglican affairs continued at another meeting in May of 1998. Encouraged by the strong
cross-cultural accord found at the Dallas Conference, several American conservatives, with the help of a few committed African leaders like Rwandan bishop John Rucyahana, planned another pre-Lambeth meeting to be held in Kampala, Uganda. The conference was hosted by the Church of Uganda and its archbishop, and attended by bishops from Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. This meeting had an agenda similar to that of the Dallas Conference—to inform and organize—and it focused on the two central issues which had emerged at Dallas, sexuality and international debt. But this meeting had a somewhat different purpose; it is described by organizers and attendees as having been intended primarily to foster unity among the bishops of East and Central Africa (including many who had not attended the Dallas Conference). The few Northerners who attended were described as presenters and facilitators. An African leader involved in planning this conference told me about its purposes:

I was seeking to bring the awareness to the African church that we are in trouble. We need to be aware of what is happening in the church we belong to. First of all, you need to realize that what happens to the American church does not leave us unaffected. Because people say, You Anglicans, look at what you are doing. So we need to know exactly what's happening. and when the arm is paining, the whole body pains.... Kampala One had another element I wanted to bring to the African church. We were going to Lambeth. And Lambeth has been a kind of a cheat on Africans. Because they [Northern church leaders] know the parliamentary procedures. They know how they debate things, they know how they pass resolutions, they know how they propose and second, they know how they change resolutions, they know how they amend resolutions, and Africans do not. So you get the African church, which is much bigger than Lambeth–other parts of the world. Asians and Africans are now more, as far as Anglicans are concerned. But because they don't know the procedures, the parliamentary procedures of Lambeth conference, they go just to rubber-stamp what the West is doing. And I wanted that to come to an end. I wanted the Africans to be prepared to face what's going on to happen there. I wanted them to be able to handle the agenda with worth and merit. So I wanted to prepare them—I wanted them to know exactly what we were going to face at Lambeth, and thank God, glory be to Jesus, it happened. [Emphasis added]

This bishop strongly articulates the goals he shared with the Northern conservatives who joined
him in planning and leading the conference: goals of convincing his fellow African bishops that there was a problem which demanded their attention, and that they could make a difference by informing themselves and working together to shape the outcome of Lambeth 1998. Another bishop, who attended the Kampala meeting, similarly described the meeting’s purpose and outcome as solidifying shared positions and preparing to uphold those positions at Lambeth.

The purpose really was for us to be clear in our minds on the position that we would take, particularly on the issue of the practice of homosexuals.... Some of us were beginning to become very seriously concerned about what was happening in the church in America particularly. And so in this meeting we aired our views on the position, and why we were holding the position....

[At the Kampala meeting] we took a unanimous position decision, that when we are in Lambeth, we are going to stand firm and tell the whole Lambeth and the rest of the world that for us, here, our position is that homosexual practice, and especially when it comes to marrying people of the same sex, we really say no.

In speaking of an ‘airing of views’ and discovery of unanimity on the issue of homosexuality at the Kampala Meeting, this bishop emphasizes that what emerged at these meetings was not that position in and of itself; a negative view of homosexuality was already held by most of these bishops well before the Kampala meeting. Others also stressed that what happened at this meeting was a strengthening of unity and preparation for mobilization around an existing consensus, and not any sort of indoctrination—whether by Northerners or brother African bishops. The new development which continued to emerge from the Kampala meeting, as from Dallas, was an increasing self-awareness and confidence among Southern bishops concerning their own political potential. The bishop who helped plan the conference, quoted above, spoke of wanting African bishops to realize they are “much bigger” than the rest of the world, and to
wield proportional influence in worldwide Anglican affairs. His desire to inculcate this awareness and determination in his brother bishops seems fulfilled in the words of the Ugandan bishop I quote just above, reflecting on the decision of those gathered in Kampala to “tell the whole Lambeth and the rest of the world” what African bishops stand for, and thereby to lay down the law for the whole Communion.

Sources of Southern views of the Episcopal Church

Northern conservatives’ efforts to inform and encourage Southern Anglicans were not limited to the Dallas and Kampala meetings, but also involved seeking to include Southern Anglican leaders in the circulation of conservative Northern reporting and commentary—the same set of Northern sources which, circulating by email, printout, newsletter, or word of mouth among parishioners at St. Timothy’s, helped them develop a clear identity as conservative evangelical Episcopalians oppositionally engaged with the national Episcopal Church. In their efforts to elicit support and build alliances with Southern Anglicans, Northern Anglicans have eagerly shared their perspectives Southern Anglicans, through the distribution of publications carrying Northern conservatives’ news analyses, situations, and opinions of the Episcopal Church. This was brought home to me in the middle of an interview with one Ugandan Anglican bishop, a moderate leader who is not terribly involved in inter-Anglican politics, when in order to demonstrate to me the posture of someone reading a book on a train he picked up from his desk as a prop a copy of the most recent Christian Challenge—a conservative American Episcopal publication which devotes large amounts of space to criticism of the Episcopal Church. I subsequently learned that the publishers of the Christian Challenge make it a point to send out the magazine to as many overseas bishops and other leaders as possible.

Email and the Internet, too, have been key tools in spreading conservative Northern ideas to Southern Anglicans. In a 2003 article in the conservative publication Mandate, Ekklesia Society head Bill Atwood wrote about the necessity of informing the leaders of the Anglican world about
the situation in the Episcopal Church, in order to get them involved in rectifying that situation. He accuses liberal Northern leaders of trying to keep the rest of the Anglican world ignorant of their revisionist moves, and states that such tactics will no longer work: “Now it is possible for people in far-flung portions of the communion to be well informed about events from the other side of the globe. News that used to take months to travel from continent to continent now zips across cyber-space in seconds” (Atwood 2002:14). This is an optimistic picture; in most African contexts, at least, access to the Internet is quite limited. However, my fieldwork in Uganda showed that many Ugandan church leaders and members do have access to Internet and email sources, but indirectly. When I asked Ugandans where they got their information about the American church, their answers indeed suggested that much of that information is passed along person to person, whether in the form of a printed-out email or story picked up by the papers, or orally as the latest story about what those American Episcopalians are up to now.45 One Rwandan churchman told me that he doesn’t often read about the Episcopal Church online: “It's not easy because it's a problem of technology.” But he assured me that his bishop often shares email messages with him and the rest of the staff, and that a friend who works in the bishop’s office also often passes along interesting messages. These examples all suggest that electronic communication, print publications like the Christian Challenge, and face-to-face meetings like those held in Dallas and Kampala have all helped African and other Southern Anglicans to share, at least to an extent, conservative Episcopalians’ views of and concerns about the Episcopal Church.46

The 1997 and 1998 meetings, and the dissemination of information and opinion by other means during this period, were intended to spread globalist thinking among two constituencies: American conservatives, who were taught that it might be worth their while to pay attention to ‘what a bunch of Africans think,’ and Southern Anglican leaders, who were encouraged to think of themselves as a global force. These meetings, too, were intended to lay the groundwork for
globalist projects to be collaboratively undertaken by those two constituencies. These globalist projects included seeking to direct the worldwide Anglican Communion, at Lambeth and beyond, into orthodox positions and policies; and seeking to provide assistance for conservative American Episcopalians, either by getting the church to change its liberal policies, or by providing alternative connections to orthodox Anglicans elsewhere in the world. The overall outcome of these conferences was the development of a united, mobilized and well-prepared Lambeth Conference voting-bloc-to-be, consisting of a handful of American and British conservative bishops (supported by a greater number of conservative priests and laity), and the many African and other Southern bishops whom Northern conservative activists had worked to so hard to bring together, inform, and equip. But another, perhaps even more broadly significant outcome of this series of meetings–Kuala Lumpur, Dallas, and Kampala–was what may be described as a process of globalization of the conservative Episcopal protest movement.

The globalization of American evangelicalism

The globalization of conservative Episcopalian activism was motivated, first, by repeated failures to gain or even hold ground in struggles within ECUSA. As a piece in St. Timothy’s newsletter put it in 1999, “We have run out of...appeals in this diocese, and in the Episcopal Church USA.” Second, this globalization was motivated by the realization–by a few far-seeing Episcopal leaders like Atwood and some at the AAC, who then passed the vision on to others–that a potentially-sympathetic body of opinion lay outside the boundaries of ECUSA, among the Anglican leaders of the global South. This realization took on particular significance in light of the approaching Lambeth Conference, which American conservatives came to see as a great opportunity for enlisting the aid of overseas Anglican leaders in calling the Episcopal Church to account for its perceived apostasy.

To an extent, this new conservative Episcopalian global orientation was built upon the foundation of older ideas and relationships. It has already been noted that evangelical
Episcopalians, in particular, had been quite active in missions in the 1970s and 1980s. In some cases, new North/South relationships with the goal of reforming the Northern church followed the same lines as older North/South relationships oriented towards helping Southern churches with mission and development. Further, ideas about missions dating back to the 1970s, such as mutuality and partnership in missions and companion relationships, were reworked as part of the ideology of North/South Anglican alliances which now took on a new significance in Anglican politics. For a time in 2002, the website of the Anglican Missions in America, the body established in 2000 to allow American conservative parishes to come under the jurisdiction of the Rwandan and South East Asian Archbishops, carries a heading, “More than Just Companions.” This phrase, offered as a description of AMiA’s relationship with its sponsoring provinces in Rwanda and South East Asia, invokes the idea of ‘companion relationships’ in order to suggest that new kinds of inter-Anglican relationships, from the first alliance-building steps in 1997 to more drastic steps like the forming of AMiA, were built upon older forms of transnational Anglican relationship, understood in new ways.

In what sense does this shift in conservative American Episcopal thought and action—from a domestic orientation up through the mid-1990s, to an international or global orientation by the end of 1997–represent a process of globalization? Certainly the work which went on during these years included a great deal of ‘globalization’ in one common sense of the word, that of moving people and ideas from place to place in order to build transnational connections and networks. From Atwood’s worldwide travels to plan the 1995 G-CODE conference and then to establish his Ekklesia network, to the bishops and other leaders gathered together in Kuala Lumpur, Dallas, and then Kampala, the activities of this period involved intensive building of cross-regional inter-Anglican relationships.

But all this globalization—in terms of actual movements of people and ideas from place to place and building of global-scale relationships—can be seen as the outward and physical sign of
a prior, inward globalization process, most particularly in the thinking and discourse of American conservative Episcopalians. As I have shown, seeking support and assistance from overseas Anglicans was not generally part of the thinking and strategizing of American conservatives until internal frustration (e.g. the conservative loss in the Righter case) and external stimuli (e.g. the G-CODE 2000 conference, organized by the Anglican Communion office) led them into these paths, beginning around 1995. And it is precisely this newly-developed global-mindedness of the American conservative camp which seems to be surprising for many when they hear about my research topic for the first time. Americans have not been conditioned to expect socially-conservative white Northerners to think, talk, and work in terms of greater relationship, across racial and cultural boundaries, with the global South. What is most interesting about the history of discourse and strategy among conservative Episcopalians from 1995 to 1998, then, may be the rise of conservative Episcopalian globalism *per se*, rather than the projects (meetings, plans, documents) to which this globalism gave rise.

Anna Tsing’s definition of *globalism* as “endorsements of the importance of the global” (Tsing 2000:330) describes well the shift in conservative Episcopalian thought and talk from the mid-1990s on—from a focus on domestic struggles and solutions, to vehement insistence that their problems are of global relevance and demand global responses. Among conservative Episcopalians, the development of globalist ideology can be tracked quite precisely by examining documents and statements for the growing prevalence of a discourse focused on the “global,” the “Two-Thirds World,” the “world-wide,” and generally, a heightened level of talk about the Anglican Communion. The strong salience of the global scale in conservative Episcopal discourse, as a way of talking about what’s wrong with the Episcopal Church (by accusing it of parochialism, arrogance, or other insufficiently global mindsets), is now so well established that a shorthand has developed—on one conservative Episcopal email list, someone recently wrote in to ask about the relevance of recent events in the Episcopal Church for the
“WWAC,” which I quickly realized stood for the ‘World-Wide Anglican Communion.’

Tsing also calls for analytical attention to “contests over what will count as relevant scales” (Tsing 2000:347). This description applies quite aptly to all the conflicts and debates which have unfolded in the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion over the legitimacy of conservatives’ appeals to overseas leaders (and likewise, over the legitimacy of the actions by Episcopal Church leadership which spurred conservative Episcopalians to these actions) are easily recognized as contests over scale. As this chapter begins to hint, and as the next three chapters will further demonstrate, the central discursive tactic for most conservative Episcopal groups had by the late 1990s become the tactic of arguing that, not the diocesan scale, not the provincial/national scale, but the global scale, is what is and should be relevant for Episcopalians and other Anglicans.

The argument, for these conservative activists, is that the Episcopal Church does not have the moral and/or political right to act unilaterally or distance itself from the practices and convictions of the rest of the Anglican world by, for example, passing resolutions expressing tolerance of homosexuality or forcing bishops to ordain women priests. In response to both internal and external pressures to come into accord with the majority positions of the world-wide Communion, liberals and moderates in the Episcopal Church increasingly stress the autonomy and self-governance of Anglican provinces. Countering such assertions, conservatives dismiss these views as arrogant and old-fashioned, and speak of a global Anglican future of interconnectedness and mutual accountability (see chapter 5 for further discussion of these issues). For example, in his 1999 essay on the Episcopal Church and Lambeth 1998, Stephen Noll titled a section, “The challenge to worldwide Anglican identity”–referring to the challenge he and other conservatives believe the Episcopal Church is failing to meet, the challenge to become a global church, engaged with and responsive to the rest of the Communion, rather than a local church, oriented to domestic needs and agendas (Noll 1999).
Tsing goes on to argue that, in addition to ideologies and rhetorics of scale, scale-making projects must be the subject of our analysis. Ideologies and rhetorics must be embodied and put into practice: “Imaginative landscapes mobilize an audience through material and institutional resources” (Tsing 2000:345). And indeed, the meetings held in Kuala Lumpur, Dallas, and Kampala all represented the deployment of material resources (funding for plane tickets, conference facilities,...) and institutional resources (the structures, norms, vocabularies of the Anglican Communion) in the pursuit of scale-making. In particular, these projects sought to unite and mobilize two constituencies—to attract more Americans to the developing conservative Episcopalian globalism, and also to convince Southern Anglican leaders to play their role in this globalism, by joining American conservatives in arguing that the Episcopal Church is out of accord with the world-wide Communion and that, therefore, the intervention of orthodox Anglican bishops from elsewhere in the world may be required to restore the Episcopal Church to such accord. The very list of names of conference sites mentioned in this chapter illustrates the far-flung engagement of American, Asian, and African leaders in sub-projects of this larger project of bringing the global Communion to bear on the Episcopal Church, while at the same time these names themselves, when invoked as significant sites or moments, create a sense of broadened horizons of salience, of global scale.

The series of meetings I have described here clearly anticipated Lambeth, and their organizers were most immediately concerned with setting in motion the Anglican Communion-level global project of informing and mobilizing a Southern Anglican voting bloc to stand up for orthodox sexual ethics at Lambeth 1998. But already the globalization of Episcopal Church conflicts was beginning to take the form, not only of carrying the Episcopal Church’s issues to an outside audience for their examination and action, but also of bringing outside leaders into the Episcopal Church to intervene directly. Before concluding this chapter and moving on to that great global-scale gathering, Lambeth 1998, I will describe two more projects, within the overarching
conservative Episcopalian globalist project, which unfolded late in 1997 and early in 1998. These projects are significant as further steps towards the fulfillment of the conservative globalist vision—going beyond merely bringing Northern and Southern Anglicans together in preparation for Lambeth, and onto the terrain of directly involving Southern Anglican leaders in the struggle to reform or replace the Episcopal Church in the United States of America.

The First Promise movement

During the weeks following the Episcopal Church’s 1997 General Convention, while final preparations were being made for the Dallas Conference, another, much smaller meeting of Episcopal clergy and laity was held at All Saints’ Episcopal Church in Pawley’s Island, South Carolina. The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette describes this meeting:

> 30 Episcopal priests [gathered] to set a new direction for their church, a course they would chart form the margins of Episcopalianism and the overarching auspices of Anglicanism. Evoking the first promise Episcopal priests make during ordination—to remain faithful to the doctrine, discipline, and worship of Jesus Christ—the men christened the governing tract they produced First Promise. [Brazzel 2002:D5]

The leader of the First Promise organization was the Rev. Chuck Murphy, the evangelical rector of All Saints Church. An article in the AAC publication Encompass further explains the group’s name and the reasons for its founding: “The ‘First Promise’ signers declared that when the Church itself departs from the faith it has received, their first loyalty must be to apostolic faith rather than the authority of canons, institutions, and bishops” (AAC 1998a). The First Promise document itself, the main outcome of this meeting, lists three particular actions of the 1997 General Convention which were seen as unacceptable, and which motivated this meeting and declaration: “The election of a primate [Presiding Bishop Frank Griswold] who has departed from the teaching of the apostles; the mandatory and coercive enforcement of the ordination of women; and the failure to uphold and require a biblical sexual ethic for this church's clergy and people” (First Promise 1997).
The First Promise document was signed initially on September 9th by approximately 30 Episcopal priests—a small network of allies and acquaintances brought together by the leadership at All Saints, and representing several conservative Episcopal organizations, including the AAC and the Episcopal Synod of America. By March 1998, nearly 200 clergy had shown their support for the document by signing it, according to a United Voice piece. The document had a great deal more to say besides affirming the vow to be loyal to Christian doctrine, discipline, and worship. Beginning with that affirmation, the document went on to list nine resolutions, including an endorsement of the Kuala Lumpur Statement, and a declaration of intent to be in communion only with other parts of the Communion who also endorse that statement, and the additional points of particular significance:

6) We will not be bound, in the exercise of our priestly or diaconal ministries, by the legal or geographical boundaries of any parish or diocese, if those boundaries are being invoked to prevent the preaching and teaching of "the doctrine, discipline, and worship of Christ as this Church has received them" {BCP (1979) Ordination of Priest, p. 526}

7) We pledge to remain under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of faithful bishops who uphold our heritage in the gospel, seeking alternative episcopal oversight if necessary....

9) We appeal to the bishops of the Anglican Communion, to reassert the apostolic truth and order which we have received in the gospel of Jesus Christ, to affirm and support theologically orthodox Anglicans in America, and to discipline those members who have departed from it. [United Voice 1998a]

The language of this declaration, in denying the relevance of geographical boundaries in the search for faithful ecclesial leadership and especially in the call to outside bishops to ‘support theologically orthodox Anglicans in America,’ opens the door to what would shortly become a reality, the claiming of jurisdiction over an American parish by a foreign bishop. There is no clear record of whether this particular idea was in the works, or whether what was envisioned at this initial meeting were arrangements more along the lines of conservative American Episcopal bishops crossing diocesan boundaries within the Episcopal Church to minister to ‘beleagured congregations’—conservative parishes in non-conservative dioceses—with the moral support and encouragement of foreign bishops. The early 1998 Encompass article cited above, in explaining the potential character of the First Promise organization’s calculated ecclesiastical disobedience,
makes no mention of support or intervention by foreign bishops (AAC 1998a).

Perhaps the *Encompass* reporter and other onlookers thought the appeal to foreign bishops in the First Promise document was a mere rhetorical device. But the founders of First Promise would become some of the most central players in transnational alliances to oppose the Episcopal Church. Within months of the First Promise meeting, one of the signers, T.J. Johnston, would become rector of a newborn Episcopal parish in Little Rock, Arkansas, under the authority of Rwandan bishop John Rucyahana—whom Johnston would meet at the Dallas Conference, only two weeks after the South Carolina meeting. Another original signer, Charles Murphy, rector of All Saints’, would in January of 2000 be consecrated as a missionary bishop by the Archbishop of Southeast Asia, Moses Tay, and the Archbishop of Rwanda, Emmanuel Kolini. A third First Promise member, Michael Hesse, rector of a charismatic Episcopal church in Florida, would solicit missionaries from a Ugandan bishop and eventually lead his parish out of the Episcopal Church to more amenable, African leadership through the Anglican Missions in America organization.

The formation of First Promise was welcomed by some Episcopal parishes, whose leaders felt increasingly oppressed by their local diocesan leadership. A piece in St. Timothy’s parish newsletter, early in 1998, informed members about First Promise: “I know that it is Lent, but sometimes I just have to let out with a couple of Alleluias. I have come home from [a First Promise meeting in] Atlanta convinced that our Lord is ‘doing a new thing’... The new thing is First Promise.” The piece went on to explain that organization’s positions and purpose, quoting the First Promise statement, then urging parishioners to inform themselves: “There will be a congregational meeting in March to bring you up to date. Be there!” (St. Timothy’s 1998a).

Over the decade preceding First Promise’s founding, St. Timothy’s gradual shift to a more evangelical and charismatic self-understanding included coming to share the general conservative Episcopal evangelical perception that the national Episcopal Church was moving
away from Biblical orthodoxy. They heard from other parishes which were having trouble with liberal bishops, and began to see themselves as one of many beleaguered orthodox parishes within ECUSA. Through the late 1990s, St. Timothy’s lay and clergy leadership developed strong ties to the wider conservative movement within the Episcopal Church, and taught other members—through newsletter pieces, teaching at the church, and so on—about what was going on in the wider Episcopal Church and why they should be concerned about it. In addition to learning directly from their clergy and lay leaders, one St. Timothy’s couple told me about getting onto a couple of conservative Episcopalian email lists (such as Virtuosity, conservative commentator David Virtue’s list), after learning about the lists when friends in the congregation forwarded messages to them. They agreed that these sources, plus their clergy “keeping them on the straight and narrow,” have helped them know what’s going on in the Episcopal Church in general: “We’re looking at the national level.”

Thus the congregation of St. Timothy’s developed a sense of being increasingly out of step with the Episcopal Church—or, perhaps, that the Episcopal Church was increasingly out of step with them. As one member remarked to me, "We didn't leave ECUSA, ECUSA left us." While in this congregation, as in other contexts, homosexuality is often mentioned as the key issue, many St. Timothy’s members stressed to me that this issue is only a symptom of a much broader problem: that the leadership of ECUSA no longer respect the authority of the Bible. The rector told me, “The homosexual issue and all the others are just lightning rods. They got an awful lot of press, but that’s not the issue. The issue is, either the Scripture is God’s word and God’s authority for the church, or it’s not.” Concerns about ECUSA’s direction, and a growing sense of a gulf separating St. Timothy’s outlook from that of the national church, contributed to heightened tensions between St. Timothy’s clergy and lay leadership and the rest of their diocese and their bishop. The last few years of St. Timothy’s life as an ECUSA parish saw repeated tangles with their diocesan bishop. In 1997, members of St. Timothy’s were given the option by
their leaders to designate their pledges for use only within the parish, meaning no money from those pledges was to be sent on to the diocese or national church, a gesture which doubtless raised tensions. Further, St. Timothy’s leadership felt the parish was being increasingly marginalized by other parishes and the diocesan leadership in general.

In St. Timothy’s case, then, their increasing alienation from ECUSA included conflicts with their diocesan leaders; but national church policies and teachings were major issues sparking conflicts with the diocese. One member told me that many don’t understand the church’s need to break away from ECUSA, because they have their own church and leadership, who are orthodox. But the church’s lay and clergy leaders, and many members, felt that the wider church context was very important and couldn’t just be ignored. A parish leader told me, “While we’re fighting with the diocese, I really believe we’re fighting with the national church. The diocese is just sort of the pawn in between.” Indeed, in other parishes’ situations, even having a conservative ECUSA bishop who was sympathetic with their views and concerns was not enough to discourage some conservative parishes from joining bodies like First Promise and ultimately breaking away from ECUSA, because of national church policies—much to the dismay of their conservative former bishops.

This increased awareness of and activism over wider Episcopal Church issues on the part of the clergy and lay leaders at St. Timothy’s led the church to formally join the conservative movement within ECUSA, by joining First Promise in early 1998. First Promise (and its successor organization, AMiA) both shared and affirmed St. Timothy’s own, independently-developed evangelical and charismatic character. One member told me that AMiA was exciting because it’s an embodiment of what they’ve been doing here at St. Timothy’s for many years now, being evangelical Christians who exercise their faith in the Anglican tradition—a unique mix of “an orthodox Episcopal church that is a bunch of evangelicals.” But, beyond a general shared outlook and style, First Promise was exciting to people at St. Timothy’s because of the
possibilities it claimed to offer for an escape from ongoing conflicts with the Episcopal Church. As one member told me, they were “ready for First Promise.”

In addition to the parishes like St. Timothy’s which quickly joined the organization, First Promise also absorbed momentum and personnel from several other conservative Episcopal organizations. In December of 1997, during the uproar following the Episcopal Church leadership’s discovery of PECUSA, Inc., First Promise joined forces with the latter organization to offer support, in company with the Episcopal Synod of America (ESA) and a charismatic church-planting organization called the North American Missionary Society. As the months went by, First Promise remained a strong and growing organization while the other three groups–PECUSA, Inc., NAMS, and ESA (FIFNA)–were less and less heard of. The former two seem to have been fairly rapidly absorbed into First Promise, which became the successor to PECUSA, Inc., as the next manifestation of a potential alternative church structure–this one with an added strength PECUSA, Inc. had apparently never envisioned: the active support and involvement of foreign bishops. This involvement was hinted at in the First Promise document, as described above, but it first began to take actual shape in late 1997 and early 1998 in a small Episcopal parish in Little Rock, Arkansas.

**St. Andrew’s, Little Rock**

The original founding of St. Andrew’s is described by the *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*:

Put off by a growing liberalism and sense of spiritual laissez-faire they sensed in the Episcopal Church,... the congregation that would become St. Andrew’s Church began meeting for Bible studies in private homes in 1996. By fall of that year, the group began gathering for a corporate worship service, held once a month....Priest-less and self-led, the group brought in priests from Colorado, Michigan, Ohio—even the Congo—to lead worship. On more than one occasion, T.J. Johnston came down from his South Carolina church [All
Saints’, Pawley’s Island] to lead the group. [Brazzel 2002:D5]

By January of 1998, the group had about 60 members. A woman who worked with the church for a time explained to me that the founding group wanted to worship liturgically, in the Episcopal style, but in a theologically orthodox parish. She stressed that the original core group were not renegades or attention-seekers, but “godly, professional, educated, loving, kind people trying to do what God wanted them to do.” However, the nascent church soon drew attention aplenty. In 1997, they asked the local Episcopal bishop, Larry Maze, to give them permission to officially found a new Episcopal parish. Maze refused, reportedly claiming the group was motivated only by opposition to homosexuality, and that this was a poor reason to found a congregation (England 1998a).48

The St. Andrew’s group was undeterred by Maze’s refusal. They continued to meet and organize, and eventually called T.J. Johnston to come and be their rector. Maze opposed this call and threatened to file charges against Johnston if he came to the unauthorized parish as their rector. However, according to an article describing the March 1998 meeting of First Promise, Johnston was not concerned; the article quotes him as stating, “I'd rather face the wrath of a bunch of cranky old bishops than to see Jesus eyeball to eyeball one day and have him ask, 'What did you do to bring in the Kingdom?’” This article further noted, “Johnston had reason to be joyous in adversity. Johnston expected to soon come under the episcopal authority of an African bishop, which would diminish his chances of facing a trial for breaking church canons” (England 1998a). That African bishop was John Rucyahana, then newly-elected bishop of the diocese of Shyira in northwestern Rwanda. Rucyahana was well-connected with American conservatives, due to his studies at Trinity School for Ministry. He had met Johnston at the Dallas Conference, and when Johnston found himself on ecclesiastical thin ice, only months later, it was to ‘Bishop John’ that he turned. Bishop Rucyahana told me about how the idea of his taking on St. Andrew’s was born:
I think [American conservative leaders] had known me for very many years. They knew me, they knew my stand in Gospel preaching.... Actually, to surprise you, they didn’t know I would even think of taking them on.... They were sharing [their] problem, and we were praying for the problem together for some time, until I felt called to take it up myself, and I told him I would do it. They didn’t know I would. They didn’t know it can even happen. [M: They hadn’t even thought of it?] They hadn’t even thought of it! They didn’t know even I would survive it, because some of them thought I was committing suicide. But I felt a call from the Lord to do it, and I told them I would do it. So it’s not a matter of asking me to do it; it’s a matter of being called to do it. This is a conviction.

A former member of the congregation remembers how excited and moved the St. Andrew’s group was when Rucyahana agreed to take them on. They saw it, she explains, as “an answer to prayer, a gift, a miracle, an incredible blessing,” that Bishop John and his archbishop were willing to reach out to them “to care for this little fledgling parish” in spite of all the financial and personal sacrifices that might entail for the African leader.

The *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette* recounts events after Rucyahana decided to take St. Andrew’s (or, more specifically, its priest, T.J. Johnston) under his wing:

Bishop Ed Salmon of the South Carolina Episcopal Diocese (Johnston’s overseer at the time of his decision to move to Little Rock) agreed to make the uncustomary transfer....

In April 1998..., Johnston was transferred by his South Carolina diocesan overseer [Salmon] to the supervision of Bishop John Rucyahana, of the Anglican Diocese of Shyira, Rwanda. Johnston... does not live in Rwanda and has no plans to move there. [Brazzel 2002:D5]

The legality of this move—officially transferring Johnston to the oversight of the Bishop of the Diocese of Shyira, Rwanda—was, and remains, uncertain. In a letter addressed to Bishop Rucyahana in July of 1998, the Archbishop of Canterbury George Carey wrote, “It is my clear
view that what you are doing is completely illegal and I hope you will quickly disentangle
yourself from something that is quite unconstitutional” (Virtue 2003b). However, as with future
moves along similar lines, the legality or illegality of the act of transferring an American priest to
the jurisdiction of an African bishop was, apparently, not clear enough for a definite response
(some sort of censure or punishment) to be possible. Johnston and St. Andrew’s, though dogged
by controversy, essentially got away with using this loophole in Anglican polity to escape the
authority of the Episcopal Church and its bishops.\textsuperscript{50} Illegal perhaps, irregular yes, surprising for
certain–but it worked.

The First Promise leadership were delighted by this new development, which in the words of
the \textit{Arkansas Democrat-Gazette} gave the organization a “test case for their growing conviction
that other Anglican avenues must be explored to preserve the biblical message they set out to
preach and embody at the time of their ordination” (Brazzel 2002:D5). They trumpeted the news
of St. Andrew’s new African patron loudly at their March 1998 conference, which was attended
by nearly 600 people and marked, according to one leader, their growth “from a document to a
movement.” (England 1998a). In a \textit{United Voice} piece entitled “First Promise Raises Global
Stakes,” conservative Episcopal journalist Robert Stowe England wrote,

> At a national conference... in March, leaders of the First Promise
> movement vowed to "fight for the faith," even if that requires defying bishops
> of the Episcopal Church. In an unprecedented development, some will fight
> under the protection of Third World Anglican bishops who are in communion
> with the Archbishop of Canterbury....The transfer of Johnston's episcopal
> oversight to Rwanda places St. Andrew's in communion with Canterbury,
> although it is out of communion with the Diocese of Arkansas. This could lead
to pressures against Rwandan bishops to cease and desist, but leaders of St.
> Andrew's are not concerned. "It puts the whole matter an ocean away," says
federal judge David Young, senior warden of St. Andrew's. [England 1998a]

Echoing this sense that transferring Johnston’s letters and thereby placing him and the parish under a Rwandan bishop would somehow defer or deflect conflict over the parish’s establishment, Johnson quipped in the *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, “It’s like setting up an offshore corporation for protection” (Brazzel 2002:D1). Indeed, the move did appear to buy some peace and stability for St. Andrew’s; in February of 2002, the church, now an Anglican Mission in America parish, had 400 members and was planning to buy land to build its own sanctuary. The move may have meant peace for St. Andrew’s, but for the rest of the Episcopal Church and the wider Anglican Communion, the excitement was just beginning. The ‘unprecedented development’ of the placement of Johnston and his church under an African bishop opened the door to a whole new world of possibilities for Episcopal dissidents, who were fast learning the value of “taking Africa seriously.” Subsequent developments have amply proved *United Voice* reporter England right when he predicted, “The battle of Little Rock could turn out to be only the first skirmish in a full-fledged global confrontation” (England 1998a).
CHAPTER 4
LAMBETH 1998: GLOBAL SOUTH RISING

“This is the voice of God talking”

The day of the Lambeth Conference’s debate over homosexuality, August 5, dawned bright and hot in Canterbury, England. The Lambeth Conference was two and a half weeks through its three-week agenda, but most attendees and observers fully expected that the most exciting and controversial events of the Conference were still ahead—in the debate to be convened that very afternoon. The fireworks began even before the plenary debate convened, with a dramatic and widely-reported scene outside the plenary hall. As one reporter put it, “On Wednesday the breadth of the Anglican Communion was unforgettably demonstrated by the Nigerian Bishop Emanuel Chukwuma attempting to exorcise the English deacon Richard Kirker on the campus of the University of Kent. Kirker’s sin, or distinction, was to be a homosexual” (Brown 1998).

Another British reporter described the repeated confrontations between the Nigerian bishop and the gay English activist as “scenes of unprecedented vitriol, near violence and...the prolific and unsolicited laying on of hands” (Garner 1998). James Solheim, in his account of Lambeth 1998, reports Bishop Chukwuma’s words to Kirker: “God did not create you as a homosexual. That is our stand. That is why your church is dying in Europe—because it is condoning immorality. You are killing the church. This is the voice of God talking” (Solheim 1999b:63-66).

Not surprisingly, this very public and dramatic confrontation caught the attention of the secular press, who interpreted the incident as a prime illustration of North/South antagonisms which many expected to characterize the Lambeth debate over sexuality. Conservative Episcopal reporter Robert Stowe England aptly observes:

Photographs and videos of Bishop Chukwuma holding a Bible, preaching and shaking his finger only inches from Richard Kirker...became a symbol in the British press and on television of the culture clash between the moral clarity of the South and the moral laxity of the North. [England 1998b:5]
The Kirker-Chukwuma face-off became an icon of what many came to see as the central theme of Lambeth 1998: righteous Southern rebuke to a cowering North. How did North/South moral conflict come to be seen as the dominating dynamic of Lambeth 1998?

**Diversity in Unity? As Lambeth Begins**

The 1998 Lambeth Conference began with a grand showing of the Communion’s multicultural colors. The opening liturgy held at Canterbury Cathedral on July 19th had been planned as a “stunning celebration of Anglican diversity” (Thomas 1998:1). A British reporter described some of the diverse and colorful details of the service:

A woman bishop at the lectern, a Latin American dance in the aisle and a Gospel read in Arabic were among the firsts for Canterbury Cathedral yesterday as it hosted the opening of the Lambeth Conference.... The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. George Carey,...welcomed 800 bishops and 600 spouses with a greeting in Swahili. The Epistle was in Portuguese and the service set to the Kenyan rite with a South African spiritual and Argentinian chorus. [Combe 1998a:7]

This opening liturgy reflected the determination of conference planners and Anglican Communion leadership to make sure Lambeth 1998 showed the world an Anglican Communion unified in its diversity, celebrating its global breadth.

As at the 1988 Conference, African, Asian, and Latin American bishops were in the majority, but as Lambeth 1998 opened, the Communion’s Southern provinces appeared poised to play a much more pivotal role in the conference than they had in the past. This was in part due to a renewed will to include Southern Christians on the part of Northern bishops and other leaders.

*As Los Angeles Times* religion reporter Larry Stammer puts it:

The prominent role of non-Western prelates and the decidedly non-English touches at the opening liturgy here are a visible sign of what Western bishops have long known–they are shepherds in a changing church that is both revitalized by the ascendancy and religious fervor of non-Western Christians and challenged by the worries, insights, and moral views of the Third World. [Stammer 1998a]
Searching for Anglican unity in this diverse and changing Communion would be one of the great themes and tasks of Lambeth 1998, the largest Lambeth conference ever. The nearly 750 bishops present included 224 from Africa, 177 from the U.S. and Canada, 139 from the UK and Europe, 95 from Asia, 56 from Australia, 41 from Central and South America and 4 from the Middle East (Moore 1998).

Besides the bishops, countless other personnel spent the three weeks of the Conference on the campus of the University of Kent, perched on a hill above the town of Canterbury and its historic cathedral. These included conference and campus staff, lay observers from various countries, observers from other Christian traditions, and a wide variety of journalists and church activists of various stripes, including a good number of American clergy and lay leaders representing both conservative and liberal interest groups. Most of those at the conference attended the gala opening liturgy in Canterbury Cathedral, heard the multilingual greetings and songs, and watched the dancers spin in the aisle of the majestic building which is the official center of world Anglicanism.

But already, even before the Conference began, the show of unity-in-diversity rang hollow. Remarks by a liberal American bishop, two weeks before Lambeth began, had elicited expressions of hurt and anger from African Anglican leaders, heightening the sense of North/South division and antagonism which the Kirker/Chukwuma confrontation would later be seen to dramatize. The American bishop, John Shelby Spong of the Diocese of Newark, is an outspoken proponent of accepting homosexuality and a prolific writer of modernist theology. Many conservative Episcopal and Anglican leaders regard Bishop Spong as the epitome of what is wrong with liberal Episcopalianism. On July 10, nine days before the conference began, Spong was quoted in the conservative-leaning Church of England Newspaper (in an article with the provocative headline, “‘African Christians? They’re just a step out of witchcraft’”) as stating that African Christians, in his experience, are “superstitious, fundamentalist Christians” who
have “moved out of animism into a very superstitious kind of Christianity. They’ve yet to face the intellectual revolution of Copernicus and Einstein that we've had to face in the developing world; that is just not on their radar screen” (LeBlanc 1998a). These comments infuriated Southern Christians and many others, and heartily embarrassed other American bishops. The offense of Spong’s remarks was further worsened by the fact that, in spite of the widespread disapproval and anger his comments evoked, he refused for nearly two weeks to make any formal apology. On June 29, Spong made his first public statement amounting to an apology, in an interview with a Lambeth staff journalist which was then published in the Lambeth daily newsletter. But by then, nearly two weeks after his initial remarks, significant damage had already been done to the cause of North/South unity and mutual understanding by his statements—and by Northern conservatives’ use of the opportunity to strengthen their own North/South alliances.

Spong’s remarks and the resultant publicity provided an unparalleled opportunity for Northern conservatives to denounce American liberalism by asserting its underlying arrogance and racism, and to distance themselves from such sentiments and affirm their own commitment to solidarity with African Christians. Soon after the original article appeared, word of Spong’s remarks spread rapidly through a charismatic leadership retreat, which was being held in Canterbury just before Lambeth. Approximately 450 Anglican bishops, priests, and lay leaders were at this conference, hosted by SOMA and Anglican Renewal Ministries, both charismatic-renewal groups sympathetic with the American conservative cause.

Photocopies of the offending Spong article were circulated among those present, and the Americans at the conference—including many leading conservative Episcopal activists—decided to make a public response. In an article entitled “Americans decry Spong’s remarks on Africans,” United Voice’s Doug LeBlanc describes what happened:

During an evening session on July 15, the Americans gathered at the front of the conference's meeting hall and faced fellow conference participants as Alex
Dickson, the retired bishop of West Tennessee, spoke for them. "We are deeply grieved by the words of our fellow citizen, John Spong," Dickson said. "We have been even more deeply grieved, if what has been reported is accurate. "He has insulted you," Dickson said to African Christians. "We are ashamed for him, we are ashamed for ourselves. We ask your forgiveness, and we assure you that he does not speak for us." As most conference participants offered a sustained ovation, African Christians approached the Americans and embraced them. Some Africans and Americans wept loudly as they embraced. [LeBlanc 1998a]

Peter Moore, dean of TESM, described this event as “the most moving moment of my time [at Lambeth],” and Todd Wetzel of Episcopalians United similarly described it as “one of the American Church's finest moments in decades” (Moore 1998; Wetzel 1998a).

Besides emphasizing their own respect for Southern Christians, some American conservatives also used Spong’s remarks to depict the whole Episcopal Church as condescending and racist, by generalizing from Spong’s remarks to a presumed overall liberal American mindset.54 Todd Wetzel, for example, highlighted the implicit racism of Spong’s remarks: “This was racism, raw and ugly. And, truth be told, it lurks beneath the surface of the West and of Westerners. Spong expressed it starkly” (Wetzel 1998a). Similarly, Doug LeBlanc argues from Spong’s words to a widespread liberal American Episcopal arrogance: “Spong's remarks have haunted this Lambeth Conference because they expose a certain arrogance that lies beneath the surface of some liberal circles in the Episcopal Church” (LeBlanc 1998d).

In sum, American conservatives sought both to distance themselves from Spong’s remarks, and to identify Spong closely with the Episcopal Church’s other leaders and general attitudes, with the cumulative effect of strengthening their own relationships with African and other Southern Christians who felt injured and offended by Spong’s comments. In thus taking Spong’s remarks as an opportunity to affirm their solidarity with Southern Anglicans, these American conservatives strove to simultaneously present, and help bring to realization, the new Anglican
world order they hoped to establish: orthodox South standing against liberal North, with conservative Northerners allied with Southerners as their true ecclesial brethren.

African responses to Spong’s remarks, which were widely collected and published by American conservative sources (the better to put Spong to shame), tended to focus more on defending African Christianity than on attacking the Episcopal Church. Some Southern leaders, quoted in the press, responded to Spong by using his terms themselves, with heavy irony. A Hispanic missionary, present at Lambeth 1998, demonstrated this in a comment reprinted in the Lambeth 1998 review in the conservative American Episcopal magazine *The Christian Challenge*: “Given the [recent ruling on homosexuality] for United Methodists in the USA, I would suggest that it is not just us poor, superstitious, uneducated and bought-out Third Worlders who appear to think that the blessing of same-sex unions is not particularly Biblical” (*Christian Challenge* 1998a). The use of the word ‘superstitious’ clearly identifies this bitter quip as a reference to Spong’s pre-Lambeth comments.

The other major African response to Spong’s characterization of African Christians was to defy that characterization by pointing to the training and credentials of African Christian leaders. One Ugandan bishop used that argument, in our interview:

Some of us have so many degrees, we have gone to the same school [as American church leaders], yes?.... [We have] the same training.... But they are saying we have not gone very far, we are still primitive, untrained, because we supported an orthodox teaching.

Similar responses were made at the time of Lambeth 1998. LeBlanc reports, “Bishop Eliud Wabukala (Diocese of Bungoma) said Kenya's converts to Christianity include thousands of university graduates.... ‘Put my name down,’ Wabukala told *United Voice*. ‘If he wants a scholarly paper, I am happy to challenge him’” (LeBlanc 1998c).

Some Africans felt further insulted, as the conference began, by the recent removal from his position of the only African member of the staff of the Anglican Consultative Council, the
planning and administrative body associated with the Anglican Communion’s offices in London. African scholar and Yale Divinity School professor Lamin Sanneh commented on that situation in an article in the Church of England Newspaper:

The African bishops see that the only one of their number to work in the central body of the Anglican Church (the Anglican Communion Office), Dr Cyril Okorocha, was sacked.... Thus they see the highest administrative offices of the Church occupied by white American males... and the one Nigerian sacked. Then, they feel that they are not represented within the [Lambeth] conference leadership. [Macdonald Radcliff 1998]

Between the significant uproar over Spong’s remarks, and the more modest furor over Okorocha’s dismissal, then, the 1998 Lambeth Conference began with Africans and other Southern bishops feeling insulted and defensive–hardly an auspicious state of affairs in which to begin a conference intended to seek global Anglican unity. As Archbishop Robin Eames, who later in the conference drew the unenviable task of presiding over the debate on the sexuality resolution, would quip at the beginning of that debate, “If I were going to Dublin, I wouldn’t start here” (Byham 1998b). Most Southern leaders’ negative feelings were not abated by Spong’s eventual apology. The apology brought little closure to the episode, since many were underwhelmed both by its tardiness and the weakness of its wording. Given that creating a greater level of understanding and cooperation between Northern and Southern Anglicans was seen as a major part of the global unity agenda of the Conference by many of its organizers and participants, the North/South tensions and suspicions generated or reinforced by Spong’s remarks constituted a significant step in the wrong direction. As one Ugandan bishop aptly described it to me, “When we met at Lambeth, the church was not at oneness. Each church...we dismissed each other.”

Global South Rising

With or without the sense of grievance elicited by Spong’s impolitic comments, African and other Southern bishops had come to Lambeth prepared to be assertive. As the Conference got
underway, expectations were high among all parties that African, Asian, and Latin American bishops would wield unprecedented and decisive force at this Lambeth Conference. Larry Stammer, religion columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*, observed in a piece written early in the Conference that many expected Lambeth 1998 to be dominated by concerns like international debt “that reflect the increasing importance of Asians and Africans in the church that once was run by their former colonial overlords” (Stammer 1998a). A *United Voice* editorial written just before the Conference further illustrates the pre-Lambeth expectations of Southern influence at the Conference, and shows, again, that the hopes of American conservatives rested heavily upon the idea of an ascendant orthodox South:

> Several observers of the 12th Lambeth Conference in 1988 believe it marked the ascendancy of Anglican voices from the Southern Hemisphere. We believe the 13th Lambeth Conference needs to witness the arrival of Southern Hemisphere Anglicanism as a compassionate rebuke to an uncertain and confused North...Orthodox Anglicans in the North, exhausted as they sometimes are, know in their souls that they stand with the vast body of orthodox Christians in the Worldwide Anglican Communion. May the South rise to this occasion to ask just what the North thinks it is doing to Scripture, reason and tradition. [LeBlanc 1998b]

But until the day of the sexuality debate, many observers felt such expectations had gone unfulfilled. During the first two weeks of the Conference, the bishops present met in groups organized around particular topics, to prepare reports and resolutions for the Conference to vote on during the plenary sessions of the Conference’s third week. These first two weeks of committee discussions passed in relative quiet and calm. Several sources note that, by the conference’s halfway point, African or other Southern protests or actions had not played much public role. Professor Lamin Sanneh remarked upon the lack of a strong African presence or voice by midway through the Conference, in an interview with Alistair Macdonald-Radcliff: “Professor Sanneh...made it clear that he was aware of deep pain felt among his African and Caribbean brethren at the Lambeth Conference: ‘They feel they haven't been given a hearing’”
(Macdonald-Radcliff 1998). Seven Southern archbishops (including the primates of Rwanda, Uganda, the Southern Cone, and Southeast Asia) issued a “Midpoint Letter” to the other bishops present at the Conference, asserting that their concerns (including the authority of the Bible, and human sexuality) had not yet come to the fore at the Conference.

Some Northern conservatives blamed the weak Southern impact in the Conference’s first weeks on draconian control by conference organizers and staff, whom Northern conservatives believed to be heavily biased towards liberal perspectives. However, Northern moderates and liberals, too, were wondering when the much-heralded Southern voice would be heard at Lambeth 1998. An article composed near the end of the Conference’s second week, by the official Lambeth press team, raised the question of why Southern Anglican leaders hadn’t yet played their predicted assertive leadership roles at Lambeth. However, this column was never released to the press; the debate on sexuality came along first, and promptly settled any questions about where the African or Southern voice at Lambeth might be found—indeed, made the very question ridiculous.

Preparing for Battle

In spite of all the misgivings of conservative Northerners and their Southern allies that not enough was happening, the first two weeks of Lambeth were far from totally uneventful—or totally under control. There were plentiful hints, if anyone needed them, that homosexuality would be the difficult issue everyone expected it to be—and that Lambeth 1998 would, indeed, be remembered as the Conference at which the Anglican global South finally, conclusively, rose. Most conference attendees and observers fully expected, with hope or dread, that the sexuality debate would be the Lambeth Conference 1998’s defining event, and that there, if nowhere else, the voice of the Anglican South would most definitely be heard.

The energetic pre-conference preparations for this debate (see chapter 3) continued into the conference itself, in the form of continued lobbying and strategizing by activists and allied
bishops on either end of the spectrum of opinion. Conservative activism included the wide circulation of literature intended to persuade the bishops and others not to support gay rights in the church. Gay and lesbian rights activists were also a visible presence at Lambeth; several gay and lesbian Christian groups had representatives at the conference who passed out literature and demonstrated outside plenary sessions.

Meetings and presentations were held to support both the anti-homosexuality and pro-tolerance positions. In fact, the scheduling, and then cancellation, of one such presentation was surrounded by controversy which newspaper articles described as the first rift in the Lambeth Conference’s appearance of unity. South African bishop Duncan Buchanan, who was heading the Lambeth sub-section group discussing human sexuality, scheduled a presentation by gay and lesbian Christians for the 60 bishops who were in charge of producing a resolution on human sexuality for the whole Conference to debate and vote upon. On July 22, after an acrimonious debate, that presentation was canceled by a two-thirds majority vote by the sub-section group (Combe 1998b). Several African bishops spoke to the press at this time about their convictions concerning homosexuality. Articles quoted Bishop Benjamin Kwashi of Nigeria, and Bishop Wilson Mutebi of Uganda, declaring their positions in response to the controversy of the canceled presentation. Bishop Mutebi stressed that Biblical authority must be the foundation of Anglican unity, while Bishop Kwashi’s statements touched on Spong’s earlier remarks, and raised the view of homosexuality as an unwanted Northern influence in Africa:

We are told we are less intelligent, we are told we are not far away from witchcraft. Now we are oppressed with this Western problem. We know that homosexuality is not the will of God. If the Western churches want to be homosexual, they can, but do not make us change, too. [Combe 1998b]

Kwashi’s remarks make it clear that, again, North/South moral conflict was the lens through which this controversy was seen. Other newspaper accounts, likewise, described the controversy over the scheduled presentation as a case of African Christians revolting against liberal Northern
agendas. Thus this event, too, became part of the general image of North/South confrontation at Lambeth—in spite of the fact that Bishop Buchanan, who had scheduled the presentation, is a white South African, and that according to one conservative American commentator, it was actually the conservative American bishop James Stanton and not a Southern bishop who started the “hour-long brouhaha” which resulted in the presentation’s cancellation (Noll 1998a).

After the cancellation of this presentation, two American bishops decided to host an open session which would give British and American church-affiliated gay and lesbian groups another opportunity to present their experiences and points of view (Solheim 1999b:56). Meanwhile, those opposed to church acceptance of homosexuality countered by holding their own informational session, an event entitled “An evening to understand more about homosexuality and the reality of change,” held on July 29th. The invitation to this meeting, officially extended by seven African and Asian archbishops and 18 bishops, mainly African and American, read in part:

We are calling for a meeting in order to signal the intention that the majority of this Lambeth Conference accepts a resolution that clearly and unambiguously affirms the biblical position on marriage and the church's traditional teaching that genital sexual behavior belongs within the context of heterosexual, monogamous lifelong marriage. We believe that this conference also needs to witness to God's transforming power and the hope that this offers to all men and women, whatever their sexual orientation. The meeting will hear from those who work with all those who struggle with their sexuality and the reality of their transformation through the gospel of Christ.... This meeting will be closed to the press. [Private archive 1998a]

The program for this evening event included brief statements by several bishops and a conservative expert on homosexuality, testimonies from men and women who had been cured of homosexuality through their faith, a moderated discussion period, and then a brief “time for the Bishops to reflect on appropriate steps to be taken during this Lambeth Conference” (private archive 1998b).
As suggested by the final period of reflection listed in the schedule, the goal of this evening was not only to present an alternative to analogous presentations promoting the liberal view on homosexuality, but to work and plan for the passing of a conservative sexuality resolution. A document shared with me by someone involved with this event, and entitled “Observations on the Politics of Passing a Sexuality Resolution,” detailed strategy for the Lambeth sexuality debate. This strategy included the drafting of a single, strongly-worded anti-homosexuality resolution which would be “promulgated” at the July 29 evening meeting on homosexuality, and then presented to the Conference during the sexuality debate and backed by all orthodox bishops present—a strategy intended to ensure that the conservative vote should not be split between competing resolutions and that, in the words of the document, the “clear majority of Anglican bishops [who] uphold the biblical and classic teaching on sexuality.... get their views to the floor in a clear Resolution” (private archive 1998d).

The site of the meeting just described, and the center for other conservative strategizing and lobbying efforts at the Conference, was the Franciscan Study Centre on the campus of the University of Kent. A coalition of conservative organizations used the FSC to provide a gathering and resource center for overseas bishops. Free long-distance phone calls, email, and copying are among the services various people have cited as being offered at the FSC. Meetings, dinners, presentations, and other events—ranging from social to informational to strategy-oriented—were held at the FSC. Allied or approved organizations (such as Five Talents, described below) were allowed to distribute information at the Centre.

The uses of this facility during the Conference were a subject of considerable discussion and even controversy. Several liberal and moderate leaders and commentators expressed the opinion that Northern conservatives were using the FSC facility to attract, propagandize, bribe, organize, and generally inappropriately influence the views and votes of Southern bishops. Conservatives argued, in response, that they were merely providing information and resources to enable
Southern bishops to participate fully in the Conference, which could be confusing and alienating for Southern bishops. A further examination and analysis of accusations concerning the facilities provided at the FSC will be taken up in chapter 8. Whatever the FSC’s status and whatever one’s views of its legitimacy, it seems to have been welcomed by those it was intended to serve. One Ugandan bishop told me, for example, “They were very, very, very helpful.” And, if the vote on the sexuality resolution can be taken as evidence of its success, the FSC seems also to have fulfilled the hopes of the conservative Northerners, and a few Southern allies, who organized, funded, and staffed it.

**The Sexuality Debate**

By the time the debate over a sexuality resolution began, then, there had already been considerable controversy over that issue at Lambeth. Besides conservatives’ consternation over the proposed presentation by gay and lesbian Christians to the sexuality subsection, and liberals’ consternation over the strategizing going on at the Franciscan Study Centre, a final controversy arose during the last day before the sexuality debate. A confusion over what resolution text would be used as the basic resolution on human sexuality, to be debated on and amended in the plenary session, heightened fears among those opposed to church acceptance of homosexuality that savvy liberal leaders would trick them out of the conservative sexuality resolution they wanted. The titles of conservative articles covering the resolution substitution demonstrate this feeling: “Lambeth Uproar of Liberals’ ‘Dirty Tricks,’” by Robert Stowe England of the ESA, and “How the Liberals have Schemed to Get their Way,” by Stephen Noll of the AAC. Though the Lambeth Steering Committee decided to replace Buchanan’s resolution text with the text the sexuality subsection had, finally, produced as the main resolution text to be debated, the confusion over resolution texts further heightened the atmosphere of hostility and distrust.

The Lambeth debate on human sexuality has been ably described elsewhere; I will offer only a few details here. The effort to unite opponents of homosexuality behind one resolution text was
successful. While several regional groups (including West Africa and East Africa) had composed sexuality resolutions, these were quickly put aside and a strong bloc coalesced around the main resolution text, that which had been produced by the subsection. However, this text was not, in its original form, strongly-worded enough to satisfy many. Tanzanian Archbishop Donald Mtetemelal proposed an amendment adding a clause stating that the Anglican Communion “rejects homosexual practice as incompatible with Scripture.” In speaking for this amendment, Mtetemela said that without it the resolution would be weak and would “not state the position of the African communion.” After some debate, Mtetemela’s amendment passed by 389 to 190 votes. That strong majority for an orthodox amendment gave confidence to orthodox bishops, and several more amendments strengthening the resolution’s statements against homosexuality were quickly proposed and voted in. The word “homophobia” was changed to “irrational fear of homosexuals,” and a clause recommending “chastity” for any unmarried Christian was changed to “abstinence” when Bishop Sentamu, a Ugandan serving in England, argued that this was unclear because it is possible to define some sexual relationships as chaste.

The tone of all this debate, according to several bishops who were present, was notably less open and friendly than other Lambeth debates. One commentator describes a bishop who spoke in favor of softening the resolution’s language being hissed and booed. Bishop William Swing of the Diocese of California wrote later, “The feeling level in the debate was actually a lot worse than the final resolution. It was worse than liberal vs. Conservative; it was Black vs. White, Imperialists vs. The natives, North vs. South. It was raw” (Swing 1998). However, in spite of the hostile atmosphere and the apparent strong support for a clear conservative statement on homosexuality, two amendments were passed which had the effect of limiting the harshness of the resolution text. First, Canadian Archbishop Michael Peers proposed an amendment stating that the Conference “notes the significance of the Kuala Lumpur Statement on Human Sexuality,” in order to forestall the proposing of an amendment which would fully adopt the
harshly anti-homosexual Kuala Lumpur Statement as the normative Anglican position. The other amendment which gave some hope to liberals was the addition of a commitment on the part of the Lambeth bishops to “listen to the experience of homosexual people.”

The final text of Resolution 1.10 read as follows:

This Conference:
(a) commends to the Church the sub-section report on human sexuality;
(b) in view of the teaching of scripture, upholds faithfulness in marriage between a man and a woman in lifelong union, and believes that abstinence is right for those who are not called to marriage;
(c) recognizes that there are among us persons who experience themselves as having a homosexual orientation. Many of these are members of the Church and are seeking the pastoral care, moral direction of the Church and God's transforming power for the living of their lives and the ordering of relationships, and we commend ourselves to listen to the experience of homosexual people. We wish to assure them that they are loved by God and that all baptised, believing and faithful persons, regardless of sexual orientation, are full members of the Body of Christ;
(d) while rejecting homosexual practice as incompatible with Scripture, calls on all our people to minister pastorally and sensitively to all irrespective of sexual orientation and to condemn irrational fear of homosexuals, violence within marriage and any trivialization and commercialization of sex;
(e) cannot advise the legitimizing or blessing of same-sex unions, nor ordaining of those involved in same-gender unions;
(f) requests the Primates and the ACC to establish a means of monitoring the work done on the subject of human sexuality in the Communion and to share statements and resources among us;

(g) notes the significance of the Kuala Lumpur Statement and the concerns expressed in resolutions IV.26, V.1, V.10, V.23, and V.35 on the authority of Scripture in matters of marriage and sexuality and asks the Primates and the ACC to include them in their monitoring process. [Byham 1998b]

The amended text was voted upon, and passed–526 votes in favor, 45 abstentions, and 70 votes against. With the passage of the sexuality resolution, Lambeth 1998 had accomplished what it would be known for around the world and through the years: for “rejecting homosexual practice
as incompatible with Scripture” by a landslide vote, to the delight of many and the horror and
grief of many others.

Though the resolution, like all Lambeth resolutions, is non-binding on the Communion’s
provinces, such an overwhelming vote would, as many noted, carry considerable moral authority
and be difficult to ignore. The landslide vote demands some explanation. Nearly all Southern
bishops voted for the resolution, as well as all Northern bishops who oppose church acceptance
of homosexuality. However, these numbers do not fully account for the overwhelming vote in
favor of this resolution. Many moderate and even liberal bishops from North America, Europe,
and elsewhere voted for the resolution as well. Several explained later that they realized they
were outnumbered by conservative bishops, and feared that if the resolution text as it stood did
not pass, then something more condemning might be passed instead. The resolution as it stood,
while deeply dismaying many who feel homosexuality is not inherently sinful, was still
restrained enough in its language for liberals and moderates to focus on a few bright spots, such
as the clauses about listening to the experience of homosexuals and ministering pastorally to all
people regardless of sexual orientation.

As the account of the debate given above suggests, African bishops played the major role that
many had expected in the proceedings. England points out the rather weak participation in the
sexuality debate by American bishops, and observes of the final vote, “When [plenary chair
Archbishop Eames] called for those favoring the resolution, a multiracial sea of hands went up
across the plenary hall. The no votes were scattered and nearly all white. Finally, the abstentions,
mostly white, were sparser still.” One Ugandan bishop, recalling the scene for me, four years
after the fact, also emphasized the racial makeup of the voting blocs:

  We were in a big meeting, and they said, OK, you need to raise your–, we
  need to see those who are supporting this business of homosexuality and other
  things. Those who are supporting [homosexuality], all of them, we saw their
  white hands up!.... But when they said, those who are opposed, those who are
Participants in and observers of the sexuality debate, then, noted the diversity of support for the sexuality resolution, in contrast with the almost exclusively Anglo opposition (probably including some bishops from America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly South Africa). This division was widely interpreted as further evidence of North/South division in the Anglican Communion, and further, of the greater legitimacy of the position endorsed by Southern leaders, due to their diversity and numbers.

“White Hands Up!”: The Global Anglican Politics of Homosexuality

An ACNS piece from the day after the sexuality vote, recording bishops’ reactions, illustrates the interpretation of sexuality vote in terms of a North/South split by quoting a number of African bishops expressing pleasure at the vote, and a number of bishops of European heritage expressing dismay (Skidmore 1998b). What is the reality behind this apparent overlap of moral and global polarizations? Is this really the shape of the Communion, or is there more heterogeneity in views on this issue within the regions, North and South? To shed some light on this issue, I devote the rest of this chapter to an examination of Ugandan Anglicans’ talk about, and attitudes towards, homosexuality (and the questionably parallel issue of international debt).

On June 3 of every year, at Namugongo between Mukono and Kampala, the Martyrs are honored with services and celebrations at separate Catholic and Protestant shrines. Martyr’s Day commemorates the deaths of forty-some Baganda converts to Christianity, men and boys, who were killed in 1885 and 1886 at the command of their ruler, the kabaka or traditional king of the Baganda tribe. Twenty-two Catholic martyrs were canonized in the 1960s, and a like number of Protestant martyrs are honored by the Anglican Church of Uganda (Ward 2002). The Ugandan paper New Vision estimated that half a million pilgrims—from all regions of Uganda, as well as Tanzania, Kenya, and even Europe—attended the Martyr’s Day celebrations in 2001, and
comparable numbers probably attended in 2002 (New Vision 2002a). Some pilgrims camp for
days to pay their devotions to the Martyrs and enjoy the celebration. Most of the pilgrims are
Catholic; when I visited the Catholic shrine on Martyr’s Day, the crush of people was so intense
that in order to move around the property it was almost necessary to step over the omnipresent
vendors’ blankets, spread with plastic devotional objects and Martyrs’ Day memorabilia. The
shrine for the Protestants, who are generally less saint-minded, permitted more elbow room but
was still characterized by a bustling, carnival attitude. The hillside looking down on the
Namugongo Anglican church was thick with worshipers, sitting on mats to listen to the four-
hour-long service held in the Martyrs’ honor. For those seeking additional diversion, there was
plenty to do and see apart from the service: food, drink, and religious books for sale; people
playing music on the sidelines; and an opportunity to tour the reproduction Executioner’s Hut
and plaster model of the Martyrs on the pyre, ready for burning.

The Uganda Martyrs have been honored internationally by the Roman Catholic church for
several decades. But it is only within the past ten years that they have begun to travel the world
in Anglican circles—usually in the course of argumentation on sexuality. By way of an
introduction to Ugandan views on homosexuality, a brief discussion of the strange career of the
Ugandan Martyrs seems apropos. Kevin Ward, a British historian and former professor at Bishop
Tucker College in Mukono, Uganda, gives an account of how the Martyrs became the victims of
Kabaka Mwanga:

Adolescents were sent in substantial numbers to [the kabaka’s] court by each
of the clans in Buganda, as part of the training of future leaders in society.... On
occasion they might be required to participate in homosexual practice....it was
part of a repertoire of power and a culture of deference.... In 1886 there
occurred a massacre of some of the pages who had become Christian converts
in the Anglican (“Protestant”) and Catholic missions. The trigger for this purge
was the refusal, at the urging of older Christian pages, by one of the youngest
boys... to submit to the sexual demands of the Kabaka Mwanga.... The
subsequent holocaust [the burning to death of forty-some young men] became
one of the defining events in the early history of Christianity in Uganda. [Ward
2002]
Ward goes on to stress that homosexual practice should be seen as, at most, a trigger or proximal cause, and not as the central issue in the tale of the Martyrs: “This was, in fact, only one of a whole series of clashes between the Kabaka and the incipient Ugandan Christian communities. Fears that Baganda Christian converts were disloyal and were acting as spies, and that Europeans were poised to undermine the state, were much more important” (Ward 2002).

Indeed, detailed accounts of the martyrdoms tend to stress other factors, including the sexual consent issues only as one conflict among many. *Namugongo: From Shame to Glory*, a 42-page, English and Luganda booklet written by an Anglican priest, Rev. John Kalini, lays out many factors which led to the kabaka’s order for the pages’ execution, including the kabaka’s anxieties about the external political powers represented by the missionaries, a series of catastrophes attributed to Ganda Christians’ abandonment of traditional gods, and the loss of the kabaka’s treasured gun during an ill-fated hippopotamus hunt (Kalini n.d.: 3-6). Kalini hints briefly at the sexual element of the story, but the lesson of the Martyr’s tale in this account is not to resist homosexuality at all costs, but to be inspired by the strength of the Martyrs’ faith and the power it gave to Christianity in Uganda. Similarly, a Catholic account of the martyrdoms, Francis Marion’s *New African Saints: The Twenty-Two Martyrs of Uganda*, offers many reasons for the executions, and, like the Anglican account, stresses the martyrs’ faith as the central message of the episode (Faupel 1984).

These pious sources, then, stress the pages’ faith as an inspiration for all Ugandan Christians as the message of Namugongo. However, other Ugandan discussions of the Martyrs’ significance in Ugandan society take another tack–but not by focusing on sexuality issues. Rather, the Martyrs’ heroism has often been questioned in the context of wider societal debates over issues of loyalty, nationalism, outside influence, cultural authenticity, and power. Discussions of the Martyrs in Ugandan newspapers–a common feature of late May and early June issues–regularly
question whether Kabaka Mwanga, not the Martyrs, should be seen as a hero, for standing up to foreign cultural and political intrusions. Kevin Ward notes that such themes have been the substance of conversations about the Martyrs for decades.

At the Anglican college where I worked in the 1970s and 80s, one of the favourite topics for the student sermon on Martyrs’ Day on 3 June was to explore the political questions of conflicting loyalties–faith or nation? There was no lack of ordinands who were willing to express sympathy for Kabaka Mwanga and criticise the young Christians as tools of foreign geo-politics. The homosexual issue was simply not a factor in these debates. [Ward 2002]

Ward concludes his evaluation of the role the Martyrs have played in Ugandan thought, in church and society, with this observation: “In none of this discourse has homosexuality been seen as the defining issue.”

Given the fact that the Martyrs are not-infrequently held up as sell-outs and cultural traitors for accepting Christianity and turning from their traditional leader, it is ironic that in recent years they have been used rhetorically with increasing frequency as icons of African resistance to homosexuality, constructed as an encroaching Northern cultural problem. The elements of the Martyrs’ story dealing with sexuality have come to be emphasized in some contexts since the mid-1990s, as a public conversation about homosexuality has begun to take shape within Ugandan society.

**Developing debates over homosexuality in Africa**

Since the early 1990s, Uganda, like many Southern societies, has been influenced by the rise of both movements for, and overt oppression against, the recognition and liberation of sexual minorities. Similarly, in their introduction to a special *GLQ* issue on globalization and homosexuality, Elizabeth Povinelli and George Chauncey note the global spread/rise of gay and lesbian identities and movements:

Transnational sexual diasporas [are] transforming the sexual politics and cultures of many nation-states. Postcolonial nations [are] witnessing the emergence of sex-based social movements whose political rhetoric and tactics [seem] to mimic or reproduce Euro-American forms of sexual identity,
subjectivity, and citizenship.... New forms of ‘gay/lesbian’ or ‘queer’ identity, of sexuality, of intimacy, erotics, and community [are] emerging in... hybrid cultural fields and calling into question dominant models of sex, governance, and nationalism. [Povinelli and Chauncey 1999]

How has homosexuality become such a global issue in recent years? In part, this trend is due to the globalization of the media. Northern media, especially television and movies, depict and normalize many identities and behaviors which are viewed, marked, learned, and inwardly digested as potential identity resources by people in contexts outside the global North. The Internet, too, provides access to information, images, and discourses for many. Sexual identities, including gay and lesbian identities, are part of this wider dissemination of Northern cultural roles and mores. Rudolf Gaudio, in a conference paper on homosexuality in Nigeria, noted that the globalization of the media gives people many resources for cross-cultural identification and self-fashioning. In addition to the media, another factor in the rise to prominence of debates over homosexuality worldwide is the increased international activism around homosexuality, defined as a human rights issue. Joseph Massad, in a 2002 essay entitled “Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World,” comments on the trend towards the universalizing of “gay rights”:

Following in the footsteps of the white Western women’s movement.... the gay movement has adopted a similar missionary role. Organizations... [such as] the International Lesbian and Gay Association [ILGA] and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission [IGLHRC]... sprang up to defend the rights of “gays and lesbians” all over the world and to advocate on their behalf. [Massad 2002:361]

The activism of (largely Northern-headed) bodies like ILGA, IGLHRC, smaller gay-rights focused bodies, and human-rights-focused bodies who occasionally take up gay-rights issues (such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) have also created greater international awareness of gay and lesbian identities—and greater political tensions around their acceptance or suppression.
Joseph Massad introduces a useful concept, borrowed from Foucault, in discussing the impact of all this in individual Southern societies: that of “incitement to discourse.” The activism or interventions of Northern NGOs, the formation of a local gay and lesbian rights group or movement inspired by Northern media, or politicians’ public statements about homosexuality likewise inspired by the issue’s rising salience in other contexts, may all serve to incite an intensification of discourse over homosexuality within a given society. Massad explains that, prior to the incitement to discourse on homosexuality of the mid-1990s, “same-sex contact between men has not been a topic of governmental or journalistic discourse” in the Arab world for the past two centuries (Massad 2002:374). Likewise, same-sex sexual contact has not been the subject of governmental and journalistic discourse in most countries in Africa (with the exception of the establishment of anti-sodomy laws in many colonial states) until the 1990s.

When and where was public discourse on homosexuality first incited, in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa? Zimbabwe, under Robert Mugabe, was one of the first African states where homosexuality became the subject of public debate. Anti-homosexual language began to feature in the state-sponsored Zimbabwean press in 1994 and 1995; the conclusive ‘incitement to discourse’ was a controversy over whether the organization Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), which had been founded in 1989 but had kept fairly quiet until that point, could have a booth at a national book fair (Long et al. 2003:12-14). The outspokenness of Mugabe and his government and press inspired “international imitation” in neighboring countries, including Namibia and Botswana (Long et al. 2003:24). Scott Long, A. Widney Brown, and Gail Cooper, in a Human Rights Watch-published account of state-sponsored homophobia in Southern Africa, observe, “In diverse corners of Africa, other countries have heard rhetoric similar to Mugabe’s” (Long et al. 2003:47). Long et al. quote the publisher of one Namibian newspaper expressing surprise at how suddenly homosexuality became a political question in Namibia, just after the 1995 book fair controversy in Zimbabwe (Long et al. 2003:24). In Zambia, a “mammoth
scandal” over homosexuality erupted in the press in 1998, sparked by one paper’s publication of a young gay Zambian’s account of his experiences and hopes (Long et al. 2003:34-35). Long et al. note, “Homosexuality had almost never been publicly discussed in Zambia; now, for months, most newspapers carried several stories a week about it. Virtually all condemned it.” Shortly thereafter, an organization for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in Zambia was formed. Governmental and journalistic anti-homosexuality rhetoric, and also a coalescing of political gay identities, thus, spread from country to country in Africa and elsewhere. Joseph Massad similarly observes that explosions of anti-homosexual rhetoric occurred in newspapers all over the Arab world in the mid-1990s (Massad 2002:379).

The rise of a public debate over homosexuality in Uganda came about relatively late, in terms of this larger picture, but emphatically nonetheless. Homosexuality seems to have become a recurring issue in the Ugandan press and government statements beginning in mid-1998—the same time that the issue was being discussed and debated at Lambeth 1998, which I suspect is no coincidence, especially given the public prominence of the Anglican church in Ugandan society. Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni made several strong anti-homosexuality public statements in the summer of 1998, which were covered in the national press. Discourse on the issue quieted somewhat in early 1999, then erupted again with the publication of news stories on an alleged gay wedding in Kampala. Museveni again spoke out strongly against homosexuality, calling for his police forces to find, arrest, and jail homosexuals, and several gays and lesbians (some of whom were members of a small, nascent gay and lesbian support group) were arrested and allegedly tortured in Uganda at this time. Meanwhile, the Anglican Archbishop of Uganda proclaimed his full support for Museveni’s anti-gay position (Long et al. 2003:50-51). In late 2000 and early 2001, the formation of a support and advocacy group for gay and lesbian Anglicans brought the debate over the place of homosexuality in Uganda to the headlines again (see chapter 8).
Stating that same-sex sexual expression was not discussed in various public spheres prior to the 1990s is not the same as stating that such sexual expression did not exist. A growing body of literature traces the elusive contours of diverse African sexual identities and desires, past and present. However, it is difficult to come to any clear conclusions about the presence and character of same-sex-oriented sexual practices in Africa before the advent of the Northern influences who are currently widely blamed for bringing such practices to the continent. Much of the writing on this topic is quite polemical in either discovering or denying indigenous African same-sex desires—a polemicism made all the easier by the paucity of sources. Anglican historian Kevin Ward, in an article on contemporary attitudes towards homosexuality among East African Christians, notes that the silence in African history on the matter of same-sex desire can be read as indicating absence, or unspoken tolerance (Ward 2002).

Ward, based on his reading of the available literature, concludes that while homosexual behavior was apparently not spoken of openly or societally affirmed in most pre-colonial African societies, various forms of same-sex relations have always been part of various African societies, though usually defined in terms of behavior or stage in life, rather than seen as a stable individual identity on the model of Northern gay or lesbian identities today. Ward also brings in the testimony of an elderly Ugandan who told a questioner that “people with homosexual tendencies have always been there,” though they were few and regarded as misfits. I encountered a few such remarks in the course of my own research. One Ugandan bishop, though convinced that homosexual behavior goes against the teaching of Scripture, stated quite strongly that there is nothing new about the presence of homosexuals in Uganda:

People are talking about it in terms of culture. This is not [true]... Even in our society, we have those people. They are there, although they are not pronounced. No, these things are just—it’s human nature.... We cannot deny these things.... I don’t think we can say we have learnt it; it is part of us. Part of us.

However, even the Ugandans who believe that there has always been some homosexuality in Africa share the perception that there is growing pressure from the global North to spread the view of homosexuality as an acceptable alternative lifestyle. Many Ugandans perceive the incitement to discourse over homosexuality in their country—the dramatic increase in talk about homosexuality since the late 1990s—as due largely to the influence of outside forces, whether
activism directly oriented to this issue, or the implicit values propagated by NGOs and donors, or merely media images of Northern sexual liberation and Northern evangelists preaching against sexual liberation. What often occurs, then, in Ugandan public discourse is that the growth in talk about homosexuality in Uganda (which is undeniable) is elided with the growth in the actual phenomenon of homosexuality in Uganda (which is unverifiable). The various external stimuli pushing for more talk about homosexuality (and especially pressures from Northern liberals to be more tolerant of homosexuality) are often spoken of, in a sort of shorthand, as pressures for there to be more homosexuality in Uganda.

These two ideas, of the influx of the idea of tolerance of homosexuality and the influx of homosexuality itself, are more often elided than not. For example, several Ugandans voiced the belief or fear that Ugandan youth in boarding schools learn homosexuality from Northern propaganda which is mailed to them. These statements suggest a sort of epidemiological view of homosexuality which defines it as a trait or orientation which is learned or acquired, at both the individual and societal level: as individuals are exposed to these ideas and practices and ‘converted,’ Ugandan society as a whole is also increasingly influenced by the growing prevalence of this new phenomenon. Indeed, in a 2001 interview Archbishop Nkoyooyo used epidemiological language about homosexuality: “I don't know what the cause of this disease [homosexuality] is. I just pray it does not hit epidemic levels.”

This elision is made all the easier by the fact that, from the point of view of those opposed to homosexuality, it does not really matter whether what is threatening to spread through Uganda is homosexual practices and identities in themselves, or only the idea that such practices and identities are acceptable. Both the practices/identities and the ideology are unacceptable. For example, one Ugandan bishop told me, in nearly the same breath, that homosexuality existed but was taboo in traditional Ugandan society, and that it is an importation that shouldn’t be allowed into Uganda today.
The debate over homosexuality in Uganda, as in many other Southern contexts, borrows its contours and content to a significant degree from the debate over homosexuality in the North. Advocates of gay and lesbian rights adopt and adapt language and arguments from the Northern gay rights movement, while opponents of tolerating homosexuality draw on Northern conservative resources. Both Human Rights Watch and Massad note the influence of North American fundamentalist and evangelical Christians in providing “approaches and language” which were “invoked in debates” over homosexuality in Africa and elsewhere (Long et al. 2003:41).

This is not to say that the homosexuality debates in Uganda or elsewhere are simply importations or reduplications of Northern debates. Ugandan pro-gay rights and anti-homosexuality positions may line up roughly with Northern liberal and conservative positions, but the correspondence is far from exact or complete, as will be discussed below. However, the use of rhetoric and ideas drawn from Northern discourses in Ugandan debates over homosexuality is important to note precisely because such borrowing itself is a central issue in the Ugandan debate. As will be illustrated in chapter 8, the debate over homosexuality in Uganda is as much over outside influences on Ugandan society and culture, and the cultural and economic power of the North, as it is about the morality or acceptability of same-sex sexual desires and practices. Joseph Massad writes about the arrest of several gays in Egypt, “It is not same-sex sexual practices that are being repressed by the Egyptian police but rather the sociopolitical identification of those practices with the Northern identity of gayness and the publicness that these gay-identified men seek” (Massad 2002:382). President Museveni of Uganda made statements along much the same lines in 2002, when in response to worldwide public outcry he backed down from a statement he’d made at the Commonwealth meeting to the effect that there are no homosexuals in Uganda. Backpedaling from that strong statement, Museveni later softened his stance:
Ugandan gays and lesbians are free to be homosexual but must not "flaunt" it in public or break the law, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni said yesterday.... In an apparent U-turn Museveni now says he does not have a problem with his queer countrymen, as long as they "did it quietly" the news agency quoted him as saying. He blamed the west for Ugandan gays and lesbians asserting themselves “in the open.” [Q Online 1999]

I heard many Ugandan church leaders express the same point of view Museveni states plainly here: that the real issue right now is not sexual practice or desire per se, but the rise of a politicized gay identity, with strong Northern associations, in Ugandan society. Homosexuality has become one of the key points at which Ugandan leaders seek to be choosy about what comes into Uganda, thereby expressing their ideological independence from what are seen as aggressive Northern cultural influences.

These leaders’ blaming the North, in Museveni’s words, “for Ugandan gays and lesbians asserting themselves ‘in the open,’” is a common element of discourse on homosexuality in many Southern contexts. In the statements of African political and religious leaders, resisting homosexuality is often tied to nationalist and cultural nativist themes. A postcolonial studies website at Emory contains a brief analysis of this issue. The author writes,

Is homosexuality a postcolonial issue?...Some critics suggest that postcolonial peoples have constructed mythologized depictions of their cultures before colonization. These myths tend to paint native societies as the absolute negation of everything that western culture brought. Thus, they brand many things deemed inappropriate or immoral by the popular culture of postcolonial nations as characteristic of western, non-native values.... A number of postcolonial peoples foster homophobia, since the elimination of homosexuality might be seen as a purging of the ills of colonial influence. Thus, attempts to re-establish native language and customs become inextricably entangled with problematic efforts to promote imaginary aspects of a prelapsarian native culture. [Emory University Postcolonial Studies website n.d.]

In a piece entitled “A Lambeth Background Guide,” the Rev. You-Leng Lim, a priest in the Diocese of Los Angeles who was born and raised in Singapore, concurs with the above-quoted
assessment in arguing that strict heterosexism and condemnation of homosexuality are products of Singapore’s colonial experience, not elements of its traditional culture (Lim 1998).

Homosexuality is thus perceived or at least described in many postcolonial contexts—Uganda, Zimbabwe, Singapore—as a form of corruption or degradation associated with the colonizing power (in spite of the fact that anti-homosexuality attitudes and laws were adopted from other colonizing powers), and the rejection of homosexuality is understood as a way of reasserting the value and purity of indigenous culture and casting off continued neo-colonial ideological influences. Expressions of such sentiments by African leaders are numerous. Long et al. quote Robert Mugabe saying in 1995, “Let the Americans keep their sodomy, bestiality, stupid and foolish ways to themselves, out of Zimbabwe.... Let them be gay in the US, Europe and elsewhere... They shall be sad people here” (Long et al. 2003:15). Blaming the North for propagating homosexuality in African nations is often quite politically effective, tying the homosexuality issue to deep-seated concerns and resonant discourses over neocolonialism, Northern cultural influences, and the maintenance of authentic African culture and morality. Further, cases in which Northern NGOs, governments, funders, and journalists have pressured African leaders or institutions to be more tolerant of homosexuality—for example, the clamor in the press over Museveni’s assertion of the absence of homosexuals in Uganda—provide substantiation for such leaders’ assertions that homosexuality is being forced on Africa by Northern gay interests.

Thus, in Uganda and across Africa, resisting homosexuality is frequently closely linked in discourse and thought with resisting neocolonial cultural encroachments and asserting African autonomy. Ugandan and other African bishops’ votes for the sexuality resolution, and their willing taking-up of homosexuality as an issue before Lambeth should be understood in light of the rising discourse over homosexuality in many of their home countries or neighboring countries. Many of these bishops came to Kuala Lumpur, Dallas, Kampala, and Canterbury with
some sense of homosexuality as a looming threat, something encroaching on their societies and churches from without. Northern conservative Episcopalians and Anglicans presented these leaders with a picture of the worldwide Anglican Communion, through the influence of ECUSA, as one more channel through which the rising tide of homosexuality might creep into their countries. Taking a strong stand against homosexuality at Lambeth, then, must have appeared to many of these leaders as an opportunity to set some clear standards on an issue of growing urgency, even if homosexuality had not yet or only recently become politically salient in their home societies.

It is in the context of such growing concerns about homosexuality in Uganda and Africa in general that the sexual aspect of the Martyrs’ story took on a new prominence. For example, the Martyrs were mentioned at Lambeth in relation to the flare-up over the cancelled presentation by gay and lesbian Christians to the subsection working on the human sexuality resolution. The secular press quoted Bishops Mutebi of Uganda speaking out against homosexuality, and cited the Martyrs as if in explanation of Mutebi’s stand. The *Daily Telegraph* quoted Mutebi’s statement that homosexuality is a sin, then went on, “Uganda has 22 Christian martyrs who were killed 1885 by their king because they refused to be sodomised by him” (Combe 1998b). Two other papers offered similar nutshell accounts of the Martyrs’ tale.65 The point of the Martyrs’ story, as invoked in these pieces, is not that Uganda has a history of committed Christian faith, but that Uganda has a history of saying ‘no’ to sodomy.

Other Africans, too, invoked the Martyrs at Lambeth as symbols of African anti-homosexual sentiment. The West African regional resolution on sexuality read in part:

This Conference, noting that.... (iv) some African Christians in Uganda were martyred in the 19th century for refusing to have homosexual relations with the king because of their faith in the Lord Jesus and their commitment to stand by the Word of God as expressed in the Bible on the subject; stands on the Biblical authority and accepts that homosexuality is a sin. [Private archive 1998e]
When the debate over resolutions began, this resolution was promptly abandoned in favor of the subsection resolution text, which was ultimately amended and passed. So ended the Martyrs’ brief appearance on the central stage of world Anglicanism, but while there they had carried the message with which they had been entrusted: to tell the world that African Christians will never accept homosexual practice. But though their Lambeth career ended quickly, the Martyrs would continue to circulate worldwide, laden with this meaning, as part of the ongoing debate over the morality of homosexuality. By the time of the Lambeth debate, the Martyrs had already been taken up as potent symbols even beyond Africa; one conservative American Episcopalian, writing well before Lambeth in a packet of informational materials on human sexuality which were provided to Lambeth bishops at the FSC, wrote, “It may be true that [some Southern Anglicans] did not think the matter of homosexuality was very important, but it is equally certain that most African Bishops do. After all, the Uganda Martyrs died over this issue” (Turner 1998).

Ugandan perspectives on homosexuality

What, then, are the stances of Ugandan Anglicans regarding homosexuality? Are Ugandan Christians’ views on the matter a stark zero-tolerance refusal, as they are represented through the telling of the Martyrs’ tale in contexts of international polemical debate? Or is the issue of homosexuality in Uganda more like the tale of the Martyrs as it has historically been told, and debated, in Ugandan society: complicated, ambiguous, rife with questions of outside cultural influence and power, and characterized by broad differences of opinion among people of conscience and conviction?

In his piece on opinions about homosexuality in East Africa, Kevin Ward argues that homosexuality has not historically been a central moral concern in Ugandan society, and that even today there is no overall societal consensus on the issue: “When it is discussed, a range of popular attitudes are forthcoming, symptomatic of an issue about which there is, as yet, no clearly established norm” (Ward 2002). My own observations during the course of my fieldwork
in Uganda tend to confirm Ward’s picture, where my analysis of the situation in 2002 and my own, limited historical research overlap with Ward’s far longer experience of Ugandan church and society. Ward cites the range of views represented in the Ugandan papers as one piece of evidence for a lack of strong societal consensus. I noted the same phenomenon during my time in Uganda, including archival newspaper research as well as tracking ongoing news and editorial coverage.

While homosexuality came up very rarely in the Ugandan papers before Lambeth 1998, during Lambeth itself there was quite an active conversation on homosexuality, in the form of articles and letters to the editor. These pieces expressed a variety of views. For example, a short piece in the Monitor on July 29, entitled “Gays, just come out, fame awaits,” argued (somewhat facetiously) that homosexuality is no longer unheard-of in Uganda, but that what’s lacking is gay pride (Lilian 1998). A Letter to the Editor, responding to this piece and entitled, “Gays, Lesbians, Jail awaits you!”, was printed on August 3. This piece pointed out that gay sex is illegal in Uganda, and ends, “Gays, stand warned. If you come out and perform ‘gay acts,’ jail awaits you” (Monitor 1998a). An anonymous August 6 letter to the editor in the New Vision, entitled “I’m gay! And it’s my right to be!,” remarks that it’s funny that people argue against his "acquired Western un-African practice" with one of their own–Christianity (New Vision 1998a). Likewise, a letter to the editor in the Monitor on August 8 also stated clearly, “Homosexuality is not Western,” and argued Uganda’s president shouldn’t be wasting his time gay-bashing, but paying attention to important issues like poverty (Monitor 1998b). On the same day, an editorial column in the New Vision responded positively to the passing of the Lambeth sexuality resolution, praised the role of African bishops in its passage, and ended by saying that Ugandans now need to face the “scourge” of homosexuality in Uganda (New Vision 1998b).

Newspaper coverage, of course, does not provide a direct index of societal and individual sentiments, but articles, opinion pieces, and letters to the editor do give some indication of the
diversity of views extant in Ugandan society—and the content of the main positions on the issue. What, then, are the main positions on homosexuality in Ugandan society and the Church of Uganda? To begin with, there is certainly a strong anti-gay position, as articulated by church leaders like Bishop Mutebi and other Ugandans like the writer threatening gays with jail in the piece cited above. The strong anti-homosexuality position in Uganda (and many other parts of Africa) can be summed up in the words of a Zimbabwean, quoted on BBC Network Africa at one point during our time in Uganda: “It’s not natural, it’s not moral, and it’s not African!” Taking the Zimbabwean’s statement one piece at a time, the argument that homosexuality is not natural is quite common in Uganda. Like Northern evangelicals, Ugandans argue that homosexuality goes against the created order. But rather than the arguments often heard about biology and nature in the context of Northern debates, which reflect scientific discourses by focusing on issues like genes and evolution, Ugandans’ arguments tend to be earthier, relying on birds-and-bees analogies. Expressing his view on the subject of sexuality by means of an analogy used by several other Ugandans I met, one Ugandan bishop told me,

We are asking: is the God who created human beings, is he the God who created other creatures? If he's the God who created people, the same God who created animals and birds and insects, why is it that the insects and the birds..., he did not put in those creatures those ingredients that persuaded them to have sex with the same sex?.... How about those other creatures? Do they also have ‘orientation’? Our simple mind, we are saying they don't have.

Secondly, Ugandan and other African leaders argue that homosexuality is “not moral.” Again, this argument is comparable to the arguments of Northern evangelicals, involving an assertion of the Biblical basis for opposing homosexuality, and of the unchanging nature of Biblical truth. Finally, an important argument for Ugandans and other African church leaders is that homosexuality is “not African.” This argument has no direct analog in the American debate. One brief example will suffice to illustrate this widespread assertion, which has already been discussed in the broader African context earlier in this chapter. A Statement from the Anglican
Province of Rwanda, issued in January of 1998, signed by all the bishops of the province, stated in part: “We know that some Westerners have introduced homosexual practices in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, but we, as Africans, repudiate the practice and do not wish it to be seen in our Province” (Turner 1998). The same argument is implicit in the common assertion that there are no words for “homosexuality” or “lesbianism” in African languages, an assertion I heard several times in Uganda, and have also encountered in conservative Northern sources.

As explained above, such ‘it’s not African’ statements gain part of their potency from the broader context, in Uganda and across much of the post-colonial world, of ambivalence about Northern cultural influences and suspicion of Northern power. Questions about Northern influence in the church, and particularly about tolerance of homosexuality, can become particularly loaded in parts of Africa (unlike Uganda) where competition with Islam is intense. Accusations of Northern influence have become common weapons in the competition between Christianity and Islam for converts, and Christianity generally faces a tougher struggle to shake off its image as the ‘white man’s religion.’ Thus, ironically, while some accounts of the Uganda Martyrs accuse Muslims of bringing homosexual practices to Uganda, today some African Muslim leaders discredit Anglicans by accusing them of legitimizing homosexuality, encouraging African Anglican leaders to be all the more emphatic in disclaiming homosexuality.

The strong Ugandan anti-homosexuality position, similarly articulated in both secular and church-related Ugandan sources, has emerged and coalesced only in the relatively recent past, as public debate on the issue has developed. Ward writes, “Until the issue came into ecclesiastical prominence in the preparation for Lambeth 1988, homosexuality had not been an issue to which the Church of Uganda had given much attention” (Ward 2002). Some Ugandans told me, in effect, that it wasn’t an issue in their churches until it became an issue in the North. One bishop, who is outspoken in his opposition to homosexuality, told me that it became important to
coordinate and take a stand at Lambeth 1998 because “the issue is growing...[and] gaining momentum.”

While some Ugandans hold passionately to a strong anti-homosexuality position, but in my observations and interviewing in Uganda it was my impression that a majority of Ugandans held to a milder anti-homosexuality position. Many people share a common postcolonial ambivalence towards what they see as hedonistic Northern cultural values, but implicit in statements rejecting Northern values is often a sort of cultural relativism: ‘You Northerners do whatever you want, we just don’t want those practices/ideas here in Uganda!’ Such a perspective can be heard even in strong statements like that of Bishop Kwashi of Jos, Nigeria: “We are being oppressed with this issue of homosexuality, which is a Western problem. If the Western Churches want to be homosexual, they should not make us change as well” (Gledhill 1998a). Many Ugandans, also, spoke about this issue as if the question, for them, is whether homosexuality should be allowed or encouraged in Uganda or Africa, not whether homosexuality should be permitted anywhere.

But even in contemplating homosexuality within their own society, many Ugandans seemed not to hold very strong positions—or held strong positions without much personal emotional investment. Homosexuality came up in most of my interviews, usually raised by my consultants; it seemed to come to people’s minds when we began talking about the Anglican Communion and the Episcopal Church. In our conversations, most people expressed opposition to homosexuality. But many of these didn’t show strong feeling about it; often there was a sense that they were just expressing the general view on an issue about which they had no very strong personal feelings. One man told me, with a perfectly calm face and voice, “Oh, we don’t accept homosexuals here. We stone them.” While it was chilling to hear such a statement made so coolly, his calm tone probably reflected the fact that my informant was just telling me about the way things were, not expressing any passionately-felt personal position. The relatively free debate in the newspapers, too, shows that while general social sentiment may oppose homosexuality (and while
homosexual practice and even the propagation thereof are against Uganda’s penal code), there is not such a strong and unanimous opposition to homosexuality that there is no space for public debate. There are known gay hangouts in Kampala, which also suggests a limited degree of tolerance.

This mild anti-homosexuality attitude found among many Ugandan Anglicans (and Ugandans in general, as far as my experiences show) likely has been shaped by a combination of widely-shared postcolonial ambivalences about Northern cultural influence; attitudes towards sexual ‘misfits’ in the country’s traditional societies; the evangelical Biblicism of the missionaries who evangelized the area; and the East African Revival stress on sexual purity. However, the heritage of the East African Revival (see chapter 2) can actually serve as a moderating influence on anti-homosexuality sentiment. The ideas associated with the East African Revival, while heightening sensitivity to sin, seem also to increase tolerance of the sinner. I found that some Balokole were surprisingly tolerant—perhaps because the Balokole fellowships stress so strongly that everyone has sin to overcome. One Mulokole said of the Lambeth sexuality debate, “Those who were for not practicing homosexuality in the church ended on a good note which I liked, that they should not condemn them. Instead they should be pastoral,... talk to them, counsel them, love them, but not condemn them, say, ‘Out of my church!’” Another long-time Mulokole told me, in the course of our conversation about homosexuality, “The thing of, 'I am right, you are wrong', is not Godly, because...we are not going to go to Heaven because of our righteousness. We are going to go to Heaven because of the grace of the Lord.” He went on to ask me my opinion on the issue—of only a handful of Ugandans to ever do so—and listened respectfully to my reply.

Some Ugandans, too, were hesitant to express a position firmly because they realized they were not getting a complete understanding of the issue of tolerance of homosexuality, from their limited sources of information. For example, the same Ugandan bishop quoted above also
questioned me closely concerning why Northern heterosexuals would support the cause of
tolerance and rights for gays and lesbians, a puzzle which he assured me had caused himself and
his colleagues a great deal of perplexity. Kevin Ward suggests a final moderating influence on
Ugandan attitudes about homosexuality and sexuality in general may result from the constraints
on living up to the ideals of European Christian culture in an impoverished colonial context,
which he argues may have have inculcated a degree of tolerance in Ugandan Christians with
respect to matters of sexual morality. He writes,

Many, perhaps most, Ugandan Christians find themselves bound in a whole
variety of less than ideal marital or sexual situations [because of polygamy, the
expense of formal marriage, etc.]. Such people remain part of the Christian
community. The disjunction between theory and practice is seen as a necessary
part of life, though often a tragic one. [Ward 2002]

Besides some strong and emphatic anti-homosexuality positions, and a wide range of milder
or less-formed anti-homosexuality positions, Ugandan society also possesses a small, nascent
liberal position on the issue of homosexuality. Ward observes, “In urban settings, more
recognisably modern forms of [homosexual identity] have begun to emerge....[but] so far in East
Africa the emergence of a self-consciously gay community of people is in its infancy” (Ward
2002). As more Ugandans (heterosexual and homosexual) take the risk of articulating positions
affirming the acceptance of homosexuality in the Ugandan public sphere, this position continues
to evolve and take shape. The arguments and statements appearing in newspaper articles suggest
some of the elements of this Ugandan liberal position, which in some ways reflects Northern
rhetoric and others represents a particularly African and Ugandan form of pro-gay-rights
positioning. For example, the assertion of the naturalness of homosexuality (and denial that it is a
Northern innovation or imposition) parallels some Northern arguments, but the differentiation
often made between situational homosexuals (influenced by prison or single-sex schools) and
essential homosexuals made by many liberal Ugandans does not have any direct parallel in Northern pro-gay rights discourse.

In conclusion, and as Kevin Ward notes, though discourse about homosexuality has risen in frequency and public prominence in Uganda since 1998, the issue is still not central in Ugandan society—or in the other African societies which reflect a roughly-similar set of positions. It commands medium-tier headlines when issues arise, and shows up on editorial pages periodically, but did not come up, for example, in one university class’s recent assemblage of essays about the most pressing concerns for Ugandans today. Though potent in international relations, homosexuality is not a driving concern of Ugandan and other African Christians on a day to day basis, contrary to the impressions of many Northerners.

**Ugandan/American correspondences**

How do these Ugandan positions regarding homosexuality line up with those of potential American allies? Northern conservative Anglicans have found fairly ready allies among African Anglicans. Some elements of the negative view of homosexuality are shared by Africans and Americans, such as the not-natural and not-Biblical arguments. Further, ex-gay testimonies appear to have strongly impressed African Christian leaders, perhaps because confessing sin and testifying to personal transformation through faith are important speech genres in East Africa. Because of such commonalities and resonances, Northern conservatives have been quite successful in cultivating alliances around this issue with Southern church leaders, and encouraging the latter to take the problem of homosexuality seriously in spite of its relatively low prominence in their home contexts. For example, Stephen Noll’s address at the Dallas Conference was quite explicitly an argument for Southern leaders to take this issue seriously and join in activism to discourage acceptance of homosexuality in the Anglican Communion.

Such arguments resonated with what many Southern church leaders had heard of homosexuality as an encroaching trend in the context of political debates over the issue in their
home countries, or elsewhere in Africa and Asia. Thus predisposed, many Southern church
leaders accepted Northern conservatives’ assurances of the urgency of this issue and began to
articulate clearer and stronger negative views concerning homosexuality than they had
previously found need to do. Thus, although there are significant differences between the African
and American debates and even the tones of the strong conservative positions (e.g. the “not
African” element), American and African Anglicans have still managed to discover and build
enough common ground and common identity to work together on this issue.

As for liberal Episcopalians, their success in building rapport with Southern Anglicans on this
issue has been much more limited (but see chapter 8). The liberal left in the U.S. sees
homosexuality as a liberation issue and thus as akin to the struggle of other marginalized
peoples, including people of the global South, to be recognized and treated decently by those in
power in the current social, economic, and political order. One liberal Episcopal scholar told me
that as he sees it, African Anglicans actually have a great deal in common with Northern gays, in
their common experience of being excluded from the structures of religious institutions. Such
common experiences, however, only have the power to produce feelings solidarity if they are
recognized or constructed as an affinity. The literature on sexuality and postcolonial theory tends
to focus on recovering local queer identities in Southern societies, especially through film or
written literature, as part of an interpretive project that is again focused on liberation—the voicing
of these doubly-suppressed identities of the queer and colonized (see Lancaster 1997). However,
the gay liberation/colonial liberation analogy simply doesn’t resonate with many Southern
Christians’ thinking on these issues. The rejection of Northern power and influence in Ugandan
society cuts the other way from Northern liberals’ liberationist projects. The fact that
homosexuality, and/or tolerance thereof, has come to be seen as a Northern agenda, often
encouraged by outsiders, is probably the single biggest factor in its disfavor. American liberals
find this rejection of their proffered solidarity dismaying and confounding, and often react by
explaining away African views in various ways, or arguing that Northern conservatives have co-opted African Christians as yes-men, thereby perpetuating the cultural colonization of Africa.\textsuperscript{71}

“Not an Issue”

One response often used by Northern liberals in an attempt to head off or defuse African statements on homosexuality is the argument that homosexuality just isn’t an issue in Africa—the corollaries being that the Anglican Communion should be focusing on other issues, and that if Africans are talking about homosexuality it must be because Northern conservatives talked them into it. There is some truth underlying this not-an-issue argument, since as I noted above, homosexuality has generally become an issue of public debate in most African countries only within the relatively recent past, well after it had done so in most Northern contexts. However, whatever validity the not-an-issue argument might have has become lost in the exchange of mutual recriminations between Northern liberals and conservatives, each accusing one another of forcing homosexuality onto the international Anglican agenda. Liberal Northerners often assert that conservatives are fixating on an unimportant issue and that the church should leave people’s sex lives alone, and focus instead on economic, health, and justice issues—coincidentally, the domains in which liberals feel they have the strongest credentials and the greatest success in relating to Southern leaders. Presiding Bishop Frank Griswold, quoted in a \textit{Church of England Newspaper} article, after being questioned about ordaining non-celibate gay priests, is quoted as “regrett[ing] that other issues before Lambeth ‘such as world debt and Christians undergoing persecution, which affects people more fundamentally’ will not get the media attention they deserve” (Libby 1998). American conservatives, for their part, use the not-an-issue idea to convey their sense that \textit{liberals} are unreasonably obsessed with this frivolous topic and have forced it onto the agenda—\textit{but} since it’s on the agenda, it must be addressed and settled. For example, Todd Wetzel wrote during Lambeth, “Bishops of the Two-Thirds World consider the
subject of massive, debilitating debt of greater magnitude [than homosexuality] and worthier of lengthy deliberation” (Wetzel 1998b).

As has already been indicated above, many African church leaders do agree that homosexuality isn’t their issue, whether because it doesn’t exist in Africa, or because it is not a central matter of public debate in their societies, or has not been until recently and is seen as becoming so now due to outside forces. Kevin Ward quotes a Tanzanian bishop who told him, at a meeting before Lambeth, that homosexuality shouldn’t be on the agenda at all: “‘It is not our issue’” (Ward 2002). However, many also argue that they need engage the issue now because of the prominent debate over sexuality going on in the Northern churches, and because the cultural power of the U.S. means that growing tolerance of homosexuality there may easily spread into African societies. One Ugandan bishop I interviewed told me:

The question that bothers me even up to now is that if the sexuality issue in the Episcopal Church in America was... one church’s pastoral concern,... why would it come as an agenda into Lambeth Conference? Why wouldn’t it be dealt at a regional level where they can handle it themselves, whatever? I think bringing it to Lambeth as an agenda was like imposing this on everybody in the Communion, which was wrong.

He explained that he would have preferred not to deal with homosexuality at Lambeth 1998, but since it did come up, it had to be dealt with—and from the Southern churches’ perspective, that meant a strong statement against accepting homosexuality needed to be made.

Another Ugandan bishop, though, differed in his views, bringing up the issue of the financial relationships that exist between many Northern and Southern churches. He argued that the Southern bishops who said homosexuality wasn’t a big issue were hoping that issue would not arise, because they held different views from their Northern patrons and feared the loss of funding if the Southern bishops spoke their minds. He told me, “For me personally, homosexuality was the issue.... Some people, I’m afraid,... they want to continue getting assistance, and they know that if they are outspoken on the homosexual issue some [Northerners]
will keep their donation, [so] they say, ‘Please, no, no, here we are on other matters, don’t bring those things [up].’ *Because they will interfere with their dollars.*”

Thus not only between American liberals and conservatives, but even to an extent between Ugandan bishops, the question of whether homosexuality is or is not an issue African and other Anglican bishops should be addressing has become a matter of politicized dispute. To sum up, in spite of the fact that many people seem to agree that homosexuality is not the kind of life-and-death issue that should be at the top of the agenda of the Communion or any of its member churches, it seems unlikely to recede in prominence as an issue anytime soon, given that even the argument over its salience as an issue has become so politicized.

**The Amazing Vanishing Debt Issue**

So what *should* the Anglican Communion really be talking about, according to the various parties who argue sexuality shouldn’t be the main issue? There was a strong consensus, leading into Lambeth, that international debt was, either one of the two main issues, or even *the* main issue, for Lambeth 1998. An Episcopal Life headline stated, “Sexuality, debt loom as concerns of world bishops” (Stannard 1997), and a Lambeth organizer stated before the conference, “The number-one concern to come from all the provinces, whether First World or Third World, is international debt” (LeBlanc 1997b).

The prominence given to debt in these and other sources reflects an assumption on the part of Northern Anglicans that Southern church leaders, the new Anglican majority, would care deeply about this issue. Partly, this assumption was based on the simple logical supposition that since international debt has a profound negative impact on largely-Southern debtor nations, the people and leaders of the churches in these nations would be highly mobilized on the debt issue. Partly, this assumption also reflected the fact that some African leaders–most notably, South African Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane–have been very active and outspoken on the subject of international debt and the need for debt forgiveness. There were other indicators, too, that at least
some Southern leaders had strong feelings on this matter, such as the inclusion of international debt relief in the report of the Kuala Lumpur conference (Douglas 1998a).

Given Northern expectations that Southern votes would be of central importance in the debates and outcomes of Lambeth 1998, and assumptions that debt would be a motivational issue for most Southern leaders, it was inevitable that the debt issue should become involved in bids for Southern loyalty by various Northern constituencies. Many liberal and moderate Northern Anglicans were already involved in or supportive of debt forgiveness activism, as Lambeth approached. Support for Jubilee 2000 initiative, calling for large-scale debt forgiveness in the year 2000, was widespread among Northern liberal and moderate Anglicans, who carried this enthusiasm into Lambeth 1998. Northern liberals, confident they had a record of concern and activism over debt, had good reason to feel that they were on solid ground in terms of their engagement with Southern Christians in this area and thus hoped to keep the focus of Lambeth on international debt forgiveness. For example, Ian Douglas, criticizing liberal bishop Jack Spong for his role in making sexuality the central issue at Lambeth 1998, expresses his sense that the more important issue of debt was being overlooked:

> In the tit for tat between Spong and the archbishop of Canterbury, the importance of international debt relief in the face of grinding poverty for sisters and brothers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Pacific, raised both in Kuala Lumpur and in Dallas, was never mentioned. [Douglas 1998a:12]

Douglas’s words hint at the sense among many of the Episcopal Church’s liberals that the debt issue, with all its dynamics of solidarity with the poor and criticism of oppressive systems, was a far better issue for American liberals’ relations with Anglicans in the global South than human sexuality.

At the same time, conservatives hoped that by taking up international debt issues they could demonstrate their concern and solidify their relationships with Southern Anglicans. Northern conservatives had little record of activism on this issue. Evangelical Episcopalians’ historical
involvement in international missions may well have given them a better awareness of Southern poverty than many mainstream Episcopalians, but engaging with poverty through missions and aid programs is not the same as having a developed platform on the issue of global poverty. During 1997 and 1998, American conservatives began to develop such a platform. The fact that sex and debt were the two key issues on the Dallas agenda illustrates this plainly. Liberals responded to this newfound conservative interest in international debt with accusations that conservatives were trying to swap debt for sex. While the debt-for-sex view of Dallas is seriously oversimplified, as I discussed briefly in the previous chapter, liberal suspicions that conservatives only took up the debt issue in order to help them strengthen their relations with Southern Anglicans can find some substantiation in the history of American conservatives’ dealings with the debt issue.

The inclusion of international debt as a key agenda item at the Dallas meeting was an important starting point in this process. This likely came about because people like Ekklesia Society’s Bill Atwood knew enough about Southern poverty to see debt as an important issue. At Dallas, a Nigerian scholar, Dr. Chinedo Nebo, spoke on international debt to the assembled bishops and other leaders, in a talk entitled “International Debt and Christian Responsibility” (Nebo 1997). Nebo laid out debt as a central problem and challenge for the African churches, using the language of ‘jubilee’ and debt forgiveness. However, some conservative Episcopalians felt that rather than throwing their own weight behind the Jubilee 2000 initiative, they needed their own, more distinctively conservative proposal for easing the burden of debt. After Dallas some American leaders began to work on producing an alternative to Jubilee 2000 which they could propagate. This work may have been motivated in part by a desire to differentiate themselves from Northern liberals, but Episcopalian conservatives also had some substantive problems with the Jubilee 2000 debt forgiveness concept. Some objected to Jubilee 2000 as a
shallow, insufficient engagement with the problem of poverty. Conservative Episcopal priest and
commentator Todd Wetzel raised such critiques in one piece written during Lambeth:

> The national offices of Western churches control endowments reaching into
> the billions of dollars. Any proposal to give all or even a portion of this
> gracious legacy to debt alleviation meets with stony silence.... The Western
> Church has done much that is good and commendable. Collectively, we've
> done a little a lot of the time. [Wetzel 1998b]

Other Northern conservatives objected to Jubilee 2000 on ideological grounds relating to their
social and economic conservatism. For example, Stephen Noll wrote, “If we have learned
anything in the last 25 years, it is that no-strings-attached welfare does not work at home or
abroad. Programs like the HIPC Initiative of the World Bank [as opposed to Jubilee 2000]
combine market incentives with debt forgiveness” (Noll 1998a). Another conservative
Episcopalian, Diane Knippers, defended capitalism in criticizing the push for a debt-forgiveness
jubilee:

> Some voices in the Church are prepared to use the debt issue as an occasion
> for simplistic denunciations of "the world capitalist system." Such
denunciations would evade the Church's own responsibility, they would leave it
blind to many of the causes of poverty, and they would do nothing to help the
impoverished African pastors. Indeed, naive and utopian proposals that will be
discussed at Lambeth would make the poverty worse. [Knippers 1998a]

Knippers’s observations come from a letter she issued in April of 1999, as head of the Institute
of Religion and Democracy, a conservative think tank, to conservative Episcopal leaders. The
invitation called for these leaders to come together for purposes of developing alternatives to the
Jubilee 2000 proposal. The rest of Knippers’ letter makes it quite clear that a significant
motivation for this engagement with the issue of international debt was the fear that American
liberals would be able to use their demonstrated commitment to debt forgiveness to attract the
loyalties of Southern Anglicans.

As you know, this summer 800 Anglican bishops from every part of the world
will gather at the decennial Lambeth Conference in Canterbury. African
bishops, who form a majority of Anglican bishops, have strongly urged the
Communion to address the critical poverty issues of the African continent. 

There are signs that some left-leaning western bishops are trying to use the debt and poverty relief issues as a trade-off to persuade the African bishops to be more accepting of their homosexual agenda. We believe it is essential that several of the AAC bishops are able to engage the international debt and poverty issues knowledgeably and compellingly both because these are intrinsically important, but also because these issues are related to our ability to persuade two-thirds world bishops to address our moral and spiritual poverty.... IRD is coordinating scholarly input on these issues in the hopes of providing some tangible micro-enterprise solutions to rural poverty, particularly in Africa.... The roundtable will consist of bishops, economists and other scholars and observers. We hope that you would be willing to make the time in your schedule to join us.... Your input is invaluable as we seek to faithfully minister the Gospel to the “least of these, our brethren.” [Knippers 1998a]

Conservatives like Knippers, then, feared liberals would use the debt issue to their advantage to push for acceptance of homosexuality (or at least avoid censure), and felt they needed to have a plan of their own and demonstrate concern for Southern issues, so they could better persuade Southerners to take on their Northern church concerns. Conservatives also realized they needed to have a strong position on the undeniably-pressing issues of debt and poverty, in order to make any credible argument for the urgency of the sexuality issue. Robert Miclean spoke about the interconnectedness of these issues, at the May 1998 meeting which resulted from Knippers’ invitation:

The Worldwide Anglican Church must effectively address two issues this summer: spiritual poverty in the West and material poverty in the South. Of course, we must confront the spiritual crisis [in the West], which is leading many Episcopalians to stray from the faith once received. But neither can we overlook the state of material poverty and physical death, which many of our brothers and sisters in the developing world must confront on a daily basis. To only address the material needs of Africa, as some western liberals apparently prefer, suggests that the Church in the West has nothing to learn from its brethren in the rest of the world. Likewise, to solely focus on the growing immorality and even apostasy found in parts of the western Church would lead to gross neglect of the sufferings of our brothers and sisters in the poorest of the developing countries. [Miclean 1998]
As at Dallas Stephen Noll told Southern bishops quite explicitly why they should care about Northern apostasy, in Knippers’ letter and Miclean’s talk, Northern conservatives are told why they should care about Southern debt.

Coming out of this conference, conservatives launched their own poverty reduction program, Five Talents, a micro-enterprise program which provided small loans to people in poor countries to start small businesses. This was officially launched during Lambeth, with a reception at the Franciscan Study Centre attended by 150 bishops, and was apparently well-received. Thus, within the space of a year, conservatives developed and presented their own, alternative approach to the problem of global poverty, in order to demonstrate their commitment to this issue and to the well-being of Southern Christians.

What is remarkable about the story of the debt issue at Lambeth 1998 is that in spite of all the expectations that it would be one of the two biggest issues, the preparation and lobbying that took place around it, and the time spent on it during the conference itself, the issue of debt was totally eclipsed by the sexuality issue, and seems, retrospectively, to have been rather a flop. Why? One reason debt didn’t really catch hold as a defining issue at Lambeth 1998 may be that it wasn’t as controversial as homosexuality. However, American conservatives’ eagerness to produce an alternative to Jubilee 2000 shows that the debt issue wasn’t uncontroersial. There were competing, ideologically-distinct positions, and these did clash at the conference, at least briefly. World Bank president James Wolfensohn, addressing the Lambeth plenary session on debt as a guest speaker, reacted angrily to a pro-debt-forgiveness and anti-World Bank video presentation which had just been shown.

But in spite of American conservatives’ efforts and Wolfensohn’s indignation, both the coverage of the debt issue in the Lambeth Daily publication and the language of the Lambeth resolution on debt show that the normative view of how to approach international debt at
Lambeth 1998 was very much the Jubilee 2000 view. The resolution text reflects liberal language and ideas about debt forgiveness, stating in part:

We have heard and understood the point of view that poverty reduction is more important than debt forgiveness. Nevertheless we conclude that substantial debt relief is a necessary, while not sufficient, precondition for freeing these nations, and their people, from the hopeless downward spiral of poverty. [Lambeth Conference website 1998]

The passage of this strongly pro-debt-forgiveness resolution in part reflects the fact that the Jubilee 2000 language and approach to the problem of international debt were quite popular with those African bishops who were already mobilized on this issue, and apparently resonated with those who were not. Five Talents simply did not have the public support of Jubilee 2000. Furthermore, few people besides the conservative Americans who came up with it saw Five Talents as necessarily an alternative to Jubilee 2000, rather than a potential addition. One American conservative explained why he sees the two approaches as opposed, but acknowledges they are not inherently incompatible:

Five Talents is not meant to compete directly with Jubilee 2000. The Conference may endorse both. But there are divergent principles at work. Jubilee 2000 aims at macroeconomic solutions by bailing out governments. Five Talents begins at the grass roots and seeks to strengthen families and villages and thereby enhance the overall quality of life. [Noll 1998b]

But in spite of some fundamental differences between the two approaches, many people probably saw no problem with supporting both Five Talents and Jubilee 2000—the one to provide assistance and projects at the local level, the other for international-scale economic relief. Thus, though Five Talents was well-received, it never stood much chance of being endorsed instead of Jubilee 2000 and the corresponding approach to debt relief.

The passage of the resolution on debt, then, represented a modest triumph for Northern liberals. As Julie Wortman puts it, the Conference “strongly ratif[ied] and committ[ed] itself to the Left’s Jubilee 2000 call for immediate debt relief for third-world nations” (Wortman
But the roaring success, among Southern church leaders, of an approach on the debt issue primarily associated with Northern liberals, did not mean that Southern bishops chose to restrain their views on homosexuality in order to please Northern liberals when the sexuality debate rolled around. Nor did the relative lack of interest in the Five Talents proposal prove to be any barrier to cooperation between Northern conservatives and Southern church leaders. In short, the debt issue did not turn out to be a particularly effective political tool in North/South relationships for either Northern liberals or conservatives.

Why did debt turn out to be such a weak issue in terms of making or breaking North/South alliances or voting blocs at Lambeth 1998? Ian Douglas suggests one reason debt didn’t seem to have much power as an issue at Lambeth was that the press weren’t interested, because Northern audiences (and, perhaps, reporters) are uncomfortable with the message of economic justice (Douglas 1998b:25). There is, undoubtedly, some truth to the idea that homosexuality became the most gripping issue, with the most power to unite and to divide, at Lambeth 1998 at least in part because it consistently received so much attention in the press. However, two additional possible answers to the ‘vanishing’ of the debt issue emerge from the information at hand. The first reason relates to the intrinsic character of the debt issue itself: many African church leaders and members are not very aware of, or mobilized around, issues of international debt. This dawned on me for the first time when, after four months of attending Church of Uganda events, reading Church of Uganda documents, and talking with bishops, priests, and laypeople about the Church of Uganda’s issues and Anglican Communion politics, it occurred to me that virtually no one had ever mentioned anything about international debt. People talked about poverty, and the need for development, and for donors and sponsors to help with that work; but nobody talked about debt. Nor was it a frequent or prominent subject in the newspapers, or in other domains of Ugandan public life and conversation. When I asked a Ugandan priest and scholar about this
strange invisibility of the debt issue in Uganda, he replied, in essence, that people have to be told that debt is impacting their lives in order to see that impact.

Many of the African Christians actually are not part of the whole process of this borrowing, and they don't know when it is done and who does it. So it does not easily come into their daily vocabulary, because it is beyond their imagination.... They don't know what is happening, so how can they talk about something they don't know? ....It affects them, [but]...it doesn't come anywhere, in the reports or even in the newspapers or even anywhere...and somehow the governments, they shelter information from the population of Africa. So the population of Africa cannot be concerned with something that is not coming to them... So even when the Lambeth was saying about this burden of debt and so on, and relief and so on, it's not within the thinking of many Africans. Nobody knows what's happening.

A Ugandan bishop’s wife provided me with some confirmation of this account in telling me about a pre-Lambeth meeting at which she learned about the problem of international debt. Her account suggests that, once the problems of indebtedness were explained to her, she recognized them instantly as Uganda’s problems; but that until that explanation was given, she’d never thought of Uganda’s problems in terms of its international debt.

Mainly they were talking about this debt burden, and its effect. Because it was one of the issues which was to be discussed at Lambeth. How poor countries like Africa come up accumulate such debts, and they become a burden for the nation. Who gets these loans, and how we use them, and how they have accumulated. You know, every child who is born has to be vulnerable to these debts, and how concerned they were that really Africans should have these debts rubbed off, because they affect our social life.... So they were sort of creating awareness and really making us know what is going on, so that we can be able to participate, you know, intelligibly. I had never thought of such as debt burden. It was never an issue. But when the man talked, I said, Oh, yes.

Though the degree to which international debt is a subject of public knowledge may vary a great deal among indebted countries, these accounts still suggest one reason why the issue of international debt may not have had great motivating power for African bishops at Lambeth. If some bishops heard about international debt primarily during the preparations for and events of Lambeth 1998, they may have felt that debt forgiveness sounded like a great idea, and happily
voted for the resolution on the subject. But coming from, and returning to, contexts where debt is hardly a subject of conversation, let alone a pressing politico-economic concern, they may not have developed a strong enough engagement with the issue to be more generally motivated by it—for example, to form enduring alliances with those Northerners who shared their pro-debt-forgiveness stance. Though homosexuality was also not yet a public issue in some African bishops’ home contexts, many African church leaders felt that homosexuality was an issue in danger of becoming more and more pressing in their societies, and international debt could not be construed as a looming or threatening issue, being already the status quo.

Furthermore, African leaders may have engaged more readily and vehemently with homosexuality than with debt because, in the eyes of many, Scripture speaks to more directly to homosexuality than to than debt. The Ugandan woman quoted above, having spoken about the importance of international debt, went on to raise this issue in our interview:

I remember asking the facilitators, ‘Where does God talk about debt burden and how it affects us?’.... We said, well, both [debt and homosexuality] are issues, but first and foremost, debts are there to stay, and we shall try to do our best to tell our countries. But again, sexuality was in the church and killing the church.

She expresses, then, both a sort of fatalism about debt—“debts are there to stay”—and the conviction that sexuality is a core life-or-death issue for the church. An African bishop who was at Lambeth made much the same point:

I think there is a big difference between this kind of indebtedness and the doctrinal issue of homosexuality.... The question of debt, OK, we have to address it as a church, and we have to plead with people whom we owe money to help us, so that... our economies also may take off. But as a church leader, that does not bother me as much as a doctrinal issue. Because however much Africa or Asia might be indebted to First World countries, that will not kill the church. What will kill the church is for people to begin dismantling the Christian doctrine and beginning to undermine and to remove the foundation.
In contrast with some Northern (and a few Southern) church leaders who describe international debt as an issue of moral and spiritual justice—in other words, as a faith issue—and define homosexuality as a cultural and contextual issue, most Ugandans, like those quoted here, seem to view the appropriate expression of sexuality as a central faith issue and define international debt as a political and economic issue, outside the scope of the church. Further, Ugandan Anglicans seem to regard debt as something they can do little about, and thus see no point in taking it up as a major concern. Both of the Ugandans quoted above make statements to the effect that they will try to talk about debt with those who have the power to do something about it (“we shall try to do our best to tell our countries,” “we have to plead with people whom we owe money”), but then both immediately turn to sexuality as an issue which can be addressed in and by the church.

To sum up, many factors may have accounted for the relative weakness of the debt issue at Lambeth 1998—lack of media coverage, insufficient awareness and mobilization among African leaders, the perceived status of debt as a secular or temporal, rather than Scriptural concern. Whatever the explanation, Northern liberals’ successful championing of an approach to international debt which met with wide approval among Southern Anglicans did not turn the hearts of Southern bishops towards them more generally. The general perception, in the press coverage and apparently to a significant extent among the bishops themselves, that the dominating dynamic of Lambeth was Northern liberals and moderates versus Southern orthodox bishops (and their Northern allies), was not weakened by the temporary affinity between Northern liberals and moderates and the majority of Southern bishops on the debt issue. Debt simply didn’t serve either liberals or conservatives as an effective coalition-building tool.

Conservatives’ concerns about the debt issue, then, were ultimately unnecessary. Whatever resolution Lambeth passed on debt, whether conservative or liberal, challenging or bland, revolutionary or ineffectual, would perhaps still have been destined to be lost in the anticipation of the sexuality debate, and the subsequent outcry over the sexuality resolution. The
media, the churches of the Communion, and the world were listening for one thing only from Lambeth 1998: what the Conference would say about homosexuality. And the resolution on debt would be quickly forgotten, while the sexuality resolution would dominate reactions to Lambeth and the way Lambeth 1998 is remembered and invoked as the Communion’s complex and conflicted history rolls on.
Another meeting in Kampala

The Hotel Africana is one of the most expensive hotels in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. Widely used by international business travelers and other wealthy visitors to the city, it sits perched on one of Kampala’s many hills, its airy balconies and lush, well-tended gardens beckoning from behind stern, high iron gates. In these elegant surroundings, in November of 1999, Anglican primates and American conservative leaders came together to consider the situation and fate of the Episcopal Church.

Lambeth was over a year past, and, the American conservatives argued, there was no sign that the Episcopal Church was going to change its policies on homosexuality in response to the Lambeth resolution on human sexuality. These Americans, with the help of some African Anglican allies—most notably, Archbishop Kolini of Rwanda and his bishop John Rucyahana—had organized this meeting in order to seek the assistance of the Anglican primates present: the heads of the provinces of Rwanda, Uganda, Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, Sudan, Kenya, and the Southern Cone of America. Several conservative Episcopal bishops were present, as well; this was an indicator of the seriousness of the occasion, since bishops have much to lose by taking any actions suggestive of a break from the national church structure and thus are somewhat notorious for their hesitance in conservative Episcopal circles. Also present in Kampala were the Rev. Dr. John Rodgers, a priest and retired theology professor, and the Rev. Chuck Murphy, rector of All Saints, Pawley’s Island, where First Promise was founded. Due to the sensitivity of the issues involved, this meeting was closed and surrounded with a significant degree of secrecy.

The Kampala Meeting was, at least in part, a response to a petition sent out to all Anglican
bishops worldwide in January of 1999 by a coalition of American conservative groups (including the AAC, FIF-NA, Ekklesia, and First Promise), under the name Association of Anglican Congregations on Mission, or AACOM. The petition was a direct appeal to the bishops of the whole Communion to intervene in ECUSA in some way on behalf of American conservatives. The full title of the petition makes its purpose quite clear: “A Petition to Orthodox Bishops of the Anglican Communion for Protection of Orthodox Anglicans in United States until the Episcopal Church of the United States is Reformed or Replaced as a Province of the [Anglican] Communion.” The wording of the petition itself makes it even clearer that the orthodox bishops of the Communion were being asked, not only to protect orthodox Anglicans in the U.S., but to play a direct role in the reformation or replacement of the Episcopal Church; it also explains why such outside intervention is necessary:

The Association of Anglican Congregations on Mission...hereby respectfully petitions that orthodox bishops of the Anglican Communion outside of the Episcopal Church of the United States of America ("ECUSA") provide temporary, emergency protection in the form of episcopal oversight to Petitioner's congregations, the individuals therein, and other orthodox Christians in unorthodox ("revisionist") dioceses of ECUSA until ECUSA is reformed or replaced by a continuing Episcopal Church as the province of the Anglican Communion in the United States.... The emergency cannot be resolved within ECUSA itself. The revisionists control ECUSA's national governing bodies and most of its major dioceses. They cannot be persuaded to change their teachings or be dislodged from their positions of power by the orthodox minority within ECUSA. The emergency can be resolved only by the Primates' Meeting, or its individual members, causing the reformation of ECUSA or the replacement of it with a continuing Episcopal Church as the province of the Anglican Communion in the United States. [AACOM 1999; emphasis added]

This petition was accompanied by 145 pages of supporting documents, including post-Lambeth letters from bishops expressing their dismay at the Lambeth sexuality resolution, and the texts of the few anti-Lambeth diocesan convention resolutions which had been passed by that time. In all, the accompanying documents were intended to illustrate that the Episcopal Church had long

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been out of line with the (newly-established) Lambeth position on human sexuality and other issues, and that it was not likely to change in the aftermath of Lambeth—at least, not without significant outside encouragement.

From the perspective of the African leaders present, the goal of the Kampala meeting was to substantiate and further explore this picture of the Episcopal Church’s apostasy. One organizer mentioned to me a particular interest in getting leaders from all different American conservative groups together, in order to get as much clarity as possible about the situation in the Episcopal Church so as to know how best to respond. He went on to explain the goals of the meeting, from his perspective:

We wanted... First Promise, Forward in Faith, the AAC, and the others to be able to be put together.... [We wanted] Asian Primates and European Primates and African Primates [to] be able to assess... the claims of these other people. We wanted to know whether the bishops in American Anglican Council confirm the pleas and demands of the First Promise, of Forward in Faith, of all these lay and presbyter's organizations.... We wanted to make sure that when we intervene, we intervene with enough information from different organs before the Primates.

From the perspective of the Americans involved, however, the purpose of the meeting was to solicit a response from the primates to the unbearable situation they felt themselves to be in. The talk by Geoffrey Chapman of First Promise and St. Stephen’s Episcopal Church, Sewickley, PA, presents the essential request:

We believe that it is essential that much of the Episcopal Church be rebuked by the international communion and called to repentance.... [Finally,] we ask for a new jurisdiction on American soil, under the temporary oversight of an overseas province. We believe that such a jurisdiction would provide the best hope for supporting those who are being persecuted for biblical faith and values.... Such a jurisdiction would also provide visible restraint and warning to those who oppose the Gospel. [Chapman 1999]

While the leaders of some American groups present in Kampala were less certain that it was really time for a new jurisdiction to be established, First Promise leaders, in particular, came to
Kampala eager for the primates present to aid them in the establishment of a new province. These leaders demonstrated their readiness by bringing with them a draft “constitution and canons” document for the proposed “Anglican Missionary Province.” An African churchman who was present told me, “The plan was, practically, that some bishops could be consecrated and be under the province of African provinces.... I heard that four of them had come ready to be consecrated here in Kampala.” I have not received confirmation from any other source that some First Promise leaders hoped to be consecrated at the Kampala Meeting, but it seems not at all unlikely. What could be more impressive than the consecration of bishops for a new orthodox Anglican province in America at an event attended by no less than eight Anglican primates? These hopes were not to be fulfilled at this gathering, but this meeting in Kampala nevertheless opened the door for the next contentious chapters in the Communion’s history.

This meeting, in November of 1999, carried echoes of the earlier Kampala meeting, held in the summer of 1998 in preparation for the Lambeth Conference. In 1999 as in 1998, conservative Americans were gathered to tell African Anglican leaders about the problems in their church; in 1999 as in 1998, these Americans sought the African leaders’ support and assistance in changing the situation. In spite of the victory of the Lambeth sexuality resolution, little had changed. The non-binding character of Lambeth resolutions, and the ill-defined character of the Anglican Communion’s unity and authority structures, meant that the sexuality resolution did not, could not, settle anything. Instead, the passage of that resolution marked the moment of shift to a new set of projects for conservative Episcopalians. No longer was the goal to secure a clear orthodox statement on homosexuality, a bar against which to measure and judge the Episcopal Church’s policies. That statement had been secured—in not quite as strong a form as some would have liked, but from the highest possible levels of Communion leadership and with a surprisingly strong mandate. The overarching project now became, as conservatives knew from the moment of the resolution’s passage, to bring it to bear on the Episcopal Church.
Given the lack of clear mandate for anyone to enforce the resolution or punish those who did not comply, the sexuality resolution’s relevance for the Episcopal Church could only be hammered out through argument and persuasion. In this chapter, I trace some of the contours of that debate, and in particular of the conservative globalist discourses which developed in this context and during this post-Lambeth period. However, by beginning this chapter with a jump ahead to the 1999 Kampala Meeting, I show that at the same time, American conservatives were planning and pursuing projects by which to make the American church take the Lambeth resolution seriously—by involving outside Anglican authorities, bishops and primates, in attacking or subverting the American province’s intransigent authorities. What Lambeth 1998 would mean to history had been sealed in the moment of the vote on the sexuality resolution; but what Lambeth 1998 would mean for the American Episcopal Church was (and remains) contested.

Reactions to Lambeth 1998

The Archbishop of Canterbury had closed the debate on sexuality with this fervent but fruitless hope: "I fully believe with all my heart that if this Conference is known and named by what we have said about homosexuality we will have failed” (LeBlanc 1998g). But in spite of the Archbishop’s hopes, Lambeth 1998 is indeed “known and named” by the resolution on sexuality—or, more accurately, the resolution on sexuality is often ‘named’ by the very words “Lambeth 1998.” One clear example of this tendency comes from a conservative analysis of Lambeth 1998 which noted, “The [sexuality] Resolution has evoked great hostility and non-compliance in the West....with Lambeth-abiding dioceses and Lambeth-rejecting dioceses” (Noll 2000a:30). In this example, and commonly in Anglicans’ and Episcopalians’ talk, the word “Lambeth” stands in for the sexuality resolution passed at that conference.

In the days and weeks following the Lambeth vote on the sexuality resolution, this reduction—Lambeth 1998 = sexuality resolution—was not the only simplification to be widely
made. The other major simplification of Lambeth 1998's events and message was the general perception that Lambeth 1998 (i.e., the sexuality resolution, but also the whole tone of the meeting) represented a rebuke to the North by the righteous bishops of the global South. Anglican scholar Ian Douglas wrote, regarding the Kuala Lumpur document, “Conservative media [in the West] soon misrepresented Kuala Lumpur as an authoritative, unanimous statement from all of the bishops in the Third World chastising the Church in the U.S. for ordination of gay and lesbian people and blessing of same-sex unions” (Douglas 1998a:11). Much the same could be said of the way Lambeth was interpreted by reporters, commentators, and church leaders and members in the period following the conference.

**The African/Asian Juggernaut: Shifts in Northern Representations of the South**

In an article written soon after the Conference, analyzing the votes on the sexuality resolution, conservative Episcopal commentator David Virtue wrote, “All the African bishops vigorously opposed any attempts to legitimize homosexuality at Lambeth.... [Northern liberals] failed... to stop the African/Asian juggernaut towards a resolution supporting a Biblical understanding of human sexual behavior” (Virtue 1998c). In thus attributing the sexuality resolution primarily to the efforts and votes of African bishops, Virtue was certainly not alone. In spite of the fact that 526 of the approximately 800 bishops at Lambeth voted for the sexuality resolution, and that that number represents far more than the combined number of African and Asian bishops at the conference, secular press coverage widely credited the sexuality vote to the ‘Third World,’ ‘Africa and Asia,’ or, often, just ‘Africa’ or ‘African bishops.’ The British paper the Guardian stated, “The passionate intensity of the anti-homosexual lobby has stunned the organisers of the Lambeth Conference. No one expected the African bishops to be interested - let alone, preoccupied - by the issue” (Bunting 1998b). Other British papers carried the message of Southern dominance as well. Elaine Storkey of the Independent wrote:

> The time has long gone since Third World bishops were token representatives. Theirs has been the voice that has prevailed on most of the
agenda, whether in discussions on international debt or human sexuality.... The overwhelming vote for the Church’s traditional sexual morality and against the ‘marriage’ or ordination of practising homosexuals illustrated the Third World empowered. [Storkey 1998]

American papers, too, attributed the Lambeth vote to African and Asian bishops. A Wall Street Journal piece reviewing the Conference described Lambeth 1998 as characterized by “debate [which] pitted a left-leaning American establishment against their more orthodox brethren from Africa and Asia” (Wall Street Journal 1998). Indeed, the perception of African agency as central to Lambeth’s outcomes was so strong that scholar Philip Jenkins was actually inspired to take up and research his “Next Christianity” thesis (see chapter 9) after observing Lambeth 1998, at which, as he explains it, “African bishops created a stir by outvoting their Northern brethren on key moral issues” (Jenkins 2002:224).

**African views of Lambeth: A victory for the South**

The majority of Anglicans, clergy and lay, in Uganda seem to share similar views of Lambeth as the site of North/South conflict and, especially, of African victory. An editorial in the *New Vision* only a day after the passing of the sexuality resolution praised the role of African bishops in its passage. Nearly four years after Lambeth, many Ugandans and other Africans still describe the conference in similar terms. One Ugandan scholar described Lambeth1998 to me as “when the African bishops stood against homosexuality.” Similarly, a Rwandan priest described Lambeth to me as:

> A meeting in Canterbury where there was a dispute between African and Western bishops over homosexuality... [and] Africans were able to stand firm for [the] moral position, though some Western clergy and bishops were angry, even threatening an embargo on resources.

In these and many other examples, Ugandans describe Lambeth 1998 with great pleasure. The vision of Lambeth 1998 as a site of African victory is satisfying and pleasing to Ugandans—as is evident in the ways this interpretation is voiced and elaborated—because of the contrast between
the apparent strength of the African voice and presence in 1998, and at past Lambeth conferences. Marshall’s writings reveal the marginalization of Africans and other Southern Anglicans at past Lambeth conferences. Similarly, one African leader told me that at past Lambeths, African bishops have just “rubber-stamped” what the North was doing because they did not understand the procedures well enough to play an active role themselves. These dynamics began to shift at Lambeth 1988, but still Southern leaders did not play the prominent and determining roles they did in 1998. Ugandans’ and other Africans’ talk about the needfulness of pre-Lambeth preparatory meetings and resources like the FSC (see chapters 3 and 4) reveals a sense of past disempowerment which needed to be overcome. And many Ugandans, bishops present at Lambeth but also clergy and laity, spoke in various ways about the need for African bishops to know what is going on in the Anglican Communion and have their say in Communion affairs. No wonder, then, that the idea that Lambeth 1998 was a site of African triumph (over the liberal homosexual agenda, and also over procedural obfuscations that have limited African participation for decades) is so widely and favorably held in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa.

Lambeth 1998 was experienced by those who witnessed it through the newspapers’ coverage, as well as by those who were present, as the moment when African Anglicanism finally came into its own on a global stage—a triumphal moment indeed. The significance of this moment is underscored by the contrast between this image of Africa—faithful, strong, commanding—and the image of Africa as a place of perpetual crisis, the image often dominant in the Anglican Communion. The Anglican Communion’s official website, some time back, featured a handsome color image of Archbishop Carey holding a Rwandan child on his lap (Anglican Communion website 2000). (Only Carey was identified in the picture’s caption; I assume the child is Rwandan only because the file name for the image contains the word “rwanda”.) Whoever chose the picture probably felt it showed the Communion’s global scope and interdependence, but the
image is also overwhelmingly paternalistic, symbolically identifying Africa as a nameless child in the lap of the white, English man who represents the worldwide Anglican Communion. Is this typical or representative of the way Africa is seen and depicted by the largely white, Northern leadership of the worldwide Communion?

To look at the question of how Africa is seen in the larger Communion from one angle, I have been collecting headlines from the official Anglican Communion News Service (ANCS) concerning Africa or African nations for two years. I offer here a few examples. The Africa-related stories for June of 2002 were as follows: “Tutu leads formation of charity to aid farmers in Zimbabwe” (6/18/02); “Archbishop [of the Sudan] crosses [military] front-line to visit Nuba Mountains” (6/18/02); “Archbishop of Canterbury calls on governments of the G-8 countries to boost poverty reduction in Africa” (6/27/02); “Mission to AIDS orphans [in South Africa]” (6/30/02); “Filing of international legal claims for apartheid reparations” (6/30/02); and “Train accident in Tanzania” (6/30/02). In presenting such stories, the ACNS is fulfilling the goal of increasing awareness across the Communion of the needs of the Communion’s members who are most troubled by poverty, disease, and war. But from another point of view these stories perpetuate a familiar image of Africa as the perpetually troubled continent, rarely, if ever, the source of good news. Well might an ACNS subscriber be led to wonder, “Can anything good come out of Africa?”

As for Lambeth, Africans may have been playing unprecedented leadership roles in the Conference’s politics, but in the resolution texts Africa was treated in the same familiar ways. Nearly all the resolutions touching on Africa focus on the Africa-in-crisis trope, citing such problems as civil war and landmines in Uganda, the ‘exceptional circumstances’ associated with the Rwandan genocide, and the ‘human disaster in the Sudan.’

Thus African church leaders stepping forward to act on the global stage of the Anglican Communion do so against the backdrop of the widespread, overwhelming representation of Africa in Anglican publications (and elsewhere) as a site of constant crisis, a land of desperate
needs. The assertiveness and activism of African leaders at Lambeth and beyond should be seen in part as a rejection of this image of Africa defined only by need and crisis. While most Africans never see such ACNS headlines, they are well aware that the rest of the world tends to see Africa as a place of trouble, disease, and conflict. Part of the appeal of seeing Lambeth 1998 in terms of African triumph, then, lies in the way that interpretation runs against other images of Africa and holds up Africa, instead, as a bastion of morality and courage. Many Ugandans and other Africans, then, share the general idea that Lambeth 1998 was marked by Africans standing firm against Northern heterodoxy. And much the same view was widely articulated during and after Lambeth by Northern Anglicans—both those who do, and don’t, look favorably on the rising influence of Africans in the Anglican Communion, or, as one Ugandan consultant put it, those who do, and don’t, “take Africa seriously.”

“The New Xenophobia”: Liberal Constructions of Africa After Lambeth

Many Northern liberals and moderates reacted quite negatively to Lambeth’s results—and the role of Southern bishops in those outcomes. Philip Jenkins writes, “Western reactions to the sexuality statement can best be described as incomprehension mingled with sputtering rage” (Jenkins 2002:203). Immediately after the sexuality vote, discussions, explanations, and dissociations began on the part of bishops present at Lambeth who wanted to either soften the blow of the resolution by interpreting its meaning to their home dioceses, or felt obligated to explain why they had voted the way they did. ACNS features from shortly after the sexuality vote reveal liberal leaders struggling to recover their composure and restate their message of tolerance:

Though stunned by the vote, supporters of gays and lesbians pledged to continue to work for their full inclusion in the life of the church. At a press conference organized by the Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement immediately following the plenary session, several bishops shared their
disappointment. Primus Richard Holloway of Scotland said he "never felt this depressed and so close to tears in my life," but said he would continue his efforts as an advocate for gay and lesbian Anglicans. "I feel gutted, I feel betrayed, but the struggle will go on," he said. Bishop Duncan Buchanan, chair of the sexuality sub-section, insisted that "nobody's existing ministry will be invalidated by this development." [Skidmore 1998b]

Over 100 bishops (including the Primates of Brazil, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and Canada) signed a statement, released the day after the sexuality vote, which expressed their commitment to dialogue with gays and lesbians in the church:

Acknowledging the difficulty gays and lesbians have experienced in having their concerns heard at the conference, the bishops apologized for "any sense of rejection that has occurred because of this reality." "It is our deep concern that you not feel abandoned by your church and that you know of our continued respect and support." The bishops... called on Anglicans everywhere to continue in "prayerful, respectful conversation on the issue of homosexuality. [Skidmore 1998c]

This statement, entitled “A Pastoral Statement to Lesbian and Gay Anglicans from Some Member Bishops of the Lambeth Conference,” was eventually signed by around 180 bishops—far more than voted against the sexuality resolution.

Many bishops also wrote letters or otherwise communicated with their dioceses, either immediately after the sexuality debate or as soon as they got home. Some of these letters focused on explaining their votes on the resolution, especially if the bishop in question had abstained or voted for the sexuality resolution and feared negative reactions from the members of their dioceses. These explanations confirm the fact that some bishops who voted for the resolution did not agree with its general condemnation of homosexuality. These bishops were anxious to
reassure their flocks by making some public or quasi-public statement reaffirming their support for gays and lesbians in the church. Most such letters followed offered some explanation of how the sexuality resolution had come about, in the bishop’s own understanding, and what it would mean for the American diocese—generally, very little. Bishop Winterrowd of Colorado, who voted for the sexuality resolution, provides one example of after-the-fact apology and explanation. He told a reporter from his home diocese that he had made a “strictly pragmatic” decision to vote for the resolution: “Frankly, the African church needed that vote to take back with them.... They are under a great deal of pressure politically because the Muslims are watching” (Torkelson 1998). Explanation and an apologetic tone are also evident in a letter written by the suffragan bishop of the Diocese of North Carolina to Louie Crew, explaining his own vote: “My abstention was a vote for unity within diversity. I am sure that some will disagree with me and I honor that” (Gloster 1998).

While some bishops who voted for the resolution or abstained in the vote were apologetic, bishops who voted against it gave voice to anger at the resolution’s passage, and reassurance concerning its implications. A typical example of the tone of letters from those who voted against the resolution comes from the bishop and bishop coadjutor of a northeastern diocese: “We want to make it plain to the members of this Diocese, and especially to our gay and lesbian members, that the resolution passed at Lambeth will not change the character of our life together” (Grein and Sisk 1998). Bishop Catherine Roskam wrote, indignantly and reassuringly, to her gay and lesbian clergy:

    Do not identify a gaggle of bishops behaving badly as The Church....You are the church, an integral part of the Body of Christ. Period. .... I hope you will take comfort from...my love for you...and from the myriad others who stand in solidarity with us. Keep the faith. Stay the course. Say your prayers. We’re in this thing together. And God will prevail. [Roskam 1998]
This outpouring of episcopal epistles of explanation, apology, and reassurance testifies to the urgency with which many, probably most, Episcopal bishops felt they had to address and calm their constituents following the contentious events of Lambeth.

In talking about and analyzing the Lambeth sexuality resolution, many Northern moderate and liberal leaders also sought to find the silver lining in the resolution’s text. Bishop William Swing of the Diocese of California, in his Lambeth response letter to his diocese, wrote, “Ten years ago the slightest mention of homosexuality brought howls of protest from 98% of Lambeth. This time there were sizable numbers of bishops who could make sure that a livable compromise resolution was presented. There is every reason to believe that more progress will be made in the next decade before Lambeth 2008” (Swing 1998). Finally, the Presiding Bishop himself (who abstained from the sexuality vote) falls into this category of silver-lining-seekers:

The bishops of the Lambeth Conference ‘while rejecting homosexual practice as incompatible with Scripture’ also committed themselves ‘to listen to the experience of homosexual persons.’ The fruits of such listening, particularly in parts of the Anglican world where sexuality is seldom if ever publicly discussed, cannot be predicted, but it is a process to which the bishops of the Anglican Communion have obligated themselves. [Griswold 1998]

Northern moderates and liberals’ negative reactions to much of the content of the sexuality resolution, and the tone of the debate over homosexuality at the conference itself, put them in a difficult spot—due to the strong identification of the sexuality resolution with the historically-marginalized churches of the global South. Accustomed to seeing themselves as advocates for the marginalized (for example, on the international debt issue), Northern liberals and moderates struggled to come to terms with what many apparently experienced as a betrayal. Conservative activist Diane Knippers commented aptly in one post-Lambeth piece the discomfiture Lambeth caused for many Northern moderates and liberals.

One result [of Lambeth 1998] is dismay for those who long championed multiculturalism and Third World causes. Picture these liberal American bishops, who... once fancied themselves on the progressive edge of every noble cause. The ‘oppressed’ whose plight they so long championed have taken over
Northern liberals and moderates, in talking and writing about Lambeth 1998, often tried to excuse or explain away Southern bishops’ support for the sexuality resolution. As Diane Knippers noted, many apparently felt variously betrayed, dismayed, and perplexed by the vehemence of sentiment against Northern culture and Northern church leaders which was manifest at Lambeth. The South-versus-North dynamic many perceived at Lambeth was new and troubling. A sort of “Why do they hate us?” reaction quickly emerged. Bishop William Swing of the Diocese of California, in his Lambeth response letter to his diocese, tried to explain the African vote on sexuality using three ideas which were commonly cited by others as well:

1) Bishop Spong stirred the African bishops prior to Lambeth by making wide, sweeping generalizations about their ancestry and lack of sophistication. Although he apologized, they were out to make a point. It was as if he had whacked a beehive with a long stick.

2) The African bishops, as well as Pakistani, Indonesian, Malaysian, and others, are indeed facing great competition and persecution from radically militant Islam. Islam gains a big upper hand on the field of battle when Christians are seen in newspapers as supporting homosexuality.... [Southern leaders] wanted a blunt statement about scriptural references on the subject.

3) The Bishop of Dallas, James Stanton, heads up another unhappy-about-the-state-of-the-church Anglican group. He and his colleagues invested a lot of time, money, and recruiting energy in rallying troops around this amendment. They did their homework, and the fight on the floor was like a rugby match.

Swing thus explains the Southern bishops’ strong support of the sexuality resolution based, firstly, on the indignant assertiveness of the previously colonized, who will respond ferociously (beehive-like) to any slights which resonate with memories of past oppression. Other observers and commentators have offered similar explanations; I have several times heard Lambeth 1998 described by Episcopal leaders as “The Empire Strikes Back.” Bishop Hays Rockwell’s November, 1998, reflections on the sexuality debate included this observation: “The African and
Asian churches are quite freshly indigenous. Now nearly every African bishop is an African, and they are understandably eager to assert themselves in the presence of their former ‘masters’” (Rockwell 1998). Bishop Frederick Borsch of Los Angeles wrote, “There was... a measure of anti-colonialism still evident in the Communion. Likewise, Bishop Swing described the dynamics of the debate as “Black vs. White, Imperialists vs. The natives, North vs. South.” While these attributions of the strong anti-homosexuality sentiment at Lambeth 1998 to lingering post-colonial antagonisms do carry some negative evaluation of the Southern churches, they serve nonetheless to absolve the Southern churches of any fundamental blame. Southern bishops, this explanation posits, were reacting against a history of oppression, and cannot really be held responsible. In this view, the debate over sexuality at Lambeth 1998 wasn’t really about sexuality but about history and power—a conclusion easier to live with for Northern liberals than the alternative.

Swing’s other explanations, the salience of competition with Islam in many parts of Africa and Asia and the idea that African bishops were essentially bought out or won over by American conservatives, were also frequently voiced by other moderate and liberal leaders as ways of downplaying the significance of Southerners’ support for the sexuality resolution. Bishop Hays Rockwell, for example, observed, “Many of these bishops live in close quarters with growing Moslem populations, in which attitudes towards homosexuality are punitive. It is clear that some of the voting was influenced by that fact.” As for the influence of Northern conservatives, Scottish primate Richard Holloway was outspoken about this idea: “There was a lot of American money from a very traditionalist diocese and a lot of entertaining of bishops from the two-thirds world [the global South]” (Scotsman 1998). One liberal Episcopalian compiled a list of “Nine Reasons Why the Lambeth Resolution Has Little Credibility,” including this point:

The influence of the American Anglican Council and its affiliates was enormous. They produced mountains of paper the bishops received nearly
every day. They paid for a major pre-Conference meeting of African bishops. They held seminars and barbecues throughout the Conference. Their Executive Director described their work as “facilitative.” [Hopkins 1998]

Such explanations were a way to attribute the outcomes of Lambeth to the familiar enemies whom many Northern liberals and moderates felt to have been deeply involved in bringing them about. Most Northern liberals and moderates who proposed this explanation probably simply did not realize how condescending and belittling it might sound to many Southerners. All of these arguments—postcolonial/racial antagonisms, competition with Islam, and Northern conservative influence—represent liberal and moderate efforts, more or less successful, to excuse Southern leaders for siding with the enemy, Northern dissidents. These explanations offered Northern moderates and liberals a way out of the double-bind of seeking to include one historically-marginalized group (homosexuals) and running into head-on conflict with the expressed convictions of another historically-marginalized group (Southern Anglicans).

However, not all Northern liberals and moderates tried to excuse Southern Anglicans; some, instead, gave vent to hostility towards Southern Anglicans, offering varying explanations and commentaries on why Southern bishops held such un-progressive views and why such views should not influence the wider Communion or the Episcopal Church. Many explanations of the sexuality vote posited that Southern Christian leaders’ lack of education, sophistication, or thoughtfulness as the prime causal factors (Thrall 2000:20). The former Bishop of Durham, David Jenkins, was quoted as stating:

[Lambeth] has voted to face the moral issues of the 21st century on the basis of an unreflective return to the traditions of the 16th and 17th. Those who are more moved by fear than full of faith, together with Third World bishops who have not yet faced up to irreversible developments in biblical, historical and scientific criticism, have prevailed. [Christian Challenge 1998a]

The Rev. Martin Smith, SSJE, who attended Lambeth as an observer, labeled the Southern
churches as “appallingly repressive authoritarian societies... which do not allow even the concept of gay and lesbian people, patriarchies that have no way of admitting into consciousness the realities we know here” (Smith 1998). Smith goes on to attribute some of this division to a gap in training and subtlety of understanding:

   Anglicans have always claimed that truth emerges from a strenuous process of intelligent reflection and interpretation of scripture and tradition. But... literally hundreds of bishops in the newly expanded churches have had no more theological education than a few months of bible school, and the only form of discourse they know is a very simple form of biblical literalism. [Smith 1998]

Bishop Frederick Borsch of Los Angeles hinted at a lack of sophistication and wisdom in Southern bishops’ approaches to Scripture, and described the tone of the sexuality debate at Lambeth 1998 as “the new xenophobia” (Borsch 1998). In sum, many liberal-leaning Northern bishops and other Lambeth observers attributed Southern support for the sexuality resolution at least in part to a lack of critical thought and sensitive judgment, an unexamined patriarchalism, and an insufficient level of education and sophistication among Southern bishops and other church leaders.

   One conservative commentator, referring to accusations that conservative Northerners bought the loyalties of Southern leaders, wrote, “These exemplars of liberal arrogance are so convinced of their moral superiority that they really believe anyone opposing them must either be stupid or cynical” (C. Moore 1998). While Moore’s remarks are obviously hostile criticism, the ample evidence of quotations like those given here also make it difficult to dismiss. The tone and implications of many of the remarks hint at some very negative thinking about the Southern church on the part of some Northern liberals and moderates. I stress that my intent in offering these examples is not to single out any of those quoted here for criticism, for these ideas were widely shared and widely expressed; and they represent a real struggle with the painful experience of Lambeth and with the post-Lambeth situation of the Episcopal Church and the
Anglican Communion. In such remarks and in many other ways after Lambeth 1998, American Episcopal liberals and moderates were giving voice to their fear, anger, and sense of alienation from the Southern church, for whom they had previously seen themselves as advocates.

**Northern conservatives praise Southern role in sexuality vote**

Northern conservatives, not surprisingly, were much more positive in their reactions to the sexuality vote. The Northern conservatives who had been involved in lobbying for the sexuality resolution, or who hoped for such an outcome, initially joined the secular press in crediting Southern leaders with the victory for the conservative side. *United Voice*’s piece on the debate was entitled “Africans Strengthen Sexuality Resolution” (LeBlanc 1998g). The conservative British paper, the *Church Times*, described the sexuality debate this way:

> During the homosexuality debate, the Southern axis was fully in control. They had managed to get the original motion changed, and extracted an apology from Bishop Duncan Buchanan for not consulting properly. They had done a deal early that Wednesday morning with Dr Carey to secure his support for the Archbishop of Tanzania’s amendment that homosexual practice was contrary to scripture. In return, they calmly let several amendments fall. They successfully fought off a wrecking procedural motion. They scored a couple of bonus points, closing a possible loophole for the liberals; and they swung a convincing majority of the bishops behind the final resolution, preventing the sort of split vote that would have undermined the result. If they had managed to keep Bishop Chukwuma away from Richard Kirker and the cameras, it would have been a day of unalloyed triumph. By every reckoning, it was a pivotal moment in the life of the Anglican Communion. The Provinces in the South have been numerically stronger than those in the North for many years, but until now the political power and influence have stayed where the money is.
Robert Stowe England, another conservative Episcopal journalist, wrote (in reference to the sexuality subsection’s refusal to hear gay and lesbian Christian testimonies):

> The homosexual agenda, championed here feverishly by the controversial Bishop John Spong of Newark, N.J., ran into a brick wall of resistance from African and Asian bishops, who called on Spong and his supporters to repent of their support of homosexuality, which has been regarded as a sinful practice since the earliest days of Christianity. [England 1998c]

Another commentary illustrates Northern conservatives’ joyful heralding of the shift of world Christian power to the global South:

> While it is still too soon to fully assess the consequences of this signal victory for apostolic faith and morals [the passage of the sexuality resolution], it does seem clearly to indicate that the center of gravity for the Anglican Churches has shifted away from the confused churches and social decadence of the First World and toward the often suffering and vibrant churches of what is now being called the Two-thirds World. The churches of Africa and Asia have experienced such vigorous growth that the absurdly over-represented American Church is no longer able to control the agenda. [C. Moore 1998]

The American Anglican Council’s newsletter Encompass, in its August 1998 issue, offers further examples of this language of global shift and the rise of the South, in a front-page letter from its president, Dallas bishop James Stanton: “Last September in Dallas, Stephen Noll... urged the forty Third World bishops gathered there: ‘The handwriting is on the wall. Please spell it out for us....’ On August 5 they did just that when they passed a strong, clear Resolution on Human Sexuality.” Stanton also refers to “the determination of the Third World bishops on this issue [homosexuality]”. He concludes, “I think this Conference will be known as the moment when the voice of the ‘South,’ i.e., the Two-Thirds World Anglicans, became the voice of the
Communion” (Stanton 1998). Richard Kew similarly observed,

The Anglican Communion has been altered forever. *Anglicans are the first worldwide family of Christians in which the baton of leadership has passed to the younger, dynamic churches of the global South.* The older provinces might still have more than their fair share of material resources, but it is the churches of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, who are now easing themselves into the driver's seat. From here on out, they will be the ones primarily shaping the agenda. [Kew 1998, emphasis added]

Finally, Diane Knippers of Five Talents and the Institute for Religion and Democracy wrote for the *Weekly Standard* in early September:

What Westerners on the right and left are learning is that Anglicanism has been geographically and demographically transformed. Today's statistically typical Anglican is not drinking tea in an English vicarage. She is a 26-year-old African mother of four. The largest Anglican church is in Nigeria. The Western churches were vastly overrepresented at Lambeth; Stephen Noll of Trinity seminary near Pittsburgh noted that the average American bishop represented up to 10,000 lay men and women, the average Nigerian bishop up to 200,000. Despite the imbalance, the orthodox Anglicanism espoused by Africans, Asians, and South Americans carried the day at Lambeth. The center of Anglicanism is now in the southern hemisphere. [Knippers 1998b]

‘The voice of the South becomes the voice of the Communion’?

Thus in the days and weeks following the Lambeth Conference, Northern conservatives made much of what David Virtue described as the “African/Asian juggernaut” which had successfully passed the resolution and thus trounced the heterodox Northern relativists. But soon the discourse shifted to describing the vote in more global terms. As two conservative commentators wrote in early 1999:

While Lambeth revealed that the strength of Anglicanism does now lie in the ‘global South’—Africa, Asia, and Latin America—further analyses found that *most western bishops had voted with global South prelates on the sexuality resolution, making it a genuine expression of the Anglican common mind....* Lambeth’s results vindicated the claim of conservative [Episcopal] bishops that they—not liberal revisionist American leaders—represent the Anglican mainstream. [Traycik and Virtue 1999:8, emphasis added]
Another piece in the same issue of the *Christian Challenge* made the point even more strongly. A short article entitled, “Sex Resolution Didn’t Need Africans, Bishop Says,” analyses a piece written for the *Living Church* by Bishop Herbert Thompson Jr. of Southern Ohio. The *Christian Challenge* article explains that Thompson’s analysis “further combats the notion that African Anglican bishops were solely or chiefly responsible for the adoption of the Lambeth Conference’s orthodox sexuality resolution”:

Further analysis [of the vote on the sexuality resolution] indicates that if all the African bishops had been present and voted ‘no,’ with 45 abstentions, the resolution still would have passed by a vote of 302-294. The Africans did not do it! We did it. The resolution represents the mind of the Anglican Communion as expressed by the bishops of the Communion around the world. [Traycik 1999a:17, emphasis added]

When Bishop Stanton, quoted above, stated that the voice of the South had become the voice of the Communion, he most likely meant that the voice of the South was being newly privileged and heeded in the Communion. But his words proved prophetic in a different way, for in Northern conservative discourse following Lambeth, an emphasis on the voice of the South was quickly displaced by discourse describing Lambeth as the voice of the whole Anglican Communion.

This shift from describing Lambeth as primarily a North/South confrontation to a site for the formation of world Anglican opinion can also be read in Stephen Noll’s analysis of the Lambeth Conference, published in 2000. Noll casts the sexuality vote as mere ‘individuals’ voting against the resolution and against the entire Anglican Communion, who supported it: “While individual bishops voted against the resolution, *the official position of the Anglican Communion* is a clear and unequivocal reaffirmation of the biblical teaching” (Noll 2000a:35). Noll’s statement, as well as the Thompson argument quoted from the *Christian Challenge* above, illustrate a key aspect of Northern conservatives’ discourse about the global Communion. This was the idea that
the Lambeth sexuality vote represented the view of a *global orthodox Anglican majority*. The strong vote in favor of the sexuality resolution at Lambeth convinced Northern conservatives that they had the support of a doctrinally-orthodox Anglican majority which was ready and willing to hold the American Episcopal Church and other errant provinces accountable to Lambeth’s decisions. Furthermore, this imagined global orthodox majority became a central feature of scale-making arguments and conservative discourse urging Episcopal Church leaders and members to take seriously the Lambeth resolution on sexuality. In the same piece just quoted, interpreting the sexuality resolution, Stephen Noll presents one example of such an argument:

> The Lambeth Conference cannot force member churches to conform, but the resolution was clearly intended to be heeded and responded to...[The bishops of the Communion]... expect the leaders of the Episcopal Church to answer to the formulation of Anglican teaching in this resolution. *Ultimately, they are calling for conformity.* [Noll 2000a:34-35]

The threat behind that expectation of conformity, the power to enforce or punish, remains undefined or at least unstated here. But the description of a worldwide majority of Anglican bishops watching closely for the American church to comply with the Lambeth sexuality resolution is intended to give authority to Noll’s call for the American church to change its policies on homosexuality. In many other conservative sources in the post-Lambeth period, the discourse of a watchful orthodox majority waiting upon the American church’s reformation was used similarly in an effort to lend persuasive weight to conservatives’ arguments that the sexuality resolution should be taken seriously in the American church.

Philip Jenkins, writing about the tendency of conservative Northerners to project their hopes and desires onto Southern Christianity, observes, “These [conservative American] observers [of the Southern church] echo the hopes of George Canning, the British statesman who looked at the newly independent Latin America of the 1820s and declared that ‘I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the old’” (Jenkins 2002:202). In what sense were conservative
Northerners, in their talk about an orthodox global Anglican majority, ‘calling a new world into existence?’ Does this global orthodox majority exist, or is it a happy dream of Northern conservatives? A wider discussion of this question must wait on subsequent chapters of this text, and an answer to the question must wait upon subsequent chapters of the Communion’s life, as it remains to be seen whether a majority of Southern bishops will finally rally around Northern conservatives and re-create the Communion on the basis of orthodox understandings of Biblical morality. But it is clear, in many respects, that in making statements such as those quoted above, conservative Episcopalians were as much constructing or imagining a global Anglican orthodox majority, as aligning themselves with some existing entity approximating that description.

The global majority to which conservatives’ discourse referred was not created out of whole cloth, but based upon the seemingly strong evidence of the 526-70 vote for the orthodox sexuality resolution at Lambeth 1998. However, this vote provides only a limited warrant for imagining such a global majority. In the first place, conservatives argued that the vote indicated the existence of a lasting, cohesive majority in agreement on key issues like homosexuality. This argument, however, assumes that all the bishops would have voted as they did even if the determination of the political trajectory of the whole Conference had not been so clear. Various bishops’ accounts of why they voted as they did suggest that many bishops voted for (or did not vote against)82 this resolution precisely because it was evident it was going to pass anyway, and because passing this resolution (which had a few softening clauses) was preferable in the minds of many than rejecting it and facing the possibility that a much sterner anti-homosexuality resolution would be passed by a smaller majority.83 In short, the overwhelming 526 votes for the sexuality resolution did not represent a lasting, solid orthodox bloc, but the summation of the votes of individuals who for various reasons felt it best to vote for this resolution. It is probable that a majority of Anglican bishops at Lambeth 1998 did support the passage of a resolution advising all provinces against the ordination of non-celibate gays and lesbians and the blessing of
same-sex unions; but this majority may have been both narrower and less vehement than the vote for the sexuality resolution suggests.

Further, Northern conservative discourse also implies that this majority is ‘orthodox’—that is, committed to evangelical understandings of Biblical doctrine and morality (see chapter 2)—in some generalized and lasting way. Again, this idea represents an interpretation of the events of Lambeth, rather than a reality implicit in those events. Even at Lambeth, the overwhelming success of an essentially liberal approach to international debt issues shows that there was no solid orthodox bloc which could be depended upon to support Northern conservatives’ views. And as I have argued elsewhere, Northern liberal/conservative positions and distinctions simply do not correspond with the salient political issues and the ways they are understood to cluster into parties in Ugandan church and society, for example. The fact that a majority of Southern bishops shared the Northern conservative position on human sexuality does not, therefore, mean that the same majority would support other Northern conservative beliefs and concerns across the board.

These qualifications notwithstanding, the discourse of a global orthodox majority was apparently effective, since Episcopal liberals and moderates tended to argue for their province’s freedom to ignore the will of such a majority rather than questioning its existence. American conservatives’ shift from describing the Lambeth sexuality vote as a Southern victory to a global victory was a discursive shift that strengthened arguments urging the Episcopal Church to change its policies. Many Episcopal Church leaders had already proven themselves willing to write off or disregard African Anglican opinion, but might find ignoring global opinion at least a bigger challenge. Failing that (and by early in 1999, it was clear that there would be no significant change in policy in the Episcopal Church in response to Lambeth 1998), the discourse of global majority served the goal of recruiting conservative-leaning Episcopal laity, clergy, and congregations to join First Promise or other conservative organizations in seeking alternate paths
to maintaining an orthodox Anglican presence on American soil. Joining such an organization with a sense that it was backed and supported by a majority of Anglican bishops worldwide was, by the testimony of various members of these organizations, a much more appealing prospect than joining such an organization when it appeared to be out on a limb, challenging the American church without a global safety net of sympathizers and supporters.

Interestingly, though Northern conservatives and their African allies continued to share the agenda of changing the Episcopal Church’s liberal policies, this shift to a globalist discourse represents a revealing difference between Northern conservatives and African Anglicans. As discussed above, Ugandan Anglicans and other Africans I interviewed still describe Lambeth 1998 using the language of African victory, a language which resonates with their past experiences of marginalization and present concerns about adequate and favorable representation of the African church in the worldwide Anglican Communion. American conservatives, however, rapidly moved away from that language of African victory after Lambeth, apparently mistrusting Africa’s persuasive power, in favor of talk about a global consensus. This shift served Americans’ primary desire to challenge and persuade Episcopal leaders and laity, while for Ugandans and other Africans, maintaining the African-triumph interpretation of Lambeth maintains their sense of the importance of their churches and leaders on a world stage. Both African and American constituencies still share a positive view of the outcome of Lambeth and the strong involvement of African Anglicans in Anglican Communion affairs. Indeed, American conservatives frequently praise African Anglicans and hold them up as moral exemplars in other contexts. Their shift to global language in describing Lambeth did not by any means imply a rejection of Africa as a site and source of moral authority (as chapter 7 will amply demonstrate), but merely a shift to an apparently more powerful discourse. The difference between Africans’ and Americans’ talk about Lambeth has had no negative consequences in terms of relations between these constituencies. Nonetheless it is significant, revealing in one clear example the
reality I have tried to convey in other cases: that these constituencies, though united enough on certain key issues and perspectives to constitute a momentous movement within world Anglicanism, are grounded in very different realities, motivations, and concerns.

American conservatives’ use of global language in describing the import of Lambeth 1998, and the potential consequences of the Episcopal Church’s disregard thereof, illustrates an important development: the evolution of a conservative Episcopal global vision. In the remainder of this chapter, I will describe this conservative globalism more fully, contrasting it with the more familiar liberal/moderate globalism which represented the other side in the grand ongoing debate over what it meant, exactly, to be a truly global Anglican Communion.

**Competing Definitions of Global Communion**

In recent years, both the scholarly community and the general public have given increased attention to conservative religious movements which are worldwide in their scope and orientation. Yet observers and commentators on such global conservative movements tend to treat their globalism as if it were merely a rhetoric or veneer over an underlying reactionary anti-globalism. In the theoretical literature, conservative religious movements are often explained as a form of retreat from the radical openness and interconnectedness of the global, postmodern world, into various faith-based fundamentalisms or, at least, parochialisms. Sociologist Manuel Castells argues, in *The Power of Identity*, that Christian fundamentalism (which he defines very broadly to include evangelicalism) is essentially a reactive movement responding to the crisis of patriarchalism and “the threat of globalization,” which causes people to “[yearn] for the security of traditional values and institutions rooted in God’s eternal truth” (Castells 1997:21, 25). As Castells sees it, Christian fundamentalism “seems to be an attempt to reassert control over life...in direct response to uncontrollable processes of globalization that are increasingly sensed in the economy and in the media” (Castells 1997:26). Peter Beyer, in his book *Religion and Globalization*, likewise identifies the conservative religious response to globalization as a sort of
retrenchment, a reaction against the relativization of identities:

In a global social environment that is generally corrosive of group cultural boundaries and that therefore encourages religio-moral pluralism,...
[conservatives seek] to gain control over a limited territory dominated by the particular culture and then control pluralism within it. [Beyer 1994:92]

He argues that the goals of the American religious right, for example, include “limit[ing] the inclusive tendencies of the global system by asserting the exclusive validity of a particular group culture” (Beyer 1994:114).

Scholars such as Castells and Beyer do not argue that conservative religion is the antithesis of globalization; both argue, though along different lines, that these conservative religious responses to globalization actually reflect the forces and forms of globalization. But these scholars, and many others who deal with these issues in depth or in passing, assume that the content of such conservative religious movements will be essentially anti-globalist, especially opposing the increased exposure to difference and the relativizing or ‘corrosion’ of extant group identities which are widely agreed to accompany globalization. Reflecting this widespread assumption that conservative religious movements are essentially anti-globalist, the vast majority of scholarly literature examining transnational or globalizing movements focuses on movements on the left, such as the environmental and feminist movements. Yet the transnational Anglican movement developing at Lambeth, and still active today, is both explicitly conservative and explicitly globalist — conservative in its strong assertion of the normativity of conservative social and moral positions which are understood as deriving directly from a literal reading of Scripture; and globalist in both its transnational scope and its vision of the Anglican Communion’s ideal character. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine this conservative global vision as it emerged in the talk and writing of American and other Northern conservative Anglicans in the wake of the Lambeth Conference of 1998.

“Global Communion” was a key vocabulary through which much of the concerted work on
difference, identity, and community before and during Lambeth 1998 took place. But this vocabulary could be used in very different ways by Anglicans and Episcopalians contending over the character and direction of the Anglican Communion. A close reading of sources from Lambeth and the period immediately following the Conference reveals the emergence of two main competing understandings of Anglican globalness, of what the globalness to which the Communion should aspire looks like. Many Anglicans endorsed what I will call here *diversity globalism*, founded on principles of tolerating diversity within a federation of loosely-unified Anglican provinces. At the same time, other Anglicans, especially conservative Northerners, articulated a vision of the Anglican Communion founded on what I refer to as *accountability globalism*—the idea that the dawning global era calls the Anglican Communion to a clearer identity, tighter doctrinal control, and more accountability between provinces.

**Diversity globalism**

Moderate and liberal Anglican Communion leaders shaped the events of Lambeth 1998 to uphold a particular vision of global Communion, characterized by acceptance of and engagement across differences of culture, experience, and belief. Similar visions of globalness, founded on ideas of multiculturalism and unity in diversity, has become quite mainstream in most Northern societies, and to a significant extent in many Southern societies as well. This vision of globalism—what, adapting Audrey Kobayashi’s term, might be called a sort of ‘red-boots globalism’—posits the encounter with difference (differences of culture and experience are usually emphasized) as beneficial in and of itself. Indeed, the innate value of such encounters is often described as the central, motivating good to be obtained from striving for unity across difference. Thus in this vision, diversity is the primary focus, while the unity which encompasses all that diversity often consists in nothing more clearly-defined than fellow-feeling and community goodwill. Moderate and liberal Anglican leaders add a theological aspect to this humanist value of engagement with diversity; as one priest I know puts it, humans know God
more fully in the encounter with other humans who are different from themselves.

The high value placed upon diversity within community by Anglican Communion leaders is easily read in the statements of many bishops and others describing Lambeth, and using the vocabulary of globalness or other, related terms: world-wide, multicultural, local, diverse. Speaking at Lambeth 1998, Archbishop Carey expressed the idea that diversity contributes to the greater unity:

I have often said, jokingly of course, to those provinces influenced by the English church in the last century: 'Be less English! Be more African or Asian or South American. Let your own tradition, music and ways of devotion enrich your life! ... By empowering and celebrating the local, we enrich the whole.

[Stammer 1998a]

James Thrall observed of Lambeth 1998, “At the risk of gross simplification, liberal forces at Lambeth seemed at times to seek... an acceptance of plural viewpoints and practices, without wanting to engage in the conflictual power relations that would seriously address the challenges those practices posed for each other” (Thrall 2000:21). This liberal/moderate Anglican globalism, then, lifts up a model of globalness as diversity in unity, unity in diversity, in which each party brings their culture, their experience, their perspective to the common table in a grand global sharing, and each party is enriched and broadened (though not, usually, seriously challenged, unsettled, or changed) by hearing each other’s stories. Within the terms of this global vision or ideal, each Anglican province is an autonomous and unique entity; these autonomous bodies gather into a whole as equals; and every perspective contributes equally to the collective sharing and truth-seeking.85

Following Lambeth, many understood the conflicts and tensions which had characterized the Conference as related to a struggle over globalness. Ian Douglas wrote shortly after Lambeth, “[At Lambeth 1998] for the first time ever, the Anglican Communion has had to face head-on the radical multicultural reality of a global Christian community” (Douglas 2003a:25-26). As
Douglas’s phrasing hints, the liberal/moderate diversity globalism just described was profoundly challenged by the events of Lambeth. Having come to Lambeth 1998 with a vision of a global Communion characterized by the sharing and affirmation of cultural and experiential diversity, many bishops and observers left the Conference feeling that the values of diversity and globalness had not been fully lived out, or had even been betrayed, by the Conference’s events. The multicultural liturgies had been colorful and joyful, the cross-cultural small group discussions had been warm and broadening, but still the Anglican Communion gathered at Lambeth had failed to affirm and celebrate the diversity of its churches’ cultures. Many liberals and moderates from Northern provinces where homosexuality is more or less tacitly accepted were shocked by the vote on the sexuality resolution. They expressed profound anger and hurt, feeling doubly betrayed. Not only had the global South turned upon their Northern liberal and moderate would-be allies, as they experienced it, but Northern liberal leaders felt that their core ideal of affirming diversity within the global Communion had been rejected.

Many Northern liberals perceived an attitude of acceptance towards homosexuals as their cultural contribution to the global diversity of the Anglican Communion. Few had realistically expected the passing of any resolution which would affirm the acceptance of homosexuality throughout the Communion, but many did expect, or at least hope, to have their views heard and tolerated—just as they saw themselves, as good diversity globalists, hearing and tolerating others’ culturally-informed views. The bishops of New York, in a statement issued soon after Lambeth, state quite explicitly that their experience with the issue of homosexuality constitutes their cultural witness to the rest of the Communion:

What we encountered... in the debate over [the sexuality] resolution was a profound clash of cultural assumptions.... As Bishops in New York, we feel that we can offer Christians elsewhere in this global Communion an opportunity to hear voices that they have not heard before. We can give
personal testimony to our own experiences of ministry with gay and lesbian people. [Grein and Sisk 1998]

This statement expresses hope that a process of inter-cultural dialogue on this and other issues will continue; these hopes implicitly reflect the fact that many liberal American bishops felt that their views were not accepted or treated with respect at Lambeth. When Bishop Frederick Borsch’s phrase, “the new xenophobia,” expresses this idea that Northern conservatives and Southern bishops have refused to hear the voices of those who differed from them in their views on sexual orientation, and therefore have behaved xenophobically (Borsch 1998). When the sexuality resolution conclusively rejected the views of Northern liberals, they experienced this as not only a political defeat, but a betrayal of what they deeply believed the Communion should be.

Given the Conference’s perceived rejection of the diversity globalist value of inclusiveness, it became all the more important for these Anglicans and Episcopalians to affirm the diversity globalist value of autonomy. Starting immediately after the sexuality vote, and lasting over the next year, a strong chorus of American voices emerged saying, “This resolution doesn’t affect us!” Many remarked upon the fact that Lambeth resolutions are non-binding, and thus that their effect in any given province depends on that province’s decision to abide by the resolution or not, was frequently remarked upon. Many liberal American leaders stressed the Anglican tradition of provincial autonomy, in writing or speaking about Lambeth. For example, Bishop William Swing of the Diocese of California wrote a letter to his diocese, which began, “Dear Friends, The most important thing to know about the resolution on homosexuality passed at the 1998 Lambeth is that it is not binding. It only ‘advises.’” Thus the Diocese of California and its bishop are duly advised but nothing will change in our practice” (Swing 1998). The current Integrity leadership, likewise, were quick to reassure their members and allies that the “issue of reception” would work in their favor, in a statement issued immediately after the vote.
The chances of this resolution’s positive reception by the majority of US Episcopalians are slim to none. And since this resolution is only advisory, expressing the mind of those bishops present at this particular Conference, such reception is absolutely necessary to its authority. The life of the Church in the US is not going to come to a halt because bishops from other parts of the world refused to even listen to the stories of their gay and lesbian brothers and sisters and even denied their existence. [Ellis and Hopkins 1998]

The stances of many Episcopal bishops were further formalized over the next year, as a significant number of Episcopal dioceses passed resolutions in response to Lambeth at their annual diocesan conventions. Such resolutions usually officially distanced that diocese from the more condemning language of the resolution. It is an interesting irony that, following Lambeth 1998, “No jurisdiction!” should have become the slogan of American liberals, because “No Jurisdiction!” was once the rallying cry of American conservative dissidents, bent on resisting and defying Episcopal bishops whom they saw as revisionist and heretical. Disinviting a ‘revisionist’ bishop from his annual parish visitation, refusing to pay the diocese the customary yearly support sum from the parish’s budget, and other forms of ecclesiastical civil disobedience have long served as common ‘weapons of the weak’ for conservative dissident parishes in the U.S. For example, at St. Timothy’s, where I did my U.S. fieldwork, relations with their bishop had been strained for several years before their break from their Episcopal diocese. At one point the rector of St. Timothy’s wrote to the bishop, explaining that all the young adults in the confirmation class which the rector was teaching had decided that they did not want the bishop to confirm them, and so there was really no need for the bishop to come down to St. Timothy’s for his scheduled visit and confirmation service. Such actions represent more or less overt assertions that leaders whose convictions differ from those of the parish are not welcome and have no authority there. Conservatives went into Lambeth prepared to carry on with such separatist tactics by breaking the Anglican Communion, if the vote on sexuality did not come out in their favor. Some African
bishops, too, told me they had come into Lambeth ready to walk out and split the Communion, if necessary. Such a split would have represented the ultimate in denying jurisdiction: the formation of a separate orthodox ‘Anglican Communion’, independent of heterodox and revisionist Anglican leaders who might lead the worldwide flock astray.

However, as Lambeth progressed and its direction became increasingly clear, some Northern liberals became concerned that there might be a move towards empowering Communion authorities to impose policies upon their provinces. A few moderate and liberal church leaders, especially following the sexuality vote, even raised the possibility that a liberal schism might occur, with liberal provinces breaking from the wider Communion. David Virtue noted this growing tendency in the talk of liberals at Lambeth, though he is apparently unconscious of the historical irony of how recently separatism had been a conservative Episcopalian strategy: “A new word is being heard to describe former liberals and revisionists. It is Separatist, says a thoughtful observer of the Lambeth scene. The opposite of separatism is unity, which is what we are all striving for” (Virtue 1998a). By the end of Lambeth, then, it was no longer conservatives, but liberals and some moderates in the North who were crying “No jurisdiction!”

**Autonomy and accountability in the Anglican Community**

The interconnected issues of autonomy, unity, and authority have been growing concerns in the Anglican Communion for some years. The Communion’s leaders and member provinces have increasingly grappled with questions such as the nature of the Communion’s unity, how much autonomy is permissible within that unity, and who or what has the authority to establish and police the limits. The Anglican Communion possesses four ‘Instruments of Unity’, charged with the work of maintaining and managing the Communion’s common life: the Primates (or provincial head bishops), as gathered in their periodic consultative meetings; the Archbishop of Canterbury; the Lambeth Conference itself; and the Anglican Consultative Council, a body of bishops, priests, and laity from around the world who help run the Communion between
As the Communion grows ever more diverse and complicated, the pressure on these Instruments of Unity increases and the uncertainty of the Anglican Communion’s authority structures becomes more problematic. In a sermon given in the months before Lambeth, Archbishop Carey outlined the fuzziness and potential paradox of international Anglican polity: “We are not a monolithic church which dictates to our members precisely what shall and shall not be the package of faith. But nor are we simply a collection of independent churches, doing what we will regardless of the effect we have on others” (Solheim 1999b:35). Between those two poles of fully centralized authority and full autonomy lies a great deal of gray area. As the Communion’s churches—and interactions among its churches—grow, and more and more controversial questions of faith, morals, and culture demand its attention, Anglican leaders around the world increasingly feel pressure either to define more clearly the nature of Anglican unity—how exactly its provinces are in relationship, and to what degree they are mutually accountable; or else, to defend the gray area, which many see as representing the great Anglican tradition of diversity within unity.

At Lambeth 1998, those pressures and concerns resulted in the passing of several resolutions dealing with matters of authority and autonomy in the Anglican Communoin. Several seemed to reassure Northern liberals, who were eager to protect provincial autonomy. The first of these essentially stated that each province should have discretion on the issue of women’s ordination, implying a concept of the Anglican Communion as a loosely-defined federation characterized by mutual regard and concern, rather than by any authoritative establishment of standards or policies. Another resolution also seemed to warn against the further centralization of authority within world Anglicanism, by affirming the principle of “subsidiarity” as fundamental to Anglican polity, meaning that Anglican polity includes a predisposition against giving any central authoritative body powers to do things which can be done effectively by the provinces, dioceses, or churches of the Communion (Solheim 1999b:261). A third resolution dealing with
authority issues at Lambeth 1998 reaffirmed the integrity of diocesan boundaries, and was proposed by the North American bishops. Given the recent events in Arkansas, where Rwandan bishop John Rucyahana had claimed jurisdiction over St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, American bishops were eager to have Lambeth reaffirm the authority of a bishop over his or her own diocese; the successful passing of this resolution caused some discomfiture to American conservatives. These three resolutions, then, seemed to indicate a trend in the direction of affirming autonomy and clear boundaries within the Anglican Communion.

Negative statements about the African and other Southern churches, quoted above, show that affirming the Communion’s cultural diversity was not uppermost in the minds of Northern moderates and liberals after Lambeth. Instead, the element of autonomy implicit in diversity globalism received considerable attention and affirmation. Both the drafting and passing of the three Lambeth resolutions just described, and the passage of a series of resolutions in American dioceses articulating dissociation from the content of the Lambeth sexuality resolution, represented moderate/liberal Anglican and Episcopalian projects of asserting autonomy as a key Anglican value and structural principle, affirming the freedom of culture and conscience of the Communion’s member provinces and their constituent dioceses. In their post-Lambeth talk and actions, liberal and moderate bishops and other church leaders insisted that if the worldwide Anglican Communion would not fully welcome diversity, at least it would not also impose conformity.

**Accountability globalism**

Most American conservatives were convinced by the events of Lambeth, if not before, that the global scale, the worldwide Anglican Communion, was indeed relevant to their struggles within the Episcopal Church. After all, looked at from the point of view of the national Episcopal Church, they were an embattled minority; but from the point of view of the worldwide
Communion, widely-publicized events like the Dallas Conference and the sexuality vote at Lambeth gave American conservatives a sense of solidarity with a worldwide majority of like-minded Anglicans. During Lambeth, Doug LeBlanc wrote, “Orthodox Anglicans in the North, exhausted as they sometimes are, know in their souls that they stand with the vast body of orthodox Christians in the Worldwide Anglican Communion” (LeBlanc 1998b).

Conservative commentators made it clear that they felt their international support strengthened them in their arguments with the Episcopal Church, arguing that the “global shift” of world Christianity to the “suffering and vibrant” churches of the Third World means that American conservatives and traditionalists are on the “moral high ground” when they stand up to the Episcopal Church’s leadership (C. Moore 1998). Thinking and talking in terms of the global scale was clearly both comforting, and rhetorically advantageous, for American conservatives. The discursive work before them, following Lambeth, was to insist on the relevance of the global scale—that is, the applicability of Lambeth’s outcomes—to the rest of the Episcopal Church, its liberal and moderate majority.

In the weeks and months following Lambeth 1998, American and other Northern conservatives built upon the victory in the sexuality debate to elaborate an alternative vision of global Communion, in opposition to the liberal/moderate multiculturalist globalism which they described as relativist and profoundly threatening to authentic Christianity. The conservative global vision is founded on the conviction that Christian doctrine and morals can be clearly read from Scripture and should be normative for all the world’s Anglican churches, and indeed all Christians. But far from being some reactionary retreat from an increasingly complex global social context into some narrow and protective Biblicism, this conservative vision is global in its reliance on the support of a worldwide Anglican majority, as already described, in its perspective on Scripture, and in its ideal of global interdependence and mutual accountability.

One key element of this conservative Anglican globalism is a global perspective on Scriptural
truth. These conservative globalists reject the liberal idea that tolerance of homosexuality is a cultural value which is compatible with some readings of the Bible. Rather, they assert that the Bible provides clear standards for sexual morality, as for other issues, and that these Biblical standards apply across all cultures. As one conservative British Anglican put it, “[We] believe that we can grasp Christian truth and that it is universally normative” (Blakely 1998, emphasis added). Conservative columnist Terry Mattingly sums up this negative view of the diversity globalists’ arguments for the acceptance of homosexuality:

Africans and Asians stressed that they welcome diversity, especially in culture, worship, and church leadership....But they clearly consider diversity a bad word, when applied to basic doctrinal issues such as biblical authority, the Resurrection, or defining the sacrament of marriage. [Solheim 1999b:229]

Thus the diversity globalist argument for tolerance of homosexuality on the same basis as tolerance for various cultural differences within a diverse global community is met by a frank refusal of this logic: the issue of homosexuality is not a matter of acceptable cultural differences, but a matter of unacceptable straying from the Gospel.

But there is nonetheless some room for the perspectives of different cultures in the conservative globalist view, in the idea of ‘inter-cultural’ engagement with Scripture. For the evangelically-minded conservatives in the North and their Southern allies, part of the value of these inter-cultural Anglican relationships lies in the idea that it is possible to help each other understand the Gospel more clearly, free of cultural blind spots and biases. One statement to this effect goes back to the Dallas Conference, when American conservatives and their new allies were just beginning to formulate their own vision of global Communion. This is from a document summarizing the content of a plenary presentation on Scripture and Authority states: “We are to listen to the [Biblical] text not only in full awareness of our own context, but also in relation to the response of others in their contexts. Thus inter-cultural engagement of our reading of scripture in the global church is most important” (ALW documents 1997a). The conservative British evangelical and South American bishop Maurice Sinclair elaborates this idea:
Our Anglican membership and leadership is now fully international and multi-cultural. Every culture can contribute understanding of the Gospel and every culture can distort the Gospel. From our different situations and cultural backgrounds we need to help each other and correct each other.... The wisdom for guiding our churches must be Christianly cross-cultural. [Sinclair 1997b]

Sinclair, then, upholds the cultural diversity of the contemporary Anglican Communion as a potential source of ‘Christianly cross-cultural’ help and correction.

Interestingly, there are some superficial similarities between this idea of cross-cultural correction and some liberal globalists’ interest in encounter with diversity. For example, American Presiding Bishop Frank Griswold suggests that Christians “need one another” in order to discover God’s “mutifaceted” truth (Griswold 1998). Likewise, the Virginia Report, a moderate source, articulates a similar idea: “The life of the Church [in a particular province]....would ...be helped and challenged by the contemporary Church in other places, and use the experience of other Christians as a way of discerning truth within the ambiguities of local tradition and culture” (Thrall 2000:27). Thus Anglicans all over the spectrum argue for the importance of letting local understandings of the faith be challenged by other Christians’ ideas and experiences.

However, the core assumptions underlying these ideas are fundamentally different. Liberal and moderate sources tend to emphasize the need for Anglican churches around the world to ‘seek’ and ‘discern’ truth together. Such language hints at an underlying belief that encounter with others will make our ideas of truth less clear-cut. When Griswold writes, “God's truth is...larger than any one...local church's experience,” and when the Virginia Report asserts that the life of any one church should be “challenged” by churches in other places, the implication is that contact with Christians from around the globe relativizes and broadens local concepts of Christian faith and life. Inter-cultural contact, thus, leads Christians into a deeper, more engaged
collaborative search for truth, rather than necessarily clarifying Christian truth in any immediate way. Indeed, Griswold’s writings here (and elsewhere) imply that God’s truth can never be fully realized by any earthly Christian community, since it is ‘multifaceted’ and always being made known ‘in fresh ways and new contexts.’ In contrast, in the conservative vision, cross-cultural ‘help and correction’ makes the truth more clear by revealing the essence of Biblical orthodoxy, free of cultural biases.

In the conservative globalist vision, then, Scriptural norms should rule the global church—and so should Lambeth’s resolutions (or at least, the key resolution on human sexuality). Northern conservatives’ arguments for global accountability included a strong insistence that the sexuality resolution, though technically non-binding, should exert a powerful pressure for conformity on the Communion’s member provinces because of the resolution’s support by a global majority, as discussed above. The global web of mutual accountability which binds the Communion together, thus, should take its power from the widespread political will conservatives believed was revealed in the Lambeth sexuality vote. James Thrall notes,

> Despite the non-binding nature of Lambeth resolutions, Bishop Bertram Herlong of Tennessee said, ‘They represent the mind and heart of the whole of the church. Any provincial church that ignores or belittles them or disregards them is consciously turning its back on the mainstream of the Anglican Communion.’ [Thrall 2000:19]

According to the vision of accountability globalism, then, the Anglican Communion’s diverse local churches should hold one another accountable to Scriptural and Lambeth-established norms.

In arguing for such global mutual accountability, conservative globalists explicitly argued against the one comfort liberal Anglicans took away from Lambeth: the fact that its resolutions have no binding power over the Communion’s autonomous regional provinces. Northern conservatives asserted that the ideas of autonomy and local orientation within the church are the
way of the past, and that the Communion has entered an era of global interconnectedness (Thrall 2000:19). Conservative-leaning Bishop Charles Jenkins of Louisiana wrote after Lambeth, “[W]e are challenged to find a new way of being the Anglican Communion. The old way of being the church, with a high degree of provincial autonomy and a trust in ways English, is no longer viable...” (Christian Challenge 1998a, emphasis added). And conservative American commentator Richard Kew described the new world of global interconnections which makes such global inter-Anglican accountability necessary:

We can no longer either act or make major decisions in isolation from the rest of the Anglican family.... Lambeth illustrated that in the global village that has fully emerged only since the last Lambeth in 1988, there is an interconnectedness that far transcends nation, tribe, race, or tongue. From our parishes to our national churches we are now enmeshed in a thickening web of relationships, and whereas the miles once isolated us from one another, those relationships now require an accountability to which we are unused. [Kew 1998]

Echoing many of Kew’s points, Ugandan bishop Henry Orombi summed up the new Anglican accountability to a reporter at Lambeth:

Bishops in America are one part of the Anglican communion. Whatever they do should be found acceptable within the wider church. If U.S. bishops are ordaining homosexuals is it for the U.S. or the wider church? We are not local priests, we are global priests. [Virtue 1998b, emphasis added]

For Northern conservatives and other supporters of the sexuality resolution, its passage represented the triumph of the universal over the particular, the global over the local. Some supporters of the resolution also lobbied at Lambeth for measures which would have put more teeth in that triumph. Once Northern conservatives’ exploration for global allies reached the point where they felt certain of strong international support, these conservatives and many of their Southern allies also sought the strengthening of the authority structures of the Communion, and especially the disciplinary functions of the Instruments of Unity. Satisfied they had a global
majority on their side with regard to homosexuality, American and other Northern conservatives at Lambeth abandoned their old politics of autonomy and disobedience to diocesan and provincial authorities and instead took up with ever-greater enthusiasm and confidence the scale-making politics of appeal to outside authorities.

At Lambeth itself, Northern conservatives lobbied for resolutions which they hoped would make it more possible and more likely for the Episcopal Church to be disciplined by means of the official structures of the Anglican Communion. In particular, American conservatives supported the strengthening of the powers of the Primates and the Archbishop of Canterbury. At the time of Lambeth, Northern conservatives felt it likely that strengthening either or both these Instruments of Unity would probably work in their favor. The Archbishop of Canterbury at the time, George Carey, was an evangelical who shared conservative views on homosexuality, so many were eager to see him play a more active role. (The same cannot be said with respect to his successor, Rowan Williams.) As for the Primates, conservatives were pleased for their power to be increased, because the one-province-one-Primate character of the Primates’ Meetings erases other differences in size, wealth, and influence between Provinces. Conservatives and many Southerners argue that the Lambeth Conference is still disproportionately dominated by Northerners because the wealthy Northern provinces can afford a higher ratio of bishops to church members. For example, the eight million Anglicans in Uganda had about twenty bishops at Lambeth 1998, while the 2.5 million American Anglicans had over 100. However, in the context of the Primates’ Meeting, the Episcopal Church and the Church of Uganda each get one vote; and provinces with a clear liberal leaning are a distinct minority among the world’s 38 Anglican provinces. Thus, for Northern conservatives, strengthening the Primates’ and Archbishop of Canterbury’s roles were appealing as avenues towards protecting Anglican orthodoxy.

One resolution in particular which passed at Lambeth 1998 pleased conservatives, taking a
distinctly different tack from the three already mentioned. This resolution called for a dramatic strengthening of the roles of the Primates, urging that they should meet more often and should exercise greater leadership, through their “moral authority,” in defining the limits of Anglican diversity on “doctrinal, moral, and pastoral matters,” including possible intervention in internally-troubled provinces. Reactions to this resolution were quite divided. Liberal priest and scholar Ian Douglas, for example, gave a negative take on its implications, stating that it “gives the Primates’ Meeting... unheard of extra-metropolitical authority to intervene in the life of Anglican provinces locally, while eviscerating the sharing of power with lay people and priests in the old Anglican Consultative Council” (Douglas 1998b:26-27). In contrast, many Northern conservatives expressed pleasure at this strengthening of the Primates’ power, and optimism about what it might mean. For example, American Anglican Council staffer Alistair Macdonald Radcliff, also writing in 2000, argued that over past decades, “the status of the Primates has been increasing in relation to other instruments of authority, such as the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Anglican Consultative Council.” He writes that more frequent Primates’ Meetings “will speed up the process by which Primates are acquiring a greater role with in the Communion, and it will also inevitably entail a much higher degree of mutual accountability” (Macdonald Radcliff 2000a:38-39).

Lambeth 1998's resolutions on authority, taken all together, seem to represent conflicting trends towards both reaffirming the autonomy and integrity of Anglican bodies at the provincial and diocesan levels–in the resolutions on subsidiarity and diocesan integrity–and at the same time towards pushing for greater accountability and centralized authority, in the expansion of the Primates’ roles. These conflicted responses to the increasing tensions over Anglican unity and diversity virtually set the stage for future conflict. Though probably not intended as such by most of those who voted for them, the two most starkly opposed resolutions—the resolutions dealing with diocesan boundaries, and with strengthening the Primates’ powers—were understood by
activists and those involved in various church conflicts as publicly-drawn battle lines. Clearly, more conflict was inevitable as these two views of global Communion—one founded on authority and accountability, one on autonomy—continued to clash. Liberal bishops went home after Lambeth armed with the resolution on diocesan boundaries and prepared to cry ‘Foul!’ at the next international episcopal trespass—John Rucyahana actually delayed a planned September, 1998, visit to St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, out of respect for that resolution. But conservatives made it plain that their willingness to abide by the resolution on boundaries was contingent on the Episcopal Church’s willingness to submit itself to the authority of the Anglican Communion gathered at Lambeth. At the same time, they fully anticipated that the Episcopal Church would not fall into line with the sexuality resolution’s stated views on homosexuality—thus, as they saw it, opening up the errant American province to all manner of outside intervention, especially from the Primates whose authority had been affirmed in the resolution just described.

**A conservative global vision**

At and after Lambeth 1998, then, Northern conservatives—and some of their Southern sympathizers and allies—articulated elements of a conservative globalist vision or discourse, the discourse of accountability globalism. The conservative vision of accountability globalism which I have outlined here rests on the concepts of worldwide inter-provincial accountability to Scriptural norms, clarified through inter-cultural correction, supported and enforced by a global orthodox Anglican majority. This vision of global Anglicanism contrasts sharply with the liberal/moderate multiculturalist globalism, in which the primary ideal for international communion is ‘diversity in unity’—understood as encounter and sharing in Christian fellowship across differences in culture, experience, and belief. These visions differ and even clash in many of their implications, but it is significant that they are both undeniably global visions.

Far from reacting against the greater interconnectedness and cross-cultural contact of the (post)modern world, these Northern conservatives, before, during, and since Lambeth 1998, have...
actively built alliances with Southern Anglicans in order to pursue a vision of global Communion founded on Biblical truth. This is no veiled anti-globalism or reactionary vision in which the older authority structures and patterns of white male Euro-American dominance are re-established so as to maintain order in an increasingly complex world-wide organization. Instead, this conservative vision embraces the diversity and complexity of the contemporary globalized world. As James Thrall writes, “If the conservative coalition at Lambeth was holding onto a status quo, it was the status quo of a particular ideology drawn from a particular understanding of Christian scripture and tradition,” and not the status quo of a particular political order in which power belongs to white Europeans and Americans (Thrall 2000:18). Rather, the vision of accountability globalism calls for power to shift away from its traditional centers, and locate instead in a world-wide orthodox network of church leaders united in their commitment to Anglican orthodoxy. New and global patterns of discipline are imagined, in the ideals of correction, help, and above all accountability between Anglican provinces and churches around the globe.

I am not asserting that this global ideal has been achieved within this movement of inter-Anglican alliances for orthodoxy, since American leaders and American problems still play disproportionate roles in determining how these alliances spend their collective time and energy. Chapters 7 and 8 will both address some of the ways that familiar patterns of North/South interaction and power imbalance recur even in the context of these innovative transnational inter-Anglican alliances. But for all that the reality remains America-centered, the ideal is nonetheless global. The enthusiasm with which many American conservatives have taken on and taken up their new global connections—belying critics’ suggestions that this globalism is a mere cynical rhetoric, a political fiction—will be documented in the next chapter.

Hierarchy or network?

While the accountability globalism vision was widely voiced and supported, the structure of the
accountability imagined in this globalist vision was and remains contested among Northern conservatives and their allies. Individual provinces’ accountability to standards such as that set by the strongly-supported sexuality resolution could in theory be enforced in one of two ways. Firstly, accountability could be enforced through the official, hierarchical structures of the Anglican Communion (such as the Instruments of Unity), if their mandate and powers were extended. Alternately, these standards could be enforced through more ad-hoc efforts to demand accountability, bishop-to-bishop or province-to-province, through international networks.

Conservative Americans appealed for help from official channels in late 1998 when, frustrated by the Episcopal Church’s already-manifest unwillingness to conform to the Lambeth sexuality resolution, the AACOM coalition of conservative Episcopal groups circulated the AACOM Petition to all the bishops of the Anglican world, requesting the Primates’ intervention in the Episcopal Church. This petition sought accountability through the official hierarchical structure of the Anglican Communion. Any outcomes which might come through such channels—such as rebukes to the Episcopal Church, or the establishment of a new orthodox American Anglican province—would have relatively clear legitimacy. The right of the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Primates’ Meeting to impose policy on individual provinces might still be uncertain, but if any such power exists within the Anglican Communion, then the Instruments of Unity are the entities with the legitimate authority to wield it.

The lack of recognition and support by any central, official Anglican authority is often named as one reason for the relative lack of success of the various Continuing Churches which broke from ECUSA in the past. A body wanting to claim Anglican identity with any kind of externally-recognized validity has traditionally needed to have bishops within the apostolic succession, and to be recognized by the Archbishop of Canterbury as within the Anglican Communion. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Continuing Churches, in breaking away from the Episcopal Church, insisted they were maintaining true Anglicanism in the United States, and many managed to
produce bishops for themselves who were at least arguably within the apostolic succession. But none were ever recognized by the Archbishop of Canterbury, or indeed any official Anglican body, and thus their claim to true Anglicanness remained only a statement of in-group identity, with little basis for any claim to official Anglican status.

However, the AACOM Petition contained a hint that the Archbishop of Canterbury, or even the Primates’ Meetings, might not be the only possible sources for Anglican legitimacy. The Petition hints at an appeal for assistance through relationships or tactics outside the formal international structures of the Communion in its request for assistance from “the Primates’ meeting, or its individual members.” This phrasing reflects a growing tendency for American conservatives to direct appeals for help to particular sympathetic Anglican leaders, regardless of their actual position and powers in the worldwide Anglican hierarchy. Such appeals represent the deployment of a different model of Anglican accountability, working through networks rather than through the centralized hierarchy of the Anglican Communion. These decentered networks of accountability connect Anglicans and Episcopalians around the globe along lines of affinity (such as the connections between St. Andrew’s, in Little Rock, Arkansas, and their Rwandan bishop John Rucyahana), and, by way of the impact of those connections, along what might be called lines of antagonism (such as the connections between Bishop Larry Maze of Arkansas and Bishop Rucyahana, by way of exchanges of letters and statements which resulted from Rucyahana’s taking charge of a parish in Maze’s diocese).

This network-oriented approach to seeking global Anglican accountability is not only a pragmatic strategy, but an engagement with one of the dominant tropes or forms of contemporary social and religious movements and international relationships. The languages of networks, reciprocity, and partnership are currently in wide use by Northern Christians of all persuasions. For example, words like ‘connection,’ ‘relationship,’ ‘partnership,’ and ‘interdependence’ dominate in ECUSA documents and materials relating to missions.
Conservative Episcopalians have for some time drawn on these vocabularies and concepts. An AAC member, talking with me about current developments in the Anglican Communion, pointed to what he called the “rise of alternative networks” within today’s Anglican Communion, with “provinces making connections with other provinces on bilateral or multilateral forms.” Such networks of affinity and antagonism serve both of the prime intentions of American conservatives: connecting them with other Anglicans who share key convictions, and striking out against the perceived heterodoxy of most Episcopal Church authorities.

The 1999 Kampala Meeting provides another example of the networking approach to international accountability. At that meeting, which had such potential to violate official Anglican procedures and structures that it was held in secrecy, American conservatives appealed to a limited number of Anglican primates who had shown themselves to be sympathetic to the American dissident cause. They asked these primates, in the words of one speaker at the meeting, to “establish accountability and discipline within our communion” by “rebuking” the Episcopal Church on behalf of the “international communion.” They asked, too, for help in the establishment of a new orthodox American Anglican jurisdiction, which would serve the cause of global Anglican accountability by making the rebuke concrete as a “visible restraint and warning” demonstrating that the worldwide Communion would not tolerate persistent departure from Scriptural norms. Conservatives hoped that the formation of such a new jurisdiction would provide the ultimate rebuke by demonstrating that provinces who would not be held accountable to Lambeth and the rest of the Communion would no longer be recognized by orthodox Anglican leaders and provinces, and instead would find their boundaries violated and their authorities subverted as the rest of the Anglican world sought relationship, not with their bishops and diocesan and provincial officials, but with their dissident conservative minority.

These outcomes—the delegitimization of the Episcopal Church in the eyes of the larger Anglican world, and its replacement by some form of new orthodox province recognized by
some international Anglican authorities—were the goal of both the Kampala meeting and the AACOM Petition, but the Petition sought to urge the Primates to work towards these goals, while the purpose of the gathering in Kampala was to begin immediate work towards these goals among those already committed. American conservatives’ simultaneous pursuit of a strong disciplinary response from the Anglican Communion’s traditional power structures, and of other tactics which bypass and subvert those same power structures, has led one critic of this movement to describe its tactics as “renegade authoritarianism” (Daly 2001:4). But efforts to pursue this dual program have become increasingly unbalanced. From early 1999 on, tactics like the AACOM petition which rely on the official structures of the Communion, such as appeals to the Primates, have repeatedly failed to bring about significant change. At the same time, tactics like the Kampala Meeting which are not dependent on the consent of the Archbishop of Canterbury or a majority of the Primates, but which work through networks and organizations of those already in sympathy, have become increasingly central to the activism of Northern conservatives and their allies. In chapter 6, I will document the outcomes of the Kampala Meeting, and some of the many ways conservative Northerners and their Southern allies followed the network paradigm and used international connections, rather than transnational hierarchies, to pursue the conjoined projects of challenging the Episcopal Church’s perceived apostasy and providing legitimating alternative Anglican contacts for conservative Northern Anglicans and Episcopalians.
CHAPTER 6
MORE THAN JUST COMPANIONS

St. Timothy's joins the Province of Rwanda

On January 29, 2000, the conservative Episcopal organization First Promise issued this press release, announcing the launching of a new endeavor–no less than the hoped-for alternative American Anglican province. Two American priests–Charles Murphy, the head of First Promise and evangelical rector of a large South Carolina parish, All Saint’s of Pawley’s Island, and his colleague John Rodgers, a widely-esteemed theologian, retired dean of TESM, and General Secretary of the temporary AACOM alliance–had just been consecrated by the Anglican Archbishops of Rwanda and South East Asia, to serve as ‘missionary bishops’ to conservative dissidents in the United States. Under the missionary bishops, many of the parishes and clergy who had belonged to First Promise would become part of a new church organization, which would come to be called the Anglican Mission in America (AMiA). First Promise’s press release stated:

Murphy, the rector of one of the fastest growing Episcopal Churches in the U.S., and Rodgers, Dean Emeritus of Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry in Ambridge, Pennsylvania, have agreed to step forward at this moment of crisis, in an initiative aimed at reversing a 30-year decline of 30 percent in the membership of the Episcopal Church of the U.S.A.... The two Bishops will provide pastoral support, guidance, and oversight at the request of clergy and congregations that want to continue in the doctrine, discipline and worship of Christ as the Anglican Church has received them. They will actively seek to plant Anglican missions in areas where there are receptive communities and little faithful witness in the Episcopal Church.... This bold initiative is intended to help Archbishops from around the world take seriously the need for the reform and renewal of the Episcopal Church at their meeting next month in Lisbon, Portugal. The sending of these bishops back to the United States is offered as an interim step in an ongoing effort to lead the Episcopal Church back to its biblical foundations. [First Promise 2000]

Within six months of the Singapore consecrations, St. Timothy’s vestry had voted to break away from their Episcopal Church diocese and place the parish under the authority of Charles
of Anglican conflicts over orthodoxy—and of the international possibilities for parishes like their own, trapped in a local situation of conflict with their diocesan leadership. In a 1999 newsletter piece about First Promise’s work and the Kampala meeting, this international dimension is becoming more apparent:

We have run out of...appeals in this diocese, and in the Episcopal Church USA. It is for that reason that we have joined others... in appealing to the bishops of other provinces of the worldwide Anglican Communion. This is a serious matter. It is about the very soul of the Episcopal Church in the US. It is about the very soul of the Anglican Communion. [St. Timothy’s 1999]

Some members were uncertain about these potential international connections at first. One woman told me that her husband was initially skeptical about these possibilities, because he viewed the church in Africa as a mission field: “Why would they be leading us to a new place?”

Anticipating such reactions, the vestry of St. Timothy’s held a parish meeting to announce their decision to join AMiA. The meeting opened, one observer recounts, with a hymn which expressed the mood of the moment: “Once to every man and nation/Comes the moment to decide,/In the strife of truth with falsehood,/For the good or evil side...” The senior warden then came forward to explain the vestry’s decision, what it meant, and the reasons for it. He justified the change in allegiance in part by reference to the rapid growth and orthodoxy of Christianity in the global South:

The greater Anglican Communion has been in renewal for the past 40 years and has experienced unprecedented growth, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere. That growth has occurred based on...foundational principles of Orthodoxy. During that same period the Episcopal Church in the US has experienced a 30 plus percent decline in membership...[and] experienced an internal crisis in faith and leadership, and has gradually drifted away from the basic truths of Christianity.... We at St. Timothy’s... find ourselves out of communion with the national Episcopal Church and our diocese, but in
communion with more than 80% of the Anglican Communion.” [St. Timothy’s 2000a]

He continued with the key announcement: “Your vestry has unanimously voted to separate from our diocese and the Episcopal Church of the United States of America. We will join the Interim Anglican Expression in the US under the oversight of The Rt. Reverend Charles Murphy, Bishop of Rwanda, who is assigned to the US to create an Anglican diocese….The vestry would like to present to you our resolution for your affirmation.” The rector described the reaction to me:

When he got through, there was a pregnant pause, and then in unison the whole congregation just rose up, and there was full room over in the parish hall—we couldn’t get them all in the church—and they just [claps]. Not raucous, just quiet, ‘this is what we need to do, God has called us to do this.’ It wasn’t yelling. It was just a committed, ‘This is where we’re headed.’

Having received this strong evidence of support from the congregation, St. Timothy’s informed the diocese and the public. The church’s name was promptly changed to St. Timothy’s Anglican Church, Province of Rwanda. The clergy asked their ECUSA bishop to transfer their letters dimissory to the Province of Rwanda—the official Episcopal procedure for transferring a priest to the authority of another bishop. The bishop, seeing this move as legitimating AMiA and St. Timothy’s move, declined, as have most ECUSA bishops presented with similar requests. Nevertheless, the clergy of St. Timothy’s now regard themselves as under the authority of the Archbishop of Rwanda, through the
intermediary of Bishop Charles Murphy. St. Timothy’s therefore joined the other established
churches who, along with a number of small mission parishes and fragments of congregations,
became part of AMiA in its early months.

Many members were delighted at this break from the Episcopal Church. The vestry’s decision
was described by several as an “emancipation proclamation.” One member told me, “I thought,
the lifeboat has finally arrived.” Another paraphrased Scripture to praise their new Anglican
head: “God so loved the world that he sent the Archbishop (of Rwanda).” Quite a few members
of St. Timothy’s (all non-cradle-Episcopalian) told me they’d made up their minds they’d have
to leave St. Timothy’s soon, in order to separate themselves fully from ECUSA, if St. Timothy’s
didn’t break away. One member told me flatly, “I would’ve left the church if they’d remained in
the Episcopal Church.” However, though many felt it might be necessary to leave ECUSA,

Figure 2. Diagram used to explain the change in St. Timothy’s affiliation.
staying within the Anglican Communion was also important—especially to the parish’s long-term Episcopal members, but also to many members who had come from other traditions, but have become very attached to the Anglican liturgy and tradition. When I asked one member about St. Timothy’s, who had become Episcopalian within the past ten years, about joining AMiA, he gave an extraordinary testimony of his affection for the Anglican tradition.

They gave us a way to stay Anglican. I really believe the Anglican tradition has a tremendous amount to offer. I think the balance of the Word, the liturgy, the form of worship is just vastly superior. I think the tradition of the Anglican outreach all over the world is something I'd like to stay part of. And I think that at the time of the Reformation, Anglicanism just went head and shoulders above everybody else because they reformed and corrected the problems with the Roman Catholic expression, and they kept the good stuff....

They made what I believe is the best expression of Christianity, the most effective, that can reach all people. And so I really wanted to stay there.

Joining AMiA, then, provided a “lifeboat” because it gave alienated parishes and groups a way to be able to continue to claim Anglican identity, while breaking from the errant Episcopal Church. This has been very important for all the dissident parishes who have joined AMiA or sought out other arrangements. Simply breaking off from the Episcopal Church and becoming, in effect, additional Continuing Churches had not had much appeal for most of these churches. This was doubtless partly because these evangelical, lively, growing parishes did not care to identify themselves with the Continuing Church movement, which is mostly Anglo-Catholic in its orientation rather than evangelical, and which has also seen little growth in its two decades of existence. As the rector told me, “We didn’t want to become a Continuing Church.” Another member told me, "We didn't want to be just fringe lunatics, we wanted to be in an Anglican body.” AMiA provided the ideal ‘lifeboat’ to avoid such a fate. As the rector of a Florida church
which left ECUSA for AMiA stated: “[AMiA] is a God-appointed way out for us, under Anglican authority. We don’t miss a beat” (Living Church 2000:6).

But some members’ reactions to the news of the break and affiliation with AMiA were not joy or relief. The list of answers about the change which was mailed to members clearly anticipated worries about the consequences of the move, and reassured members that they would still be Episcopal, that nothing would change in their worship, that they would be able to keep their building (which ultimately proved to be untrue), and that the only change would be greater freedom to do God’s work. The mailing to parishioners concludes: “What about those parishioners who are unsure of what to do?... Continue to worship with us. The only change will be in our sign outside” (St. Timothy’s 2000a). In spite of such assurances, a significant number at St. Timothy’s, as in other places, were deeply saddened by the break, and a small group chose to leave St. Timothy’s and form a new parish loyal to the Episcopal Church.93

Nonetheless, in spite of some controversy, the loss of of these members, and a long and difficult lawsuit over ownership of the church property,94 the transition to AMiA was largely peaceful, and today St. Timothy’s is a healthy, flourishing, friendly parish. Their financial status is relatively good, in spite of the losses of the financial stability provided by a diocese which AMiA is not yet able to provide. Their struggles, however, have not discouraged St. Timothy’s leaders and members; most understand these difficulties as necessary sacrifices for the greater good of maintaining Gospel orthodoxy. Many are very optimistic about AMiA, hoping that it will become the recognized orthodox Anglican province in the United States. The rector told me his predictions for the fate of the Episcopal Church: “I mean, across the country, the people who are coming out [of ECUSA] are cream.. They really are the cream.... I believe the Episcopal Church is the Titanic. It’s going down.... I think slowly but surely, there’s going to be a flight out of the Episcopal Church.” And a member of the parish articulated the general hope that AMiA might fill the void left by the Episcopal Church’s anticipated sinking: “I would like to see AMiA
become the Episcopal Church, the recognized church.”

Re-situating St. Timothy’s from its former place as a member parish of its local diocese, to a new ‘location’ as a point in a growing transnational orthodox Anglican network, brought this parish—quite literally—into a whole new world of Anglicanism. As one Ugandan priest described it to me, such American conservatives now “feel themselves at home in Kigali,” the capital city of Rwanda. But while these conservative Episcopalians found great relief and pleasure in being able to cut ties with ECUSA while maintaining Anglican identity under new, orthodox authority structures, the formation and growth of AMiA drew critical reactions from Anglican leaders around the world.

Reactions to the Singapore Consecrations

In the Singapore consecrations, American conservatives and their allied primates took an unprecedented action to create a new breakaway American Anglican body, the Anglican Mission in America, which was significantly different from any previous breakaway. The difference lay in the way these consecrations allowed the American dissidents involved to make a strong claim to continued legitimate membership in the Anglican Communion, through their connections with Anglican bishops from outside the U.S. As a document about AMiA included in materials for their 2001 Winter Conference put it (quoting John Rodgers), “In Singapore, two archbishops gave their blessing for this work. They have saved you from becoming simply another group that has broken away from the Episcopal Church” (AMiA 2001a). The Anglican Mission in America’s Six Month Report quoted Murphy and Rodgers telling their supporters that “it is now possible to remain fully orthodox and Anglican on American soil.”

This international solution appeared necessary to those involved in part because domestic solutions kept failing. The ECUSA House of Bishops seemed unwilling to consider arrangements allowing conservative bishops to serve conservative parishes in other dioceses, and the church’s conservative bishops were not willing to take the risks of crossing diocesan
boundaries without the consent of the larger church. One leader associated with the organization described to me how the need for a larger international organization arose:

I visited a number of American bishops, my friends, and I said, Can you help these people? They said no. Every single one of them I approached.... They refused. They shied away from that responsibility, because they are not protected. Their fellow bishops will subject them to the ecclesiastical court.... So they don’t want to lose their jobs, they don’t want to lose their pension, you know, whatever, their American beauties.... So then we started meetings. We started calling the archbishops from all over the world. We had meetings in Singapore, Singapore One, we had Kampala One, we had Kampala Two, we had Singapore Two.... It was necessary [because] there were many people who were having a similar problem as Little Rock is. And I didn’t want to take a second [parish], because it was much bigger.... So we consecrated two bishops in Singapore. Of course we raised the dust. People crossed each other in the air flying here and there cursing us, but Jesus became the Lord and he protected us.

AMiA came about, then, partially because American conservative bishops would not take responsibility for conservative parishes in other dioceses, and more and more such parishes were clamoring for orthodox leadership.

Perhaps even more importantly, though, the Singapore Consecrations happened when and how they did because other international solutions, also, kept failing—or at least, not producing immediate results. In taking the step of consecrating bishops to tend to American dissidents, the Primates involved circumvented the Primates’ Meeting and various efforts to solicit help for conservative Episcopalians through official Anglican Communion channels and structures. The Singapore Consecrations can be viewed as both an outcome of the 1999 Kampala Meeting, and an outcome of the failure of the Kampala Meeting. These consecrations were an outcome of Kampala because that meeting may well have finally convinced Archbishop Kolini and his bishop John Rucyahana, of the necessity of acting on behalf of American dissidents.

However, even the compelling evidence presented by assorted American conservatives in Kampala did not convince most of the Primates present to act on the spot. Hopes that a
consecration of missionary bishops would take place then and there were not fulfilled. One consultant who was present told me:

Many provinces were not ready to cut relationships with ECUSA, with all the consequences, especially material or financial. So they were quite hesitant to take that move.... They were very very sympathetic. Practically, they were very sympathetic. But they were in a fix. 'If we do this, now, what will be the effects?'. The primates, they didn't want to take a decision before the meeting in Portugal.

The outcome of the Kampala meeting, thus, was essentially a deferral of action until the Primates’ Meeting scheduled for four months later in Oporto, Portugal—the first meeting of all the international Primates since Lambeth adjourned. The letter issued by the Primates in Kampala at the close of the meeting read in part:

We hear and understand what you have told us about examples of abandonment of Anglican teaching, discipline and practices in the provinces from which you come.... *We assure you... that among us are those ready to respond to specific and urgent situations which may arise in the months before the Primates' Meeting in Portugal from 23rd to 28th March.* Parishes and clergy under threat because of their loyalty to the Gospel and to Anglican standards must be supported and we will play our part in such support. At the forthcoming Primates' Meeting we will inform our colleagues of the intolerable situation that you and others like you are facing. We will carefully document and commend a proposal to this meeting which, we believe, will address the problems in our Communion caused by misuse of autonomy and innovations exceeding the limits of our Anglican diversity. [Kampala Meeting 1999]

This statement affirmed the concern of the Primates present for the Americans’ situation, and
assured them that the matter would be taken up at the Primates’ Meeting.

This deferral must have been a disappointment to many of the Americans present, and came on the heels of other similar disappointments. There had been relatively little response to the AACOM Petition, in spite of the initial optimism of those who drafted it and sent it out to the Anglican world.95 In the spring of 1999, at a meeting in Atlanta, First Promise leaders had expressed confidence that the AACOM petition would bear fruit and that a new Anglican province in the United States would come into being within the next year. Doug LeBlanc wrote:

First Promise leaders suggested that a new province probably will emerge in 1999, if at all.... [Charles Murphy] said the work of First Promise could be complete within a year, if its international alliance seals more formal ties between conservative Episcopalians in the United States and sympathetic bishops from other countries. [LeBlanc 1999a]

Soon after this First Promise gathering, in April of 1999, American conservative leaders (including representatives of the AAC, Ekklesia Society, and First Promise) met in Singapore with sympathetic overseas primates, including Archbishop Sinclair of the Southern Cone, Archbishop Tay of South East Asia, Archbishop Kolini of Rwanda, and representatives of the Primates of Nigeria and Uganda. The goal of this meeting was to plan for the next steps in responding to the Episcopal Church’s continued intransigence. The outcome of this meeting, too, was a disappointing deferral: a letter from the gathered Primates which assured First Promise and their allies that the bishops understood the urgency of the situation in the United States, but weren’t yet ready to take any drastic actions. They expressed their intention to bring the matter of ECUSA’s compliance with the Lambeth sexuality resolution before the Oporto Primates’ Meeting:

_We have studied your particular proposal for intervention and with other relevant questions want this to be considered more widely by the Primates in the Anglican Communion_.... The international Communion is becoming more
alert to the urgency of the situation you face. We will do all we can to ensure
that our fellow primates are sufficiently informed. [United Voice 1999]

The Christian Challenge, reporting on the outcomes of the Singapore meeting, tried to cast
this as encouraging, in spite of the hesitance expressed by these leaders:
‘We hear your cry,’ the six global South bishops assured a coalition of
ECUSA conservatives.... The group of bishops said they ‘are committed to
action which in God's time will help in the reformation of [ECUSA] and restore
its biblical witness.’ [Traycik 1999b]

But some were not happy about waiting upon “God’s time.” These primates’ approach to
handling ECUSA’s perceived unrepentant apostasy–a measured, slow approach, working
through the channels and procedures of official Anglican polity–troubled some of the more eager
and impatient American petitioners, and some of their global allies. First Promise leaders had
dreamed of a new Anglican province in the United States within the year 1999, and now the
question would not even be taken up by all the Primates until March of 2000!

The Singapore Consecrations, then, were an outcome of the failure of the Kampala Meeting to
bear immediate fruit, in the form of some immediate action or provision for dissidents parishes
and groups in the United States. Following the Kampala meeting, the repeated delays and
deferrals apparently became too much for Kolini, Rucyahana, Tay, and some of the First Promise
leaders. No longer willing to wait upon official channels, these Primates and others chose to act
in their own time. Roughly two months after the Kampala Meeting, and two months before the
upcoming Primates’ Meeting, these few took matters into their own hands.

Instead of waiting on a solution which might have involved more international Primates and
other leaders, the Singapore Consecrations brought into being an immediate solution with the
support of only a few. The Singapore consecrations were and are widely seen as primarily the
work and the responsibility of the two Primates involved, Tay and Kolini, with John Rucyahana
as the third consecrating bishop, though two retired American bishops and one retired bishop of a
South American province also assisted in the consecrations. As two of the only 38 Primates in the worldwide Anglican Communion, and thus as highly influential and visible leaders, the two Primates were essential to give legitimacy and power to this endeavor. Indeed, one statement by AMiA bishop John Rodgers hints that the main reason for the controversial timing of the consecrations—before the Primates’ Meeting in March—was due largely to the imminent retirement of Archbishop Tay. As it transpired, Tay’s successor decided to support AMiA as a fait accompli, but he might well have been less willing than Tay to take a role in initiating it. Though the involvement of two Primates gave the Singapore Consecrations enough visibility to rock the Anglican world, the involvement of more Primates would have provided even more legitimacy; but the precipitate nature of the consecrations, before the Primates had had a chance to discuss the matter in Oporto, apparently discouraged other Primates from joining the action. I have been told on various occasions both that there were plans or hopes to have three primates participating in the consecrations, but that a third pulled out or could not be persuaded to join the effort. Ugandan Archbishop Livingstone Mpalanyi-Nkoyoyo apparently refused to be involved, and a source close to Congolese Archbishop Njojo told me that attempts had been made to persuade his archbishop to be a part of the Singapore Consecrations, as well.

The Singapore Consecrations and foundation of Anglican Mission in America, then, were not only a surprise—indeed, a shock—to the Anglican and Episcopal liberals and moderates against whom the action was directed. Other conservative Americans, and global Anglican leaders sympathetic their situation, were also shocked by the consecrations in January of 2000. The nascent church body was immediately on the defensive, arguing for its legitimacy and needfulness to opponents and former allies alike.

**Opponents’ reactions and AMiA’s responses**

The Singapore consecrations received numerous negative reactions from the liberal and moderate church leaders. Many Anglicans and Episcopalians perceived the Singapore
consecrations as an attack, rather than—as their proponents argued—a step towards Anglican orthodoxy and worldwide unity. The Anglican archbishop of Canada suggested in a public statement that the Singapore consecrations treat bishops as “intercontinental ballistic missiles, manufactured on one continent and fired into another as an act of aggression” (*Christian Century* 2000). ECUSA Primate Frank Griswold expressed a similar reaction:

> I am appalled by this irregular action and even more so by the purported 'crisis' that has been largely fomented by [Murphy and Rodgers] and others, and which bears very little resemblance to the church we actually know, which is alive and well and faithful.... [The two Singapore bishops] were not elected and their consecrations did not follow a canonical process. They were highly irregular and outside all acceptable norms. [McCormick and Solheim 2000]

The most influential challenge to the legitimacy of the consecrations came from George Carey, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who responded coldly to news of the consecrations. In spite of his personal sympathy with American conservatives on the issues of homosexuality and Scriptural authority, he expressed sharp displeasure at the schismatic aspects of the action. A 2001 letter from Carey to Kolini and Yong, regarding their intent to consecrate more bishops for AMiA, elaborates his objections to the initial consecrations:

> I regard last year’s consecrations in Singapore as at best, highly irregular, and at worst, simply schismatic.... I cannot recognize John Rodgers and Chuck Murphy as bishops in communion with me unless they are fully reconciled to the Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church.

He goes on to argue that the Provinces of South East Asia and Rwanda have been given no authority “to consecrate bishops for service elsewhere in the world.” “How am I to regard those who act without lawful authority?... Action of this kind takes you perilously close to creating a new group of churches at odds with the See of Canterbury and the rest of the Communion” (Carey 2001).

The consecrations, then, emphatically did not receive the *sine qua non* of official Anglican status, recognition by the Archbishop of Canterbury. The goal of becoming an alternative
Anglican province in the United States fully recognized by the rest of the Anglican world had not, and would not, come to fruition through these actions. But still, the support of Archbishops Tay and Kolini clearly gave the AMiA project a greater claim for quasi-official Anglican status than earlier Continuing Church break-aways. As the earliest announcements from Singapore pointed out, these consecrations enabled Murphy and Rodgers to assert that their nascent American Anglican church organization was legitimately Anglican, through its connections to the Anglican provinces of Rwanda and South East Asia. These assertions reflect the decentered, network aspect of conservatives’ vision of accountability globalism (see chapter 5). AMiA’s leaders and defenders have heavily used concepts of networking in describing the organization and its functions and purpose. A session at the AMiA Winter Conference in January of 2001 taught that AMiA was part of a wider movement in world Christianity in which “quality is replacing geographical proximity,” and a guest preacher at St. Timothy’s one Sunday told the congregation, “We are all Africans,” in a new world in which “relationships trump institutions.” AMiA and other similar arrangements thus become an extension of the conservative vision of global Anglicanism characterized by networks of mutual accountability, described in chapter 5. Through these new transjurisdictional alliances, networks and relationships indeed trump geography and institutional structures.

One key aspect of this vision of networked Anglican globalism, from the standpoint of AMiA’s leadership, is the argument that the Communion’s unity takes the form of multiple transnational networks of accountability, rather than a centralized form in which all the provinces are bound to one another through their allegiance to Canterbury as the formal origin and center of Anglicanism.99 David Virtue and Auburn Traycik made explicit reference to this new, decentralized vision of world Anglicanism in a piece about the consecrations:

Conservatives... believe that, after Lambeth [1998], the old dynamic—which insists that a new U.S. province will not be recognized by Canterbury—will be overcome by the new, in which recognition will be determined by the response of the larger Communion, especially the global
South, now Anglicanism’s center of gravity and pivotal to the orthodox turn at Lambeth 98. [Virtue and Traycik 2000a]

AMiA and like arrangements thus make the assertion, implicitly or explicitly, that in addition to the Archbishop of Canterbury, other Anglican archbishops and even bishops are able to bestow Anglican legitimacy on parishes in the United States. This is further demonstrated in David Virtue’s interview with John Rodgers, in which Rodgers denied that the Archbishop of Canterbury’s recognition of the consecrations would be the definitive judgment on their validity:

I do not think the fact that the Archbishop of Canterbury is evaluating the validity of our consecrations is a threat.... I am not aware that the Archbishop of Canterbury has jurisdictional authority in these matters; I believe that belongs to the respective Primates. [Virtue 2000a, emphasis added]

Finally, one AMiA supporter summed up the group’s position on the legitimacy of its membership in the Anglican Communion: “Is not Murphy a bishop of Rwanda? Is not Rwanda a member of the Anglican Communion?” From the point of view of AMiA’s supporters, the undeniable yes answers to these two questions add up to an undeniable yes to the larger question of whether AMiA is really an Anglican body.

Thus AMiA’s leaders and supporters defended their nascent organization from arguments that it was illegitimate because it lacked recognition from Canterbury. Further, they argued that the unusual cross-provincial nature of the relationships established at the consecrations–Rodgers as Tay’s bishop, Murphy as Kolini’s–did not automatically invalidate the consecrations, either. Most observers regarded the Singapore consecrations—the consecration of two priests as bishops for territory A, by the archbishops of territories B and C, and without the consent of church leaders in territory A–as at best irregular, at worst totally illegal, within the terms of Anglican polity. But nonetheless the case was not wholly clear-cut, as can be seen in the fact that among all the negative reactions to the consecrations, very few questioned the fundamental validity of the consecrations to the extent of claiming that Murphy and Rodgers were not really bishops.
Though the case was convoluted and certainly irregular, it was not entirely clear that the consecrations were so unprecedented and out-of-line that they could just be dismissed as non-events. And that ambiguity gave Murphy, Rodgers, and their sponsors space to argue for the legitimacy of their endeavor, as in this quotation from Fitz Allison, one of the consecrating bishops:

> If the historic church's experience and the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral are followed, they are a legitimate part of the Communion. Overlapping jurisdictions such as the Church of South India, the MarThoma Church, the Philippine Independent Church, the Church of Navajoland, the Old Catholic churches, the Church of England and ECUSA occur now in overlapping jurisdictions in North America and Europe. [Allison 2000]

Thus the new bishops and their sponsors and supporters, in response to criticisms and attacks from liberal and moderate church leaders, argued that this new international solution was both necessary and legal.

Another line of challenges from opponents of the consecrations took up the question of why these particular provinces, Rwanda and South East Asia, should intervene in ECUSA. Many observers questioned how Rwandan church leaders could justify involvement with AMiA when Rwanda itself has such a rocky moral record, due to the 1994 genocide perpetrated by Rwandan Hutus on Rwanda Tutsis. Some of AMiA’s observers and sympathizers answer such criticisms by arguing that Bishop Rucyahana and Archbishop Kolini as individuals, rather than the Church of Rwanda as a province, should be looked to for the explanation. Bishop Rucyahana was clearly the trailblazer in initiating new forms of North/South church alliance, though Archbishop Kolini was apparently quite willing to take up the cause. By taking on T.J. Johnston and thereby St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, as under his authority, Rucyahana established the model which the larger AMiA project would build upon and dramatically expand. Several people noted that Rucyahana was the natural person to initiate such relationships because of his many friends in the U.S. (such as Thad Barnum, a priest at All Saints’, Pawley’s Island, who is now an AMiA bishop), due to
the time he spent studying at TESM in the 1980s. Archbishop Kolini’s personal characteristics, especially his courage in facing opposition for the sake of what he believes to be right, were also often cited by those whom I queried about why Rwanda was such a key player in AMiA. A Rwandan priest told me that Kolini is a very courageous man in taking risks for his faith, and “can’t be scared by a gun or dollars or pounds.” Another Rwandan Anglican told me: The way I have understood [Kolini], he's a man who has motivation to do what he feels God is asking him to do, even when he is not getting the consent of others, but when it's the right time, he feels pushed by the spirit of God, he will go.... Once he is sure that God is saying him to do this, he will not wait for people's consent.

Rucyahana’s and Kolini’s individual connections and motivations, then, are often and strongly identified as explanations for the Church of Rwanda’s involvement in the Singapore Consecrations and AMiA.

But leaders and supporters of AMiA often argue along different lines, as well, asserting that Rwanda’s involvement with AMiA isn’t just because of individual commitments, but actually comes out of the Church of Rwanda’s experience of the 1994 genocide. Kolini, Rucyahana, and their supporters have argued that the genocide is one of the key reasons they have felt called to respond to the needs of conservative Episcopalians in the U.S. Even non-AMiA American observers often refer to the genocide in explaining or justifying the Church of Rwanda’s role. Bishop Bob Duncan wrote, in a response to the Singapore Consecrations,

> Once [Kolini] said to me: "We Rwandans have been refugees all our lives. We will always respond to the plight of refugees." On another occasion Archbishop Kolini said: "At the genocide in 1994, the whole world stood back and no one came to Rwanda's aid. We will never stand back when others are similarly threatened, physically or spiritually." [Duncan 2000]

One member of St. Timothy’s expressed the same idea: “Archbishop Kolini... would never turn his back on anyone as others turned their backs on Rwanda [during the genocide].”
A metaphor which often comes up to justify why Rwandan church leaders felt called to intervene for American conservatives is the idea that American conservatives are in the same plight, spiritually, as Rwandan genocide victims were in, physically. A newsletter feature at St. Timothy’s written by one of their clergy, shortly after the parish joined AMiA, made this point: “It is telling that the archbishop of Rwanda should be so ready to act in our behalf. He said he is acting in our behalf because he sees the crisis as being that of “spiritual genocide”.... He knows what genocide is like, because his own countrymen were being extinguished and no one came to their aid.” This analogy or metaphor is apparently a potent one, judging by how frequently it is invoked—a potency which is easily enough understood when one considers how this explanation allows Americans and Rwandans alike to gloss the events of 1994 as a source of moral strength and commonality, while avoiding difficult questions about the history, meanings, and implications of those events. But not everyone is sold on this analogy; some see it as altogether too facile, and fundamentally false. One conservative American leader sharply criticized the use of this analogy, and blamed Chuck Murphy for using “refugee” language to persuade Kolini to take his side. He cut through the logic of this analogy with one sharp remark: “The difference is that being a refugee in Rwanda means you had 9 out of 10 family members killed, and in America it means someone raised their eyebrow at you at a cocktail party.” These supposedly-analogous ‘refugee’ situations, he concluded, involved very different kinds of rejection. “They’re using the same language, but the context is totally different.”

Such questioning notwithstanding, Rwandan and AMiA leaders talk about the Church of Rwanda’s role in the AMiA in a manner which casts the genocide as something which strengthens and justifies their action. Therefore these Rwandan church leaders’ prominent role in Anglican Communion conflicts can be seen in one light as an effort to recover the moral standing Rwanda lost in the eyes of the world in 1994. By taking on AMiA, Kolini, Rucyahana, and their church assert a strong orthodox Anglican identity within the world-wide Anglican Communion,
in spite of their country’s recent violence and other factors which might seem to weaken its position as a moral arbiter: its youth as a province (the Church of Rwanda only became an independent province in 1992; South-East Asia is also a young province, founded in 1996–Tay was its first Archbishop); its poverty; its small size; its history as a colonized nation and a missionary church. All of these factors, while some might see them as reasons for Rwandan church leaders not to become involved in international activism against the Episcopal Church, are described by AMiA’s supporters as reasons why the Rwandan church (and the African churches in general) should take action—to assert its spiritual strength in spite of all its material and historical weaknesses, and to take a global stand against continued Northern dominance in the Anglican Communion and the general global order. In a piece by Thad Barnum on Kolini’s participation in the Singapore Consecrations, Kolini describes staying silent in the face of the American church’s errors as a form of colonization: “[Kolini told] those who were angry over Singapore, ‘Why are you angry with me? You put a fence around me and told me to stay quiet. That’s colonialism! In Singapore, I knocked your fence down. I will not be manipulated by you or anyone. I have a responsibility before God to speak the truth of the Bible.’” Further, Kolini argued that the other Southern primates who hesitated to call the Episcopal Church to account (in general, but also in particular at the Oporto meeting), held back because of their dependency on the United States—in short, their continued state of colonization and subjugation” (Barnum 2000). Therefore by taking the initiative in establishing AMiA and confronting the American church, Kolini and AMiA’s other leaders see the Rwandan church as taking the laudable and necessary step of challenging the position of the wealthy and powerful Episcopal Church. In short, the leaders in the Church of Rwanda may have gotten involved with AMiA, not only because of the individual connections and convictions of Kolini and Rucyahana, but also because the province as a whole had something to prove on a global scale.

**Negative responses from former allies and sympathizers**
AMiA’s leaders and sympathizers, then, were challenged strongly by their opponents, but these challenges were certainly expected and were answered with ready arguments. The real challenge for the nascent missionary endeavor was not the opposition of those the Singapore Consecrations were directed against, nor of those in high positions of power (like Archbishop Carey) who might sympathize on the issues but object to the actions. Rather, it was the opposition from former allies and sympathizers of First Promise, many of whom were sharply critical of the Singapore consecrations and formation of AMiA. A few conservative observers had some positive comments for the AMiA endeavor. One sympathizer and First Promise member, the Rev. Geoff Chapman, expressed support:

> I personally rejoice in these actions, as does your Vestry and Staff here at St. Stephen's. We see them as a great sign of hope for the Anglican Communion. However, we have many friends who are clearly committed to the same faith and the same Lord who yet believe that these ordinations are a mistake in strategy, that they are “too much”, "too soon", "too hasty", or "too desperate". I think it very important that we not criticize one another too severely for our differences of strategy. [Chapman 2000]

Even Chapman’s positive remarks clearly have the tone of someone trying to moderate negative reactions to the consecrations—which were many, even among conservative Episcopalians who had sought help and intervention from overseas Anglican leaders. AMiA’s Six Month Report notes that at an April 2000 meeting of the organization which would soon be renamed as AMiA, “Concern was expressed that not all of the orthodox Episcopalians were as supportive of the consecrations as had been hoped” (AMiA 2000a).

The response to the Singapore consecrations written by the Rev. Dr. Peter Moore, Dean of Trinity seminary, was typical of conservative American responses. He expresses sympathy with the motivations of those involved, but is clearly quite unhappy with the timing of the consecrations and their potential for dividing conservatives from one another and disrupting other efforts to find a solution for ECUSA’s perceived apostasy.

> The two new bishops are being sent from younger missionary churches
of Africa and Asia to re-evangelize a listless and doctrinally uncertain church in the West. What makes this problematic for friends and foes alike is that they will be ministering to faith communities of the Anglican Communion either divided from or at odds with the bishop and diocese of the Episcopal Church in which they live. They will travel, uninvited and unwelcome, into dioceses whose bishops find their views offensive, divisive, and troublesome....

Moreover, they will serve parishes whose bishops agree with their theology and missiological motives, but view their status as irregular and their work as divisive and a disruption of the work of the Church.... We [at TESM] affirm that the archbishops, bishops and priests who took part in this consecration are godly, humble, deeply caring and sensible men....[But also] we view this action sadly. While we hold both John Rodgers and Chuck Murphy in high esteem and love them as brothers, there is a note of desperation in their action at this time. It is a desperation that we do not share, given the whole trajectory of biblical and spiritual renewal within our Church that we have witnessed and participated in for the last 30-40 years. We fear that this will lead to the splintering and erosion of evangelical and orthodox solidarity within the Church.... We pledge that a climate of love for the Episcopal Church and of cooperation with its leadership will be maintained among us [at TESM].

[Moore 2000]

The final sentences of Moore’s statement raise the crucial issue dividing most American conservative Episcopalians from those involved with AMiA: is this the right time to give up on the Episcopal Church?–or, as one AAC member put it to me, “Is the show over?” Some other conservative groups, such as Forward in Faith- North America (FIFNA), had expressed interest in obtaining oversight from overseas bishops but did not feel that the right moment to make that
break. Other groups have also continued to feel called to working within the Episcopal Church, striving to change its direction. The participation of several key AAC figures in the Kampala meeting in November of 1999 showed that some AAC leaders did believe that the support of overseas primates was needed. But the AAC emphatically did not support the Singapore consecrations, and criticized AMiA for breaking ranks and, as they saw it, giving up on the fight for orthodoxy within the church by leading the orthodox out of the church. As another AAC member told me, “AMiA doesn’t help front-line parishes, the parishes that feel most oppressed by liberal bishops; it just facilitates leaving.” Both FIFNA and the AAC still remain—though perhaps tenuously—within the Episcopal Church, as of April 2004. (See later in this chapter for a brief account of recent developments.)

Some conservative American leaders also criticized AMiA for exploiting the African and Asian church leaders involved with group. Such critiques, interestingly, came primarily from two conservative Episcopal leaders with their own close ties to African churches. One of these leaders, when asked what he made of AMiA, replied that they are “orthodox, but pretty self-indulgent,” and went on to say that AMiA’s leadership have “no appreciation for the damage they are inflicting on the people they are recruiting.” He hastened to add that the Rwandans are responsible for their own behavior, but stated that by encouraging Rwandans to be “strident” in the context of the Anglican Communion, AMiA is costing them support and funding from Northern provinces. “I have a problem with that.” A strikingly similar note was sounded in my interview with another conservative leader:

The AMiA, I’m afraid, is exploiting the Africans. And they are taking the Africans and saying, ‘Come and help us solve our problem, and our problem is a doctrinal one, it has to do with sexuality.’ But the Africans say, ‘No, that is not your problem; your problem is materialism, your problem is the whole Western way of life, you do not understand.’ ‘Well, we don’t want to hear that’—because the AMiA crowd is as wedded to the high-style American-style way of life as anything else. So we’re not hearing their critique of the economic issues and all the rest.... We’re using the great asset of the tremendous amount of numbers that are behind an orthodox witness from
Africa to solve our problem. And I just think it’s unconscionable.

These two churchmen, then, reacted negatively to AMiA in part because they saw it as exploitative of Africans, as an endeavor which primarily responds to American conservative concerns and desires, while carrying negative consequences for the African churches involved.

A further criticism of AMiA raised by other conservative leaders was that those involved in the consecrations hadn’t garnered broad enough international support for the effort before going ahead with the consecrations. AMiA’s Six Month Report revealed that by midsummer 2000, AMiA leaders were realizing that “there is reluctance for others to join with us because there are only two Provinces officially supporting us.... For instance,... FIFNA would be much more willing to identify with us if there were several Provinces openly supporting us” (AMiA 200a). A piece in the *Christian Challenge* gives FIFNA president David Moyer’s perspective: “‘A majority of primates is required to make any solution “stick,”’, [Moyer] said. ‘If we don’t seek a larger consensus,’ he added, ‘we will split the “good guys” in the Communion’” (Traycik 2000).

This concern about ‘splitting the good guys’–creating division among those who believe the Episcopal Church needs to be disciplined–lay behind the single most commonly mentioned criticism of the Singapore consecrations: that they scuttled hopes that disciplinary action against the United States might come out of the Primates’ Meeting at Oporto in March of 2000. Conservatives and liberals alike in the Episcopal Church were sharply aware that the stakes could be high at Oporto; this meeting might well be where the global Communion’s anger would be felt, over the intransigence of those provinces who had disregarded the main message of the Lambeth resolution on sexuality. A fundraising letter from Bill Atwood of the Ekklesia Society, dating from before the Singapore Consecration, illustrates how high his hopes were for Oporto: “Rather than being ‘just another meeting,’ this one may well be a turning point in the history of the Anglican Communion.... The opportunity to see Biblical values honored in the Episcopal Church is at hand” (Atwood 2000a). Oporto was seen as such a key opportunity that the Primates
and other leaders gathered in Kampala in November of 1999 had concluded that they would focus their efforts on planning for the Oporto meeting, as discussed above.

Many conservative Americans and other Anglican leaders felt that the consecrators and the new bishops had violated an agreement made at the Kampala meeting not to take action until the Primates’ Meeting. For example, the outspoken conservative Archbishop Harry Goodhew (of Sydney, Australia) spoke out strongly against the consecrations on the basis of their violation of the Kampala statement:

_The reason that I demur from the recent action is simple: in my judgement it was too soon, it had too little support, it was against the spirit of an earlier agreement reached in Kampala by a group of conservative Primates and archbishops to take the matter to the Primates' Meeting in Portugal, and it was undertaken in a spirit of secrecy.... Kampala participants reached an understanding that no action be taken before the Primates' meeting. It is because of a breach of this general understanding that I am disappointed by what happened in Singapore. [Goodhew 2000]_

A high Ugandan church official told me, in a similar vein:

_If you were able to get hold of the resolutions in that Kampala conference, it was clear that consecrating bishops or forming new provinces or dioceses in objection of what was going on, that was not the right way to go, but that the Primates, who were going to meet in Portugal at that time, would discuss these matters and give a sense of direction. But to our surprise and amazement, we heard there were consecrations in Singapore before the primates' meeting in Portugal.... That was not the resolution of the Kampala meeting and the fellowship of those few bishops and other clergy after Lambeth._

The AMiA bishops and supporters defended themselves against criticisms about the timing of the consecrations by arguing that the persistent heterodoxy of the Episcopal Church and the plight of ‘frontline’ congregations demanded an immediate response, and that the Kampala
Statement had left room for action before the Primates’ Meeting. In a letter published in May of 2000 in *United Voice*, Archbishops Tay and Kolini wrote:

> It was acknowledged in paragraph two of our Kampala Statement that "among us are those ready to respond to specific and urgent situations which may arise in the months before the Primates' meeting in Portugal from 23 to 28 March." Again, we have established no new province or entity but have taken an interim action in accordance with the above. We cannot help but reach the conclusion that you have been seriously misinformed with reference to the consensus reached last November in Kampala. We have simply acted according to paragraph two of the Kampala Statement signed by the nine primates. [Tay and Kolini 2000]

However, others denied this interpretation of the conclusions coming out of Kampala. Archbishop Harry Goodhew responded quite directly to this argument:

> A view is circulating that all at Kampala agreed to support any of their number who believed necessity demanded some action before Portugal. *This interpretation is mistaken.* The agreement was made with clear understanding that it related to the promise of pastoral support for any church or parish that might come under extreme pressure or sanctions before the Primates had a chance to consider the whole situation. [Goodhew 2000, emphasis added]

Judging by the wording of the Kampala statement, the possibility left open in that document for responses to “specific and urgent situations” was probably intended, as Goodhew states, to cover the cases of particular parishes which might run into troublesome conflicts in the months before Oporto. Most of those who signed that statement, and those who read it, probably did understand it as an agreement to avoid drastic actions and wait upon the Primates’ Meeting.

The problem with violating the Kampala agreement to wait upon the Primates’ Meeting, from the point of view of conservative critics of the Singapore consecrations, was that it made it much less likely that appeals through official channels would bear fruit. Conservative Episcopal activists had been working extremely hard to build a commitment among a majority of Southern
Primates to demand conformity from the Episcopal Church at the Oporto meeting. These leaders and their sympathizers saw the Singapore consecrations as profoundly damaging to their efforts. As one conservative Episcopal leader told me, “There are people who I think believe that John Rodgers and AMiA torpedoed the Primates’ Meeting of March 2000. If they hadn’t done that, we could’ve gotten the majority of bishops to discipline the Episcopal Church. There are people who believe they destroyed our best chance.” AMiA’s leaders and supporters tried to argue that the consecrations could actually help the conservative agenda at the Oporto meeting. They argued that the consecrations brought the issue of the Episcopal Church’s continued rejection of the Lambeth sexuality resolution to everyone’s minds, and made its importance clear. In his interview with David Virtue, John Rodgers stated:

It seems to me that [the Singapore Consecrations] will only serve to make the issue of the increasing departure of ECUSA and the Western Provinces of the Anglican Communion in general from biblical teaching more pressing at the meeting of the Primates in March. I think it will not hurt but rather strengthen the hands of the orthodox Primates at the Lisbon meeting.

[Virtue 2000a, emphasis added]

But what in fact happened at the Oporto meetings was more in line with their former allies’ fears than with AMiA leaders’ hopes. Faced with the Singapore Consecrations—shocking, disruptive, dubiously-legitimate—many primates who sympathized with the conservative American cause apparently backed away from confronting the Episcopal Church. Alistair MacDonald Radcliff, international liaison for the AAC, wrote about his efforts to caucus Primates before the Oporto meeting:

The Singapore affair had definitely made it less likely that the nervous middle ground primates would stick with the core group who met at Kampala. Moreover... my consultations with the Primates... strongly suggested that several were so pre-occupied with the consecrations they were inclined to distance themselves from the earlier alliances lest they be thought schismatic.
A Virtue-Traycik feature entitled, “The Primates’ Oporto Communique: Warning, or Wimp-Out?” examined the outcomes of the Oporto Primates’ Meeting, beginning with the high hopes many held for the meeting, and detailing the disappointing outcome: a final statement which was weak and unclear in its language, and conclusively failed to call ECUSA and other liberal provinces to account. In their analysis of why conservatives’ hopes were not fulfilled, they place a significant part of the blame on the Singapore consecrations:

There were strong hints... that some conservative primates were discouraged from taking a harder line because they did not want to be too closely identified with the anomalous Singapore consecrations in January. One source claimed that, before the Singapore event, there was a "rock-solid coalition" of conservative primates ready to hold ECUSA's feet to the fire in Portugal. [Virtue and Traycik 2000b]

Several AMiA leaders and supporters suggested after Oporto that the weak response from the Primates further justified the Singapore consecrations–arguing that it proved most of the Primates were too cautious and beholden to the U.S. to take any significant action on their own, so that drastic action by a few was needed. But what these leaders tried to claim as justification for their actions–the failure of the Oporto Primates’ Meeting to take any action against ECUSA–others laid at their door, arguing it was the fault of those involved in Singapore that nothing happened in Oporto. An AAC member told me bitterly, “Singapore saved the day for the liberals, without a doubt, conclusively. [ECUSA Presiding Bishop] Griswold should’ve sent Tay and Kolini the biggest thank-you ever.”

All the criticism and blame the leaders of AMiA received from other conservatives cut much more deeply than the indignation of their opponents. Indeed, Murphy and Rodgers apparently found the pressure from fellow conservatives to adequately explain and justify their consecrations that they developed a strong tendency to pass the buck to Kolini and Tay. For example, Charles Murphy issued a statement shortly after the consecrations in which he stated,
This is an Archbishops’ Action. I may have some influence in some circles but I do not have influence enough to make Archbishops do what they have just done. If people have trouble with it, I want to refer them to the two consecrating Archbishops. [Murphy 2000]

John Rodgers, too, stated in an early interview: “It is important to state that neither Chuck nor I took the initiative in this matter nor did we push for any specific date. The leadership and initiative belonged entirely to the two Primates” (Virtue 2000a). Thus, under pressure from other conservatives to explain why they apparently broke the consensus to wait upon Oporto, the new bishops and their American allies referred the explanation of the timing of the consecrations to the consecrating Primates—who never issued a specific explanation of the timing. Indeed, the only concrete explanation for the timing of the consecrations which has come forth is that of Tay’s imminent retirement, mentioned above. This factor, however, was not much mentioned by AMiA leaders, perhaps because it would make the consecrations sound too contingent.

To sum up, in the months following its founding, AMiA was welcomed by some American conservatives, especially those in dissident parishes like St. Timothy’s which rapidly came to join the new body. AMiA also garnered a great deal of criticism from opponents and allies alike, and its initiators and leaders were blamed for hurting conservative unity and goals. Generally speaking, for the first several months after the consecrations, the endeavor the new ‘missionary bishops’ were to head developed slowly and under fire. However, in the late summer, it was given a much-needed boost by the outcomes of the General Convention of the Episcopal Church—the triennial meeting at which matters of Episcopal Church policy and procedure are decided by the House of Bishops and a corresponding House of elected clergy and lay delegates.

The General Convention (GenCon) of 2000, held in Denver in July, upset American conservatives in a variety of ways. Some of the more evangelically- and charismatically-minded attendees and observers saw GenCon 2000 as the site of profound spiritual warfare. But even
conservatives who did not share that supernatural view of the conference were upset by its outcomes. In the first place, the convention passed a resolution dealing with the three Episcopal dioceses whose bishops still did not ordain and/or employ women priests. The resolution called for the creation of a task force to "visit, interview, assess and assist" the dioceses in their "compliance" with the national canons requiring the ordination of women by September 1, 2002 (Virtue 2000b). Though many evangelical and charismatic Episcopalians, unlike their Anglo-Catholic colleagues, are not opposed or not strongly opposed to women priests, this resolution was universally objected to by conservatives regardless of their own position on the issue because it was seen as liberal coerciveness and a bad precedent. Furthermore, though proposed resolutions which would have permitted same-sex unions were defeated, General Convention 2000 seemed to move slightly farther in the direction of formalizing acceptance of homosexual relationships by passing a resolution which acknowledged the existence of lifelong, committed, non-marital relationships within the church.

Immediately after the Convention, in August of 2000, the AMiA ‘missionary bishops’ met with their archbishops in Amsterdam and, in light of what these leaders all saw as the continued unrepentant heterodoxy of ECUSA, were given permission to proceed, ‘full speed ahead,’ with recruiting and planting parishes and developing an alternative Anglican province in the U.S. While its leaders and proponents had often described AMiA as an “interim” measure in the preceding months, any restraint or hesitance attached to the missionary bishops’ work was now to be at an end. This was the point at which the growing church body Murphy and Rodgers led was officially christened the “Anglican Mission in America.”

In the wake of General Convention and with the new mandate from their overseas sponsors, AMiA’s leaders anticipated a great exodus of Episcopal parishes from ECUSA into AMiA. And indeed, AMiA did receive many more inquiries in the months after General Convention. Their “Ten Month Report” stated, “We were inundated with requests and inquiries from priests,
parishes and people.” By January of 2001, when AMiA held its first “Homecoming Conference” on the spacious campus of its South Carolina headquarters, All Saints’ Church, AMiA could boast 21 member congregations.

Some of these parishes were large, in those cases when almost an entire evangelical congregation had broken away, and some were small congregations consisting of groups of disaffected Episcopalians who had left an existing church to form a new AMiA parish. In one case, four priests and parts of their congregations in the Diocese of Colorado, the diocese which had hosted General Convention, joined AMiA en masse. At least one parish which had split from the Episcopal Church several years earlier joined AMiA within its first year of life, as did one Nigerian parish in Texas which had had problems with its American bishop. Leaders and parishes associated with the Reformed Episcopal Church and several other Continuing Church groups also explored establishing collaborative relationships with AMiA. At a service in Colorado in June of 2001, amid further controversy, AMiA consecrated four more bishops to serve as leaders for its widespread and diverse flock. Today AMiA is comprised of approximately 60 parishes, of widely varying sizes, scattered all over the country, though somewhat concentrated in the western and southeastern U.S. (Nunley 2001).

Though AMiA has never become the massive body some of its leaders hoped for in this early, optimistic period, it has become a solidly established body. In addition, in the period following General Convention several other conservative groups who had initially opposed or responded ambivalently to AMiA expressed grudging support for the endeavor, apparently further convinced of the Episcopal Church’s un-reformability by the outcomes of the 2000 General Convention. Shortly after Convention, the CCLEC, a small conservative organization, announced its intention to shut down and join its efforts to those of AMiA. General Convention also spurred both the AAC and Forward In Faith-North America to express their support for and solidarity with AMiA. A few months after GenCon 2000, in early 2001, FIF-NA leaders held a
joint meeting with AMiA leaders and pledged their solidarity and shared goals and concerns. But FIF-NA was not ready to join AMiA, remaining committed to ongoing efforts to lobby the Primates, as a body, to discipline the Episcopal Church (Edwards 2001). Likewise, the AAC affirmed its solidarity with AMiA after GenCon 2000, but also carried on with its own commitment to working for reform of the Episcopal Church through official Anglican Communion structures, including (unsuccessfully) petitioning the Primates at the early 2001 Primates’ Meeting to pressure the Episcopal Church to accept their “Jubilee Bishops” proposal, which would provide alternative episcopal oversight for Episcopal parishes (conservative or liberal) out of sympathy with their bishop.102

However, in spite of greater recognition by other conservatives of the need for their work, AMiA’s relations and ties with conservatives still in ECUSA (like the AAC and FIF-NA) worsened during this period. The increased exodus after GenCon 2000 hurt AMiA’s base of support among conservative ECUSA bishops, because parishes in their dioceses began to decide that an orthodox local bishop could not make up for a heretical national church and that they needed to leave ECUSA and join AMiA. AMiA’s Ten Month Report describes this development—and the correspondingly worsening relations with conservative ECUSA bishops:

Now... churches that could no longer conscientiously remain in ECUSA from moderate and even orthodox dioceses began conversations with us.... [As a result] those thought to be orthodox bishops began to make disparaging remarks about AMiA. One bishop accused us of ‘sheep stealing’ because of the parishes [in his diocese] that affiliated with AMiA. [AMiA 2001b]

Though AMiA remained moderately unpopular among conservative Episcopalians, however, the expressions of solidarity which followed General Convention suggested that AMiA’s approach was seeming increasingly justified. American conservatives were confronted with the perpetual failure of solutions to conservatives’ dilemmas which functioned within the bounds of the Episcopal Church, like the AAC’s initiatives. Further, most Primates seemed unwilling to
exert overt pressure or take a confrontational attitude towards ECUSA and other liberal provinces. Pursuing the network model—seeking connections with the few overseas Primates and other leaders willing to extend protection or otherwise offer support—began to seem like the only way forward for many conservative Episcopalians. The bottom-up, hierarchy-dodging approach originated at St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, which became the AMiA paradigm, increasingly appeared less and less a violation and a fluke, more and more the wave of the future.

Ugandan perspectives on AMiA

What were African Anglicans’ reactions to the Singapore Consecrations, to this dramatic and controversial action taken by two African bishops? In talking with Church of Uganda leaders and members about AMiA, I heard repeated explanations of why the Church of Uganda did not, and should not have, supported the Singapore Consecrations. Ugandans felt that action was too confrontational, too disruptive of Anglican order, too schismatic in its implications. But most Ugandans question or criticize the Singapore consecrations and AMiA as the wrong kind of response to the problems in ECUSA; they seem to sympathize with the motivation for the actions, and believe that there is some need for a response by Southern leaders to the problems in the Episcopal Church. This general position seems to be broadly shared by many other African church leaders, based on the available evidence, such as published statements about the Singapore consecrations from various African church leaders.

Most Ugandan bishops, like their Rwandan colleagues, were and are critical of the Episcopal Church’s disregard of the Lambeth sexuality resolution and other aspects of the American church. But they did not look favorably on actions which might damage their relations with ECUSA or the rest of the Anglican Communion. One Ugandan bishop told me that he and other Ugandan bishops see the problem, but feel getting involved with something like AMiA would only lead to more problems:

For us, and most of the bishops in Africa, we say that we see the problem
there, but we shouldn't intervene, we shouldn't go to consecrate a bishop there.

When [the First Promise Round Table] came here [at Kampala II], they thought
that we were going to help them.... But for us, we said, no, that's not our
agenda.... We have many problems; we don't like to add another problem....
Why do we start another problem there? We shall pray for you. But some
bishops said, no, we are going to go with you. And that's why they consecrated
that bishop. [Emphasis added]

Many Ugandan Anglicans expressed concern about the ways the Singapore consecrations and
AMiA challenged or threatened the authority structure of the Anglican Communion. In the words
of one Ugandan priest, “Personally I wouldn't support it. Because it contradicts the authority, the
common communion, for what the Communion stands for.... I think there is a sense of
indiscipline.” Another priest also implicitly criticized the “indiscipline” of AMiA by asking
rhetorically, “How would Kolini feel if some of his parishes went under the Archbishop of
Uganda?” Similar criticisms can be found in the comments of Anglicans from elsewhere in
Africa. For example, the Anglican primate of Nigeria, in a 2001 interview, criticized AMiA for
its disregard of Anglican structures and boundaries:

You don't just jump from your diocese to begin to do whatever you like
in another man's diocese. That is not done in our Anglican tradition. What
AMiA has done is to leave their own provinces, their own Church, and
attempting to create another church within the Church, which is totally against
our Anglican heritage. The fact that there are parts of the American Church that
have problems is not a sufficient ground for brother primates or brother bishops
to go and split the American Church. [Adekola 2001]

Some Ugandans, however, do feel there could be justification for bending rules and
transgressing boundaries. For one Ugandan priest, the situation in North America seemed so dire
that boundary-crossing of some sort might be justified:

You have some congregations where individuals are really looking for
Christian—for sound Christian leadership. And I know two bishops, mine
inclusive, who have been asked by some congregations in North America to
offer their episcopal oversight. They hesitated, of course, because of the political reasons and practical implications. And yet there is that problem that has been noticed..... It’s like you have a father who is abusing his kids. Now, do the neighbors standby and wait until the child dies, or they may come and do some violation of the privacy or the rights of the parent, for the overall good? That’s where I think the idea of geographical respect is likely to be violated for the sake of spiritual intervening in a situation which has gone out of control.

Most Ugandan bishops whom I interviewed said they thought the type of action taken in Singapore was too drastic and could not be justified. But two bishops did say they could see the need for African bishops to intervene and care for American parishes, and that actions like taking jurisdiction over American parishes might be justified. One bishop made an interesting analogy with the missionary period in the church in Africa, in which bishops were consecrated elsewhere to serve the African Christian populations, in arguing that such actions are a reasonable response to the situation in the Episcopal Church today:

If our brothers in the North cannot get help from their church, which is subjugating them, personally I support somehow–I don't know, probably I wouldn't go, but I support those who can at least go and give them some support. I wouldn't sort of castigate too much those who go there..., the Church of Rwanda and whatnot. Although probably if I'm to go I may have to think twice or something. I don’t know how I will do it.... [But] Christians were never meant always to receive. We also go out.... Why can't Christians say now, if we want to go and evangelize a group of unbelievers, let’s send there bishops? Let's consecrate bishops? That's what they did here in Uganda. When they consecrated the first bishop, they didn't first come here and ask the pagans, should this be your bishop? They consecrated him in England, and he came here as bishop of Uganda.... So when Christianity is dead in a place, the missionaries can go, and the missionaries don't have to get permission from the
people to be evangelized. 'Can you allow us to come and preach the Gospel to you, please?' No! they come and share the Gospel. So we can consecrate bishops and send them to pagan North America. [Emphasis added]

His colleague, a recently-retired bishop, likewise states that such actions are warranted under current conditions:

What these Rwanda people and Asians have done is a real breakthrough. They are doing something which is extraordinary. Because in normal terms, you do not breach [the Communion]. But they are saying, God is calling us to do the extraordinary.... So, in my mind, even if–OK, personally, would I do it? I think maybe no. Maybe no. Because the Anglican Communion, I like it. My church, the Church of Uganda, belongs to the Anglican Church. I like the Church of Uganda. My diocese here is part of the Anglican Communion, and I like it. And also I’m naturally unwilling to lose my membership, to break away, and I still value my fellowship. And so if I’m going to tamper with my relationship with my church, my Anglican church, then I would have to think twice. But if somebody has done it, I don’t want to say he has done the wrong thing. That’s why I say, no–strictly speaking, I say, Thank you, God. Because there is a breakthrough here. Maybe better things will be seen as time goes on.... Kolini and this man in Asia may appear wrong today; ten years we may say, praise God they did what they have done. [Emphasis added]

These two bishops—incidentally, two of the most outspokenly critical of ECUSA among Ugandan bishops—both talk about the possibility of taking drastic actions themselves and express some sympathy and support for the Church of Rwanda’s intervention, but they also both ultimately come to the conclusion that, most likely, they themselves wouldn’t actually do anything so drastic (‘probably I wouldn’t go,’ ‘I may have to think twice’).
However, though even these outspoken bishops would hesitate to intervene in the Episcopal Church as dramatically as did Kolini and Rucyahana, many Ugandans do welcome the idea of bringing an orthodox African witness to the American and other Northern churches. Ugandan and other African Anglicans seem to look quite favorably on ideas of a more networked, more reciprocal Anglican world. Many Ugandans told me that they felt exchange and reciprocity should characterize contemporary and future missions work. One Ugandan priest told me, “We are at a time when we should have missions from both ends.” A Ugandan bishop shared his views on contemporary missions with me, describing a globe in which Christians may travel anywhere to share their faith:

*The time is now for us to cross-pollinate one another as the Anglican Communion.... [The] time has come for us to go beyond our borders and see the church, not from a national point of view, but the church is global. Wherever He sends us as believers, let’s go! The West come to the South, the South go to the West, West go to the East, let’s move around, let’s influence each other!* [Emphasis added]

Such statements make it clear that Ugandans feel that their church, and African Christianity more generally, has something to offer the wider Christian world—but also that they feel the rest of the world still has much to offer to African Christians. Ugandans often spoke to me of the continued need for the kinds of material and technical support which Northern missionaries, and relations with Northern provinces, usually bring. Ugandans stress that the fellowship and sharing of experiences with visiting Northerners is very important to them, irrespective of the possible material correlates of those relationships; but Ugandans are also well aware that there are frequently material correlates, when Northern missionaries (or companion parish teams, or NGO workers, or researchers, etc.) visit and establish relationships with Ugandan individuals and institutions. For instance, one Ugandan priest told me she felt “we would be very much blessed to see an exchange of missionaries,” because Africans and Americans have different testimonies and experiences; she then went on to stress heavily how much her diocese has been
blessed by support from partner parishes in the U.S. Another Ugandan, a lay staff member, explained how American help for Ugandan needs flows naturally out of amicable relationships:

The thing rotates along relationships. Because now Philip comes here and he is a friend, when he goes back he says, Oh, Abner is there. Whenever you are reading your Bible and you pray, you pray for Abner. And eventually the Spirit says, well, how about getting in fellowship with this friend again? And I see a letter from Miranda. Then eventually we interact, and then the Lord says, What is your main problem, what are the challenges you are facing in your daily life? And then I say, you know, our church, the wind has blown off the roof. So you find Philip and Miranda busy organizing—we call them cookies, selling them to get money to bring to Abner to make sure Abner buys a roof, you know, to repair the roof of the church.... The whole thing revolves around who is your neighbor. You must feel for a friend.... We know we are all [equal]. But... there is more wealth in the States than in Africa. There is no question about that. So normally [Americans] have a heart to ask what they can do, you know, to help. And normally they share.

Ugandans, then, strongly endorse the idea that the evolving Anglican world should be characterized by a dense and widespread network of reciprocal relationships, in which gifts, experiences, and strengths are shared among the various churches of the Communion. In this networked Communion, the African churches might share more actively than in the past, bringing their gifts of spiritual zeal and orthodoxy to the Northern churches (see chapter 7). But this greater role for African Christians should not necessarily mean a decreased engagement in mission by Northern Christians, from Ugandan Anglicans’ perspective. In fact, Ugandans often spoke about the Singapore Consecrations and AMiA with disapproval precisely because these steps seem to violate their vision of a more reciprocal and engaged worldwide Communion,
violating the values of partnership, collegiality, complementarity, and relationship which they
describe as central to a new networked global Anglicanism. Several consultants stressed that an
African leader should be officially invited before playing any role in another province (as Kolini
and Tay, for example, have not been). For example, one church official I interviewed stated:
When the church was starting here, the King of Buganda invited
missionaries. I think if this has come up as a need, I expect that the church in
England or the church in America would make some invitations for our people
to go and evangelize. Because evangelism, or sharing the Gospel, is not a one-
way traffic. We can always having brothers coming from this end to the other,
and those coming from there to here.

Likewise, a young divinity student told me firmly,
I do not believe in a transfer of responsibility for Christian leaders in the
US to Christian leaders in Africa. Rather, it should be a joint effort, that
Christian leaders throughout the world should have a platform to work together
to face [societal] problems. The church needs unity and love; only in love can
we see our responsibilities to one another.... Missionary work today needs to be
a two-way effort, which may involve an exchange of personnel, but an
exchange of personnel should not be exercised in rebellion and rejection—it
should be complementary.

Networking and intervention by Ugandan bishops

Almost unanimously, then, Ugandan church leaders and laity told me AMiA was too
confrontational, too schismatic, too disruptive—in short, nothing they would have done, or
would have liked to see their bishops do. But, one way or another, the vast majority of Ugandans
I spoke with did express enthusiasm for the idea that African leaders might be more actively
involved in Anglican Communion affairs and might strengthen their relationships with Northern
provinces. Some Ugandans find this idea appealing because they believe more mutual
engagement and reciprocity among Anglican churches and provinces will be beneficial for all
involved, like Abner or others quoted above. Other Ugandans are concerned by what they hear
about the moral condition of the Northern churches, and are eager to see African leaders make an
impact, by preaching to those weak in faith and ministering to beleaguered orthodox minorities.
Either or both of these motivations serve to support a greater degree of Ugandan (and Southern) involvement in American (and Northern) church affairs. And, while most Ugandans were ill-at-ease with AMiA, such an arrangement is only one form of Southern involvement in ECUSA and ministry to conservative Episcopalians.

Some of the same Ugandan leaders who expressed aversion to AMiA as too schismatic, have no problem with—and, in some cases, themselves participate in—other, less dramatic relationships along the same lines. AMiA, by dint of the rank of the leaders involved, the confrontational character of its founding, and its relatively large size, is easily the most visible and most controversial example of African intervention on behalf of beleaguered conservative Northerners. However, AMiA is not by any means the only example of such intervention. The kind of innovative networking that began even before Lambeth with St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, continued apace afterwards, as soon as it became clear that ECUSA would not change its policies of tolerance in response to Lambeth 1998.

These other relationships and connections, while founded on the same general principles as AMiA, are less organized and official than AMiA, not requiring the parishes involved to declare their separation from their Northern provinces. Most of these other actions are also either smaller-scale (involving only one parish, and/or only one overseas bishop), of shorter duration (involving a short-term visit or one key service, like a confirmation service, which requires a bishop’s participation), or less controversial (in some situations, the local Northern bishop went along with the arrangement to a greater or lesser extent, making it less of a violation of Anglican order and collegiality) than AMiA. But while AMiA is the most organized, clearest-cut, and most visible example of such a transnational Anglican oversight arrangement, all the other varied arrangements along the same lines carry just as much significance, if not more—demonstrating, as they do, that AMiA was not simply the brainchild of a few frustrated and pugnacious Anglican leaders, but is instead the most visible sign of a much wider movement or trend in
world Anglicanism, which is manifest in many other sites and many other forms. This is the trend for Northern conservatives (evangelicals, charismatics, and Anglo-Catholics alike) who feel alienated from their own provinces, to seek the support and ministry of Southern Christians whom they believe to be more like-minded and more orthodox than their own Northern bishops. A retired Episcopal bishop summed it all up well, in our interview:

It used to be something that no one would have thought about. A new series of circumstances with a church that is caught in the present culture wars over the social issues that are dividing the Christian community in the United States has really produced this kind of out-of-the-box thinking. And none of it is really against the rules. The rules never anticipated such arrangements.... For many of us these foreign jurisdictions are theologically more nearly where we were when we were ordained, and where the Episcopal Church was. The American church has shifted remarkably in its positions. We're trying to find ways to stay rooted in the Anglican Communion that still make sense to us, when the local manifestation of the Anglican Communion, namely the Episcopal Church in diocese X or diocese Y, seems to have shifted substantially in its theological positions.... There are many of us who are trying to find creative ways forward that think about the church in different terms than the simple legal and geographical terms that we've always understood. [Emphasis added]

Though these various cases of African and other Southern bishops tending the needs of American parishes differ in important ways from AMiA, they serve many of the same functions: enabling disaffected parishes (or, as one Ugandan described them, “aggrieved churches”) in the U.S. to feel supported by and connected with sympathetic and like-minded bishops in other parts of the world, and also, as needed, to obtain sacramental services (such as confirmation and ordination, which require a bishop’s presence) which they cannot or will not receive from their own ECUSA bishop. Testimony of dissident Episcopalians’ pleasure at forming these more amicable, non-geographic relationships comes from the Rev. Martyn Minns, rector of the conservative evangelical Truro Episcopal Church outside Washington, D.C., who recently told the New York Times Magazine (reportedly “with glee”), “I spend more time with bishops in the global south than with the bishop of Virginia” (Massing 2004:39).
These less formal, often temporary relationships draw relatively little controversy, if any, and thus are easier for African bishops to enter into. A Ugandan bishop told me that it would be difficult for him to become the bishop of one American parish which sought his help, but that visiting and ministering to that parish and others was “no problem”:

If they asked me when I was already with them to confirm, I would confirm. If they asked me to administratively or pastorally link up, like Kolini has linked up, then I would not find it easy to make as a decision personally, for reasons like, if we are making a decision to offer any pastoral concerns for the church in America, it should be made [in the Ugandan House of Bishops].... So if they asked me to be a bishop for them so that they have direct jurisdiction under me, that would be hard.... [But] to go and minister to them, oh, yeah, definitely. That’s no problem there. I don’t find that difficult.

And another Ugandan bishop told me that he had, in fact, ministered in parishes all over the world—in some cases just as a visitor, without political implications, but in some cases helping out a parish which had conflicts with its own bishop.

In some of the congregations where I went, I could see some of the people, they were responding much more to my message and having a lot of sympathy to me.... There are a number of congregations, I think, which would be happier if they got a bishop or pastor from Africa or from Asia, because they don’t think their own pastor is doing a good job.

In what follows, I will offer a brief catalog of some of the instances in which disaffected Northern parishes have sought and received the support and services of obliging African bishops, as part of the Northern parishes’ efforts to avoid, and protest, their own ECUSA leadership. My list is by no means exhaustive, and is biased towards the actions of Ugandan bishops, but by
describing a number of these acts and relationships, I will give some sense of the outlines of the wider movement which encompasses AMiA.

**St. Andrew’s Church, Destin, Florida**

As with St. Timothy’s and many other evangelical and charismatic parishes, St. Andrew’s congregations’ differences from the mainstream worship style and outlook of the Episcopal Church led them to give increasing thought to leaving ECUSA in the mid- to late 1990s. As a result, the parish joined the First Promise movement in 1997, and several parish leaders, including rector Michael Hesse, attended the Dallas Conference. There, they met Ugandan Bishop Wilson Turumanya of Bunyoro-Kitara Diocese. Following the conference, with the support of SOMA-USA, Turumanya spent some time at St. Andrew’s, Destin, where he was much impressed with the church’s charismatic orientation. Turumanya accordingly invited Hesse to visit his diocese and teach about charismatic practices; Hesse and several other members visited Uganda soon afterwards. In Uganda, these Americans became convinced that they were not the only ones with spiritual gifts to bestow and that their African brethren might have a great deal to give to American Christians. A leader in the parish explained to me that St. Andrew’s leaders started to consider the numbers: there are 20,000 Episcopalians in his diocese, and 300,000 Anglicans in the city of Hoima, Uganda, alone, with many more in the rest of Turumanya’s diocese. He quipped, “Who needs to be missionaries to whom?”

St. Andrew’s thus asked Bishop Turumanya to send two of his staff to spend four months in the Destin area. Hesse told religion reporter Gustav Niebuhr:

> The exchange between St. Andrew’s and Uganda has run both ways. Two years ago, Bishop Turumanya sent two missionaries to Destin. They made a striking sight, riding bicycles around an overwhelmingly white community where most people drive. Their eagerness to proclaim their faith touched people at St. Andrew’s. [Niebuhr 2001]

Thus strong links to Bunyoro-Kitara and Ugandan Christians were growing for St. Andrew’s–even as their sense of connection with the Episcopal Church was weakening. Hesse
was in Uganda, being made an honorary canon in Hoima cathedral in recognition of his spiritual gifts, during the Episcopal Church’s 2000 General Convention. Observing ECUSA from that distance, he felt a conviction that it was time to disengage and seek more congenial connections. Accordingly, the church soon moved to join AMiA. The parish leader with whom I spoke explained that the parish continues to be in active relationship with Turumanya’s diocese, though its formal affiliation is now with the Church of Rwanda. He expressed hope that someday his church might be able to affiliate with the Church of Uganda, as well. But regardless of whether the Ugandan church actually became involved with AMiA or another such arrangement, it is clear that the parish’s relationship with Bunyoro-Kitara, and experiences of being missionized and ministered to by Ugandans, made it easier to make the jump to AMiA. As the parish leader put it, being part of the Province of Rwanda “made sense to people,” since they were “next-door neighbors” of Uganda; so joining AMiA “wasn’t a step into space.” Thus, in Destin, Florida, a parish’s path of seeking out African leadership and spiritual support in Uganda, eased their path into joining AMiA under the headship of an African archbishop, Emmanuel Kolini of Rwanda.

**Christ Church, Grove Farm**

St. Andrew’s, Destin, is not Bishop Wilson Turumanya’s only American connection, by any means. Like John Rucyahana, Turumanya studied at Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry, and thus has many friends and connections in the American church, and especially in the Pittsburgh area. These connections led him into another cross-provincial relationship when, in 1998, he took charge of an Episcopal priest who had broken from the Diocese of Pittsburgh to form a new, Anglican-rooted, non-denominational church. Christ Church, Grove Farm was formed in the mid-1990s from a group unhappy with the Episcopal Church formed their own new congregation. The evangelical bishop of that diocese, Bishop Robert Duncan, chose to try to work with the parish, and to allow its priests to remain Episcopal clergy in good standing. An Episcopalian from that diocese explained to me:
The bishop chose to treat it under the canons as though Guest were serving... a non-Episcopal congregation, as some of our priests sometimes do.... They chose, rather than trying to throw the book at the priest and the congregation, to find a way to keep them in the extended Anglican fold.

Bishop Turumanya became involved with Christ Church because the parish wanted David Valencia, a recent graduate of Trinity seminary, ordained as a priest, to provide more staff for the parish. Bishop Duncan, though anxious to keep up good relations with Christ Church, couldn’t legally ordain Valencia because he was not a member of an ECUSA parish. The rector of Christ Church then contacted Bishop Turumanya, to inquire whether he would be able and willing to assist. In a newspaper article on the church, Duncan explained, “Bishop Turumanya came to me [at Lambeth] to ask whether I would bless [Turumanya’s ordaining Valencia] or not. It was my response that ... I would be glad for that development” (Rodgers-Melnick 1998). The Post-Gazette documents that Christ Church did not want this arrangement understood as a way of joining the Anglican Communion. Rather, they stuck to their non-denominational parish identity, while keeping particular connections to the wider Anglican world (Guest officially reports to the Bishop of Pittsburgh, and Valencia to the Bishop of Hoima, Uganda). But in spite of Christ Church’s determined non-denominationalism, Robert Duncan hopes that they may yet be brought back into the Anglican fold—a hope which motivated him to support the arrangement with Wilson Turumanya (Rodgers-Melnick 1998).

Both the bishops involved in this arrangement, Duncan and Turumanya, see it as not merely a one-off accommodation, but an indication of wider trends and greater things to come. In a letter to the members of Christ Church, Turumanya wrote, “I am sure that we can establish a history-making arrangement between Christ Church and Bunyaro-Kitara, one that may point the way for other churches to remain within the worldwide Anglican fellowship without compromising their biblical beliefs.” Duncan, for his part, drew an analogy between current developments in the Anglican Communion, and the abolishment of parish boundaries in the Episcopal Church some 60 years. "People seem to be better served by being in the congregation that better feeds them spiritually, not just the church that happens to be in their neighborhood.” Today, Duncan predicted, “jets may do to diocesan boundaries what automobiles did to parish boundaries”—by enabling parishes to belong to the larger church bodies and networks which best ‘feed them spiritually,’ rather than having to belong to the church body within whose geographical boundaries they are located (Rodgers-Melnick 1998).
Four ordinations and a consecration

A third example also involves Ugandan bishops being brought in to help with ordinations which could not otherwise be accomplished in the Episcopal Church—this time, because the candidates had received their training in a seminary which would make it difficult for them to be accepted for ordination by any American diocese. To understand the motives behind this arrangement, it must also be understood that evangelicals, charismatics, and Anglo-Catholics in the Episcopal Church feel that it has been made very difficult for people of their persuasions to be ordained in the Episcopal Church. They feel that most of the Episcopal seminaries have been thoroughly infected with liberalism and (post)modern theology, which will corrupt orthodox students who attend; but at the same time, if those seeking the priesthood attend the two conservative Episcopal seminaries, Trinity or Nashotah House, or non-Episcopal evangelical seminaries like Fuller, then upon graduation they are unlikely to be accepted for ordination by any Episcopal diocese’s leadership.

The two would-be priests, in this case, had graduated from the seminary of the Reformed Episcopal Church (REC), a small evangelical Anglican denomination which broke away from the Episcopal Church in 1873, following conflicts between evangelicals and Anglo-Catholics in the church. The conservative Episcopal bishop of the Diocese of the Rio Grande, Terence Kelshaw, was willing to accept the two men into his diocese, but was unable to arrange to ordain them in his diocese due to their REC credentials. Hence the idea of involving an overseas bishop—this case, Bishop Samuel Ssekadde of Namirembe Diocese, Kampala, Uganda. The two men were first ordained as deacons at a service at which Bishop Ssekadde was not present; the deacons were ordained by the REC and Episcopal bishops present, but in Ssekadde’s name. David Virtue provides some explanation of the event:

One commentator explained the event by suggesting that: “By this device the seminary placed two of its students, St. Francis Parish got two assistants,
and the Bishop of the Rio Grande circumvented the normal procedures for ordination in dioceses of the ECUSA. Further, the Ugandan bishop has two of his deacons as missionaries in a foreign land.” [Virtue 1999]

The two deacons were ordained as priests several months later. However, this time their bishop, Samuel Ssekadde, was present to lay hands upon them, along with several of his Ugandan colleagues. One of the other bishops who was present described the event to me, and explained the need for it more fully, laying out the case as to why conservatives in the Episcopal Church need outside help with ordinations:

There were two priests who were being priested who are attached to Namirembe Diocese. They are Namirembe Diocese priests. But actually they are priests of the bishop of [their American] diocese.... They are Americans.... Bishop Ssekkadde ordained these two priests. I think Ssekkadde has been doing it, and a few other bishops, I think, to try and help... the evangelical bishops in America. Because in the Episcopal setting, you have to be chosen, selected by the congregation, in order to go and study in theology, and you have to go to Episcopal theological colleges, whatever. But if you go to an evangelical one, or go to Fuller Seminary or to another one, they will not ordain you, because they say, ‘Who told you to go?’.... So there are some of these good people, and their bishops feel they are good, they've studied, they've gone to... what they think is a good seminary, but they can't ordain them. So what they have been doing is to ask Bishop Ssekkadde or Bishop [his own name] or whoever to come and ordain them.... So that's what they do. Namirembe ordains them, gives them a certificate, then later on a letter, a recommendation that they're in good standing, then the bishop in America will use them. Now they will be included in his list of clergy, and slowly he can
improve the quality of his clergy. Because slowly the liberals had put an entrance and made it difficult for evangelicals to ever go through.

The deacons, then, were ‘priested,’ and Ssekadde’s ‘missionaries’ continued their work in the United States in his name, but under the immediate authority of Bishop Kelshaw. The peculiarity of a situation in which two American men, who have never been to Uganda and have no intention of going there, serve as priests in an Episcopal diocese in the name of a Ugandan bishop, makes sense only in the context of the struggle within ECUSA for a sustained conservative presence in the clergy—and the increasing tendency for conservatives to look overseas, and to Africa in particular, for help in that struggle. In fact, the priests in Texas are not Ssekadde’s only non-Ugandan priests; an event posted on a 2001 Diocese of Pittsburgh calendar reveals that Alistair MacDonald-Radcliffe, the Englishman who serves as international liaison for the conservative American Anglican Council, was also ordained “on behalf of the Bishop Ssekkadde of Namirembe” (Diocese of Pittsburgh 2001).

However, events which occurred on the same trip which brought Ssekadde to Texas to ordain his priests demonstrated the limits of Ugandan bishops’ willingness to be drawn into transgressive and potentially controversial acts. The Ugandan bishops who participated in the ordination of the two priests in Texas had come to the United States on this occasion as the guests of the Reformed Episcopal Church, to participate in the consecration of a new bishop in that church. In what The Christian Challenge described as a “further [sign] that orthodox Anglicans from various jurisdictions around the world are moving closer together,” six Ugandan bishops (Ssekadde, Mutebi of Mityana, Kisekka of Luweero, Sinabulya of Central Buganda, Senyimba of Mukono, and Kahigwa of North Kigezi) attended this consecration service and participated in various ways (Johnson 1999:12). Bishop Mutebi offered a “prayer of affirmation” for the new bishop, and the Ugandan bishops assisted in celebrating the Holy Communion.

What the Ugandan bishops did not do was lay hands on the REC bishop during the rite of
consecration itself, although their REC hosts had invited them in the hopes that they would do so
and thereby lend the validity of their own consecrations to the new REC consecration. A piece in
The Christian Challenge explains: “The Ugandans restricted their participation in the
consecration rite after receiving a [warning] letter from Episcopal Church (ECUSA)
headquarters in New York” (Johnson 1999:12). However, the accounts I received from Ugandan
bishops did not stress warnings received from ECUSA, as much as their sense of accountability
to their own church and their anxiety not to do anything which might be interpreted as taking
action against the Episcopal Church, certainly not without the full knowledge and support of the
rest of the Ugandan House of Bishops. One bishop told me, “We could not [participate in the
consecration]. Because the Reformed [Episcopal] Church there is not really one with the
Episcopal Church. It has broken away. And for us to go and consecrate, we would be affecting
our position as bishops in the Anglican Communion.” And another bishop, explaining the
decision not to play a role in the actual consecration, stressed the bishops’ own unwillingness to
break relations with ECUSA:

We left Uganda without knowing we were going to [be asked to
consecrate], and we hadn't shared that with the House of Bishops in Uganda.
So when we were in Louisiana, ...we said no. We can't do it without sharing it
with our brothers [in the Ugandan House of Bishops].... And it was hard on our
hosts.... [But] we still believe that the Episcopal Church in America could be
resuscitated.... We don't want to declare them completely dead, and then it
would be difficult to continue.

Thus the REC’s effort to solicit overseas help, in shoring up the legitimacy of their apostolic
succession, ended in disappointment, though apparently with no hard feelings. Stepping outside
the Anglican Communion by participating in the REC consecration was a step too far, while
transgressing the normal procedures for the ordination of priests, given the approval of the
Episcopal bishop in whose territory they would serve, was apparently felt to be within bounds—in the bold new transnationally-networked Anglican world which is evolving.

**Good Shepherd, Rosemont, and All Saints’, Wynnewood, PA**

Just to the east of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, where the evangelical bishop Robert Duncan allowed Ugandan bishop Wilson Turumanya to take charge of Christ Church’s clergy, Bishop Charles Bennison of the Diocese of Pennsylvania is engaged in perpetual conflict with a half-dozen conservative parishes, mainly Anglo-Catholic in orientation, who are unwilling to accept his authority as bishop because of his liberal social and theological positions. African bishops have gotten involved in these conflicts in at least two cases. The first case involves the parish of Good Shepherd, Rosemont, and its rector David Moyer—who is also the head of the conservative Anglo-Catholic organization, Forward in Faith-North America, and as such is quite actively involved in oppositional politics within the Episcopal Church. In November of 2000, Moyer hosted a number of international primates at Good Shepherd for an international confirmation service. David Virtue describes the event, and gives some of the rationale:

> It is anticipated that 70 Confirmands will be presented from the active Forward in Faith parishes in the diocese of Pennsylvania as well as from other parishes.... In a letter [Archbishop] Sinclair said the visitation was to provide episcopal ministry and pastoral care in line with the theology and consciences of faithful Anglican Christians whose theological positions are indistinguishable from millions of fellow Anglicans throughout the world.... Explaining his own actions and those of his fellow-Primates, [Archbishop] Sinclair wrote saying he was doing this “to provide an opportunity for priests and laity to celebrate our Anglican heritage; to provide a pastoral visit with the provision of the sacrament of confirmation as a response to the spiritual needs of orthodox Anglicans and to provide tangible evidence of the pastoral care and
concern of the wider Anglican Communion for people who are deprived of episcopal ministry that is faithful to the mind of the Anglican Communion.”

[Virtue 2000e]

Archbishop Sinclair of the Southern Cone and Archbishop Njojo of the Congo attended the service, as well as an Australian bishop representing the Archbishop of Sydney. A Kenyan bishop and Bishop Ssekkadde of Uganda were reported to have come to the U.S. and attended the service as well.

A Christianity Today piece explains why the overseas’ bishops presence was controversial: “The very presence of the bishops at the service was a challenge to the hierarchy of the Episcopal Church, since the bishops had been initially invited by Moyer without the permission of the local bishop, Charles Bennison of Pennsylvania, and officiated in a service outside of their dioceses—a violation of church law” (Herlinger 2000). However, Bennison chose to handle the situation by going along with it; he wrote to the international leaders whom Moyer had invited, and added his own invitation, thereby regularizing their presence in his diocese, and he attended the service and even brought some people to be confirmed there (Niebuhr 2000). The service itself went on peacefully enough, without visible conflict. But the peaceful outcome in this case did not change the perceptions of those involved that this event pointed to significant larger developments. Moyer is quoted as saying that the confirmation service was a “‘signal event of bigger and better things’ yet to come [and] ... ‘a symbolic act that demonstrated the solidarity of Anglicans around the world’ in the cause of traditional church teaching” (Herlinger 2000).

Two years later, Bennison was yet again faced with a foreign bishop’s intervention in conflicts within his diocese–this time, in the parish of All Saints’, Wynnewood. This priest, Eddy Rix, is a Canadian Anglican who, according to David Virtue, “was originally ordained in the Diocese of Lusaka [in Zambia] because no bishop would ordain him in Canada because of his opposition to women's ordination.” Rix had come to serve in the parish against Bennison’s will, and Bennison
had formally inhibited Rix—that is, forbidden him from acting as a priest in the diocese—because Rix was violating church rules by preaching and celebrating the Eucharist in his diocese without permission (Virtue 2003a). Rix’s bishop, Bernard Malango of Lusaka, decided to handle Bennison’s inhibition of Rix himself, and Rix flew to Lusaka for an ecclesiastical trial to determine if he had violated church order. David Virtue explained the situation:

This is the first trial in Episcopal history of a Pennsylvania priest ever to take place in another provincial jurisdiction. Under American canon law the local bishop of a priest has the right of first refusal to try his priest when the priest is accused of committing an offense in another diocese. This unprecedented move... will make ecclesiastical history. Should Fr. Rix be found not guilty he may return to All Saints’ parish with Bishop Bennison having no authority under American canon law to get rid of him should his parish and the vestry of that parish decide to keep him. Bennison can only appeal through channels in Central Africa where it would wind up on the desk of Archbishop Bernard Malango, an orthodox primate who is unwilling to cave into the demands of Western heterodox bishops. [Virtue 2002b]

Rix pled guilty before the Zambian ecclesiastical court, and explained his and his parish’s situation to the Zambian church officials hearing his case, who proved sympathetic. Rix was sentenced to a private admonition from his bishop, and then sent back to his American parish to keep ministering there—as Virtue pointed out, outside Bennison’s reach, according to canon law (Virtue 2003a). As of this writing (September 2003), he remains on the staff at All Saints’.

The arrangement between Rix and Malango is particularly intriguing, because it illustrates plainly how these appeals to external authority move such conflicts into a gray area in which it is unclear what is and is not legitimate. As the American bishop I quoted at the beginning of this list of cases stated, “None of it is really against the rules. The rules never anticipated such
arrangements.” The policies and structures of the Anglican Communion simply don’t give clear guidance regarding whether a priest under the authority of an African bishop may legitimately serve an Episcopal parish even against the will of the local Episcopal bishop, or if not, how the American bishop should proceed in dealing with the situation. The limitless possibilities and tremendous ingenuity of such international solutions continue to unfold.

**New Westminster Diocese, Canada**

ECUSA is not the only Anglican province to be faced with the complex challenges of such international interventions. In the spring of 2000, St. John’s, Kidderminster, a conservative parish in the Diocese of Worcester, England, invited a retired Ugandan bishop, Eustace Kamanyire, to come and perform a confirmation service in their church in place of their own English bishop, whom the congregation regarded as too liberal and insufficiently orthodox. And a recent case in the Church of Canada in which the possibility of international intervention was raised illustrates how that possibility can now serve as a threat. Parishes and leaders who feel marginalized or otherwise unhappy with their own church situation make statements like, “We have international bishops who are talking with us about our situation.....,” in order to indicate the seriousness of their distress and to threaten the potential messiness of international involvement.

The situation in Canada began when the Anglican diocese of New Westminster voted, in their administrative conference, to permit the blessing of same-sex unions. Trevor Walters, the rector of a traditionalist parish in the diocese, promptly rose and left the meeting, accompanied by several other priests of similar bent. Reporter Leanne Larmondin wrote, “[Walters] said the nine parishes that walked out and ‘members of at least six other parishes’ are in touch with primates of Anglican provinces world-wide and will decide their future soon” (Larmondin 2002a). These parishes organized themselves into the Anglican Church in New Westminster (ACiNW) network.

Within a couple of weeks, ACiNW had an apparent offer of assistance–from a familiar
source—to back up Walters’ threat to involve “primates of Anglican provinces world-wide.”

Archbishop Kolini had written to the dissident Canadian parishes, expressing his willingness “to share with others ‘the possibility of ecclesiastical protection’” (Larmondin 2002b). However, a few days after Kolini’s offer was made public, Archbishop Carey released an open letter to all Anglican primates, calling for “restraint and a period of reflection from Anglicans following [New Westminster’s decision].” An ACNS piece reports that Carey also “called on his fellow primates to resist invitations to intervene in the matter and thereby avoid aggravating an already volatile situation” (Larmondin 2002c). Kolini quickly backed away from his offer—perhaps as a result of Carey’s call. Larmondin reports,

[Archbishop Kolini] said in an interview that he has sent the clergy a follow-up letter to clarify that while he supports them and will continue to examine the matter, he was not offering to become their bishop.... The Rwandan archbishop now says the offer of ecclesiastical protection was taken out of context. “I wrote it as a word of encouragement, not as an offer of episcopal oversight,” said Archbishop Kolini. [Larmondin 2002c]

In March of 2003, the retired Bishop of Yukon, Terrence Buckle, issued a statement offering to provide episcopal oversight to the dissident parishes, under an arrangement similar to the “flying bishops” in the U.K. (non-geographically-bound bishops who serve Anglo-Catholic Anglican parishes all over the country), or to the somewhat analogous “Jubilee Bishops” proposal propagated by the American Anglican Council for the Episcopal Church. Buckle wrote, “I have recently been in contact with several Anglican Primates who have strongly supported and endorsed my offer of alternative episcopal oversight with jurisdiction” (Buckle 2003). A domestic solution with international support was thus proposed, and favorably received by the ACiNW network.

However, the Canadian House of Bishops rejected Buckle’s offer in favor of a proposal
presented by the Bishop of New Westminster, Michael Ingham, which would establish another bishop as an “episcopal visitor.” The key difference is that in the proposal offered by Buckle and endorsed by several sympathetic Primates and the ACiNW network itself, Buckle would have been providing “alternative episcopal oversight with full jurisdiction”—that is, he would have the authority to exercise all episcopal ministries for the parishes under his care. In contrast, the episcopal visitor, in the arrangement proposed by Ingham and accepted by the House of Bishops, would have much less freedom and authority (ACiNW 2003a). Furthermore, Bishop Ingham warned Buckle of disciplinary action if he came to Ingham’s diocese, New Westminster, to exercise any episcopal ministries (ACiNW 2003c).

The ACiNW was, unsurprisingly, not pleased with these developments; its leaders felt the episcopal visitor arrangement was too weak and did not adequately address their situation. They argued that their problems were not merely a local conflict between several parishes and their bishop, but one manifestation of global issues within the worldwide Communion:

The crisis in this Diocese is not the result of a minor theological disagreement that has led to chilly relations with our local bishop, but is rather a unilateral contradiction of central New Testament teaching that threatens to break communion between our Diocese and a number of provinces in the worldwide Anglican Church. [ACiNW 2003d]

The U.S.-based American Anglican Council (AAC) made a similar argument for the global relevance of events in New Westminster, and criticized Canadian Anglican leaders for their disregard of these global dimensions, in a statement supporting the ACiNW network:

The recent actions by Primate Michael Peers of Canada and the Bishop of New Westminster, Michael Ingham, compete with each other for audacity, disrespect for the Anglican global community, and for what appears to be a ‘world be damned’ attitude. [ACiNW 2003e, emphasis added]

On February 19 of 2004, these assertions of global relevance were given substance and Kolini’s initial offer came to fruition when four overseas Anglican primates—Kolini; Archbishop Bernard Malango of Central Africa; Archbishop Fidele Dirokpa of Congo; and Archbishop Datuk Yong
Ping Chung of South East Asia—announced that they would offer protection and oversight to the ACiNW parishes. These leaders asked Bishop T.J. Johnston, rector of St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, and now an AMiA bishop, to serve as their agent in “the practical aspects of this oversight,” meaning presumably that Johnston will often be the bishop on the spot providing ministries on behalf of the Primates (ACiNW 2003f).

The ACiNW case demonstrates that, after several years in which disaffected Episcopal and other Northern parishes have increasingly used international connections to evade and to challenge their own church structures and authorities, even the threatened involvement of international Anglican leaders has become a fairly potent weapon in intrachurch disputes, and that the global relevance of local conflicts has become a key point for argumentation.

**The Network of Anglican Communion Dioceses and Parishes, US**

The Network of Anglican Communion Dioceses and Parishes came into existence well after the developments I examine in detail in this work, but demands mention as the latest unfolding development of some of the trends examined in this work. This Network was officially launched on January 20, 2004, though it had been in formation for several months previously. This new Network was launched in response to the affirmation, by the Episcopal Church’s General Convention in late summer of 2003, of an openly gay and partnered man, Gene Robinson, as next Bishop of New Hampshire (and his subsequent consecration as Bishop, in the fall of 2003). The new Network, according to a description on the AAC’s website, will consist of conservative dioceses and their parishes, as well as parishes from other dioceses, who will be given “a community with which to connect” and possibly even the opportunity to “become non-geographic parishes with [Network] dioceses,... [receiving] ministry leadership and spiritual oversight from [Network bishops who are] willing to exercise Episcopal ministry in parishes that make this request,... with or without the permission of the local diocesan bishops.” Finally, the Network “gives us a way to connect with those sisters and brothers around the Anglican world
and around the ecumenical community who will no longer recognize the current leadership of the Episcopal Church” (AAC 2004a).

The Network is to a significant degree a new manifestation of the American Anglican Council (AAC). The AAC has continued, and likely will continue, to maintain its own separate identity as an information and lobbying group (rather than an alternative church structure), but many of the AAC’s leaders are prominently involved with speaking for and organizing the Network.¹¹⁰ For example, Bishop Robert Duncan of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, long identified with the AAC, became the first ‘moderator’ of the newly-formed Network. The new Network seeks to transcend the AAC by attracting individuals, parishes, and even dioceses who have not been involved with the AAC but feel driven to new lengths by Bishop Robinson’s consecration.

However, while the Network has drawn a great deal of attention and no doubt attracted some new members, its support among sitting Episcopal bishops has not, to date, been as strong as initially hoped. The bishops of thirteen Episcopal dioceses had initially expressed support for the formation of such a network, but five months after its launching, only eight of those dioceses had officially joined the Network. Some bishops may be waiting upon consultation with diocesan officials or holding back temporarily for other pragmatic reasons, but some have apparently had second thoughts about being part of the endeavor. Statements by various bishops involved in these developments suggest that hesitations and second thoughts relate both to practical issues like property rights which remain unresolved at present, and also to concerns about church unity and unwillingness to become involved with a movement which could be seen as schismatic. For example, Bishop John Lipscomb of Southwest Florida, one of the bishops involved in the initial planning of the new Network following General Convention 2003, later decided not to be involved with the newly-launched Network, explaining to his diocese:

It is unclear to me as to the long-term intentions in forming another network within the Episcopal Church. Because of this lack of clarity, the
Diocese of Southwest Florida is not currently a member of the network. I have been clear that I do not intend to leave the Episcopal Church. [Lipscomb 2004]

The “lack of clarity” Bishop Lipscomb identifies is perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the new Network for observers and potential members. In particular, ambiguity surrounds the issue of whether the Network’s leaders intend the Network to be a “church-within-a-church,” or, as it were, a “church-replacing-a-church.” The official AAC statement on the launching of the new Network stated clearly, “The Network.... will operate within the constitution of the Episcopal Church and in full fellowship with the vast majority of the Anglican Communion” (Brust 2004). And a January 13 press release from the AAC stated firmly that the organization, in its Network-related activities, was not “gather[ing] together orthodox dioceses to operate independently of the Episcopal Church” but that the AAC “continues to work within the Episcopal Church to advance the realignment of Anglicanism in North America.” (AAC 2004b). However, alongside such assurances are clear indications that some intend the new Network as the long-awaited orthodox Anglican replacement province in the United States. In a piece entitled “What is the Network?” on the AAC website, evangelical priest Martyn Minns concluded, “Could [the Network] be a replacement for ECUSA–only God knows but we will be ready” (AAC 2004a). Diane Knippers, a conservative Episcopal laywoman and head of the Institute for Religion and Democracy, observed that some in the Network want it to become “another church (or ‘province’ in Anglican parlance) [which] could be parallel to the Episcopal Church or could replace the existing Episcopal Church.... within the Anglican Communion” (Knippers 2004). Knippers goes on to state that even within the Network, some support remaining as a church network within ECUSA while others want the Network to break from and replace ECUSA.

The uncertainty surrounding the Network’s character and intentions probably relates to the current uncertainty about the Anglican Communion’s response to Gene Robinson’s consecration. The Eames Commission, a committee of Anglican leaders and scholars from around the world,
has been convened to evaluate the question of the limits of Anglican unity in the wake of Gene Robinson’s consecration, as well as moves towards officially blessing same-sex unions in the Anglican Church of Canada. Some American conservatives hope that this committee, when it makes its final report in the fall of 2004, will recommend disciplining or dis-recognizing the Episcopal Church, which might make it possible for the Network to be recognized by Anglican Communion officials as the legitimate Anglican province in the United States. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, has expressed sympathy for the position of Episcopalians in the United States who cannot in conscience accept the consecration of Gene Robinson, and support for efforts to find ways to provide them with amenable episcopal oversight (AAC 2004c). Archbishop Williams’ statements hint that he would favor a church-within-a-church solution, rather than the replacement of the Episcopal Church with another, newly-formed province; but regardless of such nuances, the AAC and the Network have expressed pleasure at the Archbishop’s support (AAC 2004d). In addition to this qualified support from the Archbishop of Canterbury, the new Network has received strong expressions of support from a number of other international Primates. Fourteen Primates—including the Primates of Nigeria, Uganda, South East Asia, and the Southern Cone—issued a statement calling the new Network a “hopeful sign of a faithful Anglican future in North America,” and stated, “We re-affirm our solidarity with faithful Bishops, clergy and church members in North America who remain committed to the historic faith and order of the church” (Mason 2004).111

Given all this international support and potential support, it seems likely that the Network’s leaders are expressing a commitment to working within the Episcopal Church out of hopes that the Eames Commission and/or the Archbishop of Canterbury will decide the Episcopal Church has broken from the Anglican Communion, and will recognize the new Network as the replacement American province—a more likely outcome if the Network plays within the rules in the meantime. The Network’s leaders, then, have some reason to hope that they may be granted
legitimacy and official status through the centralized, traditional structures of the Anglican Communion. However, failing that outcome, the strong support of a number of international Primates means that the Network has the potential to pursue Anglican membership and legitimacy through decentralized transnational Anglican networks of recognition and support. Even if the Archbishop of Canterbury or other Instruments of Unity do not recognize the Network, individual Primates may choose to recognize and be in relationship with the Network, rather than the Episcopal Church. The consecration of Henry Orombi as Archbishop of the Church of Uganda provides a recent example of this possibility. Ugandan church officials disininvited Episcopal bishops who had supported, voted for, or participated in Gene Robinson’s consecration to the service at which Orombi was enthroned, and instead invited a delegation from the new Network, which opposes Robinson’s consecration.

The politics of welcome at Orombi’s consecration hint at the possible further development of transnational networks as the primary form of Anglican connection and belonging, through the complex and fluid politics of invitation, recognition, and denial. This networked, decentralized Anglican future is also hinted at in the vocabulary of “realignment” frequently used by AAC and Network leaders and supporters. For example, the AAC’s information page about the Network is entitled, “Road to Realignment,” and Diane Knippers wrote in the piece quoted above, “I'm increasingly convinced that global Anglican realignment is both necessary and unavoidable” (Knippers 2004). Knippers went on to criticize the Anglican Communion’s centralized structure (and especially the centrality of the office of the Archbishop of Canterbury) as colonial and “remarkably unsuited for the 21st Century Church.” A “realigned” Anglican Communion, in which congregations, dioceses, bishops, provinces, and primates all relate (or not) to one another along lines of affinity rather than primarily through older, Eurocentric hierarchical structures, presumably meets the demands and matches the character of the current globalized era more effectively.
The continuity of this endeavor with the others described in this work, in which American conservatives have sought moral support, protection, and various forms of intervention from sympathetic Anglican leaders elsewhere in the world, is plain enough. However, the destiny of the Network of Anglican Dioceses and Parishes—like the character and extent of any future global Anglican “realignment”—remains to be seen.

“*At Home in Kigali*: Africanist Interests in a Conservative Episcopal Parish

What do such arrangements and links mean to the American parishes who are party to them? Are they only loopholes or dodges, tools for dodging and aggravating their Episcopal Church leadership? Are they primarily about cutting ties, dissociating from the Episcopal Church, with the foreign bishops merely as a means to an end—or do these alliances also involve taking on new, international attachments and identities, for these American parishes? In order to explore this question, I will return to my ethnographic study of St. Timothy’s. St. Timothy’s, as an AMiA parish, has a more sustained and official African affiliation than many of the other parishes I have discussed here, and that might be expected to lead them to take their African connections more seriously than non-AMiA parishes. On the other hand, belonging to AMiA also means that St. Timothy’s relationship with their African archbishop is mediated by their American bishop. Many of the non-AMiA parishes discussed in this chapter have had more direct contact with their various overseas allies, patrons, and supporters—which might be expected to cause these parishes to take their overseas connections more seriously. I suspect that the degree to which a given American parish involved in some form of international alliance like those described above (including AMiA), takes that international connection seriously in and of itself, depends on elusive variables like chance and inclination, rather than on what kind of alliance the parish finds itself in. The case of St. Timothy’s, described here, serves to demonstrate that some parishes involved in such arrangements, take their international affiliations quite seriously and seek to deepen their knowledge of and relationship with their
overseas allies.

At St. Timothy’s Church, AMiA/Province of Rwanda, I had the opportunity to explore a question I had wondered about while planning my dissertation research: how does a largely-white, middle-class, evangelical, socially conservative American congregation thinks about its connections with Africa? Do they treat this affiliation as merely an abstraction or technicality allowing them to escape the mistrusted leadership of the American Episcopal Church? Or do they seek to make their connection with Rwanda more meaningful, in spite of great geographical and cultural distances separating them? At the time I came to the parish, St. Timothy’s had been officially a member of AMiA for about a year. By joining AMiA, St. Timothy’s had placed itself formally under the jurisdiction of the Anglican Archbishop of Rwanda. However, St. Timothy’s is a long, long way from Africa—not counting ‘The Fun Jungle,’ two miles down the road, a family amusement park where a giant concrete gorilla guards the entrance and kids can ride on motorized pink elephants. Most members of this and other AMiA parishes have the average American’s minimal awareness and knowledge of the global South. Ironically, parish newsletters show that in the summer of 1994, shortly after the genocide in Rwanda, St. Timothy’s congregation decided to get involved in supporting refugees. However, the agency they worked with set them up with an Eastern European family; the massive refugee crisis in and around Rwanda did not apparently come up for consideration.

Eight years later, in the fall of 2002, members of the same congregation had harsh criticisms of the American tendency to reach out to help white European populations while turning away from Africa’s crises and needs. At a house church meeting I attended one evening, the group got into a spirited discussion about whether the U.S. should have intervened in Rwanda to stop the 1994 genocide. One woman in the group, an occasional member who’s perhaps less attuned to the growing Africanist interests in the wider congregation, spoke up to argue that we have no national interests in Africa and so we were right not to intervene. In the process of explaining
this point of view, she twice referred to the violence between “the Hutus and the Tutsis.” The second time she said this, two of the men in the group corrected her, quietly but firmly: “Tutsis.” The rest of the group argued, politely, with her position. One woman raised the humanitarian issues: as Christians, how can we stand by and watch mass murder? Other group members pointed out that the U.S. has not chosen to intervene even-handedly around the globe (by, for example, intervening in the former Yugoslavia but not in Africa), and that the U.S. was actually involved in Rwanda in 1994 through the presence of UN troops. During this discussion I was scribbling so frantically in my notebook that my consultants paused to tease me about it. I was fascinated to find myself in the middle of a roomful of socially-conservative, non-academic, white Americans all expressing the same views about international responses to the Rwandan genocide as my professors in the notoriously-liberal academy.

During the course of my fieldwork with St. Timothy’s, I learned that it was not typical, but also not unusual, for meetings or conversations to turn to African religion and politics. The first time I attended the Sunday evening Praise and Worship meeting, the leader read the group a three-page, detailed article (LoBaido 2001) about current events in Rwanda, and the rest of the group responded with observations, thoughts, and news items from elsewhere in Africa. Clearly, by 2002, St. Timothy’s was in a very different place, in its collective thinking and its larger loyalties, than it has been in 1994. In joining Anglican Mission in America and the Province of Rwanda, St. Timothy’s had not merely taken a convenient road out of the Episcopal Church, but had forged a transnational relationship of significant local meaning. Though the church building stood where it always has, on a side street in a small Southeastern city, the sign on its front lawn announces that St. Timothy’s is now a member parish of the Anglican Province of Rwanda.

The development of this relationship took time. When St. Timothy’s first left the Episcopal Church to join AMiA, most members of the congregation thought little about the African connection, being focused on the escape from conflicts with their Episcopal bishop. As one
parishioner told me, “Africa just wasn’t on our radar.” But as time went by, many at St. Timothy’s began to think more seriously about what their connection to Rwanda might mean. One member told me that at the time of the split from ECUSA, “Most folks here only knew Africa is Africa, and the people there are dark skinned, and they’d heard about the genocide, but most Americans didn’t pay much attention to that.” But, he explained, once they found Rwanda willing to help them in their difficulties, they began to see the Rwandans as human beings and to care more about what had happened to them. As this member suggests, for many people at St. Timothy’s, as for the American populace in general, their only association with Rwanda was the genocide–if they even remembered enough to recall that the genocide that was in the papers in 1994 had taken place in a country called Rwanda. A member told me of being dimly aware of Rwanda in the past, but not taking much interest until AMiA came along. “I remember when the genocide was going on. I can’t say I paid much attention to it.” She noted that Americans are desensitized to such news–we see Africans killing each other and think, “Ah, they’re all cannibals.” “And now,” she concluded with amazement, “we’re under the Province of Rwanda!”

Some members and leaders at St. Timothy’s continue to feel that the connection is mostly significant as a loophole and an escape. They see their primary involvement as being with AMiA, which is an American organization in many respects, in spite of its international founding and the fact that the Rwandan and Southeast Asian Archbishops remain its official heads. One member told me that the Rwandan church is only ministering to St. Timothy’s by providing an authority structure: “More than anything else it means to us that we are no longer associated with the American church.” But there are also many at St. Timothy’s who have become quite interested in the relationship with the church in Rwanda, and seek to make that connection more than just a loophole, formality, or convenience.

Rwanda and their archbishop are quite far away, however, and not even easily accessible by email or the Internet. Having few ways to be in direct contact with their African patrons,
members of St. Timothy’s tend to take any contact they can make with Africa as a way to think about and relate to the church in Rwanda. One example is the East African Market, a traveling display of East African crafts which holds sales at churches; it comes to St. Timothy’s about every other year. When I asked about their church’s relationship with Rwanda, several parishioners mentioned the market to me as one way they feel they have contact with Africa.

Another example of this tendency to relate to Rwanda through any available African contact (regardless of particularities of country or culture) can be seen in St. Timothy’s members’ recollections and observations about John, a young Nigerian priest who spent some time at St. Timothy’s about a year before I came there, not long after they had joined AMiA. He had come to the U.S. hoping to raise money and find support for his ministry with AIDS orphans; St. Timothy’s sent him home with two SUVs, six computers, and a great deal more. Many St. Timothy’s members spontaneously mentioned John in the process of talking about what their church’s association with the Church of Rwanda meant to them. One member, upon hearing about my research, told me immediately about John and how much everyone enjoyed having him here. She said she thinks a lot of people “have a wrong conception about Africa as a lot of black people running around,” and that meeting people like John and Archbishop Kolini helps people here realize that Africans are “just like us, or even a little better.” Two other members of St. Timothy’s told me, during our interview, that John is relevant to their church’s situation as an AMiA parish, because he put a “human face on Africa” for them. John’s time at St. Timothy’s also seems to have confirmed and strengthened the vision of African Christianity, already circulating in evangelical circles since Lambeth 1998 and before, as zealous, strong, and joyful in spite of the suffering which most Americans believe to be endemic to African life. For example, one member told me that John was “the most joyful believer,” and went on to say that Africans like John “can teach us [Americans] quite a bit.” Such statements illustrate not only St. Timothy’s members’ positive evaluations of John, but their tendency to generalize from John to
all Africans—including, of course, their ecclesiastical kin in Rwanda. Thus, in meeting John and being impressed with his faith and ministry, many members of St. Timothy’s grew in their regard for African Christianity, and correspondingly experienced their ties to the Province of Rwanda as more meaningful.

A journey to Rwanda

John’s visit to St. Timothy’s was an important step in that congregation’s process of thinking through and learning to value their connection with African Christianity. But a much bigger development in that journey took place while I was doing my fieldwork there. About a month after my arrival in the parish, several members of the congregation made a journey to Rwanda to see the country for themselves. The trip was a personal, rather than a parish, initiative, but it was whole-heartedly supported by the parish, and was explicitly an effort to strengthen the church’s relationship with its Rwandan sponsors. The St. Timothy’s delegation spent about two weeks in and around Kigali, Rwanda, under the care of the Rwandan archbishop Emmanuel Kolini. They toured prisons, orphanages, churches, and genocide sites; preached at church services and spoke at formal dinners; conversed with their Archbishop and other Rwandans; and returned home full of experiences to share with the rest of the congregation.

Naturally, preparing for this trip involved a very intense period of learning about Rwanda for the travelers themselves, including some impressive engagement with the academic literature on Rwanda’s history and politics. But the whole congregation experienced intensified learning about Rwanda throughout the period surrounding this trip: the preparations, praying for the travelers while they were away, and especially hearing about the journey afterwards through a number of sermons, special presentations, and discussions. Through these experiences, the members of St. Timothy’s learned more about Rwanda, its history, society, ecology, and its Anglican church. Even more important than such factual learning, however, was the process of learning to rethink the common American assumptions, most of them negative, about what
Africa is like. For the congregation at St. Timothy’s, this process could be plainly observed as the travelers’ retelling of their experiences and impressions caused many in the congregation to rethink their initial assumptions about the character and power dynamics of their church’s relationship with the Church of Rwanda.

Before the trip and while the travelers were away, the ways people at St. Timothy’s spoke about their relationship with Rwanda reflected the familiar tropes of missionary and aid relationships. Initially, the people of St. Timothy’s assumed that this relationship was characterized by a sharing of faith and of material goods which moved primarily in one direction: from North to South. In spite of the fact that St. Timothy’s itself acknowledges an African as its archbishop, older habits of thought about Africa as missionary destination kept re-emerging in talk about Rwanda and the proposed journey there. And, although the travelers were quite definite that their visit to Rwanda was not a mission trip, the classic missionary language of bringing the light of the Gospel into the world’s dark places was often used to describe the journey, by the travelers and others. For instance, one of those who went on the trip told me in an interview before he left, “Somebody needs to go into that dark place, from the outside, with the light of Christ. Sometimes you can rebuke the Devil from outside, but sometimes you have to put your body there—and Rwanda, Africa, is like that.”

After the trip, however, the travelers’ talk showed that they had come to see Rwandan Christians as their equals, or even their superiors, in faith. Talking with their fellow parishioners after the trip, the travelers stressed that, far from being missionaries, they came away blessed by the Rwandan Christians they encountered. One traveler described the experience this way: “We were surrounded by Spirit-filled, born-again Christians, and they recognized us as brothers and sisters.” Another concluded: “We didn’t go there to bless them. We went there to get blessed. I felt like they taught me so much more than I could give them.” Their experiences thus helped to cement and spread the idea of Africa as a Christian continent among St. Timothy’s members.
Perhaps an even more surprising lesson for the people of St. Timothy’s was that their financial superiority would not be the immediate focus of their relationship with Rwandan church leaders. Before and during the trip, the talk of the travelers and other St. Timothy’s members revealed strong shared assumptions that the purpose of the trip was, as it was described at the commissioning service for the travelers, to “survey the spiritual and physical needs of our brethren there and come home and report if there are ways St. Timothy’s can help.” This stress on finding ways to help the Rwandan church, spiritually and especially materially, was common in talk about the Rwanda trip. At one gathering, the leader directed the group to pray for the travelers, because “they’re seeing things they’ve never seen before, ministering in a land of desperate needs, and we want them to come back and tell us what we can do to help our brothers and sisters in Rwanda.”

Yet, in spite of all the expectations that the group would use this trip to assess the Rwandan church’s needs, no list of requests was presented to the congregation upon their return. The travelers had been struck by the poverty they encountered in Rwanda, certainly. One person half-joked that the experience made her want to sell everything she owns, live in a tent, and send all the money to Rwanda. But their Rwandan hosts hadn’t overtly asked for material help; instead, as the travelers explained, the Rwandans had stressed to their American visitors that gifts should flow out of an established relationship—and thus that establishing a relationship was the first priority. One traveler told the congregation about realizing, towards the end of the visit, that “they’re not asking for a hand up, they’re not asking for a handout—they’re just glad we’re here....When we’d ask them, What can we do?, they’d say, ‘You’ve already done all you can just by coming here.’” Thus instead of the expected multiple appeals for orphanage roofs, prison clinics, cattle and bicycles for rural clergy, the travelers came home with nothing to present to their fellow members but their own experiences and reflections—and the promise that the relationship would continue to develop. This new perspective on the relationship—that sending
money and gifts was not the primary or defining goal—was absorbed and pondered by the other
members of the congregation. One young man described the parish’s earlier assumption that they
would be able to help Rwanda as ‘American arrogance,’ when in fact, he said, “it turned out that
the Americans were the ones blessed by the trip, leaving Rwanda with nothing.” Thus many
members of St. Timothy’s have moved away from seeing themselves and their church primarily
as donors, and have begun to see their Rwandan brethren as having, also, much to give.

Through the travelers’ sharing of their experiences with the rest of the congregation, then,
many at St. Timothy’s began to describe the Rwandan church as a source of spiritual wealth,
rather than primarily as a destination for material wealth (see chapter 7). One outcome of the
travelers’ journey was, indeed, the establishment of a parish fund for buying materials to build
churches in Rwanda. But beyond this tangible level of continued relationship, St. Timothy’s
congregation has come to take pleasure in its association with the Church of Rwanda, especially
now that the association has become a concrete relationship. One member remarked on how
much pleasure she now takes in writing “Anglican Province of Rwanda” on her donation checks
to the church. She said, “That used to be an abstraction. It no longer is. Being a part of the
Province of Rwanda is a very special gift.” Thus the parish’s collective and individual education
about Africa have brought many of the members of St. Timothy’s through much of their initial
ambivalence about associating with an African church and to a point of embracing that
association.

Conclusion

The development of the transnational alliances documented in these chapters constituted a
number of projects instantiating the discourse of accountability globalism by connecting
Northern dissidents with Southern Anglicans who share their views on homosexuality, and also
by bringing Southern Anglicans into situations of conflict within Northern churches. Though
some conservative Northern leaders have continued to seek discipline for the Episcopal Church
through the centralized, hierarchical structures of the Anglican Communion, many have lost patience and faith in the possibilities of remaking the Anglican Communion into a more unified and doctrinally-controlled body through such means. As a result, the projects outlined in this chapter operate primarily through networks of affinity and antagonism—particular connections between individuals, parishes, dioceses, and provinces, which bypass the centralized, nested geographical authority structure of the Communion. Whether the total ‘realignment’ of the Communion into networked clusters of Anglican bodies defined by affinity rather than geographic proximity will come to pass as the fruition of all these developments remains to be seen. What can be said, with assurance, is that the innovative pattern of networking undertaken by the dissident movement in the Episcopal Church and their overseas allies and sympathizers has come a long way from its first manifestation at St. Andrew’s, Little Rock. Today, it seems possible to many that such networks will become, functionally speaking if not officially, the new organizing structure of the whole Anglican Communion.

By describing the development of these North/South alliances in this work up to the current point, I have cast into question interpretations of recent Anglican Communion events as the outcome of natural, pre-existing affinities between Northern conservatives and Southern Anglicans. In the next chapters, I will examine further how these relationships function and relate to the contexts and concerns of those involved. I hope, by elucidating some of the dynamics of these transnational Anglican relationships, to further denaturalize these North/South alliances and show them for what I believe they are: the result of concentrated discursive and practical work by Southern and Northern Anglicans committed, for differing reasons, to the same goal: a new kind of global Anglican belonging.
CHAPTER 7

“WHO WANTS TO BE IN THE UGANDAN COMMUNION?”:
PERCEPTIONS OF AFRICAN AND AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY

“We could do worse, folks...”

In January of 2004, as I was busy revising my dissertation, I witnessed a fascinating conversation unfolding on an email list for dissident Episcopalians to which I subscribe for research purposes. On January 26, a member of the list, “Faithful Follower,” wrote in to express pessimism about whether any acceptable solution to the Episcopal Church’s erring ways would be forthcoming from Anglican Communion leadership:

The Continuing Churches are beginning to look pretty appealing to me....

If [Anglican Communion leadership in] Canterbury is going to posture with no real backbone behind their words, of what use are they? And who wants to be in the Ugandan Communion? We're Anglicans, not minions of the late Idi Amin.

Several list-members replied promptly to “Faithful Follower’s” rhetorical question about Uganda. David wrote in under the subject line “Who wants to be in the Ugandan Communion?” to say, “I wouldn't mind a bit. I had been hoping to see a Ugandan Anglican Church spring up here in Boston and I would be there in a minute!” Another member told “Follower”:

Actually, I would have no problem in the Ugandan Communion, or the Nigerian Communion or the Southern Cone Communion, etc.... I think your mention of Idi Amin is not really fair to all the Orthodox Christians in Uganda or elsewhere in Africa, Asia or Latin America.

Others took up the thread by pointing out the persecution Ugandan Anglicans had suffered under the Amin regime. George wrote in with a recollection:

I remember back in the late 70's, a seminary student from Uganda.... [came] to our Church to talk about the persecutions of Christians in Uganda. He told us of Idi Amin's troops coming to Christian Churches on Sunday morning, standing at the back door and screaming at the parishioners standing
inside something to the effect of, "Sit down for Allah and live.......", and then start shooting about waist high with automatic weapons. Next time you are in church, standing for a hymn, glance over your shoulder and imagine a dozen soldiers there with AK-47's preparing to shoot you because you are a Christian! So who wants to be a Ugandan [sic] Anglican-Christian?!

George argues that, far from Idi Amin weakening the legitimacy of Ugandan Anglicanism, the suffering Ugandan Christians experienced under his regime strengthens that church’s claim to moral authority. Another member supported this point by posting in full a biography of Ugandan Archbishop Janani Luwum, who was martyred in 1977 for standing up to Amin.

Defenses of African Christianity, then, were quick to emerge after “Follower’s” initial post. However, the conversation was not yet over. A sympathizer with “Follower’s” position, “Ever Anglican,” spoke up to reply to Frank:

Knock yourself out, then. There is a reason we are Anglican...we're NOT Ugandan, Kenyan, Ethiopian, or anything else. The last time I checked, we derived our traditions from ENGLAND. Besides...I'd look stupid in African garb. I'm out.

In another post, “Ever Anglican” asserted clearly: “I hardly think the Third World churches should be our role models.”

But “Faithful Follower” and “Ever Anglican” were clearly in the minority. In one of two relatively long, reflective posts which seemed to conclude the conversation, Anne posted an indirect reply to “Ever Anglican’s” remarks:

It's funny; until Ever Anglican spoke up I had not seen anyone except members of the loony Left take a dismissive attitude towards the Global South....In fact, one of my great comforts of late has been to see how eager my father, a senior citizen Southern gentleman, is to see the African bishops get a good firm hand on ECUSA.... If you want to see genuine faith in action, the genuine work of God, look at people who have known real poverty, danger, and suffering--people who may risk their lives for the gospel. There are such people in Africa.... If we pray very hard and God has mercy on us, perhaps we will be blessed to come under their authority and teaching.
In another summing-up message, Leslie wrote in with these comments, criticizing some orthodox Anglicans for their unwillingness to accept African leadership:

I've heard or heard of several good orthodox folk making comments like this, e.g. "I couldn't imagine being under the Bishop of *Nigeria.*" .... Do you really think that your heritage or your church's heritage is at stake if you are under the primatial authority of an Asian or an African rather than Frank Griswold or Rowan Williams?.... This is racist and unchristian in the extreme.... If and when the Anglican Communion splits, it will be interesting to see how many "orthodox" folks will leave for other communions or stay in the rump ECUSA and Church of England simply because they could never imagine being under the spiritual authority of someone from Uganda or Nigeria. We could do worse, folks--and have.

Both Anne and Leslie arrive at the same conclusion: under current circumstances, conservative Episcopalians should consider themselves lucky to have orthodox African bishops as allies. These postings seemed to close the conversation, and the issue was dropped, with the dominance of a vision of African Christianity as strong, courageous, and worthwhile affirmed over ideas about African Christianity as alien, corrupt, or otherwise inadequate.

The process of the spread of positive images of African Christianity evident in this conversation was also observable at St. Timothy’s during my time there. Part of St. Timothy’s congregations’ journey to finding an alliance with an African church first thinkable, then desirable, involved more and more members coming to see African Christianity as a positive model and influence. In the last chapter, I offered the example of several members’ trip to Rwanda as one important step towards the congregations’ coming to value their Rwandan connections. But that process of re-valuing Africa had been going on for long before the Rwanda journey. At one house church meeting I attended, a relatively new member of the church
questioned the church’s connections with Africa. She noted that she "didn't know much about Africa," but described it as “a place not known for its Christianity.” An older member promptly replied, “Now it is,” and backed up this assertion by explaining that there are more new Christians in Africa every day than anywhere else in the world. The embrace by many St. Timothy’s members of a high view of African Christianity—and an admonishing attitude towards those who question that view—is well-illustrated in a story told to me by Brad, a parishioner at St. Timothy’s. Brad was on an airplane and overheard two women in nearby seats talking about St. Timothy’s and describing the church as intolerant and homophobic, then going on to say, “They’re under some African people, of all things!” Brad addressed the women, and told them that they were being very bigoted in thinking that someone from Africa is “the wrong color or too dumb and not capable of presiding over an American church.” In telling this story, Brad described these women an example of what’s wrong with the whole Episcopal Church: ECUSA leaders talk about intolerance, but they’re the bigoted ones, because they assume Rwandans, “who’ve been through more in one day than we do in our whole lives, and who they [Episcopalian] have never met,” can’t be in charge of an American church. Brad told me he’s heard of people in his ECUSA diocese’s leadership using the word “junglebunnies,” and he argued that ECUSA actually epitomizes the American conceit that “we’re more advanced than everyone else.” Brad concluded, “What is it that you find so intolerant about an African bishop presiding over an American church? What is so galling?”

In this story, St. Timothy’s relationship with an African bishop becomes proof that its members and leaders aren’t just conservative bigots—who presumably wouldn’t like gays or Africans—but are in fact righteous Christians who have conquered racism and prejudice, while still holding on to the essentials of the faith. Further, the two women in this story are generalized into ‘typical Episcopalians’ and used as evidence that the Episcopal Church is not the loving and tolerant institution it claims to be, but is actually in the wrong on all counts—both in its tolerance
of homosexuality, which should not be freely accepted, and in its intolerance of Africans, who should be accepted and indeed honored.

**The spread of positive evaluations of African Christianity**

As shown in the preceding chapters, Northern conservative Episcopalians and Anglicans, and some Southern allies, have in recent years asserted more and more strongly that the whole Anglican globe is relevant to policies in the American Episcopal Church or other particular Anglican provinces. Sharers of this global vision do not imagine an undifferentiated globe, but a globe divided between heterodox North and orthodox South. This globalist perspective makes sense of Episcopal and Anglican conflicts in terms of ideas about differences between Northern and Southern Christianity—with the American church epitomizing the former. Even though, as outlined in chapter 5, many Northern conservatives shifted from talking about the sexuality resolution at Lambeth 1998 as a Southern to a global accomplishment, positive views of the character and potential of the global Anglican South are central to this movement’s vision and have been increasingly widely held and widely voiced among dissident Episcopalians and Anglicans.

Like the members of St. Timothy’s and the email list quoted above, many laity and clergy involved in transnational relationships, and their sympathizers, have come to see Southern Christianity in new, positive ways. Disputes and incidents like those I have just described show that such views are not yet fully established, not yet hegemonic, among conservative Episcopalians; but they continue to spread. In such talk, African Christianity is often treated as the prime example of all these good elements of Southern Christianity—probably both because African Anglican leaders have been such a potent force in dissident politics, through their numbers and their relative degree of involvement, and also because African Anglicanism appears to Northerners to best fulfill positive images of Southern Christianity, by virtue of the growth of African churches and the poverty and suffering of many African Christians.
In this chapter, I examine the positive views and ideas about African Christianity which are articulated by Americans and Ugandans, illustrating both the commonalities and the differences in understanding between these Northern and Southern Anglican groups. The Anglican church in Uganda is an excellent site to examine African Christians’ ideas about African and American Christianity, because much as Africa often stands as the epitome of Southern Christianity, Uganda not infrequently is cited (by Americans and Ugandans) as an exemplar of African Christianity. Next to Nigeria, the Church of Uganda is the largest Anglican church in Africa and thus, arguably, the second largest in the worldwide Communion. The Church of Uganda is estimated to have about 8 million members, around 30% of Uganda’s population (compared to around 2.5 million Episcopalians in the United States, around 1% of the population). The Church of Uganda’s size and resulting strength, both in its own national context and in relation to other Anglican churches around the world, make it one of the sites where Northerners expect their positive images of African Christianity to be most fully realized.

In giving particular attention in this chapter to what Ugandans say about their church and about African Christianity more generally, my intent is to offer a critical analysis of currently-circulating images of and assumptions about African Christianity. My approach is twofold. Firstly, I present Ugandan Anglicans’ own doubts and questions about these images and assumptions, showing, in effect, that African Christians themselves do not uniformly share these particular positive views of African Christianity. Secondly, through these Ugandan Christians’ doubts and questions, the specificities and realities of their church and their situation emerge. By thus offering the reader an encounter with the Church of Uganda, its members and leaders, I bring the particularity of one Southern Christian church into challenging dialogue with the generalizations of Northern rhetoric about Southern Christianity.

Throughout this chapter, I will also point to some of the ways Northerners’ positive discourses about African Christianity reverse the valuations, but perpetuate the terms of negative colonial
images of Africa. Though Northern Anglicans often speak of bringing the Communion into a post-colonial era, meaning an era in which old colonial patterns of power and thought have dissolved, I argue that these discourses about African Christianity are post-colonial in the theoretical sense of the term, in that they perpetuate in new guises colonial patterns of power and thought.

“Black, But Faithful”

Conservatives’ wrestling with old ideas about their global allies, and seeking to propagate newer, positive images, involves a significant degree of struggle with race and racism. White racism directed against blacks is an inevitable factor in a situation which brings the almost exclusively white members of the American dissident movement into connections with, and sometimes under the authority of, black African bishops. AMiA, and the dissident networking movement more generally, is somewhat concentrated in the American South, a part of the country with a reputation for deep-seated racism, making it all the more remarkable to many observers that these churches are willing to associate themselves with black church leaders in Africa. In fact, as the debates with which I began this chapter indicated, seeking to confront and transform others’ racism has become an important part of this dissident movement’s ideology and identity. As Brad’s story of the airplane conversation illustrates, arguing with the perceived racism of liberal and moderate Episcopalians is one manifestation of this (see also chapter 8). However, working to correct and eradicate racism among orthodox Episcopalians is also an important priority for those in the dissident movement who have themselves come to think of these issues in new ways. Not surprisingly, during the course of my fieldwork no one told me that they themselves objected to African connections for racist reasons. However, leaders at St. Timothy’s assured me that they had lost a few members, and had to have serious conversations with a few more, because the idea of being under a black Archbishop was so hard for these members to swallow. Similarly, Leslie, in the post quoted above, recalls having heard several
orthodox Episcopalians express discomfort with being under a Nigerian bishop—a sentiment Leslie identifies as racist.

Where such racism is overcome, members of this movement express joy and triumph. Anne, quoted above, wrote about her happiness at seeing her old Southern father’s excitement about African church leadership. The clear implication is that he is a product of the segregated South, and that this excitement over black leadership is a breakthrough for him. One of the leaders at St. Timothy’s told me that he, a Southerner who grew up in the still-segregated 1950s, had had to overcome his own racism as St. Timothy’s moved towards relationship with an African bishop. Today, however, he is one of the church’s strongest advocates for overcoming racist patterns of thought. He told me that when St. Timothy’s first affiliated with AMiA and put “Province of Rwanda” on the sign in front of the church, some parishioners complained. He mimicked these parishioners’ complaints, and his response: “‘Do we have to put that up there? They’re black!’ ‘Yeah, but they’re faithful!’” In those few words he summed up the transformation he seeks at St. Timothy’s, a transformation in which the members’ old racist stereotypes and ideas are replaced by new ways of thinking about Africans—as “black, but faithful.”

“The God of the Black Backward African is Alive”

Racist sentiments, per se, are only part of what dissidents have had to overcome in arriving at a positive evaluation of African Christianity. The negative images of Africa which most Americans have absorbed from the media, schools, literature, and other sources are, indeed, laden with racist ideas. However, there are other, additional elements besides blackness alone which are part of Americans’ negative perceptions of Africa. Colonial ideas of Africa as uncivilized, savage, and dependent upon outside help for the education and uplifting of its people, hold over in American thought. Further, the news stories and images of Africa which Americans hear and see are almost uniformly stories and images of crisis and need. What Americans hear about Africa in the news media perpetuates ideas of Africans as lawless and
brutal, riven by tribal hatreds, unable to plan or run their own societies, desperately poor, and superstitious or fundamentalist in matters of religion.

In addition to—perhaps, encompassing—anti-racist ideas, new and positive ideas about Africa, Africans, and especially African Christianity have been circulating among conservative Episcopalians since the late 1990s. In the email discussion with which I began this chapter, the educating and/or quelling of two members who did not share positive evaluations of African Christianity illustrates the spread of these ideas. A high opinion of African Christianity has virtually become part of the orthodoxy to which conservative Northern Anglicans adhere. Or, as one of my Ugandan consultants put it, “You in America are saying, ‘The God of the black backward African is still alive!’”

In the following sections of this chapter, I examine the content and implications of Americans’ positive ideas and discourses about African Christianity, as well as Ugandan thoughts about the same ideas and discourses. I will also indicate some ways in which these new ideas about African Christianity, though positive, carry on old colonial patterns of thought and stereotypes, and, perhaps, continue to constrain relationships and mutual understanding. Postcolonial scholar Roxanne Lynn Doty, in her book *Imperial Encounters* (1996), has argued for the need to attend to practices of representation in North/South relationships—that is, the ways people talk about and understand the North, the South, and their differences. These representations are important and worthy of study because, as I suggested in chapter 1 in introducing the concept of discourse, *talk matters*. Doty observes that representation in discourse “is a kind of power that produces meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships, and a range of imaginable conduct” (Doty 1996:4). Representations of the global North and South, then, are centrally important in defining roles, relationships, and practices in North/South relationships of all kinds. Moreover, Doty points out that these representations are asymmetrically controlled and produced, coming mainly from Northern people and institutions. “The issues and concerns that constitute these relations
occur within a ‘reality’ whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the ‘first world’” (Doty 1996:5).

Representations of the North and South, then, are produced in the North and then become conditioning realities for North/South relationships. What Doty argues and demonstrates in her book is that, across centuries and continents of North/South interactions, there is a great deal of commonality in the basic pattern of these representations or discourses, many of which have roots in the discourses and practices of colonialism. For example, she calls our attention to the numerous binary oppositions “that we routinely draw upon and that frame our thinking,” such as: “developed/underdeveloped, ‘first world’/’third world,’ core/periphery,... modern/traditional” (Doty 1996:2). These binary oppositions also serve as hierarchies, with the global South associated with the weaker or undervalued term (Doty 1996:92).

Similarly, literary scholar David Spurr offers an analysis of twelve “rhetorical modes, or ways of writing about non-Western peoples,” which he has found both in colonial-era texts and in contemporary journalistic and other accounts of the non-Western world (Spurr 1993). “Taken together, these [rhetorical modes] constitute a kind of repertoire for colonial discourse, a range of tropes, conceptual categories, and logical operations available for purposes of representation” (Spurr 1993:5). Like Doty, Spurr finds that these general principles and patterns of representation have not significantly changed since the end of the colonial era in the 1960s; rather, these patterns continue to appear in all types of Northern writings about the global South, whatever those writers’ positions and motivations (Spurr 1993:39). Spurr, too, draws attention to the implicit Northern dominance which persists in these durable constructions of North and South (Spurr 1993:6).

Studies such as Doty’s and Spurr’s represent part of a scholarly movement to explore how colonial patterns of thought continue into the present, in discourses, practices, and especially North/South relationships in the current era. These scholars direct attention to how the North’s
representational practices, even when used in quite different ways and contexts from historical colonial discourses, replicate the logics of those discourses and implicitly perpetuate colonial patterns of privilege, by defining the North as the superior partner and constraining the terms and possibilities of relationship on the basis of Northern understandings of the global North and South. Thus even Americans who have consciously turned away from assumptions and stereotypes about Africa with roots in colonial discourses of African tribalism, primitivism, superstition, and so on, may still view and speak about Africa and Africans in ways which are shaped by the same fundamental binary oppositions and representational tropes which lie behind colonial discourses. In what follows, I bring this perspective to an examination of current Northern Episcopal conservative (and, to some extent, moderate and liberal) ideas about African Christianity, and the implications of those ideas in their relationships with African Christians.

**The spiritual South?**

One of the major tropes or themes of colonial/postcolonial discourse which David Spurr identifies is the trope of Idealization. Spurr observes, “The tradition of idealizing the savage.... is invariably produced by a rhetorical situation in which the writer takes an ethical position in regard to his or her own culture” (Spurr 1993:125). That ethical position is usually a position of critique, a critique furthered by bringing in the image of the idealized ‘savage.’ In other words, idealizing the culturally ‘other,’ such as people of the global South, serves the rhetorical (and perhaps the emotional) needs of Northerners troubled by their own society. The ‘other’ stands, for them, for the good things lost in modern Northern society, which might–or might not–be reclaimed by Northerners emulating the ‘other’s’ desirable qualities. Though other tropes and themes besides idealization will be mentioned in the pages that follow, all the discourses which will be examined here constitute an overall idealization of African Christianity. Previous chapters have shown clearly, and this chapter will continue to demonstrate, how this idealization plays a central role in Anglican conservatives’ criticisms of the American Episcopal Church and
Northern Anglicanism in general. Conservative dissidents unhappy with Episcopal Church policies point to the orthodoxy, zeal, and other desirable traits they perceive as characterizing the churches of the global South, and seek to bring that moral force to bear in transforming the Episcopal Church.

This idealization of Southern Christianity, and the contrast between Southern and Northern Christianity, is frequently articulated by both Americans and Africans in terms of what I call ‘the Exchange.’ Indeed, this is probably the single most commonly-voiced way North/South relationships were described. The Exchange is essentially the idea that Africans (or Southerners in general) should share their spiritual wealth with Americans (or Northerners in general), while the latter share their material wealth and related assets (e.g. management and technological skills) with Southern churches. The idea of the Exchange encapsulates in its simplest form the model of a bifurcated world Christianity, and the characteristics of its Northern and Southern ‘halves’, which are currently dominant among conservative (and to an extent among moderate and liberal) Northern Anglicans, and many Southern Anglicans as well.

One clear-cut example of the Exchange comes from the website of the Ekklesia Society, a conservative American organization devoted to networking bishops internationally:

Each Member, Each Region Shares Its Strength: The Ekklesia Society will provide a mechanism to help connect evangelism and renewal resources with needs around the communion. For example, materially wealthy US parishes can be greatly enriched by contact with (and exposure to), preaching and evangelists from Asia and Africa. At the same time, sharing even a small percentage of the relatively opulent Western parish budgets can provide resources that will make a tremendous difference in areas of great poverty in the under developed nations which make up what is called the “two-thirds world.” [Ekklesia 1998]
A leader in the AAC, another conservative Episcopal Church organization, who works on international Anglican relationships told me, “Exposure to the 2/3 World evangelistic ethos is helpful [for Americans]. We get a spiritual benefit, if you like. In return for which, we are comparatively rich and are able to offer material support.” Members of the congregation of St. Timothy’s also voiced similar ideas. One member told me, “I see both helping each other. The U.S. has been undernourished spiritually because we’ve been overnourished materially.”

Many Ugandans also described ideal North/South church relationships to me in terms of the Exchange. A young Ugandan church member and musician, when I asked about relations between African and Northern churches, told me, “As in most cases, they [Northerners] assist us in sponsorships, [and] the Anglican bishops of Uganda can assist with spiritual matters.”

Another Ugandan churchman, a lay member of a bishop’s staff with substantial experience with American/ Ugandan church relations, told me,

There are things we lack here, and there [is]... something lacking in America. I think there is a general feeling that the Gospel is very needed in America. As we have been sharing. So whenever some American friends come, they feel that when we go [to America], we can also help them to share the message for Christ.... And when we reach there, the Americans also feel that we are really poor here. When we share [about our faith in America], we say, ‘This wealth, what about sharing it with African brothers and sisters?’

These examples of the Exchange make amply clear the way the American and African churches are characterized. The American church, and Northern churches in general, have ‘material wealth,’ ‘material abundance,’ ‘financial resources’ to ‘bestow,’ ‘opulent parish budgets’, and ‘people with training in leadership and management,’ to share with their African brethren. On the other hand, the African churches have ‘more fundamental faith,’ ‘spiritual enrichment,’ ‘wealth of spirit and soul,’ ‘personal values,’ ‘the Word of God wholesale,’ and
‘people with very, very enthusiastic faith’ to send North for the benefit of their brethren in the US and elsewhere. As in the rhetoric of neoliberal global economics, each region is envision exporting what it has in plenty, and trading those goods for what it lacks but another region can provide. One appeal of the Exchange model among Africans is that this model offers a clear avenue for Southern reciprocity and relational equality, through the giving of spiritual aid in return for material aid. One main reason Northern conservatives may currently be so successful in building and maintaining relationships with Southern Christians at present, compared to Northern moderates and liberals, may be the possibilities for mutuality and reciprocity found in Northern conservatives’ guiding discourses and ideas. This insistence may make relationships with Northern conservatives more satisfying for Southern partners than relationships with Northern moderates or liberals who have less-fully-developed ideas of what Southern Christians may have to offer them.

Moral Drift and Global Shift

The characterizations of the strengths of Northern and Southern Christianity which emerge from statements of the Exchange reveal a highly salient concept for both Americans and Africans entering into these transnational Anglican alliances: the idea that the moral center of world Christianity has shifted towards the global South. Invoking this idea, dissidents can not only claim to be in line with a global majority, but they can, and often do, claim to be in line with the wave of the future, the up and coming Christian world order.

The idea of a sort of global North-to-South shift in world Christianity, or at the very least in world Anglicanism, has been around for some years. Scholars such as Andrew Walls, David Barrett and John Pobee had noted the shift in worldwide Anglican numbers long before Lambeth 1998, by which time it had become a truism that the majority of the world’s Anglicans lived in the global South. There seems to be little serious argument with the basic thesis that there are
more Anglicans now in the global South than in the church’s Anglo provinces. The question is, what does this shift in numerical dominance mean?

Evangelical Anglicans in both the North and South have interpreted the numerical growth of the Southern churches as evidence that they are preaching the Gospel effectively and earning God’s favor, and thus success, with their evangelism. The shift in numerical dominance within the Anglican Communion is thus often elided with the corresponding idea of a shift in the location of moral and spiritual authority within the Communion. The parts of the Communion where Anglicanism is growing fastest—usually generalized as Africa, Asia, and Latin America—are thus also described, often in the same breath, as the parts of the Communion where the Gospel is preached most zealously, where orthodoxy is most secure, where doctrine is most pure. One of countless possible examples comes from the Ekklesia Society’s literature:

The present day Anglican Communion is one of the most vibrant, authentic expressions of the Christian faith that history has ever seen. The growth and vitality of the church, especially in the third world is one of the greatest success stories of the communion, and is an inspiration to the rest of the church. It is especially true in the light of the poverty, famine, injustice and war which is afflicting many of the very areas where the church is growing most dramatically. .... In the Northern and industrialized Western nations, the picture is not as rosy. The pluralism of the cultures which surround the church have intruded, obscured values, and in some cases, polarized the church. There is an incursion of secular humanism, and a radical liberalism which has sought to change the faith and tried to redefine the meaning of orthodoxy. [Ekklesia 1998]

This “rosy” view of Southern Christendom received a recent boost in the form of Philip Jenkins’ 2002 book (and even more widely-read Atlantic Monthly article), which argued that Christianity in the global South was the important rising force in world geopolitics today. Not surprisingly, Jenkins’ work was received with tremendous enthusiasm by dissident Episcopalians, who read his argument as affirming and providing further justification for aligning themselves with the perceived orthodoxy of Southern Anglicanism. More will be said in
chapter 9 of the adoption of Jenkins’ arguments by conservative Episcopalians. For the moment, suffice it to say that his much-publicized conclusions further cemented, in the minds of conservative Northern Anglicans, the vision of a vital, orthodox, and growing Southern Christendom—backing their side. Buoyed by this shining vision of rising Southern orthodoxy, conservatives feel they are catching the wave of an exciting future, rather than—as some of their opponents argue—clinging to a fading past.

Many African Anglicans also see their own churches as stronger and more orthodox than most Northern churches. For African Christians, such arguments are salient in the context of ongoing debates about the place of Christianity in modern Africa. The Church of Uganda, for example, is a post-missionary church in a post-colonial society in which debates over whether Christianity can ever be an authentic and legitimate African religion, or is always already tainted by the white oppressor’s power, are very much alive. The association of Christianity with colonialism continues to be a critical issue for African theology and Biblical interpretation (Paul 2003). The continuing salience of this issue in Uganda was apparent to me when I presented an early draft of this chapter to a small audience of local intellectuals at the Centre for Basic Research in Kampala in May of 2002, a solid half-hour of the subsequent discussion among the small audience of Ugandan scholars revolved around the question of the authenticity, strength, and Africanness of Christianity in Africa, demonstrating clearly that these matters remain the subject of lively debate.¹¹⁸

The influx and increasing politicization of Islam (elsewhere in Africa, if not yet in Uganda) has made questions of the legitimacy of Christianity as an African religion even more loaded. In many African contexts, Muslim leaders have tried to position their faith as the more authentically African alternative to Christianity, cast as the ‘white man’s faith.’ In response to such questionings of the appropriateness of Christianity as an African religion, African Christian leaders repeatedly assert that Christianity not only is, but always has been, an African religion.
For example, in a sermon at UCU’s Mission Week, one priest pointed out that there are more African than European place-names in the Bible, and argued that Uganda had nurtured Jesus, since the Nile flows from Uganda, and Jesus drank from the Nile as a child in Egypt.\(^{119}\)

The Africanness of Christianity—and the larger issue at stake, the appropriateness of Christianity as a religion for Africans—thus remain problematic issues for African Christians. To avoid having their faith and their church seen as tools of Northern ideology in a society decidedly ambivalent about such influences, leaders in the Church of Uganda, as in other Southern churches, seek to assert the distinctiveness and authenticity of Southern Christianity. One way Southern Christian leaders defend themselves and their church is by arguing that Southern Christianity is stronger, purer, more Scriptural—in short, better—than Northern Christianity. These arguments are implicit in Ugandan church leaders’ use of anecdotes about the decadence of Northern Christianity, drawn from personal experience, circulating stories, newspaper accounts, and Northern conservative sources. For example, in one UCU Mission Week sermon, a Ugandan priest spoke about being in New Zealand and seeing a live broadcast of “Bob and Dick being married by an Anglican priest!”\(^{120}\) He used this an example in his general argument that Northern Christians have lost their bearings and values. Questioning the orthodoxy of Northern Christianity, then, serves as a way for Africans to speak about what is good in African churches, in spite of their missionary past and present weaknesses.

To sum up, most African leaders and laypeople I spoke with, like their American Episcopalian counterparts, feel the African churches are now at least the equals, and quite likely the superiors, of the Northern churches on spiritual terms—though the Northern churches are clearly superior in other respects, particularly in their wealth and educational advantages. However, not all Ugandans accept wholesale the conservative American accounts of ECUSA as spiritually dead. Though many give these accounts a fair amount of credence, and see confirmation of such negative visions of ECUSA in events like the Lambeth sexuality debate, a significant number of
my Ugandan consultants told me they could only report on what they’d heard about the Northern church and couldn’t pass judgment on what they do not know firsthand. And while some Africans who visit Northern countries confirm the negative view, some who have had direct exposure to Northern churches express uncertainty about the ways what they see doesn’t match what they hear from Northern conservatives. A Ugandan priest told me that the “implication that the church in the West is really collapsing... is partly, not wholly true. When people tell us about the Episcopal Church, they don’t tell us about churches that are booming.”

More generally, many Ugandans balk at fully accepting the “global shift” vision of world Christianity–decadent, immoral North juxtaposed with vibrant, faithful South–on the basis of their own perceptions and experiences as Southern Christians. For example, one member of the Church of Uganda’s provincial staff told me a recent visitor with an American evangelical Episcopal renewal team had just been telling him, “‘The U.S. is a mission field because people are not taking Scripture seriously, there is high moral decay’”–then, reflecting on it, he added, “Though that is in Africa too, and people are drifting from the church....” In the remainder of this chapter, I will lay out some of the different understandings of Southern Christian moral authority commonly voiced by both Northern and Southern Christians–and the hesitations or qualifications of these understandings which are also voiced, most often by Southerners.

**African Christian Spiritual Capital**

Statements about the strength, orthodoxy, and vitality of Southern Christianity often include implicit or explicit arguments about why Southern Christianity possesses such a high degree of what one consultant called “spiritual capital.” The debate over the desirability of belonging to the “Ugandan Communion” with which I began this chapter presented some relevant examples. Members of the list, writing to defend African and particularly Ugandan Christianity, cited the suffering and endurance of Ugandan Christians under Idi Amin’s regime to argue that Ugandan Christians are actually much more faithful than American Christians. Similarly, a British bishop
I interviewed during my fieldwork told me that African preaching carries a special message to Northerners because of the “authority of [Africans’] poverty, of their suffering, of their experiences.” In these and countless similar examples, Northern Christians offer explanations of the sources of Southern, and especially African, Christian moral authority—the moral authority which they argue obligates Northern Christians to listen to African Christian voices and honor their convictions. The email list members write about persecution; the English bishop cites the authority of poverty and suffering; others cite the African churches’ youth and their rapid growth as arguments for Northerners to give these Southern churches a respectful hearing. Conservative-leaning Kentucky bishop Don Wimberley, writing about the Southern impact at Lambeth, put the matter another way in arguing that the Southern churches have “earn[ed] the moral right to speak,” through their leaders’ and members’ experiences of poverty and suffering.

From these and many other examples, I have drawn out five basic explanatory concepts which commonly serve to justify African Christian moral authority. These are: Youth; Zealousness; Numbers or growth; Suffering; and Poverty. In what follows, I describe and illustrate each of these concepts, as they emerge from talk about the legitimacy and moral authority of Southern and especially African Christianity. I will also show how Ugandans question some of these images of the African church, sometimes even as they invoke them. Through this exploration of American images of African Christianity, and Ugandan Christians’ reflections on those images, I offer another image of one African church: optimistic yet uncertain of the future, confident of its orthodoxy but sharply aware of constraints on its mission.

**YOUTH**

One explanation both Northerners and Southerners often use for the differences between the Northern and Southern churches is the greater youth of the Southern churches, many of which were founded by missionaries and their first converts within the past 150 years. The youth of the African churches has been cited disparagingly by some Northerners unhappy with the growing
influence of African Christianity in the Anglican Communion. American bishop John Spong’s infamous remarks just before Lambeth 1998 present one such example. In a similar vein, a liberal-leaning American bishop told me that the Episcopal Church differs from other Anglican provinces because it is a “historically advanced culture:” “It sounds pejorative to say so, but there are pre-Enlightenment, Enlightenment, and post-Enlightenment societies in the world....The differences between us and the African churches are partly due to this.”

However, many others, Northerners and Southerners alike, use the youth of the Southern churches, not to describe them as immature or lacking in understanding, but to explain their perceived superior ‘spiritual capital’—their greater enthusiasm and purity in faith. One moderate British churchman, talking with me during a visit to Uganda, found hope in the same ‘pre-Enlightenment’ character of Southern Christianity that the above-quoted American bishop found troubling:

[Uganda] has never been through the whole both scientific and urban revolution of human life which the West has known.... The sense of God is still very strong here.... I am hopeful that Uganda and Africa and Asia will have a lot to teach the rather self-confident scientific world-view which hit Europe so hard over a long period, but which the Church of Uganda has not yet encountered, fully.

Northern conservatives also often uphold the youth of these churches as a factor accounting for their strength and zeal. To offer one brief example from the Lambeth period, an article in one of the British papers praising the conservative Lambeth sexuality resolution carried the bold headline, “It’s the Church’s children that have kept the faith” (Dalrymple 1998). The implication that it is now the young churches of the Communion, recently graduated from mission status, who are holding fast to true Christianity and striving to keep the rest of the Communion on track, as well.

Youth as a characterization of peoples and institutions in the global South has a clear history in colonial discourses. Throughout that history, youth has sometimes been described as a
negative or limiting characteristic of Southern societies, and sometimes as a positive and inspiring characteristic; what does not change is the binary opposition between the young, new, inexperienced South and the older, experienced, wiser (if sadder) North (Doty 1996). Dipesh Chakrabarty has written about the way such talk places Southern societies in a realm of unreadiness or immaturity, of “not yet,” temporally dislocated from the contemporary or modern world, which Johannes Fabian has called “the denial of coevalness” to those “others” outside the Euro-American cultural sphere (Chakrabarty 2000:8).

This perceived separation is not just about time, but also about knowledge and understanding. Bruno Latour observes that people who understand themselves as modern see themselves as separated from those they define as non-modern, not by “a certain number of centuries” but by “epistemic ruptures” (Latour 1993:71). The Northern bishops quoted above, in describing Africa as “pre-Enlightenment” or as never having been through the scientific revolution, express such a view quite clearly. For Northerners, looking ‘back’ on these pre-Enlightenment, pre-secularization (as one bishop noted, “Their sense of God is still very strong”), Southern societies is often associated with nostalgia and longing. Spurr notes that a colonizing power often sees colonized territory and people as an image of its own immature self, and that “nostalgia for the lost innocence and harmony of [“earlier, more pure”] Western life” is often a part of this perception (Spurr 1993:41). In describing African Christianity in terms of youth, then, Northern Christians are articulating long-held Northern ideas about the relative knowledge and advancedness of Southern and Northern societies and cultures.

In spite of the colonial associations of the discourse, Ugandan church leaders, too, sometimes speak of the youth of the African churches as a source of strength. As one Ugandan churchman told me, “The church is relatively young in Africa.... And that purity, that newness is still there.... And that's why the church is still growing in Africa. So that may be an area where the African church may be helpful [to the Northern churches].” Ugandans stress that the youth or newness of
their church does not mean it is immature; rather, their descriptions liken the church to a young adult, newly mature and still vigorous with youth. A divinity student told me: “The West is being victim of a lot of technological achievements... [and] losing the flavor of Christianity, while for us, we are maturing in Christianity. We are at a certain advanced level of Christianity.”

Many Ugandan Anglicans talk about their church’s youth particularly in terms of the relatively recent turn—at both societal and individual levels—from traditional religions. A Ugandan priest and evangelist told me why he thinks Americans take Christianity for granted and Ugandans do not:

People [in Africa] are very familiar with where they came from, in their ancestral worship, the kind of spiritual conflict that goes on there. People also know what it means to have a break from their old life, in which they were very much dominated by fear of spirit this, fear of spirit that, the damage of habits like alcohol that have been in people’s lives, the complication of polygamy that they come from,... and now that they are Christians their lifestyle must change. There is a very clear demarcation here.

One argument, then, for why a young church should also be a strong church is that its members are conscious of having made a choice for Christianity and turned away from traditional religious beliefs and practices, while Northerners living in ‘culturally Christian’ contexts take Christianity more for granted. Ugandans sometimes explicitly contrasted their church’s youth with the Northern churches’ age. One bishop pointed to old age as the problem with the church in the North:

We [think] that the church in the West is suffering from the problems of old age. You see, old age—When you become very old, you become behaving like a baby. Of course you are still ahead of us, you are very brilliant—we are talking generally.... Of course you still have people who are theologically far ahead of us and so on. But in terms of faith, you know, sometimes when you get old, you get tired, you begin to do things—you know?—you no longer do things the way you used to do them. So we thought maybe they have problems of old age.

Some Ugandans turn arguments about their church’s youth into reproaches to Northern
Christians for their straying from the simple truth of the Gospel message. They argue that the African churches have kept to the faith the missionaries brought, while the Northern churches, the original sending churches of those same missionaries, have strayed from the orthodox faith. For example, one young churchman told me, “Apart from those deviations of culture, us in Africa had taken [the faith] as it came form the CMS. So when changes come, we think, what, are we to change the message now?” This idea, that Africans have kept to the missionaries’ faith while the Northern church has strayed into error, is often connected with talk about the need to re-missionize the North. As one African divinity student put it, “Maybe there is a need... for us to go [to America] and say, you see we have been taught this and that, but now we can't bear the new teaching.” This idea, that Africans have preserved the faith of the missionaries and now need to carry the Gospel back to the North, is also shared by Americans in these relationships. Several members of St. Timothy’s commented to me on various occasions that they found it ironic that Americans and other Northerners had taken Christianity to Africa 100 years ago, and that now Africans were bringing it back to Americans. One American associated with the conservative movement in the Episcopal Church once asked me whether I was familiar with the book, How the Irish Saved Civilization, which, she explained, details how many aspects of Western civilization were preserved in Ireland through the Dark Ages when most of the rest of Europe devolved into chaos. She went on to suggest that perhaps the same thing was happening with Africans and Christianity right now—that in Africa, as out-of-the-way in world terms today as Ireland was in the Dark Ages, Christianity is being preserved while the rest of the world slides into postmodernism and heresy.

In this vision of Africa, shared by Ugandans and Americans alike, the youthful African churches become the precious repositories of orthodox Christian faith, where that faith is preserved and whence it may come forth to renew the rest of the world. A compelling vision for African Christian self-esteem—and yet, a very few Ugandans hinted at a certain ambivalence
about this idea. Instead of seeing African fidelity to the faith received from the missionaries as laudable, they wonder—with some humor, but an underlying seriousness—whether they’ve just been suckers all along. One young divinity student commented on seeing Northern bishops engaging in behaviors which many Southerners regard as inappropriate for Christians: “It is shocking for us to see a bishop drinking alcohol, because we will feel they were telling us lies.” And a young Ugandan priest commenting on the differences between the Northern and the African church remarked, “Many people on your side have gone a long way to analyze the issues, while for us we are being kept in the myths [while] you may have disproved it.” These rare but provocative examples of Ugandans wondering if they’ve been lied to or left behind by Northerners carry surprising echoes of some Northerners’ negative views of the youth of Southern Christianity (defined as naivete or ignorance). They hint, too, at these speakers’ awareness of the ambivalence of the identification of their church and nation with youth. But, these hints of uncertainty aside, by and large most Ugandans join Northerners in accepting, and sometimes propounding, the idea that the youth of the African church gives it strength and orthodoxy which raise its ‘spiritual capital’ well above that of the Northern church.

**ZEAL**

A second, related explanation for the high level of African Christian ‘spiritual capital’ is that African Christianity is characterized by a cluster of related traits including zeal, commitment, enthusiasm, and simplicity or purity in faith. For example, a parishioner at St. Timothy’s commented on how she sees the parish’s relationship with the Province of Rwanda: “From everything that I have heard and read, and what I heard from the people who went over there, shows what Godly people they are, and how much they love the Lord.” An American missionary remarked on faith in the US versus African faith: “So many people in America have just been in the church and they haven’t had a chance to see a living, vibrant faith.” The contrast, implicit or sometimes explicit, is with an image of Northern Christianity as shallow, over-theologized, and
dull. Ugandans often articulate similar views of their church and the African church in general, highlighting qualities of commitment and enthusiasm for a simple, essential Gospel message. A Church of Uganda official told me, “[I don’t] mean that [the Church of Uganda] has been perfect, .... but at least you can see that there is vitality. And I attribute this to building our faith, and rooting our faith, on Scripture.” Many point to the East African Revival in accounting for the superior quality of their church’s faith.

Again, as with the discourse of youth, this talk reflects colonial ideas about the simple thinking and enthusiasm of Africans. Doty notes the endurance of Northern representations of Southern peoples as emotional and passionate rather than rational (Doty 1996:88,110). However, Ugandan and other African church leaders, in taking up such concepts, are adopting them not only as self-identity discourses for themselves and their churches, but also as tools for critique of the North. One Ugandan priest told me:

Some things are easy; just believe them! You don't have to question.... Some of the problems the American church is facing are too intellectual to make sense to the African mind. [Africans’] concern is, are their sins forgiven? Are they going to heaven? Can they live a meaningful relationship on earth before they do that? That's it. But to get divided over whether--like over the Trinity, over these doctrine issues--that doesn't concern them. They have enough faith.

Another Ugandan church leader told me, “We are a church close to that of the New Testament, Acts, in Africa. And that’s why the sophisticated academicians in the West call us primitives, because we tell them that Jesus is the Lord and He saves.” Though one of these leaders attributes the identification of Africans as “primitives” to Northerners, and the other himself voices a view of the African church as un-intellectual, both are using these ideas to strengthen their critiques of the “sophisticated academicians” in the North who are so wrapped up in complex theological issues, and so distant from living faith, that they can “get divided...over the Trinity [and] doctrine issues.”
Ugandans also contrast their church with the lack of enthusiasm and charisma they believe characterizes most Northern churches. One Ugandan priest told me, “Our church in Uganda is a very joyful church.... Our church celebrates a lot. Our church is a vibrant church. American churches, very few are.” A Rwandan priest studying in Uganda told me that he thinks the fact that some American priests and parishes want to be attached to African bishops means they’re lacking something at home. “Maybe it’s the spiritual flavor, the charisma, which may be being lost in America, with priests and bishops drying up and preaching eloquent sermons without spiritual flavor, without prayerful healing.” The African church, he explained, has leaders with spiritual vigor and moral authority, who can even pray for the sick or cast out demons: “

[African leaders] have a stronger charisma. Churches in Europe or the US may be lacking that.”

Some leaders I spoke with commented on the constraints on the African churches, such as limited opportunities for training, which may partially account for African Christians’ focus on the ‘basics’ of faith. One Ugandan priest explained,

When you are dealing with the bare minimum, some of the details don't matter. You get the basics [snaps]; if they apply, go for it. Then, of course, the levels of formal education. The American church leader is on average a college graduate, but here in Africa we can't raise enough leaders of that caliber. So we just get some intermediate training and give them basic training in pastoral work and ordain them.

And Ghanaian scholar and churchman Kodwo Ankrah, who lives in Uganda and occasionally teaches at Uganda Christian University, noted in the course of a lecture in his Theology and Development seminar: “Nowadays they in the North would like more preachers from here, more missionaries, because we are more dynamic, maybe because we are more ignorant—[laughs] and haven’t studied theology, so we say something new!” Ankrah’s ironic play with the notions of African ignorance and dynamism shows his awareness of the double-edgedness of such characterizations of African Christianity. The limited opportunities and resources available to
African preachers may be the very thing which attracts Northerners to such preachers. Nonetheless, double-edged in its implications though it may be, the image of African zeal and simplicity in faith and preaching does provide Ugandan Christians with another ground for raising questions about the quality of Northern Christianity, and thus Northern Christians’ right to lead in the worldwide church.

**NUMBERS**

Some other arguments commonly made by Northerners for African spiritual capital prove to be less popular among Ugandans and other African Christians. A significant divide in North/South usage emerges when these explanations are examined. The first of these which I will explore is what I will call the ‘Numbers’ argument. The Numbers argument essentially states that the much-touted rapid growth of African churches gives them moral authority. As mentioned above, this is a common argument among Northerners. As one conservative observer of the AMiA movement described it, they are “using the great asset of the tremendous amount of numbers that are behind an orthodox witness from Africa” to give strength to their side in conflicts within and among Northern churches.

Northern conservatives who make such arguments begin from the idea that there is rapid church growth in Africa. This idea of rapid growth is quite generalized, since not all Anglican provinces in Africa are flourishing, but, in general, most scholars of world Anglicanism agree that recent African church growth has far outpaced any such growth in Northern churches. Northern conservatives take that generalization about church growth in Africa and attach particular understandings of what that growth must mean about African Christianity. The logic of such interpretations is twofold: first, that the African churches must be doing something fundamentally right to be growing, just as the Northern churches must be doing something fundamentally wrong to be shrinking; and secondly, by a vaguely democratic logic, that since the African churches are by far the largest in the Anglican Communion today, that they should have
a correspondingly strong voice in its activities and positions, even to the point of being empowered to impose orthodoxy on errant Northern provinces.

One example of the numbers discourse comes from the AMiA homepage, which reads in part: Christianity is spreading faster than at any time or place in 2000 years. Yet this extraordinary growth is not taking place in the United States where many of the mainline denominations are losing members. Rather, the Christian church and specifically the Anglican church are booming in places like Africa and Asia. [AMiA 2003a]

In an article supporting the conservative American venture into microfinance in the developing world, the Five Talents initiative, Robert Miclean raised similar arguments:

Despite persecution, starvation, and government repression, people are coming to Christ in record numbers. The Church is experiencing phenomenal growth in Africa and elsewhere. There are now more Anglicans in Nigeria than in Canada and the United States combined. Most of them are orthodox in theology and evangelical in fervor, which accounts for the growth in membership. The growth of the faithful Church of Christ in the two-thirds world should give beleaguered Episcopalians in the United States rejuvenated hope in our sovereign Lord. [Miclean 1998]

This example makes explicit the usual assumption that growth in a church is an indicator that it must be doing things right (orthodox theology, evangelical fervor). Nigeria is not the only African nation to be singled out. In the October 2000 AMiA newsletter, an article on Rwanda noted,

Although the nation of Rwanda is only about the size of Vermont and has a population of 7.7 million, there are 1,000,000 Anglicans in attendance in its churches every week. The church is growing rapidly. It is not unusual for Rwanda bishops, overseeing nine dioceses, to confirm hundreds of people at a time. [AMiA 2003b]

And when conservative Episcopal scholar and AAC member Stephen Noll moved to Uganda to
take charge of Uganda Christian University in 2000, he stated in a sermon marking his departure, “We’re not going to a virgin jungle nor evangelizing a pagan people; in fact, Uganda is one of the most Christian countries in the world today” (Noll 2000b).

Numbers arguments are heard in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa, too. One Ugandan priest and evangelist put the case clearly:

Of course, the numbers now. The numbers of Christians in Africa are many.... [Numbers] give authority and credibility. It's something to do with spiritual capital, really. That explains the enthusiasm and the zeal which the African leaders have, because they have a base. They are not ashamed. It has to do with conviction and confidence. When you are a minority, your confidence is not the same as one who is in the majority. Numbers are critical.

A Ugandan bishop spoke in similar terms about the authority of ‘sheer numbers’ and the ‘red-hot experience’ of being part of a rapidly-growing church:

I think that... African and Asian bishops made a very important contribution [at Lambeth 1998]. But of course this is partly due to the fact that that is where, Africa and Asia, is where the Christian church is growing.... I was in a division to do with mission and outreach.... And it was Asian and African bishops who gave great leadership in that. They were well-assisted, of course, by Western scribes and writers but the red-hot experience was coming from those places.

However, while Americans assume rapid church growth translates directly into legitimacy and moral authority for the African churches, Ugandans’ reactions to such growth figures (and to their own experiences of church growth—or not) are more mixed. They question whether high membership numbers and rapid growth rates necessarily correlate with deep faith and solid orthodoxy, as Northerners often imply.122

**Questioning the numbers**

Ugandan Anglicans frequently express ambivalence and concern about numbers matters in their church, as I found during my fieldwork. The predominance of nominal Christians or “churchgoers” (people who are judged to perform all the outward actions of Christian life, but
without any deep faith) in the churches, and worries about how to reach those people and bring them to deeper faith, came up again and again in interviews with Ugandan Anglican bishops, priests, and laypeople alike. In sharp contrast to the Rev. Dr. Noll’s approving description of Uganda as “one of the most Christian countries in the world,” Ugandan preachers not infrequently describe Uganda as a ‘Christian country’ with bitter irony. An elderly Ugandan evangelist, preaching on the UCU campus, observed, “If you listen to the radio, you find Satan is robbing the world. People defile children, school fees are stolen, and people call this a Christian country?” In another sermon, a different preacher admonished his listeners: “The Gospel has been preached a long time in Uganda. This is not the first time you’ve heard this.... The Gospel has been preached here in Uganda for over 100 years now.” Uganda’s relatively long history of Christianity, and the large proportion of the population (around 80%) who claim to be Christians, seem to these preachers to be belied or even betrayed by the practices of the populace of this so-called Christian country.

Several Ugandans suggested to me that, in fact, the very Christianness of Ugandan society—the pervasiveness of Christian institutions, ideas, symbols, etc. in Uganda’s public sphere—might account for the shallowness of many people’s faith. A young layman told me, 

Most schools begin with prayers in the morning, and so on and so forth. So the influence of Christianity is actually big. Only that like all human beings, some people are Christians, you know, superficially. They are not deeply rooted in their faith. That’s why you hear of things like, you know, in some offices you find embezzlement of funds, you meet people in the streets who are thieves, you hear of prostitution, you know. I mean, people who do these things are not pagans. They are Christians.

A few Ugandans offered the surprising observation that, while sincere Northern Christians were no doubt fewer in number, they were probably more committed, since the strong social norms in favor of Christianity in Uganda encourage nominalism. A Ugandan bishop told me, 

The people in America who go to church are really devoted to that church, because it’s not the norm now in America to go to church.... In our context,... the majority will go to church, because if you don’t go to church you
cannot answer the question, ‘Why didn’t you go to church?’ Because they are going to ask you.

During the course of my interviewing in Uganda, I was interested—and amused—to note that Ugandans often describe their church, and Christianity in Africa in general, as “a mile wide and an inch deep.” One Ugandan priest observed to me that Africa is “a continent where you have 20,000 people coming to the Lord every single day, according to statistics.” Yet, he went on, there are wars here, violence, dirty cities, HIV/AIDS, and poverty. “What’s the problem? Christianity here is a mile long but an inch deep; it has quantity rather than quality.” Another Ugandan churchman observed, “If Rwanda is 90% Christian, why the genocide? Christians must not condone evil,” and concluded, likewise, that African Christianity is “an ocean wide and an inch deep.” The same phrase is often used to describe Christianity in the U.S., by those with doubts about the strength and sincerity of American faith—including conservative Episcopal dissidents. There is, then, an intriguing parallel between American and Ugandan perceptions of the depth or quality of faith in their own churches and countries—but the parallel takes on a significant degree of irony in light of the ways American conservatives fetishize African faith and church growth. American conservatives, despairing of their own churches and convinced that the size and growth rates of the churches in Africa prove they’re preaching the Gospel and following God’s will, seek out leadership from African church leaders. But at the same time, Ugandan Anglicans lament the situation in their churches, worrying endlessly about how to deepen the faith of nominal Christians and encourage right behavior among committed Christians. During our six months in Uganda, we witnessed an endless cycle of parish and campus Mission Weeks; crusades and evangelistic campaigns in towns and villages; Bible studies, fellowships, and other discipling opportunities; and sermons preached from the pulpits of Anglican churches urging the congregation present to truly give their hearts to God. All of these events manifest the concern of many church leaders and members about the level of Christian
belief, and quality of Christian practice, in their church and country at large.

Lay and ordained leaders in the Church of Uganda, then, are preoccupied by questions about whether the numbers within their churches really indicate a faithful populace. Many of these leaders are even more troubled by the question of whether the numbers within their churches are growing at all. One Ugandan bishop spoke to this question, from his own experience and the information gathered in a census effort with which he was involved:

Some people have thought there is a strengthening of the Gospel in the South, and that then it is flowing North. Personally I don't see it that way. What is flowing is the forces of liberal theology, washing away the evangelical South. In the North, there are only a few relics left. In the South, we are struggling to hold our own; but not because it's stronger here than it was. Pentecostal churches are growing here, but it's 'transfer growth' from other churches, not [growth which makes inroads into] Islam or traditional religions.... People 'converted' now were converted from a 'dead' Christian upbringing in the Church of Uganda or wherever. And the Church of Uganda itself has fewer members now than 10 years ago. Everyone thought, 10 years, ago, that the Protestants [which, at that point, was almost entirely the Church of Uganda] had about 1/3 of the population. Now, after a census in 2000, they found the Church of Uganda is at 20%.

Several Northern missionaries living and working in Uganda also commented on the apparent lack of growth in the Church of Uganda. As their comments indicate, they, like some of the Ugandans quoted here, were struck by the disjunct between the rhetoric about church growth in Africa which they heard from Northern sources, and what they see on the ground in Uganda. For example, a British missionary, commenting to me on a Mission Week held at one Church of Uganda parish, remarked on the post-Mission Week assessments saying that 91 people had been
saved. He pointed out that probably relatively few (if any) of those who came forward at the
daily altar calls were actually new converts to Christianity, per se. The sermons preached at these
events explicitly invited not merely new converts but also those seeking recommitment to Jesus
Christ, or a new level of faith, to come forward at the altar call; and a good number of those who
came forward during Mission Week probably fit into one of the former categories. Yet once
Mission Week was over, as this missionary noted with some cynicism, the number 91 was
treated as the number of those saved at mission week. He suggested this case is indicative of a
kind of manipulation of numbers to make it seem like African churches are growing much more
than they may actually be. He recalled viewing to a video produced by a Northern missionary
agency about the growth of the church in the developing world, which had mentioned in passing
all the vital faith and many, many conversions happening every day in Uganda. The missionary
told me, “I saw that and I wondered to myself, ‘Do they mean the Uganda in East Africa?’”

In a few instances, then, my consultants—both Ugandans, and Northerners in Uganda—directly
questioned whether the Church of Uganda is growing. However, pervasive worries about how to
make the Church of Uganda into an institution which can capture and engage the younger
generation, while rarely phrased explicitly as concerns about church growth, are essentially
anxieties about whether the church is even capable of sustaining its current membership. This
issue came up, one way or another, in the majority of the interviews I conducted in Uganda, as I
discussed in chapter 2. In contrast, then, to the confidence in Southern Christian faith which
Northerners often express, Ugandans do not generally find reassurance or justification in their
church’s numbers. When a Ugandan does comment on the numerical strength of African
Christianity, quite often in the next breath they question the significance of those numbers in
terms of real Christianity, voicing doubts about whether the African churches’ size and growth
really represent strong faith—or whether growth can truly be seen in particular African Anglican
churches at all.
Such anxieties about growth in the Church of Uganda certainly don’t invalidate general assertions that Anglicanism is growing in Africa, since other Anglican provinces may well be growing at significant rates; it is also possible that other Christian groups in Uganda may be growing. What is significant here is that American and other Northern Anglicans generalize what they hear or read about African church growth to apply to all the African Anglican churches. Accordingly, they ascribe to all those churches the qualities of vitality, orthodoxy, enthusiasm, and so forth, which they assume this assumed growth implies. By this logic, the Church of Uganda (or Rwanda, or Kenya, ...) must be growing, because it’s an African church and the African churches are growing; and it must be vibrant and orthodox and strong in faith, because those are the qualities which make churches grow.

**SUFFERING**

A fourth argument often made by Northerners praising African Christianity is that the suffering, the hardships and life-or-death risks, which are presumed to generally characterize African life gives moral authority or spiritual capital to African Christians. These arguments are heard from Northerners on both the liberal and conservative ends of the spectrum. For example, in one pre-Lambeth issue of the conservative-leaning *Church of England Newspaper*, a piece on the pre-Lambeth Kampala meeting of the Great Lakes bishops was entitled, “Why it is vital to listen to suffering,” while another article quoted the liberal-leaning primate of ECUSA, Frank Griswold, saying: “In the suffering of fellow Anglicans there is an incredible testimony to their faithfulness and also an indictment of some of our western selfishness and self-concern” (Libby 1998).

The presumption seems to be that having to face and cope with high levels of suffering and life-or-death risk makes African Christians bold and uncompromising in their faith. For example, during Lambeth 1998 David Virtue wrote about a controversial planned visit by Rwandan bishop John Rucyahana to St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, which was then newly under his authority.
Rucyahana is supposed to visit the Arkansas parish in September. So far, it appears there's nothing any American bishop--or even the Lambeth Conference--can do to cancel his plans. Such is the freedom a Christian can know when looking into the face of death--and laughing. [LeBlanc 1998f]

An American bishop commenting on the supposed dominance of Southern Anglican voices at Lambeth 1998 argues clearly that suffering gives moral authority:

This change of [the Anglican Communion’s] voice [to the Third World] is not just about the demise of First World supremacy in the Anglican Communion. It is about earning the moral right to speak. We heard countless stories in our small group Bible studies about provinces growing even when spiritual affluence is accompanied by material poverty. The growth of the developing Churches has not been without pain. We heard personal stories of great suffering...All of this made me realize...that when faithfulness to Jesus Christ costs everything you have, then you become a more legitimate voice.

[Christian Challenge 1998a]

Northern Christians interpret images of Southern suffering through traditional understandings of the suffering of Jesus, and thus attribute to Southern Christians a Christlike authority and wisdom. However, the value placed on suffering by American Christians reflects, not just theological understandings, but also these middle-class Americans’ sense of the banality and ease of their own lives. The bishop’s statement, quoted above, implicitly contrasts Third World poverty and pain with First World affluence, and finds greater legitimacy in the former. An American missionary working in East Africa made this point when she spoke to me about suffering and authority: “The cost of commitment is so much greater in those times of crisis, and that speaks to people in our complacent society...I definitely think anyone who’s been through a great tragedy has a platform for speaking in a way that people who’ve just been breezing through don’t have.”
In sum, then, this argument, very common in Northern talk about the Southern church, asserts that experiences of suffering and the presumed resulting committed faith give a tremendous legitimacy and authority to Southern Christian voices. This argument has significant resonances with the trope of aestheticization, which David Spurr identifies and describes. Spurr argues that Northerners’ distance from Southern populations, and privilege relative to most such populations, allows Northerners to view Southern suffering as an aesthetic quality, moving and ennobling (Spurr 1993:47). Americans’ distance from African suffering is manifest in Northerners’ generalizations that suffering and risk characterize all African lives. It is, of course, true that many African Christians (for example, in parts of Nigeria and Sudan) do face the risk or the reality of persecution for their faith, and that many others (for example, in Northern Uganda, Liberia, or again in Sudan) must contend with the realities of war and oppression as part of the conditions for their daily lives. These realities should not be belittled; but generalizing these specific situations to an overall image of suffering Africa can have the effect of making specific situations seem less significant. Such universal suffering appears insoluble and therefore inevitable; all Americans can do (perhaps all we need do) is admire the noble faith of these suffering Africans. The invocation of African suffering, when it is cited in such generalized ways and tied to idealizations of Africans, can become a sort of sentimental cliche—which Spurr argues is one common result of the aestheticization of suffering (Spurr 1993:53).

Besides homogenizing the specificities of violence, disease, and privation in Africa into a generalized and aestheticized image, the rhetoric of suffering Africa is problematic because it can make Africans appear, to American eyes, as fundamentally ‘other,’ different from themselves in experience, thought, and motivation. Northern journalistic writing seems often to assume that “human chaos and disorder are somehow a natural condition of the Third World,” rather than locating them in histories of colonial abuse and mismanagement, economic and environmental exploitation, and the many other factors extrinsic to these societies and nations which have played some role in their past and present troubles (Spurr 1993:165-66). Americans, rather than seeing themselves and Africans as both situated in a complex and interrelated world-system in which one’s privilege is often related though through twists and translations to another’s disadvantage, are wont to see the world as divided between North and South, each continent or world region with its own characteristics and issues. Africa’s problems thus appear intrinsic to Africa and perhaps to Africans.

This ‘othering’ effect of ideas of pervasive African suffering, besides often blinding
Americans to the North’s historic and continued complicity in much of the suffering in contemporary Africa, also hides the surprising things that American and African Christians may have in common. Many African Christians’ daily lives are dominated, not by overwhelming suffering and life-or-death risk, but by some of the same concerns shared by middle-class Americans: the costs of education, the trials of finding and keeping satisfactory employment, maintaining harmony in family life, caring for the aged and the young. Certainly there are important systemic differences in average risk (of AIDS or malaria infection, of traffic accidents, and so on) and in average standard of living between Ugandans and Americans, but few of the Ugandan Christians I met during the course of my research did— or, I venture to say, would— describe their lives or the corporate life of their church communities as characterized by constant suffering and life-or-death risk. 

In fact, in my fieldwork I found that the suffering argument is very rarely made by Africans. One notable exception, as discussed in chapter 6, is the tendency for Rwandan leaders (like their American allies) to use the 1994 genocide as a source of legitimacy for their controversial actions in challenging the Episcopal Church. Apart from such cases, few Africans seem interested in making a case for suffering as a source of strength or legitimacy for their church; at least, I heard very few such arguments. One of the only Ugandans, a theology professor, who mentioned such an argument for African Christian authority, did so only to refute it—quite directly challenging the idea that the Rwandan genocide in particular bestows upon Rwandan church leaders a certain moral authority:

The whole mission [of Anglican Mission in America] is being built on the question of moral purity. And yet it cannot clearly be that these Rwandan archbishops and Singapore and so on will distinguish themselves more morally. So I can see that the basis of the mission is shaken. What moral authority does the Archbishop of Rwanda have to challenge moral problems in North America, when they are killing one another here? What
is the moral authority that is there?

This professor spoke explicitly to the suffering argument by asserting that Rwandan suffering, in the genocide, does not give the Rwandan church any “moral purity.”

In general, however, Ugandans’ unwillingness to have the strengths of their church attributed to the sufferings of its members is expressed in more indirect ways. For example, many Ugandan church leaders articulated anxieties about whether illness, joblessness, and other desperate circumstances were encouraging some Ugandan Christians to go to ‘witch doctors’ or traditional healers, because they feel the church can’t solve or won’t address their problems. The current move in the Church of Uganda to provide healing and deliverance services at some Anglican churches is a response to this perceived failure of the church. Such cases hint at Ugandan concerns about whether people’s suffering actually weakens the church. But Ugandan unwillingness to talk about suffering as a source of strength for African Christianity may go beyond simply not finding the argument convincing. Africans are aware that much of the rest of the world perceives the African continent as in a constant and all-encompassing state of crisis, and in response to that image, they are often not terribly interested in talking about African suffering, whether real or imagined by outsiders. Ugandan perspectives on discourses that position Africa as a site of crisis and lack will become more clear as I examine a final argument, the argument that—in close parallel to the suffering argument—African poverty gives moral authority to African Christian voices.

POVERTY

Like the suffering argument, the poverty argument is widely used by Northerners describing Southern faith. This argument assumes that, having so little in the way of material things or wealth, Africans value such things less and place their hopes in God instead. Many Northern statements about the African church carry this argument implicitly in making contrasts between
the material poverty and spiritual wealth of the African churches. For example, one Sunday morning at St. Timothy’s, the rector gave a bulletin on the progress of the group from the parish then traveling in Rwanda:

What [the travelers] will find in Rwanda and in Africa is that those who have not been blessed with the world’s goods tend to turn to the things of God more easily than those who have been blessed. The poor seem to turn to God more easily. They don’t have all the stuff we do to depend on. It is easier to be spiritual when you’re poor. It is more difficult when you are rich in material things.

Such arguments are grounded in Christian understandings of the life and ministry of Jesus. Some of Jesus’ statements (such as his saying that it is easier for a camel to pass through a needle’s eye than for a rich man to enter heaven) are widely interpreted as judgments on the rich, or at least as indicating his conviction that wealth and the spiritual virtues are not often possessed by the same person. However, in addition to Biblical precedents, such discourse about poverty and spiritual purity also has strong precedents in colonial discourse; Spurr identifies such views of poverty as a form of idealization which reduces responsibility on the part of the observer.

Some Ugandans, similarly, argue that poverty makes faith strong in Uganda and Africa in general. Several Ugandans commented on the low pay for Church of Uganda clergy as one instance of how poverty creates more commitment, arguing that if the salary for being a priest doesn’t provide a comfortable livelihood, the people performing such work will be those who feel a strong call and commitment to preaching the Gospel and serving the people. One young priest, when I asked him, “What does the African church have that the West doesn't?,” told me:

I think there is now more commitment. Ministers here are less paid and sometimes go without pay for 6 months, but they keep preaching. A minister's house isn't nice, and he doesn't have much help, but he will preach the Gospel even in such conditions. You find a minister here, a reverend, he has no means of transport. I think you are seeing, they are [walking] from here to there, to preach the Gospel....So that [degree of] commitment is lacking in some people coming from your area.
Such arguments do carry some weight, since those who made this argument are in a position to understand these issues. During my time in Uganda I certainly met many Ugandan clergy (and non-ordained church leaders) who seemed deeply committed to their work, and who were living in quite modest conditions. But, as one Ugandan pointed out, the low pay for clergy may also discourage some good candidates from entering the ministry, to the weakening of the church overall. Further, as another Ugandan churchman noted, the lack of resources in the Church of Uganda may also mean that its clergy and other officials are more tempted to abuse their position for financial gain: “Some people actually encroach on some funds of the Christians, like donations, because they are not satisfied with what they get.” The church’s poverty, then, may cause a temptation for some even as it breeds firmer commitment in others.

Though poverty can be argued to produce stronger clergy, its impact on lay members is even more debatable. Northerners’ poverty arguments imply that poverty creates more commitment among all Southern Christians. Ugandans, for the most part, do not seem to share this view. Instead, they talk about how the widespread poverty in the population tends to weaken, rather than strengthening, Christian faith. At the same time the church’s limited resources, while arguably selecting for more committed clergy, also limit the capacity of the church to provide for its members’ many needs and lift them out of the oppression of poverty. One theology professor told me flatly, “When people are poor they can’t truly worship God. They’re in bondage to their economic limitations and are unable to worship. ‘What do we worship God for?’ People can begin to ask these questions.” Another churchman also expressed concern about the frustration and lack of faith which poverty may produce: “Sometimes people can become frustrated because of poverty and other backwardness, he can’t afford to pay fees for the children, he says, ‘Aaah, there is no God after all.’” A common theme in interviews with Ugandan church leaders was the need for the church to engage in holistic ministry, meeting people’s material as well as spiritual needs, since so many Ugandans struggle with poverty, lack of infrastructure, illness, and other
difficulties, and since the Ugandan state has few resources to offer. Church leaders feel the pressure to respond to all these needs, but their resources, too, are sharply limited. One churchman put the problem poignantly—the church simply cannot do Christ’s work if it is unable to feed, to heal:

If children cannot go to school, or if children are very hungry, or malaria is still tormenting people, we don’t preach the live Christ. You see the point? So we still have that challenge of preaching the Jesus who is a healer, who is a giver of life, who can feed the hungry.... So that is the challenge we have in [this diocese].... The gospel must be holistic. Development must be integrated with spiritual issues. That’s the challenge which we have.

Poverty, then, is inimical to Christianity because it leads to temptations to steal, because it breeds hopelessness and cynicism, and because it weakens the church’s ability to minister fully to its people. Several Ugandans also expressed concern that poverty may lead to moral compromise, as Christians may be lured away from the right path by the promise of wealth; as one Ugandan told me, “With a hungry person you can almost do what you want” (see chapter 8). That the idea of poverty creating strong faith may not only be incorrect, but dangerous, was pointed out to me by a Ugandan theology professor:

This idea of the fervency of African Christianity coinciding with crisis in Africa.... I'm saying, the Western church are trying to make the two, link the two and romanticize [poverty]. And I'm saying, in my view, that the two are not connected. Although certainly you cannot—you cannot deny the fact that one is impacting on the other, but it is not on the side of strength. In other words, if the African church, with its faith, had enough resources, it would do more than it has done. That is what I would be arguing strongly for.... This romanticization is more or less saying, Make the African church more poor to be more faithful and be more fervent! If these Africans lose their poverty, they are also likely to lose their faith! .... And you see, that one is also dangerous. It is a dangerous attitude. Because even in the question of partnership, there will be [Northern] people who will say, ‘OK, let us protect the faith of this African. If he becomes more affluent, he will lose his faith.’ So there is a fear that the true partnership of the West and Africa will spoil the African church. Make it more affluent, and weaken it.

I have no evidence that romanticization of African Christian poverty has led any potential
Northern partners or sponsors to hold back in their relationships for fear of corrupting the faith of poor African Christians. But, as the Ugandan professor observed, it does follow logically from the belief that strong Christian faith in Africa is intimately bound up with poverty, then greater wealth and other advantages might weaken that faith. And, in spite of Ugandan Christians’ many ambivalences may have about the ever-multiplying aspects of Northern influence and Northern modernity evident in their society, precious few would choose to be kept, at the discretion of outsiders, in isolation and poverty for the sake of the purity of their faith. One older Ugandan clergyman told me that he, too, worries that Ugandans’ faith may weaken as they become wealthier:

Poverty and hardship strengthen Christian faith.... We have seen, in Uganda, some people that are very committed when they’re poor, but as they come up in the world, they weaken in faith. They are overtaken by a spirit of self-sufficiency—‘I can do it all without God.’

But he went on to note that he has seen one rich nation which is truly Christian, when he visited Korea some years ago. The implication of this observation about Korea, I suspect, was that he would willingly take his chances on Ugandan Christianity if the country could somehow become wealthy. Likewise, a young Ugandan churchman already quoted above spoke of the value of exchanging Southern spiritual wealth for Northern material wealth, without any apparent concern that receiving Northern wealth would weaken Southern faith: “When we share [about our faith in America], we say, ‘This wealth, what about sharing it with African brothers and sisters?’”

Faith versus fridges full of cookies

Unlike suffering, few who have lived in Africa would argue that poverty does not profoundly shape the conditions of daily life for the vast majority of Africans, though that poverty is of widely varying degrees and types. People who live with such an intimate awareness of poverty (whether their own, their neighbor’s or cousin’s, their congregation’s...) may be less inclined to see it as a significant benefit. While Northerners talk glowingly about the spiritual wealth of those who have nothing, Southerners wonder, sadly or cynically, why people who have nothing
would adhere to a faith which cannot change their lot. Instead of glorying in their purifying poverty, Ugandans long for a sound financial base for their church so they could make the Gospel tangible by feeding the hungry, tending the sick, and educating children.

Convinced that poverty is far more of a liability than an asset to the Church of Uganda, yet also believing their church to be stronger in faith—in spite of everything—than the Northern churches, Ugandans explain that gap by focusing attention on Northern affluence. The question, they suggest, is not why the Ugandan church is strong but why the Northern church is weak; and in explaining the latter by describing the corrosive effects of wealth, they also, implicitly or explicitly, call on Northerners to share their wealth and thereby restore their faltering faith. They argue that Northern wealth and technology have made Northerners overly reliant on themselves and their possessions, so they no longer rely on God.

An older Ugandan priest suggested to me one reason for the difference between the Ugandan and American churches is that Northern society is so affluent, and there are few challenges there: “The tendency to take life easy is high..... ‘Give us this day our daily bread’ does not make sense in the UK, because there is plenty of food.” Similarly, a Ugandan priest waxed eloquent in explaining to me in explaining why he feels it’s “high time for African missionaries to...evangelize the churches in the West”:

People here, someone, if they go to Kampala, when he goes on the main road, a friend comes, and then just gives him or her a free lift to Kampala. Because someone prayed in the morning in his house, in his bedroom, he will think that, 'Oh, the Lord really replied [to my prayer].’ But for you people in the West, [you have] about two cars in the garage! Your fridge, they're full of cookies, full of chicken and all that. Then people begin questioning, people in the West questioning: ‘What do we pray God for? Cars are here, money is here, and other things are here.’ But that, as much as you have that wealth around you in your homes, in your households..., you are contented with all the wealth, riches you have accumulated, people in the West. That is one of the key problems, why you are faced with a lot of misbehavior.

Plentiful food, other material goods, and the corresponding convenience in daily life are strongly
linked to America’s weak morals and faith, in this priest’s understanding.

Ugandans, then, express a greater or lesser degree of critical judgment of the relative wealth and materialism of Northern societies; but some also go beyond criticism and feel compassion for the problems of wealthy Northerners. One priest told me, “Terrible is the whole war you fight with materialism in your country. Materialism there is almost similar to our spiritual darkness here. Ours is obvious; yours is very subtle. And so you find that a Christian has to struggle with those things.” And another observed:

I think the problem with the Western churches is prosperity. Material prosperity is a real problem, while the church in Africa is struggling with scarcity. That is easier to deal with than prosperity... [M: Spiritually speaking.] Yes. It's tough to manage riches. It's much easier to manage poverty. That's a problem.

These leaders suggest that the challenges of materialism—self-reliance, greed, complacency, and so on—are more subtly damaging to Christian faith than the effects of poverty. In feeling such compassion for the spiritual difficulties which wealth entails, Ugandans can look on their Northern Christian brethren with pity, rather than longing.

Many Northerners, of course, would agree that wealth carries great spiritual dangers, and that American society, for one, is far more saturated with materialism than a true Christian ethic would have it be. Members of St. Timothy’s often spoke about the negative effects of wealth on their own faith. The rector observed in one sermon, “This congregation is in the top 1% in the world.... The problem with wealth and stuff is that it deflects us—it takes energy, it takes time.” Another member quipped on the difficulty of spreading the Gospel in a country so afflicted with “affluenza.” These instances point to the fact that St. Timothy’s is a community struggling with the faith implications of its own wealth, in the face of the poverty of their Rwandan allies and many other peoples around the globe (as well as in their own town). At St. Timothy’s, the result of the congregation’s thoughtful self-examination, inspired by the economic gap between its
wealth and its Rwandan partners’ poverty, was the organization of a fundraising project to buy building materials for churches. These efforts are doubtless appreciated, but the project is somewhat underwhelming as an effort to rectify (or at least confront) the unequal global distribution of wealth and power.

The relatively modest engagement with African poverty in a parish like St. Timothy’s may be due, in part, to evangelical Christians’ preference for interventions focused on individual transformation, and relative disinterest in systemic problems or systemic solutions (C. Smith 1998:190-194). But the way American conservatives (and, to be fair, many moderates and liberals) tend to view African poverty also mitigates the perceived need for a response. The Ugandan professor, quoted above, suggested that Americans might hesitate to help out Africans for fear that their faith would be weakened. However, even without such conscious concerns about ‘spoiling’ Africans, the very idea of African poverty as romantic and productive of strong faith creates a sense that Africans are well-off as they are.

David Spurr examines the way Northern discourse often idealizes Southern poverty in ways which reduce or eliminate any sense of obligation to alter that state of poverty on the part of the Northern observer. He brings out these points clearly in his examination of Dominique Lapierre’s famous novel about Calcutta, *The City of Joy*. Spurr writes:

[Lapierre] helps to manage symbolically the human crisis of the slum dwellers by showing that they have taken the spiritual path out of their misery.... The ‘joy’ of Calcutta thus serves to compensate for the great inequality between the Third World and the modernized West; it enables a Western audience to feel compassion and even to see the poor of that other world as living out the realization of some of the West’s most ancient ideals. [Spurr 1993:134]

The key point here is that the idealization of poverty frees the comparatively wealthy Northerner who looks upon it from any sense of guilt or responsibility. Spurr describes Lapierre’s work as “a deflection from politics,” expressing his sense that such idealizations deflect Northerners from
engaging with the politics—the established structures and dynamics of power—which create and perpetuate Southern poverty. Spurr observers that aestheticizing poverty isolates images and stories of poverty “from the relations of political and economic power that provide a more meaningful context for understanding poverty [such that] poverty [appears]... unrelated, except for purposes of dramatic contrast, to the prosperity that thrives on other shores” (Spurr 1993:48). I hasten to note that some of the conservative Episcopalians I study have learned, through their engagement with Southern allies, to think more critically about economic globalization, the history of colonialism, and American privilege and power. However, even those who question the conditions and origins of African poverty still tend to share in the general Northern idealization of it, a perspective which separates them significantly from most of their African allies. As Spurr cogently notes, “The power to perceive poverty as aesthetic value is a privilege not granted to the poor” (Spurr 1993:47).

One conservative Episcopal leader, quoted in chapter 6, criticized AMiA for not taking its African allies’ perspectives on wealth seriously:

The Africans say, ‘No, [doctrine] is not your problem; your problem is materialism, your problem is the whole Western way of life, you do not understand.’ ‘Well, we don’t want to hear that’—because the AMiA crowd is as wedded to the high-style American-style way of life as anything else. So we’re not hearing their critique of the economic issues and all the rest.

An interesting illustration of the bishop’s point occurred at the controversial confirmation service attended by various international bishops at the dissident Episcopal parish in Rosemont, Pennsylvania (described in chapter 6). These international bishops came to Rosemont to show their solidarity with the conservative parish and its rector in the face of perceived persecution by the parish’s liberal ECUSA bishop. Yet the bishop who preached the sermon, Congolese Archbishop Patrice Njojo, apparently chose not to focus on what unites the international bishops
and their American hosts, but on what differentiates them—their relative wealth: “The word of God is not present in all these who want too much for themselves in luxury.... Some want to buy a new car every year. God would like to teach us how to help other people” (Nunley 2000b).

Njojo’s sermon points provocatively to the expectation, or hope, among Southern bishops that the wealthy American conservatives who are lately so inspired to seek relationship with them will also be inspired to balance the disparities between Northern and Southern church resources and conditions in life. Yet, to date, while AMiA and its churches have certainly been generous in their giving, this generosity has not cut nearly as deeply as Southerners’ critiques call for. It is, apparently, easier to carry on idealizing African poverty than to take radical action to change it.

**Missions from the orthodox South?**

To sum up, Americans seem much more likely to talk about the spiritual benefits of African suffering and poverty than Africans are. Americans’ convictions of the orthodoxy, zeal, and general quality of African Christianity articulates with the often-voiced idea that we have arrived at an era when the direction of missionization needs to shift from its traditional North-to-South, and begin to move South-to-North, since the region of real Christian vitality is now the global South. The idea that Southern church leaders have a unique and powerful Christian message for Northern Christians, and indeed that such Southern leaders may have more spiritual gifts to give the Northern churches vice versa, are not innovations of the late 1990s and early 2000s. But these ideas seem to have gained significantly in popularity and salience since the mid-1990s. An increasing number of Northern and Southern Christians, ranging from conservative evangelicals to mainstream and liberal Christians, believe that the Northern churches need the witness of Southern Christian missionaries. Even the CMS, the great British missionary society which once sent British missionaries all over the world, has begun to bring “mission partners” from Asia and Africa to serve as missionaries in Britain (Witts n.d.; Combe 2001).

Not surprisingly, disaffected conservative Episcopalians are eager proponents of this idea of
Southern missions to the North. Indeed, the idea that orthodox Southern Christian leaders have the potential to restore orthodoxy in the Anglican Communion’s Northern provinces has been an underlying theme, assumption, or hope in many of the actions and statements of conservative Episcopalians from 1997 on (see chapter 3). One of countless possible examples comes from a post-Lambeth analysis in the Jacksonville, NC, Daily News:

From its humble beginnings in the masses of poverty-stricken, uneducated converts hundreds of years ago, what used to be called the mission field is now quickly turning into the cutting edge of ministry. Where white missionaries once went to save the savages from paganism, mature black leaders now return to save white churches from their own excesses. [Turner 1998]

The AMiA organization bases its self-understanding partially on the South-to-North missions idea, as its very name suggests—Anglican Mission in America. A piece on AMiA’s website presents the idea of reversal of missions: “For decades, the American church sent missionaries to Africa and Asia. Now, Africa and Asia have reached out their missionary arms to embrace Anglicans in America” (AMiA 2001a). I heard the same view many times at St. Timothy’s. AMiA’s leaders and members see this church body as one way to bring to reality the vision of re-evangelization and renewal of Northern Christianity by zealous and orthodox Southern Christians—an understanding which does not seem diminished by the fact that belonging to AMiA is no guarantee that a parish will have any actual contact with African Christians. AMiA’s members and leaders simply define themselves as missionaries on behalf of their Southern Christian sponsors—some AMiA members self-define as Rwandan missionaries.128

How do Southern Christians see this idea of South-to-North missionization? Many Ugandans agree strongly with the idea that the time has come for missions to flow from South to North. For example, one priest offered me this unsolicited observation: “I would plead that it is high time for African missionaries to leave Africa and go an evangelize—again!–the churches in the West.” The idea of sending African missionaries to Europe or the U.S. is a not-infrequent theme in the
Ugandan newspapers. A 1998 article entitled, “Africa Evangelizes Europe,” approvingly described the work of one African-initiated church, the World Trumpet Mission, in sending missionaries to Europe: “In the 19th century, Christian missionaries traveled from Europe to Africa bringing the message of salvation. The story has now changed and Africa is taking the gospel of Jesus to Europe.... Today, African evangelists are calling upon the Europeans to ‘arise and shine’ and return to their heritage as a Christian nation” (Tumwine 1998). Several Ugandans expressed the view that Uganda, in particular, has a missionary calling to the rest of the world, because this country was a center of the East African Revival. While watching television in Uganda one evening, I saw a broadcast of a local praise service began with a screen showing a map of the world, with arrows going out from Uganda to other parts of the world, with corresponding labels: the USA, South Africa, Sweden, and many more. This image captured the idea voiced by many Ugandans: that the spiritual vitality of East African Revival-influenced African Christianity demands that Ugandans carry their faith out to the world.

However, just as many Ugandans expressed doubts about the validity of the tropes of African Christian moral authority outlined in this chapter, many also expressed doubts about how realistic or even desirable it would be to shift the primary direction of missionary movement to South-to-North. When that idea came up in conversation, Ugandan leaders and laypeople often wondered about whether Ugandan Christians were really ready and able to fulfill the role of worldwide evangelists. Three concerns which were commonly raised were the readiness of Southerners to confront Northerners, the lack of funding for Ugandan missionary work, and the question of whether Northerners would accept Southern missionaries. Several Ugandans indicated to me that the thinking of those Southerners who are used to receiving missionaries, rather than sending them, can present challenges to South-North missionization. This challenge was demonstrated to us when my husband told a friend of ours, a Ugandan university student, about my research on American parishes placing themselves under African church leaders. The
young man responded with amazement: “That’s like a father having a child, and then turning around and calling the child the father!” Several Ugandan church leaders spoke about such patterns of thought as a challenge which must be overcome, if South-to-North missions are to thrive. For example, one Ugandan priest told me that his church needs to develop more confidence in its own strengths, in order to share them with the North:

“For a long time the church in Africa has been looking to the West to model the faith, because of the thinking we got from the missionaries.... Now we are facing the challenge of turning and realizing, what do they want from us?.... The Church in Africa should develop the confidence to feel we have something to offer the Western world.

However, even if Ugandan Christians can develop such missionary confidence, the project of sending missionaries to the North remains difficult. The problem of dependency and insufficient funding was brought up by several Ugandans and others whom I asked about the possibility and desirability of African missions to the U.S. or Europe. In his UCU course on Theology and Development, Ghanaian scholar Kodwo Ankrah spoke about how many Northerners now desire Southern preaching, and noted that many Africans are now in the North preaching the Gospel. But, he concludes, “the problem that keeps the South from sharing what it has is money”–there are no wealthy mission agencies to send Africans forth as evangelists. A Congolese priest argued that the African churches need just such a mission agency, though he pointed out humorously that the funding for such an agency would have to come from the North: “One hundred years of the church in Africa, [and] we need to have a missionary society, because we don't have any which can go there. And if we need to have that program, we shall still be dependent on the West!” But obtaining Northern funding for anything in Africa, including a missions agency to send African evangelists forth to the wider world, is difficult at best.129

Furthermore, as several Ugandans pointed out, even when funding to support Southern missions to the North can be obtained (for instance, in new CMS programs bringing African
evangelists to Britain), the financial imbalance between the North and South remains a problem, because the poverty of the Southern evangelists undermines the effectiveness and freedom of their witness. One consultant bemoaned the dynamics of a situation in which a British diocese had paid for a Ugandan priest to come serve as an evangelist. My consultant was troubled that the Ugandan’s home diocese hadn’t been able, or hadn’t bothered, to contribute any money at all to the evangelist’s travel costs and needs, “just to show he is our missionary.” As it is, the evangelist is in Britain only at his host diocese’s discretion, and my consultant worried that this would cause him to water down his message for maximum acceptability, rather than preaching freely as the Spirit calls him.

South-to-North missions, then, cannot truly parallel North-to-South missions, because of the inequality in resources to put into the missionary endeavor. Whereas North-to-South missions in past centuries were generally fully sponsored by the same Northern bodies who sent forth the missionaries, South-to-North missions often require funding from Northern partners, which, as my consultants suggest, weakens the Southern missionary’s autonomy and ownership of his work. The global inequalities in wealth distribution which became entrenched during the 19th and early 20th century missionary period, while Northern nations were busily extracting wealth from their Southern colonies, still determine the constraints and possibilities of North/South relationships.

Concerns about funding relate closely to concerns about the acceptability of African evangelistic preaching to American and European ears. If African evangelists are usually unable to access Northern audiences without the substantial support of Northern funding, then if Northerners are unwilling to hear their message, the whole mission collapses. Several Ugandans expressed doubts about whether Northerners would feel African evangelists could have anything to tell them. When I asked one Ugandan bishop about sending missionaries to the West, he stated that the Church of Uganda is trying to do so, but went on to observe,
To send a missionary to someone who is proud, he will say that, [in a gruff voice] ‘No, I don't like your missionaries, I don't need your service!’ It's difficult. Sometimes they say, ‘You are primitive, you don't know what you are talking about, you are backward!’ It is difficult, but we need to send missionaries there.

The same point was made by a young Ugandan woman, who answered with eloquence and humor when I asked her about the possibility of African missions to the U.S.:

I don’t know how people in America, they respond to the Africans. Do they give much attention, or do they not? Because I have heard some of them do not like black people. Secondly, they also don’t think we have houses like this one. They think we live in the bush. If we go to a place where somebody has never seen a brown person and he thinks we are acting like monkeys and we try to preach the word of God... they would just say, ‘Where did God find you, when you were sleeping in a grass hut?’

“But tell us about you!”

While Ugandans express these ambivalences about the logistics and dynamics of African missionization and preaching to Northerners, most Northerners articulate great enthusiasm at the prospect of bringing African preaching to American Christians. For example, in a commentary on Lambeth 1998, conservative commentator Todd Wetzel wrote, “God is no longer asking [Northerners] to speak to, much less preach at, the Two-Thirds World. The time has come for them to listen and, yes, be converted by a more vibrant Christianity that the Holy Spirit is blowing toward our shores” (Wetzel 1998b). It is, in fact, relatively common for Africans to have the opportunity to preach to American congregations. African clergy and bishops often have the experience of visiting and preaching abroad—whether guest-preaching in churches while studying abroad, exchanging visits with a companion parish or diocese, or otherwise making some sort of preaching tour. For example, the (non-sectarian but largely Anglican) African
Evangelistic Enterprises agency sends priests and preachers to the U.S. on a semi-regular basis. Such visits and exchanges are not limited to conservative or dissident Episcopal parishes, though such parishes may be particularly eager to host an African preacher.\textsuperscript{130}

Ugandans who have preached abroad often remarked, some with pride and some with bemusement, on the warm and eager reception they received from Americans who claimed their preaching is profoundly different from the usual American sermon fare. These remarks reflect Ugandans’ efforts to make sense of Americans’ idealizations of them. Several comments suggested to me that the speakers were trying to figure out what their American hosts saw in them. These speakers told me about the success of their preaching in America by telling me what Americans had told them about their preaching. A Ugandan priest and evangelist, when I asked him what he preaches about in the U.S., replied: “I think one of the things people really respond to in America is my preaching out of conviction.” He told me about one American who responded to his preaching, telling him, “I’m not born again and I’m really not so much of a church-goer, but I’m really impressed by what you said, not because I am convinced but because you speak with conviction.”

Others explained away that puzzling American enthusiasm as simply a reaction to novelty, suggesting that the success of African preaching in the U.S. is not so much because African preachers offer something substantively different but because Americans are just more interested to see a new face in the pulpit. One member of the Church of Uganda’s mission staff told me about his own successes in preaching in the U.S., then went on to imply this was not because of any special gift of his but simply because he came from a ‘different background.’ “If African missionaries can go out, at least God can use them to bring meaning to individual lives, [because Americans hear] not what they’re accustomed to, but sharing of the same Gospel from a different background.” He went on to add, “Actually, the same thing happens to us—they will listen more to you” if he took me to a church here to share my testimony, instead of preaching himself.
Even Ugandans who share the view that there is not necessarily a unique African message are enthusiastic about the prospects and benefits of preaching to Northerners, as evidenced in the frequency with which Ugandans spoke about the value they see in international sharing of faith and experiences. However, in spite of the enthusiasm for African preaching in the U.S. which both Africans and Americans express, tensions do sometimes arise over these occasions. Sometimes African desires to focus on preaching the Gospel come into conflict with American aestheticizations of African poverty and suffering, and Americans’ corresponding interest in hearing about how awful things are in Africa. Such conflicts came to light in stories about Africans preaching in the United States. These stories generally demonstrate a pattern in which the American parishes (mostly moderate and liberal, but also some conservative) seem to lean towards viewing their visitor as a representative of a continent in crisis, and want to hear about the crises—and, to do them justice, how they can help. However, the visitor views himself as a guest preacher, and wants to talk to them about the Gospel.

Many stories are told of facing resistance in the course of preaching in the U.S. (or, sometimes, the UK). Kenyan bishop Alexander Muge’s visit to a liberal Episcopal congregation is a clear example. At dinner before his appearance at one particular church, with his American hosts, Muge was asked what he thought about homosexuality. Muge described the results:

I told them I was going to preach to the congregation of St. Luke's on the very issue that we were discussing; that I planned to tell them it is evil for people who call themselves Christians to practice homosexuality. The canon and the rector instructed me not to mention anything concerning homosexuality because the national church had suspended consideration on the issue, and to bring it up would be a violation of the rule. I insisted that the Spirit of The Lord was leading me to speak on Sodom and Gomorrah, and there was no way I could restrain the Spirit of God. the rector finally told me that if that is what I
was going to preach on the subject of homosexuality, I should not proceed to the church. I told him I accepted this. **I was turned away from preaching nothing but the true Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ!** [Muge 1998]

Another story of an African preacher encountering resistance to his message came from a Ugandan bishop, who told me about how his hosts sometimes try to limit his message:

You know, sometimes when you are going to preach, they ask you not to mention this one. For instance, homosexuality. When you go to those churches, sometimes they say, Don't talk about homosexuality! Don't talk about homosexuality! Or stealing. Don't talk about stealing!.... And sometimes when they know that you are going to talk about that one, they don't allow you in their churches to speak. They says, OK, now we don't need your sermon, please.

I asked how he handled those situations, and he explained, “Sometimes what we do,.... we don't talk about them. We talk about us. We give them testimony.... For the testimony, they can understand, they can hear, they can listen. But when you talk about other things, they say, Mmm-mm! We don't like that one.”

Stories of such encounters are often told with a moral: that in spite of the unpopularity of the preacher’s message, a few people in the congregation were moved by what they heard and changed their lives–proving the visiting preachers were right to preach as they did. One Ugandan priest reflects on his own visit to a Chicago-area Episcopal church:

The pastor told me in the vestry, ‘I hear you have been talking about sin. We don’t dwell too much on sin here.’ And I was hearing him saying, ‘If you could change your subject....’ And I said, ‘Well, if I can’t preach on sin and its remedy, then I have no message for the day, in which case, Pastor, you can take over and I will sit in and do whatever else.’

He was allowed to preach after all, and at the end of his sermon, he made an appeal for conversions, and “nine people came to the Lord.” A Ugandan bishop spoke to me about a case where he had preached an unpopular message, but been successful, as demonstrated by reactions afterwards:
After I preached, as people were coming out of the church, they were shaking my hand and saying, ‘Thank you for saying what you have said, because people in this country don’t say it, and we know this could be the true Christian faith, we know this to be the foundation of our church, and we want to hear people who speak like you have done.’

If many American Episcopalians—lay and clergy, conservative and liberal—show some reluctance to hear the particular Gospel message their African visiting preachers feel called to share with them, then what do they want to hear from their visitors? Here is where the American tendency to focus on (and idealize) African problems and needs asserts itself: what the Americans want to hear about, often, is what’s wrong in Africa and how they can help. The Ugandan bishop who was quoted explaining that he often falls back on giving testimony, talked about the reactions he gets to his preaching from some Americans:

When you go there [and] you... just share the testimony, they do listen, and for that one, no problem.... But when you start preaching to them and say that, ‘Now, you are doing this one, you are doing this one, you shouldn't do like that one,’ they say, ‘My friend, that's not your business. That's our business. But tell us about you.’

He explained how he responds to those “Tell us about you” reactions: by giving his audience what they want and presenting programs in his church that need funding.

Sometimes when you know that these people are not interested in [your preaching], you just go ahead with your program. Sometimes you have a program, like a water sanitization program—we need to raise funds to provide water, good water, to the community. We have children, street children.... We want to build a house for those abandoned children.

Sharing their church’s needs, talking about orphans or clean water systems or whatever the pressing project may be, does have its advantages. Americans are often generous in response to
such appeals. A young Ugandan churchman who spent several months in the U.S. as a missionary, visiting evangelical and mainstream Episcopal churches, commented on (but apparently found no problem with) the tendency of American churches to want to hear about Africa’s challenges.

At times we would be invited to share the political and economic situation, so that people get to understand, those who have not come to Africa, to understand how we live, and yet in a Christian way.... Some of the American friends would very much listen, wanted to hear how we relate with life as Christians in such conditions.

Thus inspired by accounts of African Christian hardships, Americans respond to the needs which their visitors set forward, as the same young man recounts: “They were very very very enthusiastic, and they helped us.... When I went to these churches, I came back with $19,000. You know, they have... to give, because they know to whom they are giving.” Hearing personal accounts of problems and possible solutions in one African diocese encourages American benevolence, as this young man found.

However, not all Ugandan leaders are philosophical about the tendency of American parishes to be more open to pleas for funding than to preaching. The bishop quoted above uses the opportunities to get help for his own flock at home, even if he’s prevented from preaching as he feels called to the American flock he is visiting. But another Ugandan bishop expressed indignation about such situations:

Sometimes, when I went to a church [in the U.S.], they wanted me to speak about the orphans here. I told them, I can't come from Uganda and I talk about the orphans. I come from Uganda, I come with a message. I'll preach, and after the preaching, when there is time, we can talk about orphans. So they wanted me—'Bishop, you talk about'—in the pulpit!—'talk about the orphans.' I said, my friend, traveling from Uganda and I talk in the pulpit about the
orphans? I want life! I want to share my story, the story of the African church, the Ugandan church, with you here! They don't want to hear, some of them.

The down side of giving the American audience what they want to hear and talking about Africa’s needs is that this reinforces the idea of Africa most Americans already carry: that it is a place of continuous crisis, overwhelming poverty and suffering, and so forth. This bishop insists that the story of the African and Ugandan churches is not the same story as the story about orphans he’s being asked to tell; that the “story of the African church” is a story about life, not suffering and death. A priest and professor at Uganda Christian University remarked on how troubled he is by some African bishops who do take advantage of the American interest in African problems in order to fundraise: “When I was in the US I was very cross with many bishops who used to come with pictures [of starving children] to raise money, swollen bellies, running noses.”

**The persistence of colonial concepts**

What are the implications when Americans, in spite of all their interest, concern, and engagement with the African church, continue to perceive it through images of starving children? There are starving children in many parts of Africa, and hungry children in many more parts, and most African bishops wouldn’t mind some Northern help in trying to feed and house them. But most African bishops and priests also don’t care to be perceived through the lens of that same image—as an infantilized figure characterized primarily by lack, by need, by the outstretched hand. For Africans to participate in the continuing construction and interpretation of Africa as primarily a site of lack and suffering is to accede to American perceptions of Africans as profoundly different from Americans, by virtue of their presumed daily experiences of poverty and suffering—and, possibly, lurking beneath that perception, the feeling that perhaps all Africa’s problems point to some even more fundamental difference: perhaps Africa is constantly in crisis because Africans are less civilizationally advanced, less rational, more prone to atavistic
hatreds and violence. The image of Africa as a continent in crisis, for white Americans, may have subtle or not-so-subtle resonances with racist thought. Furthermore, this image of Africa, as it plays into North/South relationships within the church, serves to perpetuate essentially colonial patterns of relationship, in which Northerners share the assets and benefits of their civilization in order to provide for, heal, educate, and uplift their perpetually needy and desperate Southern brethren.

But surely critical changes have taken place from these colonial patterns of power-in-relationship? Surely it makes a difference that today, an increasing number of American Christians, conservative, mainstream, and even liberal, view African Christians as spiritual authorities, superior to Americans in the zeal and purity of their faith? Surely the fact that some conservative parishes have gone so far as to place themselves under the authority of African bishops shows that the old colonial logic of North/South relations has been conclusively overthrown? Indubitably, the views of African Christians as spiritual authorities which I’ve described in this chapter are in many respects a significant step away from the negative and blatantly racist ideas about Africans which are still in circulation—including, unfortunately, in the words of some liberal Episcopal bishops following Lambeth 1998. The Rev. Theodora Brooks, an African priest working in the U.S., commented on the persistence of such ideas in a letter to her diocesan newspaper shortly after Lambeth:

Years ago, Africa was always referred to as the "Dark Continent." Artists created buffoonish characters in their attempt to portray the people of this continent. Writers, historians, anthropologists, etc. used choice words such as "natives." "barbarians," and "savages" in their attempt to introduce the people of Africa to the rest of the world. And let us not forget the missionaries who, in their attempt to spread the Good News of salvation, condemned the traditional religion of the people and labeled our forebears "heathens" and "pagans." With
the meteoric advancement of technology, world travel, and telecommunication, it seemed that the negative stereotype of Africa had ceased. We were wrong.

*The bishops' remarks about Africans only confirm what Africans have always known; that people have yet to erase the image of Africans that has been passed down to them.* [Brooks 1998, emphasis added]

But while some liberal Northern church leaders describe African Christians as superstitious, ignorant, fundamentalist, and opportunist, conservative Northern church leaders describe them in glowing terms as defenders of true Christian faith and prophets of a new global revival. Have Northern conservatives, and others who describe the Southern churches as superior in faith, finally transcended or “erased” those inherited negative images of Africa?

I have shown in this chapter the many ways in which current discourses about African Christianity serve to idealize both African faith and African problems, as well as reinscribing colonial ideas about Africans’ otherness in time (the church’s youth), thought (simplicity and enthusiasm), and experience (suffering and poverty). Idealizations of African Christians as simple, pure, zealous, enthusiastic, noble in suffering, and so on, do provide more positive and empowering terms for North/South relationships than some of the alternatives. But they do not escape the terms of earlier, negative discourses about Africa and Africans. In particular, descriptions of African Christian faith as simple, basic, and pure resonate strongly with colonial rhetoric. One of the members of St. Timothy’s, upon his return, told his audience at one church meeting, “You’ve never heard children sing until you’ve been to Africa, you’ve never seen children dance until you’ve been to Africa; and you’ve never heard drums played until you’ve been to Africa. The people there really know how to sing and dance and play the drums.” While on the one hand these comments represent this man’s effort to articulate his own profound enjoyment of what he encountered during his visit to Rwanda, on the other hand I was immediately struck by the echoes present in these comments of older and undeniably negative
images of Africans. What the speaker had in mind, no doubt, were rows of sweet-faced Rwandan schoolchildren singing hymns in church, but his words resonate with other, older, ‘heart of darkness’ specters, ghosts which have not yet been thoroughly exorcised.

Conceiving of African Christians in such terms, as people who express their pure and simple faith by singing, dancing, and drumming, invokes concepts and images which are ultimately derived from older and indubitably negative views of Africans, as childlike, primitive, and uncivilized. To be sure, these negative images have now been turned on their heads to become idealizations, but the ideas of African otherness which underlie the old negative ideas carry on unimpeded into the new, idealized images. Roxanne Doty concludes, after a chapter in which she examines the persistence of colonial patterns of thought into contemporary North/South relations such as foreign aid practices:

The texts examined in this chapter attest to the power of earlier representations, the continuity amidst discontinuity. They form a sort of cultural unconscious that always comes back to the presumption, generally unstated, especially in more recent texts, of different kinds of human being with different capacities and perhaps different inherent worth and value. [Doty 1996:162]

Furthermore, besides perpetuating constraining colonial images, current idealizations of African Christianity arguably serve Americans better than they do Africans, by allowing African Christianity to serve as an illustration of Northern values in the context of Northern conversations and debates. Visions of African Christians as ‘noble savages’ give weight and moral authority to the Northern conservative side in the struggle over values within Northern Anglicanism today. Indeed, one way the argument over orthodoxy and sexual ethics in the Northern church has come to be phrased is precisely as an argument over the value and character of African Christianity—is it pure, noble, traditional, essential (so we should listen to the Africans)? Or is it ignorant, fundamentalist, premodern (so we need not listen to the Africans)?

If the rhetorics of idealization which many Northerners apply to Southern Christians construct
and constrain African Christians in some of the same ways as older, more negative colonial rhetorics, what does that mean for the African church leaders and others who must negotiate these rhetorics and images in the process of interacting with Northern Christians? In such North/South relationships, Africans must deal with and, to an extent, deal in the images, roles, and discourses which make up the Northern repertoire of ways-to-relate-to-Africans. The tensions described above over African preachers in American parishes feeling pressure to hold back on preaching, and to talk more about Africa’s problems, point to the ambiguous position of these African Christian leaders. Is it better, more tolerable, more advantageous, to go along with the American idea of Africans as people characterized by constant suffering, poverty, and need—or to go along with the corresponding American idealization of Africans as pure and zealous Gospel preachers? Most Ugandan preachers I interviewed seemed to prefer the latter, but hinted in various ways that that is no ideal position either—not least because it feeds into a romanticization of poverty and suffering which most Ugandans find nonsensical. Still, African leaders and others who interact with Northern Christians must negotiate the latter’s imaginings of African Christianity, until and unless relationships which escape these tropes and stereotypes can develop.

**Visions of Africa: Pride or shame?**

As for the American partners in these new-forged North/South Anglican relationships, traces of older negative images of Africa still haunt them as well. The spread of positive, idealized visions of Africa, as illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, is well-advanced within the dissident movement, but limited in Northern society at large. And some members of St. Timothy’s parish, for example, continue to struggle with the negative associations of blackness and Africanness—not only their own negative associations, but more especially those of outsiders. Continuing ambivalence about St. Timothy’s African associations were manifest in a debate over whether to include the name “Rwanda” on a new sign for the church, to be placed on the
outskirts of town. This dispute flared up at a vestry meeting I attended—ironically, immediately after one member, Paul, had given a presentation on his visit to Rwanda. It had been decided at a previous meeting that the sign would read, “St. Timothy’s Episcopal Church, Anglican Mission in America.” Paul objected strenuously to this text, saying he wanted the sign to include, “Province of Rwanda.” A vestry member explained the earlier decision to leave out the African designation: “We didn’t want to [include Rwanda],” he said. “It’s a confusing thing and it brings about a conflict for some people.” Another vestry member said, “Let’s not put up anything we’re going to be ashamed of.” Paul replied, “Well, I’m not ashamed of the Province of Rwanda.”

Further discussion followed, but it was clear that the decision on the text was final. Brief debate at the vestry meeting ended with the rector reminding the traveler, “The other thing [meaning Rwanda] just creates some problems for some people.” Paul answered, “Well, I think they need to live with that problem.” But, outnumbered, he let the issue go.

The sign was printed with the copy as the vestry had earlier decided—no mention of Rwanda. It was a decision which surprised me as much as it did Paul, given the widespread and burgeoning interest and enthusiasm in the parish concerning St. Timothy’s relationship with the Anglican church in Rwanda. But the leadership at St. Timothy’s, while believing themselves to have transcended their racism and their previous negative ideas about Africa, are still keenly aware that the wider public, driving past their sign or visiting their church for the first time, may not be so liberated and well-informed. For all their pleasure in knowing about and identifying with their Archbishop and his church within the congregation, they are hesitant to face the stigma which they fear association with Africa may carry in the wider world. Breaking from the Episcopal Church one thing, but publicly identifying yourself as an African church is still another. This may change, with time and further relationship with their Rwandan sponsors. But at this point, to paraphrase the Beatitudes, St. Timothy’s has shown itself ready to be reviled and persecuted and have all manner of evil spoken against it for the Gospel’s sake, but not for Africa’s.
“Integrity-Uganda”: An ‘outlandish’ assault on Ugandan culture?

Throughout the spring months of 2001, the Ugandan press was kept busy with updates, commentaries, interviews, letters, and editorials commenting on a controversial new Anglican organization, Integrity-Uganda. Integrity-Uganda is the Ugandan chapter (and only African chapter) of the organization for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender Episcopalians and Anglicans, originally founded in the United States in the 1970s. From the first announcements about the group’s founding, controversy over the new organization centered on the extent of its association with the American Integrity organization. In February of 2001, a press release from the Ugandan House of Bishops described Integrity-Uganda as an outside plant: “This organization is a move by gays and lesbians from the United States which want to establish their root on the continent of Africa to be headquartered in our own country, Uganda. We categorically condemn the practice of Homosexuality” (Bishops of the Province of Uganda 2001).

In contrast, Integrity-Uganda’s leaders insisted that Integrity-Uganda was an indigenous organization, developed in response to local needs. Integrity-Uganda’s original leaders were a bishop, a priest, and a layman, all heterosexual, who—according to their own testimony—had all individually encountered gays and lesbians in the course of pastoral work and become convinced of the need for an organization for such people in the church. In the organization’s first public statement, a response to the House of Bishops statement quoted above, they stated: We wish to respond to a Press release of the House of Bishops of Church of Uganda... which condemned the good efforts of our organization as an outlandish feature from the Episcopal Church in the USA We want to make it categorically clear that Integrity-Uganda is not an alien influence from the West. It is simply a local initiative borne by a strong need amongst Anglicans in Uganda. [Integrity-Uganda 2001]
The groups’ leaders acknowledge association with the American Integrity group, but insist their American allies provide only support and encouragement.

In spite of such assertions, however, Ugandan church leaders and Ugandan press coverage of Integrity-Uganda have consistently described the group as an American plant. Integrity-Uganda is cast as an effort to spread homosexuality in Uganda with the aid of Ugandan agents who are serving American gay cultural-imperialist interests for monetary gain. Such negative evaluations of Integrity-Uganda have particularly focused on Bishop Christopher Ssenyonjo, the retired bishop and counselor involved with the group. The involvement of a bishop, even a retired bishop with a known history as a bit of a radical (by Ugandan standards), with advocacy for gay rights in Uganda was quite attention-getting, and the majority of the newspaper coverage of Integrity-Uganda focused on Ssenyonjo’s personality and motives.

Most Ugandan criticisms of Integrity-Uganda and Bishop Ssenyonjo focused on the idea that Ssenyonjo had ‘sold out’ to American gays, accepting money and support from their organization in exchange for propagating homosexuality in Uganda. This view of Integrity-Uganda clearly rests upon the idea of the “homosexual agenda”—of homosexuality itself, and/or the ideology that it is an acceptable ‘alternative lifestyle’—as something which is entering Uganda from outside, something literally ‘outlandish.’ Like the House of Bishops statement, many public comments on the group and on homosexuality in general express the belief that homosexuality is fundamentally un-African (as discussed in chapter 4). Ssenyonjo and the organization’s other leaders were seen as compromising their culture and abetting the intrusion of corrupting foreign influences into Uganda—and for the basest of motives: greed.

In newspaper reports and interviews, the most common explanation given for Ssenyonjo’s involvement with Integrity-Uganda is that he was frustrated by the loss of income upon his retirement and sought to make additional money by ingratiating himself with an American
activist group. Pensions and post-retirement provisions in the Church of Uganda are, by necessity, minimal, and no doubt Bishop Ssenyonjo did take a step down in standard of living when he retired from his episcopal post. Many Ugandans believe that in these facts lie the key to Ssenyonjo’s adoption of the gay cause. One Ugandan columnist summed up the Ssenyonjo-Integrity-USA relationship in such terms:

In return for [the bishop’s] pro-gay stand in the Church of Uganda, Rev. Michael Hopkins [then head of Integrity-USA] on behalf of the gay rights movement pledged to finance his campaigns for gay rights in the Church of Uganda and that this generosity would extend to his personal life. [Kabushenga 2001]

Leaders in the Church of Uganda, too, made similar claims. When asked to explain Ssenyonjo’s stand in a 2001 press interview, Archbishop Nkoyoyo offered such an explanation:

It is poverty. He is going against his conscience because of the meager pension... he gets. This is a man who used to earn sh700000-sh800000 [$440; per month] on top of driving a Mercedes Benz, servants, a house and food. So when a chance to earn an extra coin shows up, he takes the opportunity.... So the church needs to provide better pensions if our clergy are going to retire honourably. [Kakengo 2001]

The Archbishop concluded by exhorting Ugandans to “brace themselves for old age.”

Such interpretations of Ssenyonjo’s motives are widely shared. Most Ugandans with any awareness of the Integrity-Uganda debate seem to suspect Ssenyonjo signed on to the Integrity cause out of desperation because of the dramatic reduction in his income upon retirement. Of course, Ssenyonjo and others deny that they are propagating the ‘homosexual agenda’ in Uganda in order to make money for themselves. But, unsurprisingly, such denials do little to lessen the suspicions of church officials and the Ugandan public that Ssenyonjo and the other leaders and members of Integrity-Uganda had allowed themselves to be ‘bought’ by favors from US to take up the gay cause.

“Money is muscle”
The circulation of suspicions and accusations that Integrity-Uganda was planted by an American Episcopal gay rights group, through bribery of its Ugandan leaders, is only one of many cases in the recent history of contentious Anglican Communion politics in which money has been a central issue. Northern liberal and conservative activists and leaders have accused one another, on repeated occasions, of using money to influence Southern Anglicans; Southern Anglicans have argued for their own freedom from such influences, but questioned other Southern leaders’ incorruptibility. Because of the widespread occurrence of allegations and accusations that financial incentives underlie controversial North/South Anglican alliances, I devote this chapter to an examination of questions of money, influence, and power in these relationships.

The idea that North/South alliances are secretly all about money is probably the most common and most damaging criticism aimed at these alliances. I realized that it would be necessary to take up this topic during the course of my fieldwork, as I noticed the ubiquity of accusations (in all directions) about the role of financial influence in inter-Anglican politics. Further, several key consultants also pointed me to the significance of money issues. One American conservative leader, well-acquainted with North/South Anglican alliances, told me that in order to understand these relationships, I needed to look at the role of money, ranging from out-and-out corruption to decisions people make that are influenced in more subtle, but still significant, ways by the availability of funds. James Thrall, in a footnote to his paper “An International Community? The Anglican Communion and the 1998 Lambeth Conference,” noted, “[At Lambeth 1998] disparities of resources between different provinces of the communion, especially as translated into subtle and not-so-subtle forms of economic control of the conference’s direction, emerged repeatedly as an issue” (Thrall 2000:40). Finally, AMiA bishop Chuck Murphy himself pointed to the power of money in current international Anglican politics in a press interview soon after his consecration: “It's expensive to do this kind of work. But if you make the decision
to do this work, go over the heads of... the Episcopal Church... to get leadership, you'd better have some money. *Money is muscle; it makes things happen*” (Nakamura 2000, emphasis added). Murphy’s statement makes the reader wonder: where and how is money making things happen in the Anglican Communion today?

As I will show in this chapter, accusations about money and the exercise of influence through financial power permeate the rhetoric and debates in the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion today, especially with reference to relations between Northern and Southern Anglicans. But Americans and Ugandans have very different perspectives and sensitivities on these issues. For Americans engaged in polarizing conservative/liberal debates, such accusations serve as a way to cast aspersions on the sincerity of the other side’s concern for the global South. The potency of the argument lies in the idea that the opposing party, rather than being noble advocates for the disadvantaged and historically marginalized (as both the liberal and conservative sides have positioned themselves at times), are taking advantage of those same disadvantaged peoples to try and support their side in inter-Episcopal conflicts. Such accusations of exploitation have become entangled with debates over the role of different Northern groups in the decolonization, or recolonization, of the Anglican Communion. In recent decades and especially since the preparations for Lambeth 1998, the idea of the full, free participation of the formerly-colonized provinces of the Communion in worldwide Anglican affairs has been voiced and supported by Anglicans from all over the world and the political spectrum (see also chapters 3 and 5). The broader salience of such ideas accounts for liberal and conservative Northerners’ mutual accusations of neo-colonial practices in their use of money in North/South relationships.

In the African context, accusations about monetary influence carry a very different weight and meaning, because of the ways they intersect with salient issues of need, dependency, and post-colonial ambivalence about Northern power and influence. Furthermore, African church leaders are anxious to affirm the agency of African Christians, which is often ignored or implicitly
insulted in Northerners’ accusations. In this chapter, after a brief look at American conservatives and liberals’ mutual accusations of financial coercion of Southerners, I will turn to the ways such accusations play out in Uganda, showing that the issues and understandings involved are quite different in the Southern context. My Ugandan sources will include documentary sources (particularly newspaper reports) but also interview materials, from Ugandans representing various ranks and various positions within the Church of Uganda. This breadth of Ugandan sources demonstrates that, though the contours of the debate differ in significant ways, concerns about the role of money in contemporary North/South relationships are central issues in Uganda, as well.

It is true, of course, that money itself, and not only accusations about the use and abuse of money, permeates relationships between Northern and Southern Anglicans. For my purposes here, I am less interested in the actual movements of dollars than in the way money, and the power and influence it stands for and bestows, is a factor in the ways people describe, experience, worry about, and negotiate the varied and evolving North/South relationships in today’s Anglican Communion. My primary topic in this chapter, to paraphrase novelist John Crowley, is to examine, not the impact money has on these relationships, but the impact that the notion that money has an impact on these relationships, has on these relationships.\textsuperscript{138}

**Liberal accusations: Neo-colonial chicken dinners?**

Northern liberals—those whom the more politically-active North/South alliances are intended to challenge—have repeatedly argued that Northern conservatives exploit Southern Anglicans by using their material advantages to attract Southern allies and supporters. They describe Northern relations with Southern Anglicans as economically and politically exploitative, and as fundamentally neo-colonial—that is, involving the establishing of power relations such that the Northern partners are able to use the Southern partners’ statements, votes, actions, and so forth, to serve the Northerners’ needs and agendas. In examining these Northern debates, my sources
are largely documentary, reflecting the statements of leaders and commentators. This is because such written (and often published) comments and opinions are readily available, and not because ordinary lay Episcopalians do not share these views. For example, I have heard suspicions that money is at the root of alliances between Northern conservatives and Southern Anglicans from lay Episcopalians on many occasions. The predominance of such views is precisely the reason I feel called to examine them in this chapter.

In a number of specific situations and cases, liberal-leaning Anglican leaders and commentators have made accusations or insinuations that conservatives have, more or less bluntly, bought the loyalties of Southern Anglicans. These leaders rarely make flat-out accusations of bribery or vote-buying; instead, they suggest that American conservatives have found so many willing Southern partners because of the Americans’ willingness, and ability, to pay their Southern partners’ travel expenses and bring them or send them to various meetings, to support them, inform them, enable them, persuade them, all with the aid of generous donors in various American conservative organizations. At Lambeth 1998, many liberal leaders and activists were highly suspicious of the activities and resources located in the Franciscan Study Centre (see chapter 4), a building on the conference site which had been rented by a coalition of conservative groups to provide communications and other resources for the bishops gathered at Lambeth, particularly those from poorer provinces. Meetings and social events were also held in the FSC. Kim Byham, a lay member of Integrity-USA who attended Lambeth, wrote about the Centre in his Lambeth diary:

Yesterday I had occasion to visit the AAC headquarters at the Franciscan Center.... I couldn't help but be impressed with the scope of their operations. They essentially have the entire Franciscan Center, which is a very large and well-appointed space. Conveniently for the right wing, the Human Sexuality Sub-Section of Section 1[the committee which worked to draft a resolution on
human sexuality] also met at the Franciscan Center. They weren't originally scheduled to meet there, but moved there at [Dallas] Bishop Stanton's invitation. Very convenient. [A member of the AAC staff] told me that much of what they do [at the FSC] is a servant ministry. They type and copy things for African, Asian and South American bishops, and they run errands for the bishops and their wives. How much does all this cost? I have no clear idea, but when you take into account the pre-Lambeth meetings and the expense here, it seems to me that it would have to be at least $400,000. [Byham 1998a]

Byham restricts his observations to expressing his amazement with the scope of the FSC operation and the amount of money which American conservatives are willing to put into providing ‘servant ministry’ and support to Southern bishops. In effect, he keeps his attention on the intensity of the Americans’ efforts, and tactfully makes no insinuations about whether their efforts and expenditures can, in fact, account for the apparently ever-closer relations between Southern bishops and American conservatives. However, many liberal-leaning commentators and observers were not so restrained, especially in the angry and bitter days after the passing of the Lambeth sexuality resolution. One retired American bishop stated that “people from Dallas, with an agenda, manipulated the resolution... by 'buying' the vote both before and during the Conference.” An American priest who was present at the Conference argued that the “stigmatization” of homosexuals was “eagerly encouraged by a very active group of American conservative propagandists with lots of money to spend who occupied a command center in one of the residences of the campus [the FSC], fomenting and encouraging this movement of collective blackmail” (Christian Challenge 1998b). Bishop Ronald Haines of Washington, D.C., speaking in 2001, described the bribing of Southern bishops which he felt he had witnessed at Lambeth.

The AAC [American Anglican Council] was there with a whole building [the FSC]--a large, large building, with free phone banks for any bishop who
wanted to call anywhere in the world.... I was present to see some railroad
tickets handed out, a nice charitable gesture, but I'm left thinking, 'OK,... who's
supplied the million dollars?' That's more than any diocese or any combination
thereof could ever put up. And the even more important question is why?
[England 2001]

Archbishop Holloway, Primate of the Anglican church of Scotland, made some of the most
direct accusations concerning Northern conservatives’ use of monetary influence at Lambeth. At
a public appearance not long after the sexuality vote, he stated, "There was a lot of American
money from a very traditionalist diocese and a lot of entertaining of bishops from the two-thirds
world [the developing countries]. What they [the fundamentalists] have done is, having failed in
their own Church at home, they have hired the opposition from abroad. That is a substantial and
worrying trend that ought to be noted" (Scotsman 1998).

Besides making this bald accusation that Northern conservatives had ‘hired opposition from
abroad,’ Holloway is also one of the two Northern bishops usually named as voicing the
accusation that conservatives bought the loyalty of Southern bishops with meals held at the
FSC—sometimes described as barbecues, but most infamously named as “chicken dinners.”\footnote{139}
The other bishop usually mentioned as a source of chicken-dinner-vote-buying accusations is
Barbara Harris, an African-American and the Episcopal Church’s first woman bishop. Harris is
widely identified as the bishop who uttered the phrase “chicken dinners,” though I have not been
able to find a complete quotation or the context of the remark. A July 2003 article by
conservative British Anglican reporter Andrew Carey summarizes the implications of the
“chicken dinners” accusations—and also, incidentally, demonstrates the way the phrase quickly
became conservative shorthand for liberal (“fundamentalist modernist”) racism and insensitivity:
Evangelicals were accused of buying the support of the developing
world. The memorable phrase 'chicken dinners' still describes the literal beliefs
of some fundamentalist modernist bishops who apparently believed that
African church leaders would sell their soul for an evening barbecue. [A. Carey
2003]
Meals were, in fact, held at the Franciscan Study Centre, for various groups of bishops and other Lambeth attendees. A photo from a post-Lambeth issue of the AAC’s publication *Encompass* shows African bishops being served food at a dinner event at the FSC. The idea that dinners were used to influence, or at least attract, Lambeth attendees is not, then, totally unfounded. But Holloway’s and Harris’s reported remarks imply that these meals went beyond mere hospitality, and should be seen as an effort to persuade Southern bishops to support the Northern conservative agenda.

The ‘chicken dinner’ accusations, like the other remarks by Northern liberals cited above, suggest that Northern conservatives bought the loyalties of Southern church leaders or at least used financial and material incentives inappropriately (for example, by providing various resources at the FSC) in persuading Southerners to take up their issues. Such suspicions on the part of Northern liberals probably relate in part to the fact that conservatives have a history of explicitly using money as a tool or weapon in intra-Episcopal conflicts. Episcopal churches are required to contribute funds to the budget of their dioceses, and unhappy churches have often chosen to withhold those funds from their dioceses as a protest (or, if the amount of funding thus withheld is sufficient to seriously impact the diocesan budget, as a weapon). A mid-1990s conservative Episcopal slogan for how to continue relating to the Episcopal Church was, “Stay. Don’t pay. Don’t obey. Pray.” In a recent piece, David Virtue expressed confidence in the power of money as a weapon for conservatives:

> [Withholding funds] is the last bastion of hope the orthodox in ECUSA has to get back at the liberals and revisionists. All the doctrinal and moral battles have been lost.... If all the orthodox dioceses withheld their millions of dollars, the liberal agenda would slowly grind to a halt. [Virtue 2003d]

Given such precedents and rhetoric, it is perhaps not surprising that some liberal Episcopalians suspect conservatives of now using their money as a weapon in another way—to attract and secure overseas allies.
Furthermore, it is manifestly true that conservative evangelical American Episcopalians’ alienation from the Episcopal Church has correlated with an intensification of their engagement with the African church. This intensification, in turn, has often resulted in financial, technological, and other material advantages for the African individuals and church bodies who are able, and choose, to be so engaged. While wandering around a provincial Ugandan town one evening, my husband and I passed a building under construction. A sign out front proclaimed that it was to be a medical clinic, run by the local Anglican authorities, and funded substantially by an American Episcopal parish whose name I immediately recognized. The American parish funding this clinic is a well-known evangelical and charismatic Episcopal church, with ties to the conservative dissident movement in the Episcopal Church. The sight of this sign in front of the clinic epitomized a pattern I saw exemplified repeatedly in the course of my fieldwork in both the U.S. and Uganda. This is the pattern in which an American parish or other church body, feeling alienated from its own church context, seeks stronger engagement with other parts of the Anglican world with which the leaders and members of that body feel greater sympathy.

Evangelical churches tend to be more intensely involved in mission work (in the broad sense, including medical, agricultural, and building projects) than mainstream churches, in any case, so it would not be surprising to see an evangelical Episcopal parish sponsoring a project in Uganda, even if African Anglicanism were not so tied up with conservative dissidence in the Episcopal Church. But today the trend for evangelical parishes to seek involvement in Africa and elsewhere in the global South has become even more pronounced, and taken on a new set of meanings, as is evident from the list of new alliances given in chapter 6. North/South relationships are no longer understood by Americans as simply a way to minister to needy Christian brethren, but as a way to be in relationships of solidarity and mutual support with like-minded orthodox Christians—an understanding which seems to encourage greater engagement, and often greater generosity. In the recent controversy over Gene Robinson’s consecration, some
dissident parishes have even articulated the intent to stop giving money to their dioceses and the national church entirely and devote all the funds thus withheld to mission and development work in Africa.

Some liberal and moderate church leaders and members perceive this intensification of relations, including the transfer of material goods, between American conservatives and various Southern allies as instances of bribery and exploitation. They accuse American conservatives of colonizing Southern Anglicans by using material inducements to appropriate their numbers, voices, and moral authority to support Northern conservative causes. Two key assumptions undergird such accusations: that Northern conservatives’ new interests in the Southern churches is not due to any manner of sincere awakening to the gifts and needs of Southern Christianity, but is merely a matter of strategic alliance-building in order to strengthen their position in Episcopal Church conflicts; and that Southern Anglicans have little or no inherent reason to side with these newly-interested conservative would-be allies, and thus must be taking conservatives’ side because those conservatives have taken advantage of Southerners’ dependency and needs to lure them with financial inducements.


The bishops [at Lambeth 1998] will be meeting at a time of dramatic change in which the abuses and indignities of late 19th- and early 20th-century colonialism have given way to a “post-colonial” world where nations in the southern hemisphere are still subject to the economic, political, and military whims of the industrialized West. This “new colonialism” infects all international conversations today and Lambeth is not immune from such pressures.... The 1998 Lambeth Conference is vulnerable to the new colonialism in which players from Western industrialized nations, with their sophisticated communication, control of the media, and deep pockets, continue
to have a disproportionate amount of control over the lives of sisters and brothers in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific. [Douglas 1998a:11]

He goes on to criticize Northern conservatives in particular, taking as a case in point the way American conservative groups adopted and adapted the outcomes of the 1997 meeting in Kuala Lumpur (see chapter 3):

Traditionalists in the U.S. were quick to use the voice of sisters and brothers in the South to advance their own aims.... The sins of the new colonialism are not so much in the [West’s role in the] funding and organization of the Second Anglican Encounter in the South but rather in the West’s misuse of one article from the encounter report to fuel debates over sexuality in our own context. In the hands of American traditionalist spin-doctors, what was originally presented as an eight-article ‘Second Trumpet from the South’ soon became the ‘Kuala Lumpur Statement’ on human sexuality. The wholesale looting of raw materials belonging to sisters and brothers in the southern hemisphere for our own use and misuse in the industrialized West had been effected once again. The mining and export of raw materials from the south for the benefit of the West’s industrial machine in the colonial era was not wholly dissimilar from the stealing of words in the new colonialism of Kuala Lumpur. [Douglas 1998a:11]

Though Douglas does not accuse Northern conservatives of using their financial power to attract the support of Southern leaders, he does argue strongly for an essentially neo-colonial view of relations between Southern Anglicans and Northern conservative Episcopalians.

A similar account of conservative exploitation of Southern Anglicans comes from a recent source, an Episcopal layman’s comments on the Anglican Communion’s response to the election of an openly gay bishop in the Episcopal Church:
To accomplish a realignment of the church in North American, conservatives are exploiting differences in cultural and tradition between Anglicans in the U.S. and Canada and those in other areas, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, and forging them into a weapon.... As Anglicanism has spread from continent to continent, it has flourished in divergent cultures and has paid great respect to local practices. For this reason it is particularly troubling to see American conservatives using the anger of African prelates over Robinson as stick with which to beat the leadership of the American church. [Kincade 2003]

This writer attributes conservatives’ power of Southern Anglicans to “differences in cultural [sic] and tradition,” and not economic power, but the essential vision of these North/South alliances as exploitative of Southerners is strongly present in his account. Many other liberal leaders and commentators, like Bishops Holloway and Haines, quoted above, explicitly identify Northern economic power as the central tool of such exploitation.

These liberal Northerners, unwilling to believe that Southern Anglicans have turned against them on their own initiative and deeply suspicious of their Northern antagonists’ newfound solidarity with the global South, assume these South/North alliances amount to the appropriation of Southern voices and buying of Southern loyalties. Viewing these alliances in this way, besides making sense of confusing developments and perceived betrayals, also serves the interests of liberal leaders by weakening the political and moral impact of alliances between Northern conservatives and Southern Anglicans. If these alliances are seen as founded on bribery and economic exploitation, Southern Anglican leaders’ involvement no longer appears as independent justification of Northern conservatives’ positions by the orthodox majority of Anglicans in the global South (see chapter 5). Instead, Southern leaders’ activism appears to be merely the result of Northern conservatives’ using their economic advantages to hire allies to back their side in Episcopal Church conflicts. What is more, accusations that these relationships
are essentially economic in character not only cast doubt on conservatives’ justification of their position by reference to the affirmation of Southern church leaders, but undermine the whole image of the rise of orthodox Southern Christendom, invoked so often and with such anticipation by Northern conservatives. For those who see Southerners’ support for Northern conservative positions as the result of Northern conservatives’ exertion of financial influence or persuasion, this idea of ‘global shift’ appears as pure fiction and these North/South alliances appear instead as a new form of colonial domination and exploitation.

**Conservative responses: Liberal racism and conservative liberation**

In response to these various accusations and insinuations, American conservatives accuse liberals of racism for thinking Southern Anglicans could be bought, and argue that they themselves, far from colonizing Southern Anglicans, are actually helping them to liberate themselves from Northern liberal domination. Conservatives defended their activities at the FSC, insisting that it was only a small-scale operation for providing basic resources and hospitality to the bishops at Lambeth. One piece in the post-Lambeth issue of *Encompass* described the Center’s activities, refuting the “chicken dinners” idea:

> Bishops from Nigeria and from India and Pakistan hosted meals in the evening. Most sessions included a buffet or dessert. This habit of feasting gave some small-minded opponents the opportunity to say we had influenced bishops with ‘chicken and sausages.’ The feasting was a sign of the truly cordial relations we have developed over the years with Third World churches. [Noll 1998c]

Another response argued against suggestions that astronomical sums were spent on and at the FSC: “Conservatives spent only around $30,000 for their FSC-based support work at Lambeth, according to a U.S. priest linked with the effort” (Christian Challenge 1998b). Likewise, a priest at a non-AMiA evangelical Episcopal church who worked at the FSC on the AAC team told me the accusations people were ‘bought’ there were unfounded, and that rumors that the AAC came with $1 million to spend on influencing people there was “pure hokum.” He insisted the team
was “running copiers at midnight, eating sandwiches from paper bags, and operating on a shoestring.”

Northern conservatives not only defended their practices, but went on the offensive and turned such allegations (especially the alleged ‘chicken dinner’ statements) into opportunities to accuse Northern liberals of racism. During and after Lambeth, conservative print sources tended to play up, rather than downplay, liberal accusations about the FSC, and use these stories as an opportunity to point out the racism implicit in the argument that Southern votes were bought or swayed by Northern conservative lobbyists and their money.\textsuperscript{142} An American priest pleased with Lambeth’s outcome wrote to complain about accusations of bribery, in a letter published in \textit{Encompass}, the AAC newsletter:

I am deeply grieved to learn that there are post Lambeth rumors and accusations of bribes to the third world bishops. I wonder why the voice and opinion of the third world bishops have upset us so much in the West. Have they not listened and obediently followed our decisions and interpretations for many centuries? Do we want them to be our subservient forever? Will we not have a grace to respect the dignity and the voice of those who are not as affluent as we are in the West? It looks as if we measure their integrity with green dollars. They may be poor, but not lacking integrity. [Augustine 1998]

Similarly, Bill Atwood of the Ekklesia Society, writing well Lambeth, sharply criticizes the “elitist racism and imperialism” of liberals who assume Southern leaders are “easily swayed”:

As someone who is proud to have been honored years ago to be selected as a Canon in the Church of Nigeria... I have been particularly grieved by the many misrepresentations which have been made by a number of Western liberals claiming that criticisms of the same-sex agenda by African leaders are thoughtless, non-collaborative and ignorant. As the only person who hosted a chicken dinner at the 1998 Lambeth Bishops Conference, let me say that pejorative characterizations by Western leaders of bishops from the two-thirds world as people without conviction who are easily swayed are racist and imperialist. [Atwood 2003]
As these examples may suggest, conservative responses to the ‘chicken dinners’ accusations, and to the general concept that conservatives bribed Southern bishops, were and are much more numerous than the liberal accusations which spurred the responses in the first place. When, seeking additional sources for this chapter, I searched on the terms “chicken dinners” and “Lambeth” in the Internet search engine Google, I found three pages’ worth of hits on various articles. Nearly all these references were in different sources (that is, few re-postings of the same article), and nearly all were in conservative-leaning articles or commentaries. This plethora of citations (and refutations) of ‘chicken dinner’ accusations reveals that conservatives feel this issue serves them more effectively than their liberal critics. In fact, conservative commentators continue use the “chicken dinners” to assert, and attack, Northern liberal racism, as demonstrated by the fact that the Atwood quotation just above, and the Carey quotation used earlier, both date from mid-2003—a full five years after Lambeth 1998.

Northern conservatives did not stop at accusing Northern liberals of racism. They countered liberal accusations of conservative neo-colonialism by described Northern liberals, in turn, as would-be neo-colonialists—and conservatives themselves as liberators. Conservatives argued that the Lambeth operations at the FSC, rather than being a site of conservative Northern neo-colonial activity, aided in the decolonization of world Anglicanism. Northern conservatives describe the activities of the FSC in terms of a vocabulary of ‘helping’ Southern bishops have their say at Lambeth1998. Samuel’s strong statements—and, perhaps more tellingly, the fact that he is quoted at such length in this piece in a conservative Northern publication—indicate just how important it was to those who worked at the FSC to assert that their activities there should not be seen as colonizing or even as ‘providing a platform’ for Southern bishops, who—Samuel strongly asserts—don’t need anyone’s platform. However, Samuel’s strong line here is not echoed by most other conservative sources on the FSC. An article refuting liberal allegations, in The
Christian Challenge, began: “It was actually the respected Oxford Centre for Mission Studies (OCMS) which coordinated the FSC effort to resource and network global South bishops at Lambeth, particularly to help them make sense of the Conference's western procedural and theological nuances” (emphasis added).

Most conservative leaders and commentators, then, spoke about the FSC using terms like ‘resource’ and ‘facilitate’ to describe it as a Northern endeavor to serve and inform Southern church leaders. They argue that by providing resources and assistance to Southern bishops there, they were helping to level the playing field by providing Southerners with the same preparation, information, and communications and lobbying resources that wealthier Northern leaders and groups have had all along. In effect, the work of the FSC was to decolonize Lambeth. A leader in one conservative American organization which was involved with the FSC’s work told me, “We’ve never felt it was our job to put an agenda forward, but to work to give voice to [Southern] Anglican leaders,” who might otherwise have trouble getting their voices heard in a context like Lambeth. Another conservative Episcopalian explained to me that such assistance was necessary because, in effect, Southern bishops have been excluded and marginalized at past Lambeth Conferences by the politicking and procedural obfuscations of Northern church leaders, disinclined to share power.

R: A lot of [Africans] don’t really understand the politics that the Brits and the Americans are so adept at. I saw that at Lambeth 1988, where the African bishops thought that everything was aboveboard and straightforward, and were shocked to find that it wasn’t, and that committees were stacked and reports were rewritten and resolutions were made that were very complicated except in how they came out, which was very carefully crafted to make sure this point of view prevailed and that one didn’t. And they finally got their act together in ‘98. And they’re more and more doing that.

M: What do you think happened in 1998? How did it happen that some of those bishops and archbishops from the global South were able to sort of pull themselves together into more of a block?

R: Well, a lot of things went on between the times, and I think the AAC was part of it... One of the things they did, along with the Ekklesia Society, Bill
Atwood’s outfit, was to bring a lot of those African bishops together to a conference in Dallas.... And they were simply briefed. And they were also given to get to know each other and to get to understand how a strategy had to be put together. So that when they did get to Lambeth, they had some caucuses in place and they learned how to work that parliamentary structure so that the things they were interested in got a proper hearing, and also got supported. So that’s what happened. They simply began to learn how to play the game.

Similarly, Doug LeBlanc defended the meetings and strategizing that took place at the FSC by arguing that liberals have always strategized for Lambeth: “To be sure, conservative bishops met regularly at the Franciscan Study Center for strategy sessions. Is this scandalous? Does anyone deny that liberal bishops met to discuss Lambeth strategy?” (LeBlanc 1998h). In sum, Northern conservatives assert that the goal of the FSC and other Lambeth-related activities, such as the meetings in Dallas and Kampala, was not to colonize Southern voices by persuading them to throw their considerable moral and numerical weight behind their agenda, but in fact to liberate Southern Anglicans by raising their awareness of the issues at hand, and equipping them (with arguments, understandings of parliamentary and debate procedures, and so forth) to have their say in Lambeth debates.145

The liberation of Southern Anglicans with which American conservatives are concerned is not limited to the domain of Anglican Communion politics, but includes the broader realm of inter-church economic relations as well. Rejecting accusations that they are abusing money in their current relations with Southerners, conservatives charge that, in fact, Northern liberal church leaders have long used money abusively in their relations with the Southern churches. They argue that the Northern provinces have historically kept Southern leaders from arguing with them over doctrinal orthodoxy and other matters by keeping them subjected through the provision of funding for Southern church programs. One conservative Episcopalian leader told
me that the attitude of such Northern liberal leaders is, “We’re all equal [in the Anglican
Communion], but we [in the North] are more equal because we have more money.” He described
the Episcopal Church as “abusive with its economic power,” manipulating the Primates’ Meeting
and other international Anglican bodies. A conservative layman leveled similar charges at
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams, who is widely regarded as liberal-leaning in his
theology and social positions, and thus is distrusted by many conservatives. In this 2003 satire,
he attributes the following thoughts about an upcoming visit to West Africa to Archbishop
Williams:

Good grief, I've got to visit some of those awful fundamentalist
provinces this summer, and it doesn't look good for the prospect of buying
them off with funding, unless everybody will just shut up about this stupid
sexuality thing..... While I really can't stand evangelicals, they are part of my
portfolio and its good to check in on our former colonies to remind them that I
am the big enchilada, and they should really listen to me because I am very
well educated, and they just don't understand Western pansexuality. Hey,
perhaps I can send in Canon John Peterson of the Anglican Consultative
Council with a pocket full of walk around money; the man is as smooth as an
English ale, and he can throw money at them before I arrive, and then they will
be happy to see me. [Adams 2003]

This writer suggests that Williams, and by extension other Northern liberals, believe all they
have to do is spread some cash around to get friendly reactions from African Anglicans. As
conservative Northerners see it, the events of Lambeth 1998 and subsequent cases in which
Southern leaders have intervened in Episcopal Church show that Southern Christians have
thrown off the yoke of such economic domination, choosing to stand for orthodoxy and confront
ECUSA even under threat of economic sanctions.
In contrast to the liberal view of the years since Lambeth as an era of Anglican neo-colonialism, characterized by Northern conservative exploitation of Southern Anglicans, conservatives see this as a post-colonial era, in which the full implications of the fact that Southern Christians are no longer subservient to Northerners are still unfolding. In a piece on the Rosemont confirmation service (see chapter 7), David Virtue wrote, “It is... apparent that money will not be a big enough inducement to ... keep ECUSA in the [Anglican] club, nor will the African bishops care one jot if that is the case. They have lived without [money] for centuries and they will go on living without it” (Virtue 2000d). And another conservative commentator, writing about Southern leaders’ opposition to the election of Gene Robinson, an openly gay man, as a bishop in ECUSA in the summer of 2003, mocks the perceived arrogance of wealthy white Episcopalians who believe—this writer implies—that their wealth gives them the right to determine Anglican Communion policies and doctrines.

Third world Christians are so ungracious. After rich country club whites have generously stooped down to their primitive, ignorant, backward level and treated them as near equals, they have the temerity to put the word of God before the opinions of upper middle class suburbanites. [Shea 2003]

To support the argument that liberal Northern church leaders have lost their former ability to use money to control the rest of the Communion, some Northern conservatives point to instances where funding has apparently been cut or shifted away from Southern provinces that have become involved in oppositional politics in ECUSA. To their credit, in these cases conservative groups also often strive to fill the resulting funding gap. The most prominent example of such a filling-the-gap response comes from Trinity Church, Wall Street, a large and wealthy Episcopal church in downtown New York. In the late summer of 2001, this church decided not to renew funding for a theological education extension (TEE) program it had been funding in the Church of Rwanda. A notice on Trinity’s website explained that this cut in funding was related to Rwandan bishops’ involvement in “actively working to promote schism” in the Episcopal
American conservatives’ regard for their Southern allies was further increased by the refusal of Rwandan church leaders to be moved from their positions by the loss of funding. For example, members of St. Timothy’s spoke often and proudly of Archbishop Kolini’s apparent courage in the face of economic coercion. AMiA’s newsletter carried an appeal for member parishes to contribute to the TEE fund, and, inspired by their overseas allies, AMiA’s member parishes responded generously. An official from the Church of Rwanda told me in 2002, “The TEE program has continued through God's care, via other means.”

Another case of alleged attempted liberal coercion, of which some conservatives have made much, involves Episcopal bishop Ronald Haines of Washington, DC, who was quoted above accusing American conservatives of bribing Southern bishops at the FSC. Haines wrote to a Ugandan bishop, Eliphaz Maari, shortly after Lambeth concerning a request for funding for Uganda Christian University (UCU) that Maari had discussed with Haines, shortly before Lambeth. Haines’ letter expressed his and his diocese’s dismay over the Lambeth resolution on sexuality, and linked this with the possibility of providing funding to UCU:

The gay and lesbian community [in this diocese] has been particularly graced with the gift of generosity. That leads to some of our present difficulty. One gay person said to me, "If I am an abomination, is my money also abominable." As a diocese we would like to be in greater partnership with brothers and sisters in Africa, but for the present time we have a considerable impediment presented by the Lambeth decision.... We sincerely want to be in partnership, but there is no way we can be in partnership without gay and lesbian people being involved in our side.... Your insight would be greatly appreciated. [LeBlanc 1999b, emphasis added]

Haines’ letter was widely interpreted by both Ugandans and American conservatives, who learned about the situation from an article in the conservative publication United Voice, as an
effort to hold out the possibility of providing funding as a means to persuade Maari to recant his conservative views on homosexuality. This case, which received considerable publicity in both American conservative circles and the Ugandan church, strengthened the perception in both these contexts that liberals are wont to use their wealth to coerce compliance with their agenda. As with the Trinity Church, Wall Street case, Northern conservative coverage of the case informed readers concerning how to contribute directly to UCU. In documenting such cases, American conservatives applaud Southern leaders for standing up to perceived efforts at financial coercion by liberal Northerners; in seeking to respond to the resulting financial needs, conservatives fill out their self-appointed role as facilitators of economic liberation and de-colonization of the Anglican global South.

In sum, in the realm of inter-Anglican funding relationships as well as the realm of Anglican Communion politics, conservative Northerners argue that they and not their liberal opponents are the ones truly assisting, even liberating, Southern Anglicans from dominance, coercion and marginalization. They account for the strengthening relations between Northern conservatives and Southern Anglicans as the result of a process of decolonization, enabling true affinities to surface, not (as some liberals argue) the result of a process of colonization creating the appearance of solidarity where none truly exists. The alliance between Northern conservatives and Southern Anglican leaders that was so potent at Lambeth is cast as an overturning of colonial patterns and structures, as the new-minted allies thwarted the agendas of the liberal and moderate Anglican leaders who are perceived to hold most of the institutional and financial power in the Anglican Communion.

We Are All Anti-Imperialists

Both sides in Northern disputes have accused the other side of using money coercively and selfishly in their relationships with Southerners, giving only in the hope of gaining Southern support in Northern internecine battles, rather than out of commitments to global justice and the
well-being of Christian brethren. Julie Wortman, in a post-Lambeth analysis, expressed doubt about the sincerity of American conservatives’ commitment to helping the poorer provinces of the Anglican world:

Importantly—and this is where they will expose themselves—despite their alliance with the South/East on the sexuality issue, it is unlikely the Right in the U.S. church will... actively support the long struggle ahead for debt relief. Conservatives opposed the church’s disinvestment in business concerns in apartheid South Africa in 1988 and they will not be prominent in the struggle to expose the fundamental evils of market capitalism now. Indeed, Stephen Noll, a member of the faculty at Trinity School for Ministry..., who has tirelessly argued that homosexual relationships are immoral, openly scoffed during the plenary on debt, ‘Do they really think the clergy back home would welcome a cut in their pensions in exchange for debt relief?’ To him, debt, unlike sex, apparently seemed a doubtful candidate for serious consideration back home. [Wortman 1998:24-25]

The irony here is that Stephen Noll, as Wortman quotes him here, is actually making the same point as Wortman: that the wealthy Northern churches aren’t sufficiently willing to sacrifice for the Southern provinces. Several conservative Episcopal commentators, including Noll himself, have bemoaned the unwillingness of Northern church leaders to compromise their own salaries and standard of living for the good of Christians in the global South. Wortman and Noll, in fact, fundamentally share a critical view of the Episcopal Church as unwilling to cede economic or ecclesio-political power. However, the clearly-drawn lines of liberal/conservative conflict apparently prevent the recognition or acknowledgment of their shared position. Instead of finding common cause in advocating for greater Northern commitment to sharing resources and power with the poorer Southern provinces, liberals like Wortman and conservatives like Noll...
cast aspersions on one another, cynically doubting that the other side is committed to the global South for any reason other than sheer self-interest.

Anthropologist Scott Morgensen has noted the popularity of rhetorics of anti-imperialism in the contemporary world. It often seems that everyone wants to liberate the oppressed and empower the marginalized, and to fight domination and imperialism of every form (Morgensen 2003). His observations are easily applied to disputes among Northern Anglicans, in which both conservatives and liberals see themselves as liberating Southern Anglicans from neo-colonial domination. Both Northern liberals and conservatives described Lambeth 1998 in positive terms as evidence that the old colonial structures of the Anglican Communion were finally crumbling. Ian Douglas and Kwok Pui-Lan offered this evaluation of Lambeth 1998 in the introduction to their 2001 co-edited volume, Beyond Colonial Anglicanism: “Lambeth 1998 signaled for all that the colonial structures of the first two hundred years of the Anglican Communion were giving way to something new.” In a similar vein on the conservative side, Diane Knippers recently offered this optimistic evaluation of the potential for the emerging global affinity network of orthodox Anglicans to reshape the inherited English-centered, colonial structures of world Anglicanism.

Right now, the determination of who is in and who is out of the Anglican Communion rests with the Church of England, most specifically the Archbishop of Canterbury. One man, appointed by the Queen of England, calls the shots. Much of the joint work of Anglicanism goes forward through the London-based Anglican Consultative Council. Archbishop Drexel Gomez of the West Indies is blunt about the problem. "Many of our brothers in the global South resent that the minority North still controls the Anglican Communion and sets the agenda for meetings," he said this month.... “There is the feeling that although we people of color are present, we are not fully accepted.”.... In
short, Anglicanism retains a 19th Century colonial structure,. The post-colonial
churches are coming of age. Something new is coming. American
Episcopaliains, both liberal and conservative, can only watch and wait.

[Knippers 2004]
Conservative commentator Doug LeBlanc has already been quoted remarking that Lambeth 1998
meant the death of “the days of cultural imperialism” (LeBlanc 1998h). Though conservatives
and liberals agree in looking forward to a new global Anglicanism which has transcended its
colonial past and the power imbalances among its members, opinions differ dramatically over
who is facilitating, and who obstructing, this process of decolonization.

**Gift or commerce in North/South relationships?**

Both liberals and conservatives, then, claim to be eager to free Southerners from Northern
domination. Given the tremendous political salience of Southern voices and positions in
Northern church disputes right now, this eagerness is manifest in efforts to clarify the nature and
terms of Southern involvement in Northern intra-church conflicts, in order to assert or deny the
independence (and, therefore, the legitimacy and moral force) of Southern leaders’ positions and
actions in relation to these conflicts. In short, these Northern debates amount to efforts to purify
Southern positions and actions from the taint of Northern patronage. This purification of
Southern positions and motivations requires a second purification: of the monetary and other
material gifts and resources which, undeniably, do flow along existing and developing lines of
affinity between Northern and Southern Anglicans. Cleansing Southern statements and actions of
suspicions of Northern influence requires that these material flows must be clearly defined as
*free gifts*, and *not* as elements of exchange relationships, in which Southern Anglican leaders
speak and act as they do in order to obtain these material benefits. Drawing on the work of
Mauss and Latour,\(^1\) I argue that these Northern debates over money and influence represent a
contentious effort to maintain and purify two mutually-exclusive categories: commerce and free
As Marcel Mauss argued in his 1950 work, translated as *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*, modern/capitalist/European thought has created and tries to maintain a clear distinction, unknown to most of human history and most human societies, between these two kinds of activity. Mary Douglas, in her introduction to the 1990 edition of *The Gift*, summarizes this distinction as “the idea that commerce and gift are two separate kinds of activity, the first based on exact recompense, the second spontaneous, pure of ulterior motive” (Mauss 1990:vii) The idea of the free gift, according to Mauss, is an innovation of capitalist societies, in which commercial exchange has become the dominant form for the transfer of property, and the notion and practice of gifting becomes marginal to the overall economic structure. The notion of the free gift, the wholly disinterested, generous transfer of material goods from one person to another (who incurs no obligation to reciprocate), is a concept which could only exist in the interstices (birthdays, wedding showers) of a capitalist society, an economy founded on monetary exchange rather than the reciprocal gifting that is a foundational economic practice in most non-Western societies. Further, and importantly for what follows, Mauss observes that a clear differentiation of gift and commerce is quite difficult to maintain, in practice, even in the capitalist cultures which support the distinction. The gift/commerce distinction, like other modernist dichotomies, requires maintenance and policing, in order to interpret relationships and determine obligations.

Debates between Northerners over the role of resource flows in North/South ecclesio-political alliances serve as a contentious mutual policing of the boundaries between these categories of activity, commerce and gift. Each side accuses the other of transgressing that boundary, by claiming to give freely while in fact conducting commerce by demanding a return from their investment—such as support, intervention, or strategic silence. At the same time, players on each side tend increasingly to give to (or withhold gifts from) Southern partners along the lines of
affinity and antagonism defined by Northern church conflicts. Such giving and withholding demonstrates, though the Northerners involved are unwilling to admit it, that such gifts are *not* wholly disinterested but are often entangled with inter-Anglican political loyalties. The debates between Northerners over these issues boil down to one key question about the involvement of Southern leaders in Northern church disputes: *Are they, or are they not, doing it for money?* The key point here is that this question *assumes* the strong gift/commerce distinction discussed above. *Either* the statements and actions of Southern leaders are purely independent and autonomously undertaken, and any apparent material correlates of their statements and actions are in fact *free gifts*; *or* the statements and actions of Southern leaders have been influenced, shaped, or elicited by the judicious application of material resources, and these statements, actions, and resources should all be seen in terms of the give-and-take of *commerce*. However, as Mauss argues, this strong gift/commerce distinction is more ideological or discursive than descriptive of social realities even in the Northern capitalist contexts; and the distinction becomes even more problematic in the Ugandan context, which is less thoroughly penetrated by capitalist ideology and where issues of gift and exchange are complicated by a history of colonization and a contemporary situation of dependency. In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine how Ugandan church leaders and other individuals negotiate North/South relationships—personal, political, and economic—in such loaded and ambiguous circumstances. I preface this analysis with a brief examination of the general Ugandan cultural predicament vis-a-vis Northern cultural and financial power and influence.

“*Africans just want what they see on TV*”: Culture and power in Uganda

One day, about halfway through my stay in Uganda, I caught a lift over to a class I was sitting in on with the elderly Ugandan priest and professor who was teaching the class. As we drove over to the classroom, I asked him whether he’d ever been to the United States. He explained
that he had spent a sabbatical with a church in the northeastern U.S. only a couple of years previously, and then told me how his trip had come about. His bishop, my consultant explained, was worried about him, because he didn’t yet have any arrangements for a home for after his retirement. Since retirement provisions are so minimal in the Church of Uganda, clergy do their best during their pre-retirement careers to scrape together the resources to make their own retirement arrangements. It is especially important to build a home for oneself and one’s family to use after retirement, when the Church of Uganda will no longer provide housing—as my consultant put it, “you may become destitute.” Such preparation is often aided by connections with outside friends and supporters in the US or UK. My consultant hadn’t had much chance to make such connections, and his bishop was anxious to give him an opportunity, as his retirement was approaching fast. The bishop’s effort seems to have worked; with the aid of his American friends, the priest now has a half-completed retirement home.

Hearing this story, told offhandedly and apparently with no intent of arousing sympathy, brought home to me the heart-wrenching extent to which ordinary Ugandans depend on the largesse of Northerners—not only as members of a debtor nation that receives many loans and grants from wealthier nations and international organizations to finance its day-to-day operations, and not only as members of a church and society that are frequently able to meet people’s material needs only through the generosity of various NGOs, but also as individuals whose connections with potential donors, or lack thereof, can easily make or break their chances of a comfortable life or a peaceful and timely death. Given these realities, it should not be surprising that Ugandans are much more sensitive to the meanings and implications of receiving gifts, of being dependent, than are the largely middle-class American Episcopalians who cast around accusations of bribery and vote-buying in the course of their disputes over church doctrine and morality. In the last chapter I contrasted the Northern tendency to romanticize Southern poverty as a source of strength and purity for Southern Christianity, with Ugandan and
other African attitudes regarding the effect of poverty on the Church. Many Ugandans argue against the idea that poverty strengthens their church, seeing it instead as a liability in many ways—not least because it may make them vulnerable to accepting donations with strings attached, and thereby tempt them to compromise their own culture, values, or goals. Poverty thus creates a situation in which the intrinsic and extrinsic attractions of outside goods, resources, and ideas are always in tension with desires for independence and self-determination and mistrust of outsiders’ motives and values. These tensions are manifest in a complex and multifaceted ambivalence towards external influences and goods in Ugandan society.

Things Northern (and especially American) undoubtedly exert a powerful attraction on many Ugandans. Our best friend’s favorite café in downtown Kampala had a huge mural of the six main characters from the American TV series *Friends* painted on the wall, the movie theaters in Kampala show American blockbusters, the markets are full of second-hand Gap clothes and cheap knock-off ‘Nike’ gear. We arrived in Uganda only four months after the September 11th attacks on the U.S., and several American friends asked if there was much anti-American feeling in Uganda and if we might be in any danger for political reasons. Such questions made us laugh. In general, both urban and rural Ugandans seemed quite pleased to meet and talk with Americans. I often found myself trying, mildly, to debunk the most romanticized visions of America, assuring Ugandans that there are poor, homeless, and sick people in America too. Everyone seemed to want to go to America, even those who harbored deep reservations about American culture and American power.

Yet even while Ugandans idealize the North and desire its ways and commodities, they also often express ambivalence about and resistance to Northern influences. This can be seen, for instance, in public calls for selectivity about what Uganda and Ugandans take in. A speech delivered by a government official on behalf of Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, at the consecration of a bishop which we attended, included this exhortation to selectivity:
Internet Cafes are the new craze of our youths and they are spreading in the urban centers and this is good. However I am appealing to the church to reach the youth to guide them on what is of use and on what is morally debasing and to avoid what is morally debasing. We cannot prevent progress but at least we should guide our youth to absorb what is useful and discard what is not. [Museveni 2002]

Bishop Michael Sennyimba struck a similar note in addressing the November 1999 Kampala meeting: “We have got what we have got by copying our western mentors. In the copying exercise we have obtained very good things in the shortest possible time and we have also received the worst in the twinkling of an eye” (Sennyimba 1998). Coming from statesmen and clergymen, such remarks may not be surprising. But younger Ugandans express similar concerns and ambivalences. One university student told me, “There are many things Africans are incorporating from the West,” and went on to stress that the African church really has to “inquire of” Western culture, and most of all to measure it by Scripture, before accepting it. In classes at UCU, students often talked about their concerns about Northern cultural influences on Ugandan society. In a discussion on the morality of pastors, one student remarked that cohabitation “is coming to such a peak that even clergy are going into that,” and observed, “The church has to find a way not to copy foreign cultures that are coming in, and remain Bakiga or a Baganda or whatever.” But a student behind me whispered to a friend that you have to allow some of your culture to be transformed: “You must be selective.”

These attractions to, and ambivalences about, Northern influence are inflected by a sharp awareness of the marginal position of Uganda and Africa in general, seen from the point of view of Northern culture, politics, and economics. To take one minor but telling example, several Ugandans mentioned feeling offended by the practices of British Air, which has the interiors of its airliners sprayed with some mosquito-killing substance before takeoff on Uganda-to-UK
flights. A UCU professor described the practice to his class: “The minute they get to Africa, they [British Air staff] begin spraying, because they don’t want cockroaches.” Doubtless British Air has sound epidemiological reasons for the practice; but, also doubtless, it sends a clear message to the mainly-African travelers in the cabin that they must be sprayed, fumigated, purified before being carried to clean European soil. Postcolonial literary critic David Spurr notes that “the fear of contamination that combines images of social and biological disorder” has a place in the rhetoric of debasement of colonized places and peoples: “The association of the Third World with epidemic disease is epidemiologically sound, but metaphorically loaded” (Spurr 1993:88-89). Ugandans’ complaints about being sprayed by British Air, and many other examples of comments and quips (such as the young woman who wondered what Americans would make of African missionaries: “Where did God find you, when you were sleeping in a grass hut?”), reveal a keen sense of being seen as inferior and unimportant by the dominant political and economic powers of the world. This awareness only heightens the tension between attraction and aversion to Northern things and Northern ways.

These tensions and desires are not only matters of culture, identity and style, but also matters of resources, power, and dependency. The mivumba debate in Uganda provides one trenchant example of the entanglement of cultural and economic issues. The vast majority of Ugandans wear Northern-style clothes, most of which are actually used clothes from North America and Europe. Buying these used clothes, known as mivumba, is easily the cheapest way to get clothing in Uganda; in addition, the clothes are valued for being ‘really’ Northern, not local or Asian copies of Northern styles. A stylish student on the campus of Makerere can wear the same clothes a stylish student wore in the U.S. only a season or a year earlier. The mivumba phenomenon extends far beyond clothing: used vehicles, appliances and many other consumer goods flow into the global South. However, the practice of importing other people’s cast-offs is controversial. In May of 2002, near the end of our time in Uganda, a furor erupted in the
Ugandan papers over a proposal by President Yoweri Museveni to dramatically raise the taxes on mivumba goods, with the expressed intention of stimulating domestic industry and raising national self-esteem. Museveni’s idea immediately drew sharp criticism. Many argued that most Ugandans couldn’t afford anything more expensive than mivumba. Those who could afford a respectable wardrobe at current mivumba prices might only be able to manage one or two suits of clothes at higher prices, and this would in fact lower self-esteem, and hurt job prospects as well.

The mivumba issue shows how entangled the economics of poverty and dependency are with the cultural currents of attraction to, and resistance of, Northern influences. Is it more desirable to live as second-class citizens in a Northern-dominated global culture and economy, buying Northern castoffs? Or is it better to shut that door and struggle for self-sufficiency and self-esteem, quite possibly at the cost of living with far fewer consumer goods? The real choices for the Ugandan government and economic leaders are not quite so stark, but the public debate often takes this form. In a theology class at UCU, a student spoke up during a class discussion to praise Museveni’s 1980s plans for a closed-border, produce-what-you-consume, China-style Uganda. The professor responded by challenging the student: “OK, but this guy [another student] is wearing jeans from London, and he wouldn’t have bought them if they said ‘Ggulu’ on them.” Ggulu is a town in northern Uganda, a war-ravaged part of the country looked down upon by most Ugandans. The professor went on to condemn the reluctance of Ugandans to turn away from outside goods: “The problem is with us.... When something is given free, it may be very expensive in the long run. How long are we going to beg?” In the mivumba debate, as in many other contexts, the weak Ugandan economy and the relative poverty of most Ugandan people add urgency and complexity to key cultural, aesthetic, and identity questions—in this case, what people wear and what that says about their identity and their place in the world.

**Culture and power in the Church of Uganda**
Similar dilemmas are at work in the life of the church, where debates and tensions over Northern influences are likewise complicated by the entanglement of matters of resources and power. One important context for understanding ambivalences about Northern influences in the Ugandan church is the debate over whether Christianity can ever really be African, which as I noted in the last chapter is very much a live issue in Uganda. In this context, in which the colonial history of the church raises persistent questions about whether becoming a Christian inevitably means selling out to the North, Church of Uganda leaders worry about all manner Northern influences in their churches. There is some concern among Ugandan Anglicans that their church will absorb Northern liberal theologies and outlooks from its contacts with Northern Christianity. But an even bigger and more immediate concern for many Church of Uganda leaders relates to the current renewal movement in that church. Many church leaders and members expressed either excitement or concern about the shift to what was variously described as a more Pentecostal, renewed, English, or modern style of worship, which is widely seen as coming in from the U.S. and other Northern countries. Ugandan church leaders and elders often express worries about whether the Pentecostal/renewed movement in the Church of Uganda is diluting the church’s Ugandanness. One church official told me that the trend towards emulation of Northern Pentecostal TV shows is “eroding a bit of our cultural witness to Christ.” A music leader at a Ugandan cathedral summed up television’s influence: “Automatically everyone is looking toward that. Africans don't know what they want; they just want what they see on TV.” One major ‘indigenization,’ in the Church of Uganda. Renewal and indigenization may be described as the two major trends in the Church of Uganda today. I have already dwelt upon renewal in chapter 2. The other trend, towards indigenization, involves conscious efforts on the part of provincial and church leaders to shape Anglican worship to reflect more thoroughly the cultural context of Uganda, recovering and incorporating Ugandan aesthetics and styles which in some areas had never really been integrated into Anglican worship. A Ugandan priest and professor I
interviewed told me he would like to see more “liturgy rooted in cultural expressions of our people.” The idea is that Ugandan Christianity would thrive and grow if it were more culturally-appropriate (as one young man told me concerning the need for indigenization, "The African beat is different from the Western beat.").

Indigenization has some commonalities with renewal, such as moving away from inherited Anglican liturgical and musical texts, greater freedom in prayer, more lively music, often more movement, and the use of more instruments. However, indigenization also has some quite significant differences from renewal: use of local languages instead of English, use of traditional Ugandan instruments instead of Northern electronic instruments, use of music based on traditional local tunes and rhythms rather than Northern or Northern-style praise choruses. Indigenization, generally, also seems to involve adaptation of traditional, structured Anglican worship to reflect Ugandan cultural traditions, while in contrast renewal tends to involve moving away from traditional Anglican structures of worship altogether.

Renewal and indigenization go hand-in-hand in many respects—both require a certain loosening-up of old ways to take hold—and the two trends often do co-occur to a greater or lesser extent. For example, many worship music teams mix Ugandan local-language worship songs with the Northern praise songs they also perform. But, though strongly supported by some provincial leaders (not least the Archbishop of Uganda), indigenization is not spreading through the Church of Uganda nearly as rapidly as the renewal trend. The greater popularity of Northern-influenced renewal over Ugandan-oriented indigenization reveals that in spite of Ugandans’ worries about Northern influences in church and culture, there is not a strong will to turn away from the North and push strongly for indigenization. The Ugandan priest and professor quoted above on the need for indigenization explained to me that he has no problem with praise music and other aspects of the renewal movement, but feels Ugandans need to break the mindset of over-valuing what comes from outside:

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If people own the church, they can sing, with their own life and joy and liberty, songs from America and Britain and Germany, if they have first been truly liberated in their local setting.... I don’t want to see a preoccupation with the foreign to the neglect of the local.

The contrast between the movements for renewal and indigenization in Uganda, and the ways people speak about these movements (such as the repeated requests we received to help churches get Northern-style instruments, ‘so that we can really worship,’), suggest that most Ugandan Christians have not yet experienced the liberation this priest desires.

Many of the pressing issues in the Church of Uganda, as in Ugandan society in general, are issues that come down to questions of Northern influence—the tensions between attraction to Northern ways, as transmitted by the media, material culture, and various visitors; and the desire to reclaim and re-value ‘local’ ways (whether tribe-specific, Ugandan, or pan-African). All these issues are complex, and made even more so by the dependency of the Church of Uganda, at all levels, on outsiders’ support to be able to carry out its ministry. As described in chapter 1, many Church of Uganda leaders describe feeling called to “holistic ministry”—that is, trying to meet the many material needs of church members. These needs include infrastructure, clean water, education, agricultural development, and much, much more, since the Ugandan state provides little such assistance, and much of the Ugandan population is very under-served in these respects. But, though its leaders believe the church to have a mandate to respond to a much wider range of its people’s needs than an American church body, the Church of Uganda also has far, far fewer resources at its disposal than most established American church bodies.

In striving to fulfill the holistic ministry mandate, the Church of Uganda is dependent upon its leaders’ abilities to attract outside resources, and outsider’s willingness to help. Several Ugandans complained to me about the inadequate support they feel their church gets from the larger Anglican Communion. Some contrasted the Anglican situation with the Pentecostal churches, since many of the larger Pentecostal parishes receive considerable support from
Northern sponsors. Others contrasted the Anglican Communion with the worldwide Roman Catholic church, which they believe is much more responsive to the needs of its African member churches. One Anglican told me that the Roman Catholics “get sponsorships from their headquarters,” but this doesn’t happen much in the Anglican Communion. Another Ugandan layman suggested to me that part of the weakness of the Ugandan church might be because they’re not getting enough funding from the United States: “I think today the donations from you people are minimal.”

To sum up, Ugandans are in a complex position with respect to attitudes, styles, and other cultural influences that enter their society and their church from the North. They experience a good deal of attraction to these things, but also a considerable degree of ambivalence and sometimes outright hostility towards them. This position is further complicated by the economic position of Uganda as a nation, the Church of Uganda as an institution, and many Ugandans as individuals and families. Ugandans' dependency on donations, loans, and other forms of support from outside the nation and, usually, outside the continent raise the stakes on these matters of culture and choice. Frequently, the path of going along with the Northern way of doing, thinking, dressing, or worshiping appears cheaper, more remunerative, or otherwise advantageous.

The complicating effects of differential material advantages on cultural and religious choices have a deep history in the Church of Uganda’s missionary history. Scholar of East African missions Robert Strayer notes that the mission communities in early colonial Kenya, for example, became more attractive as colonial power settled in and the “pressures of a new social order were felt.” The economic value of education and other Northern markers, like a European name, became more apparent and increased the missions’ appeal. Strayer observes that in many ways, religious and secular, cultural and material, mission communities were “an important means by which subordinate peoples could tap the resources of their rulers” (Strayer 1977:59, 158). Today, positive relationships with Northerners remain such a means in many respects.
Because of all this, Northern accusations about the role of money in North/South relationships cut to the heart of Ugandans’ situation. There is, essentially, no way to purify North/South relationships of material elements, because there is no way for inequalities of access to money and resources not to be at issue in these transnational Anglican interactions and alliances. Both Northerners and Southerners in such relationships may strive not to make money the central issue, but money is never irrelevant. A retired American Episcopal bishop with considerable experience with mission and development work in Africa gave me his perspective on why some African leaders choose to get involved in Episcopal Church conflicts, joining forces with American conservatives:

I think they all are aware of the spirituality in the West. They, however, are so poor that what they see—the biggest thing they see is the tremendous assets we have at our disposal, and how they can get some of that for themselves and their own work is their major concern.... Their primary concern, I think, is to build the liaisons, both organizational and economic, that are going to be able to help solve some of their problems over there, which are primarily economic.

On the one hand, this bishop's views exemplify the strong tendency to assume North/South relationships are fundamentally about money. On the other hand, his own experiences and friendships in Africa give some weight to his opinion; this is not just an assumption, but his perception based on his own time in Africa and interactions with African Anglicans. His view seems at least partially confirmed by the frequency with which Ugandans mentioned the needs of the Church of Uganda (and the wealth of the American church) in interviews and conversations with me during my fieldwork in Uganda.

Financial and material concerns, then, are almost always involved in some way in these North/South relationships among Anglicans. Furthermore, given the politically charged nature of North/South Anglican alliances in the Communion today, the twin threats of financial inducements and financial sanctions are constantly in play as Southern Anglicans, and their
Northern advocates (liberal or conservative), work towards a less neo-colonial and marginalized place for the South in Anglican Communion affairs. Anthropologist Erica Bornstein has argued, based on her study of child sponsorship relationships and World Vision Zimbabwe, that transnational sponsorship relationships can create a sense of transcending difference and distance to create intimacy and equality. However, she argues that at the same time such relationships have other, less positive effects: they reinforce the Northern and Southern partners’ experiences of the economic disparity between them, can raise anxieties about neo-colonial exploitation, and often create tensions and jealousy among Southern recipients and non-recipients of sponsorships or beneficiaries of relationships (Bornstein 2001). On much the same note, scholar of social movements Kathryn Sikkink has noted, “Foreign funding is both a lifeblood and a major source of asymmetries of power within transnational networks” (Sikkink 2002:307). In the North/South relationships I am examining in this work and indeed at every step on that path towards a post-imperial global Anglicanism, Northern advantage and Southern need and dependency are reinscribed, with mixed results for North/South mutual understanding and for goodwill among Southerners or Northerners who are differentially involved in such transnational relationships.

In re-negotiating their own role in the larger Anglican world, Southern leaders must constantly negotiate Northern bids (sometimes quite literally) for their support, friendship, or silence. Such bids are hard to disregard, given the needs relationships with Northerners can fulfill, but also sometimes hard to accept, depending on the conditions explicitly or implicitly attached. How do Southern church leaders deal with this situation, these constraints and demands, the eternal tension between their various needs and desires—for equal and sincere relationships with Northern Christians, for resources to support their ministry, for a greater role and greater power in world Anglican politics, for self-determination, for self-respect? In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore how Ugandan and other African leaders view and handle the situation in which they find themselves, in which any statement or move of wider significance in the
Anglican world is open to the charge, from within or without, of having been motivated by the prospect of winning favor from outside interests.

**Assistance and autonomy in relationships with Northern conservatives**

The accusations cast about by various Northerners carry the implication that Africans and other Southern bishops were or could be swayed by material inducements. These accusations are, in fact, considerably more challenging and insulting for African and other Southern bishops than for the Northern liberals and conservatives who aim them at each other. Both Northern liberals and conservatives have, by their words and actions, implied that Southern church leaders could be convinced, through various forms of financial persuasion, to support their claims and agendas. Not surprisingly, many Ugandans I spoke with expressed an unwillingness for money to be—or appear to be—the *central* concern in the formation and maintenance of North/South relationships.

African leaders respond to Northern accusations about money and influence by asserting that they support what they support (and reject what they reject) on their own initiative and for their own reasons, and that what they gain or lose from their stands is incidental. They thereby reaffirm the gift/commerce distinction, and assert that any North/South transfer of resources is (or should be) a matter of *free gift*. One Rwandan churchman spoke to me about both the loss of funding from those upset by his church’s actions, and the gaining of funding from those impressed by the same actions:

> God is providing, certainly. God has provided. This is not the end of it. God will give more.... You know, we should be able to know we worship God; we don't worship money.... I don't want anybody to think I'm doing what I'm doing because I want [my American allies] to support me. So my preaching,
my mission, what I am doing, is not for support, material. No, it's for the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ.

This Rwandan leader asserts clearly that while his “preaching and mission” may attract material support, it is not done for material support.\(^{159}\)

This position has been asserted strongly by various African leaders, with reference to the resources and support they have received over the past few years from American and other Northern conservatives. In particular, Africans who took advantage of the opportunities provided for them by Northern conservatives before and during Lambeth 1998 firmly stated that their support for the sexuality resolution was unrelated to their appreciation of those opportunities. As I argued in chapter 4, Southern bishops were for the most part predisposed to share the conservative American position on homosexuality. However, the Dallas and Kampala meetings and other pre-Lambeth preparations funded and organized largely by Northern conservatives had an indubitable impact, by convincing Southern bishops of the necessity of speaking out on that issue and helping them with the procedural skills and background information to do so. Ugandan leaders freely acknowledge the needfulness and effectiveness of this assistance and encouragement from Northern conservatives; indeed, Ugandan bishops seem even more willing to admit their need for assistance than Northern conservatives are to admit to providing it. As the “African/Asian juggernaut” language about the Lambeth sexuality resolution demonstrated, Northern conservatives believed that their victory there would have the most force if it appeared as the natural rising of orthodox Southern Christian sentiment against Northern liberal heterodoxy, without that rise being attributable to the urging of Northern conservatives. The latter, then, downplayed their role in encouraging and equipping Southern bishops and helping to get the sexuality resolution passed.

The African bishops I interviewed, in contrast, were much more willing to say that Northern conservatives helped them, especially by preparing them for the sexuality debate; but they are
very clear that Northern conservatives’ help only went so far. They answer the charge that they 
have been pawns for Northern conservatives by stating that Northerners simply showed them 
how to effectively put across their views, and did not play a role in shaping those views. With 
respect to the infamous Franciscan Study Centre in particular, one bishop assured me that the 
resources provided there were only to help Africans and other Southern bishops to understand 
“the process of Lambeth,” and not to influence their views:

[The FSC facility] was helpful in that it helped some of the people who 
had never been at Lambeth to know the dynamics of Lambeth, the dynamics 
and process of debate, and motions, and being focused.... I would here dispel 
what we used to hear, the fact that some of the times the African bishops used 
to meet in that center, that they were being bribed, that they were being lobbied 
to support certain motions. No!.... I was there, and I saw what was happening. 
It was mainly fellowship and networking, making friends and getting exposed, 
as I said, to the process of Lambeth.

Many Ugandan leaders stressed that the meetings and resources provided by Northern 
conservatives before and during Lambeth helped them know how to manage Lambeth debates. A 
bishop’s wife told me about the Americans who came to the Kampala meeting, and what they 
taught:

They tried to help us really–you know, Africans, we like telling stories, 
[rather] than just giving the information they have asked you.... They said, 
there is no time in Lambeth for you to tell stories! When you want to 
contribute, just say two-three sentences, two-three minutes, and sit down! 
Know how to present your points, and then you will be able to deliver what 
you want to say. Because by the time you reach the point you want to say, they 
say, ‘Sit down,’ and you will have contributed nothing. They were helping us
A Ugandan bishop, describing Lambeth 1998 to me, told me that Bishop Stanton and other Americans at the FSC helped the Africans “so that when we are in plenary, we are smart and we can talk to the point.” Another bishop agreed that conservative Northerners’ efforts to prepare Southern bishops, through the various pre-Lambeth conferences and the activities of the FSC, were indeed helpful for him and other African bishops, helping them not to “be led astray by the very clever debates that the [liberal] American bishops will offer during Lambeth, and not understand the background information of how those debates would be.” He concluded, “We appreciated [conservatives’ efforts] very much.”

Other Ugandan leaders made very similar statements about the pre-Lambeth conferences held in Dallas and Kampala, which one described as “a time of sensitization, of organization.... to prepare people.” Indeed, the whole Northern conservative endeavor to engage with Southern bishops before and during Lambeth 1998 is described by Ugandan bishops as a process of being sensitized to the issues and prepared to be effective at Lambeth—and absolutely not as a process of being taught, convinced, or otherwise directed how to vote on the issues. One Ugandan bishop, when I asked whether the pre-Lambeth meetings helped African bishops, told me that the meeting simply helped bring African leaders together to “get one voice”–but that the Americans didn’t “add another thing” to what the Africans already believed on sexuality and other issues. Another Ugandan church official spoke about these meetings as a legitimate and useful effort by Northern ‘lobbyists’ to inform and mobilize African bishops, but stressed that these lobbyists’ efforts don’t determine African positions.

In Lambeth '88 nobody came to this country to either sensitize or even lobby or even advocate for anything. But pre-Lambeth '98, there was a meeting here–two meetings that came on.... I think it was necessary that they come and give their views, lobbying for what is going to be discussed. But what is
important is that you may... lobby to put your views to me, but this doesn’t mean that I have got to take your views.

By these accounts, conservative Northerners’ pre-Lambeth lobbying, at the Dallas and Kampala meetings, raised African bishops’ awareness of the urgency of the sexuality issue so that they could be prepared to take a stand, but did not determine or even shape what that stand would be.

In presenting such a view of Lambeth, these African leaders thus acknowledge the resources and other assistance provided by their Northern would-be allies, but at the same time assert the independence of their views and actions, implicitly and sometimes explicitly rejecting the view that the assistance and resources provided amounted to shaping their views or buying their support. More generally, as the Rwandan leader quoted above suggested, Southern church leaders may acknowledge that their relations with conservative (or any) Northerners often result in various forms of assistance, but clearly assert that their positions and actions are independent of Northern influences–are, in effect, the cause and not the outcome of this increased engagement by Northern conservatives. This position insists on the purity of Southern Christian convictions and the integrity of Southern Christian agency, in the face of the evident increased investment in relations with Southern Christians on the part of Northern conservatives.

Indignation and temptation in relations with Northern liberals

In situations where Southern leaders’ positions correspond with the desires of Northern allies and sponsors, then, Southern leaders make a point of stressing African agency, arguing for the independence of their positions and actions. They name the associated material benefits of their alliance with Northern allies as assistance or ‘free gifts,’ flowing out of relationship, not given in exchange for Southern support for Northern positions. Likewise, when Northern interests are perceived as offering inducements to take positions or actions outside what most Ugandans see as reasonable and acceptable, Ugandans voice condemnation of the Northerners for exerting coercive pressure, and sanction members of their own church and society who appear tempted or
subverted by such Northern interests. But examining such a case reveals a stronger sense of the ambiguity and complexity of *gift* among Ugandan Christians, including a greater awareness of—and respect for—the obligations of reciprocity than most Northerners seem to possess.

Ugandan leaders tend to react sharply to any perceived attempts to influence their church in a liberal direction. These reactions reflect their anxieties about the vulnerability of their church and society to corrosive outside influences. One bishop told me indignantly, “The bishops in America are using money as baits, which is wrong!” A Rwandan church leader spoke about the Haines/Maari case and the wider issue of attempts to coerce African churches, concluding that Africans had better remain poor and faithful than accept funding with such conditions:

Some [American leaders] are just political and punitive, pejorative, derogative. Some tend to think that if they don't relate to us, we shall be choked and starved, we shall have to beg because we are too poor, we can't do without their money.... I cannot betray the Lord Jesus Christ because I want money.

One Ugandan churchman, though strongly asserting that he himself could not be ‘bought’ by liberal Northerners, also demonstrated anxiety about the wider church’s vulnerability, while talking about then-Archbishop of Wales (now Archbishop of Canterbury) Rowan Williams’ upcoming visit to the UCU campus. He told a group of colleagues that Archbishop Williams is “the kind of liberal who would happily accept homosexuality,” but went on to lament, “It’s hard to resist such people when they come with inducements.” One of the others told him, “I’m glad you don’t have a price!” Someone else jokingly asked the Ugandan speaker, who had been having chronic car trouble, if he’d welcome the Archbishop if he offered him a car that works. He replied, “No, not even for a new car; too much is at stake.”

This sense that “too much is at stake” to permit any compromise or tolerance of liberal outsiders’ efforts to influence the Ugandan church was certainly evident in Ugandan reactions to the letter Bishop Haines wrote to Bishop Maari soon after Lambeth 1998. A Ugandan priest, commenting on Haines-Maari case to me, raised the issue of the needs which make such an
attempt a temptation—but also make it more imperative that African leaders resist.

It is unfortunate that such a thing is going on in the body [of Christ–i.e. the worldwide Church]. And [African bishops] also don't have a moral right to receive such assistance, if it is on those terms. And it is also unfortunate that some of this money was raised by faithful people, and yet some of the leaders are conditioning it towards that. So it's regrettable.... Of course the pressure is there. The needs are clear, and the money would be useful. But they are now in that dilemma. Is it a question of receiving money from any circle? They would go to Saudi Arabia and get money from Muslims, and they probably would get more money! So they have a problem of faithfulness and the reality on the ground. [Emphasis added]

Indeed, Ugandan church leaders like Bishop Maari are faced with a “problem of faithfulness and the reality on the ground”: how to remain faithful to their convictions and values as Ugandan Christians, while at the same time negotiating the reality that the Church of Uganda must depend on outsiders’ assistance, and thus must sometimes deal with and in outsiders’ values and agendas, in order to carry out its ministry and meet its members’ needs. Precisely because these issues of dependency, choice, and conscience are so commonplace, the importance of protecting Ugandan convictions and culture is stressed in the strong negative reactions expressed by Ugandan church leaders, both to outsiders who seem to be attempting coercion or bribery and insiders who seem to have given in to coercion or bribery. These reactions are all exemplified in the case to which I will now return, that of Integrity-Uganda.

“If money is the motivation, we are all to blame”

The vociferous and widespread negative response to Integrity-Uganda and particularly to Ssenyonjo’s role exemplify Ugandan anxieties about their church and society’s poverty-induced vulnerability to outside influences. Ssenyonjo’s involvement with Integrity-Uganda, 408
understood as a selling-out to outsiders’ agendas, demands a harsh response because it undermines the appearance of African incorruptibility by seemingly demonstrating that Africans can be ‘bought,’ and even persuaded to support what many Ugandans see as the most outlandish of positions: tolerance of homosexuality. The lively discussion, evidenced in the Ugandan newspapers, of the role of Northern influence and money in the foundation of Integrity-Uganda reveals Ugandan concerns about what poverty—and greed—might lead Ugandans into.

Some of this discourse involved the same distinction between commerce and gift which preoccupies Northern liberals and conservatives in their mutual casting of aspersions. Many negative reactions to Integrity-Uganda, carried in the newspapers or collected in my interviewing, name these Ugandans’ taking up of the gay cause as commerce. In contrast with situations like that of Northern conservatives’ provision of assistance and resources at the Franciscan Study Centre, which Ugandans describe as gifts in order to protect the autonomy of their positions and actions, the case of Integrity-Uganda—in which the Northerners involved are advocating a position regarded as fairly radical by most Ugandans—is condemned by Ugandan leaders and commentators as a transgression into the realm of commerce, of tit-for-tat, of selling one’s voice and conscience.

However, at the same time there is another side to the way Integrity-Uganda and its leaders have been spoken about and treated, which instead of working within the terms of the commerce/gift distinction, reveals the interpenetration of these categories and the fuzziness of this boundary in Ugandans’ lived experiences of North/South relationships. This is manifest in a surprising sort of tolerance of Integrity-Uganda, in spite of all the public condemnation. As I argue above, one main reason Ugandans reacted so harshly and negatively to Bishop Ssenyonjo and others’ involvement with Integrity-Uganda was that African church leaders, and laypeople as well, are sharply aware of their church’s and society’s material and economic vulnerabilities. As a result, they felt the need to vocally sanction those who, it seemed, had betrayed that
vulnerability, sliding down the slippery slope of dependency by selling off their consciences and good names for American favors. Yet I suspect that the Ugandan church and Ugandan society have been as gentle as they have, in handling the Integrity-Uganda transgressors, for much the same reasons.

In spite of the undeniable negative impact of their involvement, neither Ssenyonjo nor the group’s other leaders have yet gotten in serious trouble. Ssenyonjo’s involvement with Integrity-Uganda, once it became common knowledge, caused a rift between him and his church—and considerable disruption of his livelihood, as well as his relationships. Numerous bishops and other church and civic leaders had harsh words for him, which were eagerly quoted in the papers. A number of Church of Uganda dioceses banned Ssenyonjo from exercising ministry as a bishop, including the diocese of Namirembe, where he had previously made a significant amount of supplementary income by helping out the sitting bishop, Samuel Ssekadde, who is vehemently opposed to homosexuality. The priest involved with Integrity-Uganda and his family also suffered socially and economically from the church’s displeasure and the public’s negative attention. But though the social and economic consequences for those involved with Integrity should not be downplayed, they have not been jailed or physically harmed. And there is evidence that many Church of Uganda colleagues’ private reactions have not been as harsh as their condemnatory public statements. Though many bishops spoke out against Bishop Senyonjo, as of summer 2003 there hadn’t been a strong enough consensus in the House of Bishops to defrock him (making him no longer a bishop). A member of Integrity-Uganda told us that the Ugandan media have been surprisingly sympathetic, giving Ssenyonjo an opportunity to have his say, and seemingly not merely for the sake of ratings.

I suspect that this degree of tolerance in terms of actual consequences to the founding of Integrity-Uganda was primarily due to Ugandans’ general awareness of their vulnerability to economic influences. I first arrived at this interpretation when it dawned upon me that many
Ugandans actually seem comfortable with the idea that Ssenyonjo took up the homosexual cause for money, a realization which surprised me considerably. The first few times I heard someone say of Ssenyonjo, “We suspect he is only doing it because his pension is small,” or words to that effect, I heard it as an additional insult—not only is he betraying the Ugandan church and Ugandan culture, but he’s doing it for money! My reaction was informed by my own acceptance of a strong commerce/gift distinction, with its correlate that any position taken for monetary gain does not have the legitimacy of a position freely taken. Finally, I heard the tone and the context of such remarks, as well as the words, and I understood that such statements were, in fact, offering mitigating explanations for Ssenyonjo’s actions. Enlightened, I realized—and then saw confirmed, again and again—that most Ugandans find it easier to believe, accept, tolerate, and even excuse Ssenyonjo and others for becoming involved with Integrity-Uganda for reasons of material gain, than for becoming involved out of an inner conviction that the cause was right and demanded their efforts. To provide one brief example, a Rwandan priest studying in Uganda told me: “People are suspecting that [Ssenyonjo] did it to secure his retirement package,” then went on to say, “Still, people were devastated, people even cursed him.” That “still” is the give-away: that Ssenyonjo “did it to secure his retirement package” reduces the magnitude of his crime.

The fact that Ugandans would rather think Ssenyonjo ‘sold out’ than was convinced of the need for Integrity-Uganda’s work, says less about the unthinkable of tolerance for homosexuality for Ugandans than it does about how understandable it is to Ugandans that another Ugandan should change his tune in order to please potential Northern donors. This is a pattern which Ugandans apparently find more likely, more familiar, and thus easier to accept as the explanation for the surprising development of Integrity-Uganda. In spite of many Ugandan leaders’ public condemnation of Ssenyonjo for allegedly following the logic of commerce into a position out of line with Ugandan mores, Ugandans also talk about Ssenyonjo’s error as if it falls on a continuum with other behaviors which they find familiar and comprehensible. Ugandans’
experiences with North/South relationships and dependency has kept them keenly aware of the ambiguity of gift in such relationships, and the rarity of the truly free gift. The ‘free gifts’ of resources, sponsorships, materials, funds, expertise, etc., regularly given to Ugandan individuals and church bodies by a wide range of Northern sponsors, supporters, allies, and admirers almost always carry some conditionality or expectation of reciprocation, even if only the expression of gratitude in some way which fulfills the Northern partners’ expectations. For both Northern and Southern partners in such relationships, such gifts are not free, but as a complex hybrid of gift and commerce–in Mauss’s words:

    neither...the free, purely gratuitous rendering of total services, nor... of production and exchange purely interested in what is useful....Just as these gifts are not freely given, they are also not really disinterested. They...represent for the most part total counter-services, not only made with a view of paying for services or things, but also to maintaining a profitable alliance. [Mauss 1990:73]

The material correlates of North/South relationships, by this view, are not incidental nor even separable from the relationship. They are part and parcel of the terms of relationship. This reality seems more easily recognized and more readily acknowledged by Ugandans (and, perhaps, Africans in general) than by Northern partners, who may be more invested in the idea of the ‘free gift’ and also freer of the obligations of reciprocity their Southern partners must negotiate. Usually such obligations can be managed without much difficulty or compromise on the part of the Southern leaders involved; but sometimes the temptations of such relationships and the exigencies of Southern needs lead Southerners into relationships which involve them with actions or positions which most of their coreligionists and countrymen see as beyond the pale.

Discourse about Integrity-Uganda places Bishop Ssenyonjo and Integrity-Uganda as extreme type-cases of a situation many share and everyone understands: that of balancing one’s own
needs, convictions, and desires with donors’ agendas. The familiarity of the idea of economic persuasion for Ugandans can be heard in the many remarks about Integrity-Uganda, or homosexuality in general, which assume a link between the rise to prominence of the issue of homosexuality in Uganda and Africa in general, and the economic vulnerability of the Church of Uganda and other African churches. One senior Church of Uganda official, who expressed no strong feelings about homosexuality, told me his main worry on that issue is that people from outside will use money to infiltrate the churches to speak for and against homosexuality in the churches in the South. Another Ugandan priest explained to me that one reason people were so bitter about Ssenyonjo was that many were afraid that Integrity-Uganda might be “a beginning.” “People have a feeling that the West, by having resources, may try to introduce these values in a tricky way. People are poor, it is hard to say no, so the faith may be diluted.” Another Ugandan bishop told me:

In this generation [homosexuality] has become an issue. And I think it has become an issue because... [of] the problem of money, funding. Because with a hungry person you can almost do what you want.... So the [Northern] churches which are heretical, and... have a lot of money, they are still keeping African churches or churches in Asia, because of money.¹⁶³

The concerns about Bishop Ssenyonjo and his pension thus illuminate a much broader concern among Ugandans: that the poverty and dependency of the Ugandan church and Ugandans in general makes them vulnerable to persuasion, bribery, and coercion by potential or existing Northern partners, by which means they may be lured into betraying their faith and their culture. Two statements from Integrity leaders make the point that Ssenyonjo’s case attracted so much attention and censure, not because it was atypical, but because it was so very typical. The priest involved with the Integrity-Uganda told us that Archbishop Nkoyoyo had been in the United States at the time that the news about Integrity-Uganda’s existence and leaders were really breaking in Uganda. He told us that in many of the American churches the Archbishop visited,
people kept asking him, “We hear you’re harassing sexual minorities in Uganda!” When Archbishop Nkoyoyo tried to downplay Integrity-Uganda’s significance by saying that Bishop Ssenyonjo was only involved with Integrity in order to get money from Northerners, according my consultant, Nkoyoyo’s American hosts asked him, “And what are you doing here?” Ssenyonjo makes a similar point in a piece printed in the *New Vision* in May of 2001. He pointed out that he is certainly not the only Ugandan bishop to receive some funding from abroad.

I have great sympathy for those people who say I am looking for money in crusading for the gay populace in this country. This is not true. Instead I can cite many bishops in the Church of Uganda who are being paid by the gay folks and have still failed to provide a support system for the gay community here. Others are still paid by the conservative sources to make sure there is no gay support in our Church—and these are responsible for the propaganda in the media. So if money is the motivation factor, then we are all to blame in some way. [Ssenyonjo 2001a, emphasis added]

Both of these statements come from Integrity leaders, who have an interest in justifying their own actions (which, indisputably, do include the transfer of resources from American to Ugandan partners). Nevertheless, they make a valid point. Many Ugandan church leaders and others are in such situations and relationships (bishops often, for example, present requests for support when visiting American churches), and could be vulnerable to some of the same charges of soliciting American support and even of taking actions or making statements to increase the likelihood of attracting such support. Indeed, one of my interviews revealed that a Ugandan bishop who has developed strong relations with American conservative evangelicals in the course of pursuing renewal in his own diocese has been subject to similar suspicions. Layman and diocesan staffer Abner told me,

In the church, there are a few individuals who will say, ‘But I think
maybe there is some hidden thing behind this thing [the bishop’s close relations
with American groups]. Why on earth should many many bazungu [white
people] gather and come here? Eh?’ And so out of curiosity they say a lot of
things.... [They say,] ‘They have sold our church to the Americans.... Abner
and Bishop are busy selling the church.’

Thus Integrity-Uganda is not by any means alone in raising suspicions that Ugandan church
leaders have compromised or taken up new ideas or practices in order to attract and secure
American attention, friendship, and funding.

I argue that both the harsh public reaction and the milder private reaction to Integrity-Uganda
are due to the way the case brought into public prominence the realities of which all Ugandans
are aware: that the Northern partnerships and sponsorships which many Ugandan organizations
and individuals eagerly seek are marked by the parties’ economic inequality in such a way as to
leave the Ugandans, as the materially poorer parties, perpetually vulnerable to attempted
influence, persuasion, and manipulation. The ideal of North/South relationships founded on the
‘free gift’ principal, of mutual fellowship and sharing of resources with no strings attached, was
reportedly put into words quite bluntly by Archbishop Nkoyoyo at a dinner held during Louie
Crew’s time in Uganda. Crew wrote in his account of his trip that the Archbishop told him and
his delegation, “You need to understand me quite clearly.... We believe it is your Christian duty
to support us with your money, but we don't want you to bring your issues here” (Crew 2001).
This your-money-not-your-issues standard is doubtless an attractive ideal for many Ugandans,
but most realize or expect that it will rarely be the reality, and that their dependency and
acceptance of outside support will often leave them open to pressures, sometimes irresistible, to
take up the agendas of their donors–be it tolerance of homosexuality, particular forms of
democratization, free trade, women’s rights, or other ideological programs.

The issues raised by the formation of Integrity-Uganda thus relate closely to the general
position of dependency on foreign aid and foreign political will, shared by the poorer countries of the contemporary world. An article in the Ugandan newspaper *New Vision*, entitled “Ssenyonjo may yet have the last laugh,” and subtitled, “They say beggars have no choice. Homosexuals may soon be able to flex their economic muscle to developing countries,” examined the link between dependency and homosexuality.

There is a saying, which goes something like this: He who pays the piper calls the tune. This is an apt reminder to nations like Uganda, which receive foreign aid from developed nations like the USA and Canada. By accepting the said help, you lose some autonomy.... Despite his outrageous suggestion that there are over 600,000 homosexuals in Uganda, Bishop Christopher Ssenyonjo is actually closer to world reality than most Ugandans on the subject of gays and lesbians. The simple truth is that gays and lesbians have become formidable forces in developed countries like Canada and US.... [The] changes sweeping across North America, Europe and Japan where gays and lesbians are now accepted as part of life, will soon cut a wide swath through Africa.....

[because] *most African countries are dependent on foreign aid for development assistance... [and] donors are increasingly demanding certain returns from the recipients.* For instance, political democratisation is now one of the conditions for receiving aid.... *No doubt, the time will soon come when homosexual issues will be on the table too.* If it comes to pass, such a demand will be quite simple: Change your views and laws about homosexuals or forget about the goodies that we promised you last year. Naturally, a demand such as this will provoke vehement outrage in Uganda. But, from the point of view of the donor countries, it boils down to the fact that gays and lesbians are taxpayers whose taxes are being used to help developing countries like Uganda to get ahead.
This writer articulates a keen sense of Uganda’s social, political, and economic vulnerability to the demands or conditions of donor countries, NGOs, and other “development partners.” The agendas of such partners are difficult for Ugandan partners, from the state to the churches, to resist. Sounding fatalistic rather than alarmed, one Ugandan priest predicted to me that pressure from donors and the influence of the mass media would inevitably cause homosexuality to become accepted in Uganda:

As the world becomes a small village, and TV and information becomes very easy to attain, you have all these pressing pressures, and some promoters of the homosexual agenda are very political. They are organized. They know which buttons to push.... The general [Ugandan public] does not accept it yet.... [M: You used the word ‘yet’. Do you think that it will become accepted?] Well, a lot of things are becoming accepted.... People don’t want to spend their energies stopping something that doesn’t concern them.... Legislation in the local countries is very much influenced by international pressure groups that appear as NGOs, and some of the things are done at United Nations, in international circles, easily become ratified, even when they would not ordinarily pass. Yes, that’s what I can see. The lobby groups are very active, and they can pass anything.

These quotations all address the pressures exerted by NGOs and other donor agencies, rather than churches, but similar dynamics of ideological conditionality are also widely thought to prevail (whether openly or tacitly) in small-scale and less-formal donor and sponsorship relationships, like those between churches.

Integrity-Uganda is alarming to Ugandans partly because it appears as the vanguard of a movement, a new wave of economic and cultural colonialism, in which the values and opinions
of Northern NGOs and other donors will be forced upon Southerners as conditions attached to
the aid they seek. Bishop Ssenyonjo’s involvement with Integrity is both tacitly tolerated, and
vocally condemned as a warning, because this could happen to anyone, since Ugandans are so
often in similar situations, as individuals, in their churches, and as a nation.

**Conclusion: Negotiating relationships in an unequal world**

As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, one of the most common questions asked about
the growing number of North-South Anglican alliances is whether the Southerners are engaged
in these alliances primarily for reasons of material gain. When first writing this chapter, I kept
finding myself sliding into trying to evaluate that question myself—for example, I attempted to
assess whether Kolini or Ssenyonjo gained enough from their newfound outside allies to make
up for the funding sources they lost on account of their controversial stands. In attempting to
write about these matters, I found myself focusing increasingly on the pervasiveness of financial
considerations, of one kind or another, in inter-Anglican relationships between Americans and
Africans. Accusations about the role of money are so common that there is no way to make
judgments about whether material considerations played more of a role in one relationship than
in another, or to judge in which relationships that role was significant enough to cross some fine
and shifting line to be named as bribery or coercion. In fact, upon closer examination of the talk
about money and the realities of wealth and poverty in the American and Ugandan contexts,
respectively, the significance of questions about the role of money in particular situations pales
compared to the issue of the drastic economic inequality that fundamentally shapes and
constrains the possibilities and dynamics of these relationships.

After showing how liberal and conservative Northerners dispute whether North-South
alliances are all about money, I have tried to show how Southerners negotiate their needs and
desires in these relationships—which often do involve material aspects, though not in any
simplistic way. From the Ugandan perspective, and, I would venture to generalize, from the
perspective of the poorer Anglican provinces in general, the question of money in North-South relationships is not a question of which Northern bidder will win their loyalty and support by providing the most resources to pay school fees and buy water tanks. Rather, the question is how one can make the best of whatever opportunities can be found to build and strengthen relationships with Northerners (which relationships may, or may not, produce school fees and water tanks), while at the same time negotiating the web of conditionalities and expectations surrounding such relationships in such a way as to best maintain the integrity of one’s faith, values, and practices. The either/or language that is used by Northerners (and some Southern leaders, when speaking polemically) when talking about money in North-South relationships—either the Africans are doing what they’re doing for money, or they’re doing it out of conviction and by their own initiative—is too stark, too dualistic, a language for the actual situations Africans often find themselves in. Rather, I hear African Anglicans speaking about a spectrum of ways in which material considerations play into North-South relationships. Christopher Ssenyonjo is said to have transgressed, not simply because he entered into a potentially lucrative relationship with Northerners, but because he is seen to have slid too far towards one end of that spectrum by sacrificing widely-accepted Christian and Ugandan values in the pursuit of personal comfort.

The increasing entanglement of North/South inter-Anglican relationships with conflicts among Northern Anglicans has resulted in significant shifting of such relationships, and corresponding redirecting of material benefits, away from connections which have become colored by these antagonisms (e.g., Trinity-Wall Street’s ceasing to fund theological education in Rwanda) and towards new lines of affinity (e.g. some conservative parishes’ redirection of funds from ECUSA to African mission partners). African Anglicans seem ambivalent about this trend towards Northern investment in North/South relations only along lines of doctrinal, moral, or political affinity. This development is likely to constrain the possibilities for North/South relationships,
and thus is undesirable from the point of view of many African leaders. Most Ugandan church leaders are perfectly aware that their conservative Northern allies are something of a minority in the Northern church—after all, that is why they seek Southern allies, as more than one Ugandan leader observed to me. These Ugandans realize that most of ECUSA’s leaders are moderate or liberal in their theological, social, and political views; and the Church of Uganda, like other African churches, depends on relationships with Episcopal churches and the fellowship and funding that those relationships entail.

In cases where donors appear to be attaching unacceptable conditions to their support, or where the media make the church’s acceptance of support from a particular source sound like selling out, Ugandan and other African church leaders tend to speak out strongly against the acceptance of such support and the compromise it entails (or is popularly perceived as entailing). In one recent example, Church of Uganda leaders decried Episcopal Church offers of funding for peace efforts in northern Uganda which were perceived or portrayed as bribes offered the Ugandan church in exchange for restoring amicable relations with the Episcopal Church following the controversial Gene Robinson consecration (Ntagali 2003). However, in cases when there are significant moral and doctrinal differences between donors and their African partners, but neither the donors nor the press make an issue out of those differences, African church leaders are likely not to make an issue of those differences themselves. At least three Ugandan bishops made statements to me suggesting that they were willing to be in relationship with liberal Episcopal leaders and dioceses, as long as the Episcopal partners did not place conditions on them or make their differences an issue (as Bishop Haines had, in his letter to Bishop Maari). Several other Ugandan church leaders mentioned to me that they had friends and partners in various camps within the American church, and wanted to keep it that way, without permitting intra-church conflicts in the U.S. to break or limit their transnational relationships. Further, during the course of my own fieldwork, I observed that very few Ugandans pressed me about my
own convictions. Most simply chose to assume that I shared their views on important matters, rather than get into conversations which might prove awkward for all parties. Though my position as a researcher differs in significant ways from that of a visiting Northern church leader seeking to establish some form of inter-church relationship, this sort of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy may be widespread in North/South interactions.

Given the real and sometimes challenging differences between American and African Anglicanisms, many Ugandan leaders in such relationships follow a policy of tact and pragmatism within the limits of conscience. This practice means trying to keep commonalities with Northern partners central and avoiding focusing on differences and disagreements. In this way, the parties strive, in Mauss’s words, to ‘maintain profitable alliances’—defining ‘profitable,’ as Mauss intends it, in the broadest possible sense. An interest in maximizing their opportunities to build relationships with Northern Christians may lead African Christians to choose to accept support and encouragement in taking positions or actions which agree with their Northern allies’ concerns and agendas. Both the Franciscan Study Centre and Integrity-Uganda can be seen in this light. In both cases, the evidence available suggests that the provision of support and resources by Northerners did not persuade African leaders to take positions which they would not otherwise have taken. However, the eager interest and concrete support of sympathetic Northerners for these African leaders’ positions may well have encouraged those Southern leaders to be more outspoken on these matters of shared concern. In other situations, when African leaders’ views conflict with those of Northern partners or potential partners, African leaders may find themselves in a position where it is most pragmatic to hold back their views in tactful understatement or silence. I interviewed one American conservative Episcopalian who has been closely involved in facilitating several African church leaders’ visits to American parishes. He commented on the predicament of African leaders who oppose homosexuality, and are invited to come preach or speak in liberal Episcopal parishes on the basis of their political or
social justice or humanitarian work. My consultant said that in such a situation, most bishops would “keep silent” regarding homosexuality if at all possible, “because he knows where his bread is buttered.”

The view that African leaders may choose tactful silence in some situations was also articulated by West African Anglican Primate Robert Okine, in an interview with David Virtue exploring why South African bishops voice liberal views on homosexuality.

Liberal white and black bishops in The Province of Southern Africa are out of step with the rest of their African brothers. "You don't bite the hand that feeds you," said Archbishop Robert Okine, Primate of West Africa. "The South African churches have been given millions of dollars from U.S. dioceses and the U.S. National Church to fight apartheid and support women's ordination. They were easily manipulated to support liberal values because of American money," he said. "The issues of discrimination towards women were then linked with the homosexual agenda of the Western Provinces. We Africans have a sense of appreciation even when we disagree with a person. South Africa's decision to go along with western values is not unconnected with the kindness Bishop Desmond Tutu received at their hands," said Archbishop Okine. "Some bishops cannot distinguish between exploitation, and under duress, because of the people they serve and the poverty they see every day they can be bought.” [Virtue 1998c, emphasis added]

Okine thus implies that the South African bishops may secretly share with other African leaders a negative view of homosexuality, but mute those sentiments and voice approval and support because of the funding they have received from the American Episcopal church. Much like some of the remarks about Bishop Ssenyonjo quoted above, Okine’s remarks about the South African bishops are somewhat derogatory, suggesting these bishops have allowed themselves to be
‘manipulated’ and ‘exploited.’ However, as in the case of Bishop Ssenyonjo, the real object of criticism seems to be, not that the South African bishops have received funding from America, but that they have allowed that funding to influence them to too great an extent. Further, the statement in which Okine includes himself, by using the first person plural—“We Africans have a sense of appreciation even when we disagree with a person”—suggests an acceptance of the fact that sometimes Africans are influenced, by the help of Northern allies. His phrasing leaves open the possibility that, in comparable circumstances, he, too, might choose to express his appreciation rather than voice his disagreements and disrupt a relationship.

My examination of these various cases suggests that money issues are so pervasive, so complex, so nuanced, that the either/or, commerce/gift perspective prevalent in Northern and some Southern political rhetoric is simply untenable. Disentangling or purifying money from the ideological, cultural, doctrinal, and practical issues with which it is perennially entangled is all but impossible. The purification of money from issues of relationship and influence is equally difficult and contested whether the goal is to purify money from ideological conditions, as when Archbishop Nkoyoyo called for the North to give money without issues, or to purify ideological positions from the taint of money, as in the expressed desire of both Northern liberals and conservatives for a clear Southern voice without the taint of monetary influence. The persistence of rumors and accusations of bribery and coercion in the cases mentioned in this chapter show that it has never been possible to disperse fully suspicions that hopes or expectations of monetary gain has influenced Southerners by tempting them to silence or to renewed vehemence on particular issues.

Inevitably, North/South relationships are fundamentally shaped by the profound economic gap separating Northern and Southern partners. Inevitably, money does play a role, and there is always room for dispute over what that means and how finance relates to the other aspects of such relationships. Is the financial support offered by Northern partners a mere side effect, a
‘free gift,’ a natural and spontaneous outcome of growing affinities and positive engagement between Northern and Southern partners? Or does the prospect or reality of financial support have an important motivational effect, intentional or unintentional, in leading Southern leaders to be more amiable, more sympathetic, to potential Northern partners? The reality of the role of money in these relationships somewhere between these two poles, in the unmarked territory between commerce and gift. As long as such gaps exist, as long as money must always matter in these relationships, it will remain impossible to have relationships where partners and observers, Northern and Southern alike, can securely feel themselves or their colleagues to speaking and acting freely from their convictions. In the current situation, economic imbalance always generates ambiguity, suspicion, and questions about agency and power, a situation that reflects the realities of the imbalance of economic and political power in the Anglican Communion and the world in general. In this sense, though its Southern churches are nearly all now independent and headed by indigenous leaders, the Anglican Communion is far from decolonized.
CHAPTER 9

THE NEXT ANGLICANISM?
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Philip Jenkins and the North/South vision of world Anglicanism

In the preceding chapters, I have illustrated the rise of a particular Anglican globalism. This
globalism envisions, and seeks to remake, the Anglican Communion as a global entity,
embracing a diversity of provinces into some kind of whole; as a divided entity, split between
the variously labeled zealously-orthodox/fundamentalist-intolerant global South and the
revisionist-heretical/progressive-sophisticated North; and as a contested entity, in which the
global South is growing in both size and influence, challenging the traditional dominance of the
North and demanding a re-imagining of the terms of Anglican identity. This vision of the
Anglican Communion as global, divided, and contested, has been propagated and supported in
significant part through the collaborative actions of the Northern conservative Anglican minority,
who describe themselves as aligned with Southern Anglicanism, and Southern Christian leaders
eager to take a more central role in worldwide Anglican affairs.

This vision has come to central prominence through projects of scale-making, and the
 corresponding spread of discourses of scale. In chapters 3 through 6, I have illustrated the
projects of scale-making, bringing the global into the provincial and vice-versa, undertaken by
Northern conservatives and sympathetic Southern Anglicans. These have included building
coupsions and common goals in preparation for Lambeth 1998 in order to ensure that Episcopal
Church conflicts would be addressed by the worldwide Anglican Communion, calling for the
worldwide Communion to discipline the Episcopal Church following Lambeth, and connecting
Southern church leaders with conservative dissident American parishes and organizations,
embodying in these interventions the strongest possible assertion of the global relevance of
issues and conflicts within the Episcopal Church. At the same time, discourses of scale, given
additional impetus by major ‘global’ events like Lambeth 1998, the Singapore Consecrations, and other global projects, have spread widely among conservative Northern Anglicans and Southern Anglicans who have become concerned about the moral state of Northern Christianity. Church scholar Lewis Daly describes the outcomes of these developments:

The international mechanisms of the Anglican Communion—its annual Primates’ Meeting, the decennial Lambeth Conference of Bishops, and the See of Canterbury itself—have been injected into an historically local and national battle against [the Episcopal Church’s] mainline leadership, creating a new terrain of conflict, mobilization, and leverage [for conservative dissidents].

[Daly 2001:9]

The North/South alliances which have generated these discourses and processes of globalization add an interesting case to the literature on transnational social movements, though this movement is oriented to church, rather than government or corporate, policy. The social movements literature offers keen analyses and useful concepts concerning the dynamics, forms, and implications of new forms of transnational activist networks and alliances, like the Anglican relationships I have described here. However, the applicability of this literature to my case is limited by its strong bias towards progressive or leftist movements; there appears to be a widely-assumed intrinsic connection between liberalism in political sentiments, and globalism in discourse and activism. To take just one of many possible examples, the recent edited volume *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms* takes as its subject “a wide range of cases around the world where nongovernmental actors attempt to change norms and practices of states, international organizations, and private sector firms” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002:4). Even given this broad range, the cases the book includes are all on the left or progressive side: activism for women’s rights, human rights, World Bank policy changes, democracy, local environmental issues, and labor-associated causes.
The orthodox Anglican globalism I have examined in this work represents an interesting case to add to this literature precisely because of the way it confounds assumptions about progressivism and conservatism. Who shall we say has made the most meaningful progress towards de-centering traditional authority structures, between largely-white Anglican liberals who eagerly affirm racial, cultural, and sexual diversity, or the broad coalition of American, European, African, Asian, and Latin American Anglican conservatives who support an essentially heterosexist and patriarchal understanding of Biblical morality? How do we as scholars interpret a movement which is conservative in its values and goals, but progressive in its efforts to re-imagine traditional authority structures and share power with the formerly marginalized? Anna Tsing suggests that one important question to ask of global movements and projects is whether they limit, or spread, Northern hegemonies (Tsing 2000:344). A complex, hybrid movement like this suggests this question needs to be asked in a less binary form: which Northern hegemonies might it be spreading, and which limiting or reversing? Scholars’ attention to progressive movements is understandable and laudable, but I suggest that we need both to look for innovations and implications in movements of primarily conservative ideals as well, and to attend to the ways agendas and interests can combine in surprising ways in transnational movements, complicating left/right distinctions.

The literature on religion and globalization has much more to say concerning movements on the right. However, as I have discussed earlier (see chapter 5), scholars often assume that such movements are fundamentally reacting against globalization, rather than engaging with it or even, in their own way, furthering it. Simon Coleman, in his study of globalization among Swedish Pentecostals, has noted such thinking—and argues that “tribalist” movements, that is, conservative (reaffirming of particular identities and worldviews) movements, may actually be actively globalist in their outlook and activities.

Reactions to [globalization] can range from a cosmopolitan acceptance of pluralism and ‘creolisation’... to an assertion of the validity of a single view of
the world. Indeed, contained within or prompted by processes of globalisation, apparently anti-globalist impulses can develop. The ‘Rushdie affair’ can be interpreted, for instance, as an attempt by Khomeini and other Muslims to counter perceived inequalities within the global system through the reclamation and revitalization of Islamic particularity. Similarly, [globalization scholar] Bauman argues (1998:3) that neo-tribal and fundamentalist tendencies reflect and articulate the experience of people on the receiving end of globalisation. He is correct to see the reassertion of neo-tribalism as inherent within the global circumstance, and it is true that such a reaction may come form people who feel left out of the cosmopolitan ecumene (or who object to its existence in the first place). As we shall see in the case of charismatic Christianity, however, it is possible to regard a rhetoric of ‘tribalism’ as positively and actively seeking to redefine the global condition, and not simply as a defensive reaction in relation to it. [Coleman 2000:59-60]

The movement I have depicted in the preceding pages, like Coleman’s Swedish Pentecostals, is not merely a defensive reaction, but positively and actively seeks to redefine global Anglicanism—in terms of decentered networks of accountability to shared doctrinal orthodoxy, protected and enforced especially by the leaders of the Anglican global South.

**Anglican globalism further polarized: Philip Jenkins’ *The Next Christendom***

The idea of a global Anglican backlash on the Episcopal Church and other errant liberal provinces, spearheaded by righteous Southern Anglican leaders, was by June of 2002 when I completed my fieldwork widely-accepted and widely-invoked among conservative Northerners and Southern Anglicans who pay attention to international Anglican politics. This vision of global Anglicanism was to receive a significant boost in mid-2002, which strengthened its legitimacy among those who already shared this vision and propelled it into much wider circulation among liberal and moderate Episcopalians and other Northern Christians and observers of world Christianity. This boost was the publication of Philip Jenkins’ book, *The Next Christendom*, and an article summarizing some of his points, printed in the *Atlantic Monthly*. In these pieces, Jenkins argues that Christianity in the global South is growing, conservative, and assertive, and will increasingly be the force with which Northern churches, and for that matter
Northern political leaders, must reckon as the 21st century advances. Episcopal scholar Ian Douglas, reviewing *The Next Christendom*, notes,

Philip Jenkins’ new book on the incredible growth of Christianity outside the industrialized West in recent times, has captured the imagination of even the most strident secularist. With appearances on popular national radio programs (NPR's The Connection, September 18, 2002) and coverage in major monthly magazines (October 2002 Atlantic Monthly) Jenkins has become the harbinger of the next wave of ‘the West verses the rest’ ideology sweeping post-September 11 United States. [Douglas 2003b]

As Douglas notes, Jenkins’ book and article drew wide attention in the secular media. His piece in the *Atlantic Monthly* (October 2002), which explicitly cited Anglican Mission in America as an example of the rise of Southern Christianity he describes, almost certainly reached a wide audience of liberal and moderate lay Episcopalians who had previously been relatively unaware of conflicts within the Episcopal Church, or the developing global dimensions of such conflicts. Similarly, Jenkins appeared on NPR on several occasions, on at least one occasion explicitly positioned as the expert explaining the phenomenon of American Episcopal parishes reaching out to African church leaders. Not only Jenkins himself, but also the media sources who covered his work, have positioned his argument as the explanation or context for the increasing involvement of Southern Anglican leaders in the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion. These media sources, by covering or invoking Jenkins in this way, brought the idea of a North-to-South shift in global Anglicanism to a much wider Episcopal audience–those who most certainly don’t read David Virtue or *The Christian Challenge*, but do read the *Atlantic Monthly* or listen to NPR–as well as bringing these events and visions to the attention of a wide range of other interested moderate and liberal Christians and secular observers.

In the first chapter of his book, Jenkins observes that American Christians have not
historically paid much attention to Christianity in the rest of the world (Jenkins 2002:4). But the
eager and interested reception his own work has received in Episcopal lay and clergy
circles–conservative, moderate, and liberal–demonstrates the newfound urgency with which
Episcopalians are today seeking understanding of their Southern co-religionists. Jenkins’ work
did not add any substantively new elements to the thinking of those Anglicans and Episcopalians
who were already well-acquainted with discourses and visions of North/South struggle and
global shift. The global-shift vision, after all, had already been well entrenched in some Anglican
Encounter’s] final statement, ‘A Trumpet from the South,’ heralded the vitality and strength of
an emerging Anglican presence outside of the Anglo-American context” (Douglas 1998a:8). And
similar images were frequently invoked by Northern conservatives, as well: a 1998 piece by
Doug LeBlanc about conservative hopes for Lambeth was entitled, “It’s time to hear from the
South,” and his 1999 article on the growth of First Promise was called, “Conservatives Dream of
a Global Shift.” (LeBlanc 1998b, 1999a)

For most of those already acquainted with these ideas of global shift—including a large
proportion of conservative Episcopalians, and those moderate and liberal Episcopalians who had
been involved with or otherwise become aware of globalizing developments in the Episcopal
Church before 2002–Jenkins’ work appeared, not as a new set of ideas, but as a scholarly
explication and legitimization of what they already perceived to be the emergent condition of the
worldwide Anglican Communion. On the other hand, for those Episcopalians (probably mostly
lay, and mostly liberal or moderate) who had been only slightly or not at all acquainted with
these ideas about global shift in the Anglican Communion, Jenkins’ work appeared as a warning
call, bringing threatening trends to their attention. I first heard about Jenkins’ work myself
through the buzz of conversation about his article and book in my own Episcopal parish–where
one member who had recently read his article told me gravely, “It sounds like we’re entering a
new Dark Ages.” To sum up, some received Jenkins’ elaboration and apparent scholarly substantiation of the global-shift vision with enthusiasm, some with dread, a few with skepticism (see Ian Douglas’s take, below). But, undeniably, nearly all have taken from his work a new or renewed conviction that the global scale of the Anglican Communion is salient for the Episcopal Church. The Anglican and Episcopal globalization processes which Jenkins both describes, and facilitates, have convinced Episcopalians across the spectrum that they can no longer afford to be ignorant of the rest of the Anglican world.

Jenkins’ work, then, has been widely read and discussed among Episcopalians—and, apparently, widely accepted as an accurate depiction of what has been happening in the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion. While liberals and moderates received this explanation with some trepidation, conservatives, on the other hand, responded to Jenkins’ work with great excitement and pleasure, finding in his account an apparently independent, objective, scholarly justification for their optimism regarding the Southward shift of moral authority in world Christianity. Jenkins’ focus on the growing numbers, growing assertiveness, and growing influence of Christianity in the global South, and his characterization of Southern Christianity as a monolithic, conservative, zealous Christian force, accorded perfectly with the ways conservative Episcopalians and other Northerners were already speaking about Southern Christianity.

As a result, Jenkins’ work was eagerly taken up and cited repeatedly by American conservative Episcopalians and their allies. In July of 2002, acclaimed British evangelical theologian Alister McGrath cited Jenkins in addressing a worldwide conference of evangelical Anglicans, held in Oxford and attended by many conservative Episcopalians.

What will the future of the Christian faith look like? A recent highly-acclaimed study by Philip Jenkins paints a picture which many western Christians need to heed. For those who believe that liberal western forms of Christianity are normative, Jenkins’ book makes profoundly disturbing reading. Jenkins argues that by the year 2050 the centre of gravity of the Christian
world will have shifted firmly to the Southern hemisphere.... Jenkins shows that the churches that have grown most rapidly in the global south are far more traditional, morally conservative, evangelical, and apocalyptic than their northern counterparts.... Might not the rise of Anglicanism in the developing world represent a judgement of the complacencies of western Anglicanism? And more than this: might it not be an opportunity to rediscover something which western Anglicans seem to have lost, including a sense of purpose and a quiet confidence in God’s grace?.... Anglicans in the west must learn to respect their colleagues in Asia and Africa, to whom numerical superiority and increasingly spiritual leadership is passing with unprecedented speed. Things are changing, and the west cannot behave as if it runs the show. That was then; this is now. [McGrath 2002]

In December of 2002, David Virtue cited Jenkins’ work and ideas in describing a great emergent shift in world Anglicanism:

As we approach the end of 2002 it is becoming increasingly apparent that the old barriers and paradigms that separate Christians are coming down.... It is happening, especially in the Global South where Christianity is light years ahead of the West in making more converts to Jesus Christ than all the crusades this country has ever seen. .... How ironic that just when Spong thought he could get his New Reformation of Why Christianity Must change or Die off the ground that he should take a torpedo from Philip Jenkins in his book *The Next Christendom*. Jenkins argues that Americans are all but unaware of what is one of the most important shifts of the twentieth century—the explosive growth of Christianity in the Southern Hemisphere. His book... reveals to the world that Christianity in its orthodox and evangelical form is alive and well and flourishing like streams in the desert in Africa, Asia and Latin America, shaping not only the future of Christianity but the political and economic landscape as well. [Virtue 2002a]

Jenkins himself was invited to speak at the January 2003 AMiA Winter Conference, and at another meeting of conservative American Episcopalians and Anglicans, the December 2002 U.S. Anglican Congress meeting, where according to the AAC’s website Jenkins spoke on “the opportunities of the changing balance of world Christianity” (AAC 2003).

A conservative Episcopal priest, writing about the AMiA conference, makes it clear why Jenkins became so popular among AMiA members and other conservative Episcopalians who place their hopes in Southern intervention in the Episcopal Church:
One of the principal speakers at the recent AMiA conference was Philip Jenkins, author of the Next Christendom. The primary thesis of this book is that the churches of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are becoming the center of Christendom. This is happening because Southern Churches proclaim a dynamic, living gospel, a faith badly needed in the countries of the Northern Hemisphere. *AMiA believes this, and for that reason, invited Philip Jenkins to speak at their conference.* In fact, AMiA itself is a mission of the Diocese of Rwanda, a missionary outreach of the African Church. [Sanders 2003, emphasis added]

Jenkins’ salience for conservative Episcopalians and Anglicans in the global North is perhaps best summed up in the words of the website of one AMiA parish, Christ the Redeemer in Louisiana. This church’s website includes an “Endorsements” page, listing statements of support or sympathy for AMiA from various Anglican and other religious leaders. The final name on the list is that of Philip Jenkins; the text beneath his name reads, in part:

> The Anglican Mission in America is part of the global expansion of Christianity that is rooted in what is being called the “global south”: Africa, Asia and South America. Professor Philip Jenkins, from Penn State, tells this story in his book “The Next Christendom”, which is excerpted in October’s edition of the Atlantic Monthly.... *While [Jenkins] is not a spokesperson for the Anglican Mission, his research and insights are helping many to understand the exciting things happening in global Christianity.* [Christ the Redeemer Church 2003, emphasis added]

Indeed, Jenkins, though not a spokesperson for AMiA, might as well have been, since his work and conclusions were read by conservative and moderate/liberal Episcopalians as historicizing, explaining, and generally naturalizing the growing trend for Southern Anglican leaders to speak out against, put pressure on, and intervene in the Episcopal Church. Though ‘global shift’ in the Anglican Communion had been the subject of conversation and debate for years by the time Jenkins’ work was published, his research provided an apparently externally-legitimized and -legitimating formulation of the ‘global shift’ vision which indeed was taken up by a wide range
of Anglicans and Episcopalians to ‘help them understand’—that is, provide them with an explanatory framework—for current developments in the Anglican Communion.

Jenkins’ timely formulation of the ‘global shift’ vision was again widely circulated in the summer and fall of 2003, as his work became the explanatory model invoked during the much-publicized controversy over the election, confirmation, and consecration of Gene Robinson, an openly-gay and partnered priest, as bishop of New Hampshire. Conservative Episcopalians and other Anglicans cited Jenkins’ findings on weakening and shrinking Northern Christianity by way of explanation of the Episcopal Church’s decision, and spoke about the rising global South as their source of encouragement and hope in this time of crisis. In a piece written in August of 2003, conservative commentator Doug LeBlanc reported on a meeting of American conservatives, preparing for the possibility that Robinson would be confirmed as a bishop at General Convention:

[Conservative evangelical] Bishop Robert Duncan.... [believes that God may be acting] on a global scale: casting down the mighty institutions of the West and raising up the embattled and often despised Christians of the Southern Hemisphere.... Peter Moore, dean of Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry, sounded a similar note on Saturday night during Trinity's General Convention dinner. "In North America the typical Anglican is older, white, well-educated, lives in a safe environment, is comfortably off, is an Anglophone, and is liberal," he said. "The typical global Anglican is young, nonwhite, undereducated, lives in a hostile environment, is poor, is not an Anglophone, and is evangelical.... When Philip Jenkins, author of The Next Christendom, says 'Christians are facing a shrinking population in the liberal West and a growing majority of the tradition Rest,' I know what he means. I've seen it in my lifetime," Moore said. [LeBlanc 2003, emphasis added]
The tendency to invoke Philip Jenkins’ work, as a legitimized version of the global shift thesis, thus intensified further during the course of the controversy over Robinson’s election.

Indeed, the wide readership and popularity of Philip Jenkins’ ‘Next Christendom’ thesis probably accounts at least in part for the high degree of press coverage by non-Episcopal and Anglican sources accorded to the Robinson controversy. Jenkins’ thesis placed this story of conflict within a relatively small mainline denomination into a frame of global religious and even political salience. *Christianity Today* implicitly invokes Jenkins in explaining why these Episcopal/Anglican developments should be of interest to all Christians:

The meeting of Anglican leaders from around the world [at Lambeth in October, to decide how to respond to the Episcopal Church’s acceptance of Gene Robinson] is huge religion news, whether you're an Anglican or not. What's at stake is no less than the unity of the third-largest Christian body in the world, and whether one of America's largest mainline denominations will be disciplined by colleagues from the Global South. [Olsen 2003]

An editorial in the Dallas News, quoted in my introductory chapter, covered the meeting of conservatives (held in a suburb of Dallas) and was tellingly entitled, “Looming Schism: Anglican split is between First, Third Worlds.” Like the *Christianity Today* piece, this writer invokes Jenkins—in this case, by name rather than implication—in explaining quite explicitly why these inter-Anglican conflicts are of wider interest and relevance.

The lobby of a Dallas luxury hotel filled with Anglicans isn't many people's idea of a revolutionary cell, but that's exactly what it is. The conservative Episcopalians gathering here this week to protest the national church's approval of an openly gay bishop aren't merely disgruntled traditionalists. They may be on the losing end of this particular issue within the Episcopal Church, but their meeting is worth considering in the context of a
worldwide struggle that may transform Christianity in this century. We won't take sides here, but we do urge you to pay attention, because what's happening in Dallas is momentous. It has attracted the attention, and engaged the passion, of Anglican leaders throughout the Third World. This is neither solely an American nor solely an Anglican concern. As one veteran church journalist put it on the eve of the conference, "What we're seeing here is Philip Jenkins' thesis in action." Religion scholar Philip Jenkins argues that the global Christian community is split between an increasingly liberal (and demographically shrinking) version of the faith in the West and an aggressively conservative (and demographically exploding) version in the Third World. "During the past half-century," he writes, "the critical centers of the Christian world have moved decisively to Africa, to Latin America and to Asia." [Dallas Morning News 2003]

Thus as inter-Anglican controversies evolved through 2002 and 2003, Philip Jenkins’ formulation of the ‘global shift’ idea became, for Northern Episcopalians, Anglicans, and outside observers, religious and secular, the quintessential descriptive/explanatory model for these controversies and their wider implications. As Episcopal scholar Ian Douglas notes in his review of Jenkins’ work, “the public imagination has been captured” by Jenkins’ ideas (Douglas 2003b).

The next Anglicanism?: How Episcopalians read Philip Jenkins

Many people, then, read Jenkins’ work as supporting Northern conservative Episcopalian positions and ambitions. However, an examination of Jenkins’ work reveals that this is in several key respects a problematic, or at least a revealingly selective, reading. Firstly, the ways Jenkins’ work has been taken up and described as independent confirmation of trends in world Christianity which conservative Episcopalians and Anglicans had already identified within the Anglican Communion carries an interesting circularity, because—as a footnote in Jenkins’ book
reveals–Jenkins was first inspired to develop his thesis about North/South Christian divisions and struggles while observing the events of Lambeth 1998. Thus from one perspective Jenkins can be seen as having taken up ideas about North/South divisions which were circulating among some Anglicans and Episcopalians, found other parallel examples (particularly from the worldwide Roman Catholic church), added historical and demographic information to the argument, and published his conclusions–thereby presenting the ‘global shift’ concept, much-elaborated and greatly legitimized, back to the conservative Anglicans who gave him the idea in the first place.

But this circularity is not the only incongruity in conservative Anglicans’, and others’, taking up of Jenkins as if his work represented an independent explanation/confirmation of developments in the Anglican Communion. In many respects, the ways Jenkins’ work has been taken up is founded on a strikingly selective reading of his argument. In his reworking of the global shift thesis, Jenkins added not only historical and demographic arguments, but also a distinctly geopolitical slant. He positions his work as an improvement of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis, on the growing threat of conflict between the secular/Christian West and militant Islam. Jenkins writes,

Huntington...understates the rising force of Christianity. He believes that the relative Christian share of global population will fall steeply in the new century, and that this religion will be supplanted by Islam.... But far from Islam being the world's largest religion by 2020 or so, as Huntington suggests, Christianity will still have a massive lead, and will maintain its position into the foreseeable future. By 2050, there should still be about three Christians for every two Muslims worldwide.... [Huntington] refers to "Western Christianity" as if there could be no other species. The same kind of tunnel vision affects another recent work on global mega-trends, Benjamin Barber’s *Jihad vs.McWorld*. For Barber, Third World religion is discussed chiefly in
terms of Islam, and Christianity just means North American fundamentalism.

There is no recognition that the gravest challenge to “McWorld” might not come from Jihad, but rather from what we might call the forces of Crusade, from the Christian Third World. [Jenkins 2002:6]

Much later in the book, having evaluated current and potential Christian/Muslim conflicts, Jenkins concludes,

> It is conceivable that within a few decades, [Christianity and Islam] will have agreed on amicable terms of coexistence, but looking at matters as they stand at the start of the twenty-first century, that happy consummation seems highly unlikely. Issues of theocracy and religious law, toleration and minority rights, conversion and apostasy, should be among the most divisive in domestic and international politics for decades to come. [Jenkins 2002:160]

While conflict with Islam is a concern not infrequently voiced by Episcopal conservatives, this thrust of Jenkins’ argument—arguably the intended main thrust of the book—is largely ignored by this constituency, and for that matter by many other readers. While Jenkins tries to raise the alarm about future Christian/Muslim conflicts, the conflicts which interest most of his readers and fans are those between Northern and Southern Christians—to which he does give considerable attention, but which are not his central theme.

Jenkins’ work is also selectively read by conservative Episcopalians, and others who apply his work to the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion, in ways which make his thesis apply better to these situations than it otherwise might. Boiling Jenkins’ work down to an assertion that conservative, zealous, Southern Christianity is rising up to challenge and overpower shrinking, secularist Northern Christianity involves significant oversimplification. Jenkins leaves himself open to such simplification, to an extent, by himself oversimplifying. Most notably, his characterizations of Southern Christianity as generally Pentecostal and conservative represents a
broad and somewhat misleading generalization. In his introduction, Jenkins comes as close as he ever does to defining what he means by naming Southern Christianity as “conservative”:

At present, the most immediately apparent difference between the older and newer churches is that Southern Christians are far more conservative in terms of both beliefs and moral teaching. The denominations that are triumphing all across the global South are stalwartly traditional or even reactionary by the standards of the economically advanced nations.

[Jenkins 2002:7]

Elsewhere he defines Southern Christianity as “theologically conservative” (Jenkins 2002:137). However, he offers only minimal discussion of what specific theological beliefs or moral positions might comprise the cluster of issues defining this Southern conservatism (as I have tried to do in reference to Northern conservatism, in my second chapter). Thus, though Jenkins stresses, as I do, that Southern moral and political positions do not line up or correspond neatly with Northern conservatism, his characterization of Southern Christianity is open to being read the way most Northern Christians and others seem to read it. To these readers, informed by their Northern context in which religious/political/moral debates have long been elided and roughly polarized (in discourse, if not so neatly in reality) into liberal and conservative camps, Jenkins’ naming of Southern Christianity as “conservative” suggests, or confirms, that Southern Christians are always-already on the side of Northern conservatives.

Furthermore, Northerners read Jenkins’ work as an explanation of Episcopal and Anglican developments, not only by making assumptions about Southern conservatism, but also by ignoring Jenkins’ cautions about the anomalous religious character of the United States. Jenkins points out the persistent strength of American Christianity, and argues that the United States therefore sits somewhere between the extremes of the Christian South and the secularized North, best epitomized by Western Europe (Jenkins 2002:103-104). However, as far as I can tell, out of
all the conservative Episcopalians who take up and cite Jenkins’ work and ideas, only Stephen Noll notes this fact. Noll mentions parenthetically in a short review/evaluation of Jenkins, “According to Jenkins, the Church in the U.S.A. teeters in-between [the Northern and Southern] trends” (Noll 2002). Nearly all Episcopalians and commentators who invoke Jenkins and his thesis in relation to Episcopal and Anglican affairs do so as if the United States, and the American Episcopal Church, were perfect examples of the weakening and secularization of Northern Christianity which Jenkins describes. American Christianity is thus generalized back into the overarching North/South division, and even treated as the epitome of Northern Christianity, in spite of Jenkins’ defining American Christianity as an exception to his general picture.

This negative evaluation of American Christianity, in spite of sociological indicators of its continuing strength, is in keeping with the ethos of American evangelicalism. Evangelicals in the United States represent an extremely strong, even dominant, religious movement in a relatively highly religious society—or, in Chris Smith’s words, “the strongest of the major Christian traditions in the United States today” (C. Smith 1998:20). The strength of American evangelicalism is one of the strongest reasons Jenkins makes the United States an exception to his general North/South picture. However, American evangelicals (including the majority of the conservative Episcopalians engaged in current struggles, and who show a particular inclination to write off American Christianity as an all-but-lost cause) tend to see themselves as threatened by and embattled with the forces of secularism, according to Chris Smith and other scholars of American evangelicalism. This sense of embattlement explains why American Episcopal evangelicals see themselves as situated within, and struggling with, revisionist/secularist Northern Christendom.

The fact that conservative Episcopalians, and other observers of the Anglican global scene, took up his writings to support their own global ideologies probably came as no surprise to
Jenkins himself. He notes several times in his book that Northerners will tend to project their own ideas, hopes, and desires onto the rising Christian South; and he argues that contrary to such projections, this rise probably will not fulfill any Northern dreams or agendas perfectly—or, as one bishop noted at Lambeth 1998 regarding the growing assertiveness of African and Asian Anglican leaders, “The Spirit is moving across the face of the earth, and it's probably going to gore everybody's ox equally” (Scotsman 1998). Jenkins’ observations along this line, in the first chapter of his book, lay out an argument surprisingly similar to the argument I have made in this work, considering that I have worked towards a critical deconstruction of the North/South division thesis while Jenkins is widely viewed as that thesis’s greatest proponent.

The greatest temptation and maybe the worst danger is to use future projections as a club in present-day arguments. Northerners rarely give the South anything like the attention it deserves, but when they do notice it, they tend to project onto it their own familiar realities and desires. If in fact the global South represents the future, then it is tempting to claim that one's own ideas are more valid, more important, because they coincide with those of the rising Third World. For the Left, the rise of the South suggests that Northern Christians must commit themselves firmly to social and political activism at home, to ensuring economic justice and combating racism, to promoting cultural diversity. Conservatives, in contrast, emphasize the moral and sexual conservatism of the emerging churches, and seek to enlist them as natural allies. From this point of view, the churches that are doing best in the world as a whole are the ones that stand farthest from Western liberal orthodoxies, and we should learn from their success. *For both sides, the new South is useful, politically and rhetorically.* Even if an activist holds an unusual or unpopular position, it can be justified on the basis that it represents the future: if they wait
long enough, they will be vindicated by the churches of Africa (or Asia, or Latin America). Like any true-believing Marxist, one is claiming to be on the side of history, which will absolve its faithful disciples. The difficulty, of course, is deciding just what that vast and multifaceted entity described as the Third World actually does want or believe. As Southern churches grow and mature, they will increasingly define their own interests in ways that have little to do with the preferences and parties of Americans and Europeans. [Jenkins 2002:13-14, emphasis added]

Jenkins returns to this point—of the ultimate futility of efforts to mold the global South to Northern agendas—towards the end of the book, in a section subtitled “Southern Mirrors”:

Time and again when European and American Christians look South, they see what they want to see. A generation ago, liberals saw their own views reflected by the rising masses of the Third World, marching toward socialism and liberation. Today, conservatives have the rosier view.... [But] if a single lesson emerges from all the recent scholarship on the rising churches, it is that they define themselves according to their own standards, despite all the eager efforts to shape them in the mold of the Old Christendom. [Jenkins 2002:208]

In looking at the global South, American conservative Episcopalians have often seen their own hopes and desires mirrored back at them. These Northerners have articulated again and again their expectation that Southern Christianity will rise to power in the Anglican Communion, rescue and justify its Northern conservative allies, and reform and restore the fallen Northern churches—in other words, that Southern Christians will meet all their needs, settle all their conflicts, fulfill all their hopes. As I have shown by offering my ethnographic portrayal of one Southern church, the Church of Uganda, this Northern idealization of Southern Christianity does not necessarily connect very directly with the lives and concerns of Southern Christians.
Nonetheless, relations are strong and mutual regard is high between Northern conservative dissidents and Southern Anglicans at present. And as I have shown, though Southern Anglican leaders have repeatedly failed to go as far as their Northern allies hoped (for example, in failing to attack or exclude the Episcopal Church at the past few years’ Primates Meetings, where Southern Anglican leaders constitute a clear majority), many Southern leaders have collaborated with Northern conservatives in a wide-ranging set of discursive and practical projects oriented to the discipline, reform, or replacement of the Episcopal Church in the United States.

**Shared goals and differing motives in North/South alliances**

So far, then, the collaboration of these constituencies seems to have been effective, in spite of the disjuncts between the ideas of Southern and Northern Christianity on which it is founded, and the lived realities of the Southern and Northern Christians involved. The success of these collaborations, however, is not due to the existence of an outlook and set of concerns which is fundamentally shared between Northern conservative Episcopalians and Southern Anglicans. These constituencies, as I indicated in chapter 2 and elsewhere, do generally share some characteristics, which enabled the development of shared identities and agendas which, in turn, generated additional commonalities. Ugandans’ initial reactions to various Northern would-be allies have no doubt been conditioned in part by how much they feel they have in common with these outsiders. Though there are significant cultural and contextual differences, most Ugandan church leaders share an evangelical theology and identity with conservative Episcopalians, and many Ugandans and Americans also share a renewal orientation in worship and spirituality. Ugandan Christians share other aspects of their faith and thought with many Northern liberals, such as commitments to economic justice and developmentalism. But most Ugandan Christian leaders seem nonetheless to perceive themselves as having more in common, or more important things in common, with Northern conservative evangelicals—in part because a few prominent leaders like Bishop Spong (often highlighted in Northern conservative texts like *The Christian*
Challenge which are distributed to Southern church leaders) make it easy to identify Northern liberal Christianity with the cultural currents of modernity and postmodernity, individualism and sexual liberation, which Ugandans perceive as threats to their own values; and in part because Ugandans’ own Biblical convictions predispose them to see a shared focus on Scripture as more important than a shared focus on, say, international debt (see chapter 4).

A full comparison of American Episcopal liberals’ and conservatives’ efforts and successes in building and maintaining relationships with Southern Christians in recent years would be a fascinating project, but is outside the scope of this work, for which I focused intensively on conservatives’ relationships. On the basis of this research, I argue that the available evidence strongly suggests that the strength of conservatives’ Southern relationships right now owes a great deal, not to the inherent commonalities of the constituencies involved, but to the enthusiasm and will they bring to the relationships. True, American conservatives and Ugandan (and, I would argue, many other African) evangelical Anglicans do share some important priorities and orientations which have served as a foundation for, and been further reinforced by, the alliance-building and collaborative work they have undertaken since 1997. But, at least as importantly, American and other Northern conservatives have been highly motivated to seek out and build relationships with Southern Anglicans in recent years. This motivation is due to their strong sense of alienation and disempowerment in their own church contexts and their evident eagerness to connect with Anglicans elsewhere who are perceived as more like-minded—both for the sake of the rhetorical and practical resources for domestic debates which arise from such connections, and for the sake of the sense of connection itself, as expressed in frequent allusions to the joy of feeling solidarity with a worldwide Anglican majority.

African Anglicans, for their part, also seem strongly motivated to participate in North/South relationships of various kinds, given the opportunity. When Ugandans talk about such relationships, they, like their Northern counterparts, describe them as desirable for the sake of
fellowship and sharing of faith and experiences; they also speak of the needfulness of the material resources which tend to follow the lines of such relationships. Further, Ugandans describe such relationships (e.g., in the context of preparations for Lambeth 1998) as providing additional opportunities and resources for asserting Southern voices and perspectives at a global Anglican scale. I argue, then, that the current strength of these North/South relationships is not fundamentally due to natural affinities between American conservatives and Southern Anglicans; and to a significant extent, the affinities which do exist (such as a shared concern with the Episcopal Church’s position on homosexuality) have been developed in and through the development of these relationships (see chapters 3 and 4). What the strength of these relationships does reveal is the potency of motivation and opportunity as factors. Where Northerners are motivated to seek out such relationships (and it is, almost always, Northerners who have the resources and power to establish or maintain such North/South relationships), Southerners welcome the opportunities to engage, and many and strong relationships can easily develop.

In chapters 7 and 8 I have presented aspects of the relationships and mutual understandings between Northern and Southern Anglicans involved in these developments, which further complicate the idea that some natural affinity between Northern conservatives and Southern Christians adequately explains the current strength of these relationships. I have shown how the terms of this vision—the orthodox and vibrant South rising to the challenge of disciplining the errant North—fail to fully reflect the experiences and concerns of Southern Anglicans in particular, and oblige them to negotiate their newfound position of moral authority, however dearly desired that position might be, in terms of images of Southern Christianity’s character and position which are not of their making. True, the current idealization of Southern Christianity is more positive and potentially empowering than older images of Africa and African Christianity. But the idealization of Southern Christianity still carries constraints, as I have shown in chapter 7.
by demonstrating the ways African church leaders’ real concerns about issues of poverty, church
growth, and so on, do not correspond with the way Northern Christians think of these issues in
their idealized image of African Christianity; thus these issues may not be given sufficient
attention or addressed in productive ways in North/South relationships.

Furthermore, as I demonstrated in chapter 8, the new Northern idealization of Southern
Christianity has not fundamentally altered the situation of Southern Christians with respect to
their economic dependency and the resulting continued necessity of soliciting Northern
engagement and support in order to be able to pursue their churches’ missions. Indeed, the
politicization of North/South inter-Anglican relationships which has developed, as the idea of
bringing righteous Southern Christendom to bear on the apostate North has spread, may well
have complicated the negotiations required of Southern church leaders, as their own convictions,
positions, and actions are increasingly called into consideration in Northern decisions about
funding and other forms of engagement with the churches of the South.

Finally, the global-shift vision masks the power relations of the Anglican Communion by
naturaling the rise to power of the global South. It renders invisible the active role of
Northerners—both liberals and moderates anxious to be inclusive of the formerly-marginalized,
and conservatives eager to support and encourage Southern voices which lend greater legitimacy
to their own positions—in pushing Southern Anglicanism to the fore in contemporary Anglican
Communion debates. In so naturalizing the global South’s rise, the global-shift vision is in
danger of obscuring the need to continually ask the question Ian Douglas and Julie Wortman
raised after Lambeth 1998: whether the past few years have finally seen the ascendancy of a truly
post-colonial and decolonized world Anglicanism, in which Southern Anglicans play their full
and rightful role alongside their Northern colleagues, or whether the Communion remains
dominated by Northerners who are trying to manage diversity by determining the implications of
including Southern Anglicans.
The vision of a Southward global shift in world Anglicanism, then, is descriptive only in a limited sense. Few dispute that there are today many more Anglicans in the global South, especially in Africa, than in the global North; and few dispute that the power structures and dynamics of the Anglican Communion ought to shift in such a way as to give these Southern provinces a greater role in worldwide Anglican affairs. But the characterization of Southern Christianity involved in the global-shift vision is oversimplified and idealized to a striking extent, as testified to by many Ugandan leaders and likewise by some Northern Anglicans, conservative and liberal, with first-hand knowledge of the African churches. Yet in spite of—perhaps, because of—the complexities and ambiguities of both Northern and Southern Christianities which are emphatically not captured in the simple and powerful terms of the global-shift, North-vs-South vision, this vision has taken a firm hold and is today ubiquitous in writing about the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion. The logic of the vision is simple, apocalyptic, and therefore attractive, regardless of whether the rising South is perceived as savior or menace.

**Implications of North/South alliances and North/South polarization**

The alliances between American and other Northern conservative Anglicans and Southern Anglican leaders and laypeople which I have described in this dissertation may prove to be profoundly consequential for world Anglicanism. Significant consequences may or may not unfold directly from these alliances themselves. Up until the controversy over Bishop Gene Robinson, these connections and actions had had relatively little direct effect on Episcopal Church policies. Even the Anglican Mission in America organization, the largest and most controversial manifestation of these alliances, never received the massive exodus of new parishes which was predicted for it at various points; it still consists of perhaps a dozen churches which have actually left the Episcopal Church, though its member parishes also include a large number of newly-planted churches, some of which have grown to significant sizes. AMiA also oriented
itself away from engagement with the Episcopal Church, soon after its formation. Though its leaders have continued to comment on Episcopal Church events, and though Episcopal Church matters were clearly an ongoing interest for members of St. Timothy’s AMiA parish, the organization’s evangelical character led it to shift its emphasis away from embracing disaffected ex-Episcopalian (the original purpose of First Promise) to reaching and converting the unchurched. As the July 2001 AMiA newsletter declared, “AMiA is mission minded, not maintenance minded.... AMiA is strategically equipped to reach the entire United States with the saving Gospel of Jesus Christ” (AMiA 2001:6). Today, a significant majority of AMiA’s lay members most likely come from religious backgrounds other than the Episcopal Church.

Even in the current post-Gene-Robinson-election disruption, it remains unclear (as of November of 2003) whether a substantive split and re-alignment will occur, in spite of all the apocalyptic North/South rhetoric surrounding this controversy. American conservatives were disappointed by the outcome of the emergency Primates’ Meeting of mid-October, the outcome of which fell considerably short of the dramatic condemnation and expulsion of the Episcopal Church which conservative leaders hoped for. The Primates, instead, referred the question of the Communion-wide implications of one province’s decision to consecrate a non-celibate homosexual to a special committee, the Eames Commission, and issued a stern statement warning that for the Episcopal Church to consecrate Robinson as a bishop on November 4, as planned, would seriously “jeopardize” the Anglican Communion’s unity. The AAC has launched the Network of Anglican Communion Dioceses and Parishes, in order to connect conservative parishes with orthodox bishops, whether in the U.S. or beyond. Negotiations are underway with both Presiding Bishop Frank Griswold of the Episcopal Church, and Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams, to determine whether this new orthodox network will have the blessing of ecclesial authorities, or will represent a renegade project, unrecognized by the Communion’s Northern leaders. It is impossible to say, at this stage in the unfolding of the implications of
Robinson’s consecration, how much the established polity, policies, budgets, and so forth of the Episcopal Church will be affected by reactions (negative or positive) to the election and consecration of Gene Robinson as a bishop.

Nor is it at all clear whether the patterns and scope of the predicted ‘realignment,’ the dissociating and re-networking which is currently underway in the Episcopal Church and wider Communion, will result in a new configuration conforming to the image of North-South split, with the Communion divided into a small, liberal Northern Anglican body and a large, orthodox, evangelical Southern body, which would embrace those Northern Anglicans whose convictions place them more in line with the supposed character of Southern Anglicanism. Open, generalized conflict and division between the Anglican North and South, though implicitly or explicitly predicted in much recent talk about the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion, may easily not be the outcome of current actions. Indeed, in recent conversations with fellow Anglican scholars familiar with the African churches, I have found these informed observers tentatively predict that no such dramatic split will occur—at least, not in the immediate future. Networks, divisions, and realignments may proliferate and confuse, but the whole unwieldy structure, that argumentative family of churches which constitutes world Anglicanism, will likely hold together for a few more years, or months.

Further, in spite of current rhetoric about division and fragmentation in the Anglican Communion, it can be argued that the past decade of Anglican Communion history has seen the Communion come together as much as come apart. Many speak of current controversies as if they were tearing up an established, settled way of being a global Communion, but even the short historical view I have offered in this dissertation (see in particular chapter 3) should be sufficient to cast that view into doubt. In many respects, the controversies of recent years represent in themselves the working-out of coexistence in a global Communion. As I showed in chapter 3, becoming a post-colonial, multicultural Communion characterized by the full participation of all
provinces has been an unfolding project of the Communion’s leadership for several decades now, and, according to many, came to its fullest fruition yet at Lambeth 1998. The ideal of being a *global* Communion, characterized by a high degree of interconnectedness and mutual awareness, is of even more recent vintage, dating back perhaps to the mid-1990s. However, my point here is not merely that ‘global Communion’ is a relatively recent vocabulary and ideology, but that in significant ways it has also only recently become a reality.

Since the mid-1990s the Communion’s provinces have experienced a significant increase in the degree and speed of mutual knowledge, thanks both to the increasing penetration of the electronic media and to the efforts of Anglican leaders eager to increase mutual knowledge, ranging from the journalists of the Anglican Communion News Service to American conservative dissidents seeking overseas Anglicans’ sympathy. Scholar of religion Vicky Randall observes,

> [New electronic mass media] have expanded the audience of communication [and] sensationally transcended geographical distance and associated time lags [what Anthony Giddens and others have called “time-space distanciation”].... Increasingly, people can learn of what is happening at the opposite end of the globe almost as it happens.... The new media can have the effect of reducing social distance.... Through the media, people have learned more about the relationship between their own personal or group experiences of religion and that of a wider faith. [Randall 1999:59, 62]

Or, as the 1960s-era CBS commentator Eric Sevareid put it, “Now, with the highly-developed arts of mass communication and mass transportation, we can misunderstand each other faster and more deeply than ever before” (Cronkite 2004). The controversies, tensions, and discoveries of affinities, differences, and antagonisms with which the Anglican Communion is currently struggling have much to do, then, with its member provinces simply learning more about one another—and finding that they don’t, after all, have as much in common as they perhaps assumed, in days when all they knew about one another was that they shared allegiance to Canterbury.
Some conservatives, commenting on the significance of the media for their movement, have almost suggested as much, in arguing that the current strong response to events in ECUSA from the leaders of the rest of the Anglican world is due to a significant degree of their becoming increasingly aware of those events by means of modern media. In an article on the 2003 Primates’ Meeting held to respond to Gene Robinson’s election as bishop, Bill Atwood of the Ekklesia Society wrote about all the ways Anglican leaders around the world have gained in knowledge about Episcopal Church policies and events in recent years, and concluded, “Information has overcome disbelief and has given way to outrage”—and outrage has produced the kinds of international responses to the Episcopal Church which have become commonplace today. At an Episcopal diocesan convention I attended recently, a conservative speaker arguing for proposed resolutions which would censure the Episcopal Church for consecrating Gene Robinson stated, “Regardless of how you feel about this particular issue, the facts speak for themselves in that the scope of reaction from the world-wide Anglican Communion is bigger than to any previous division in the American church.” His intent in this statement was to imply that acceptance of homosexuality is more damaging and more fundamental an issue than any previous controversial issue in the American or worldwide church. However, the intensified international response he observes may have as much or more to do with increased interaction and awareness on the part of Southern church leaders (as Atwood, quoted above, hints) as with the intrinsic character of homosexuality as an issue.

That the Anglican Communion’s current struggles are not a matter of global communion being torn apart, but rather being examined for its implications, possibility, and desirability, for the first time, is further indicated by the mandate of the Eames Commission, the special committee established by the 2003 Primates’ Meeting to address the consequences of Gene Robinson’s consecration. The Eames Commission is charged, not to debate homosexuality, but to work on larger questions of polity, relationship, and accountability, namely “issues of process..., the
nature and purposes of Communion, the obligations of Communion, authority, [and] the role of
the instruments of unity in preserving fellowship” (ACNS 2004). The “crisis in global
Anglicanism” I cited in my introduction, then, may really be a crisis or series of crises (the
Righter decision, the Lambeth Conference, the Singapore consecrations, the Robinson
consecration...) which are forcing the Anglican Communion’s leaders and members to come to
grips with “global Anglicanism”—what they mean by it, and how to get there.

The alliances I have studied in this work represent a significant development in the Anglican
Communion’s working-out of its global character. These relationships have had an impact on
Anglicans’ understandings of other provinces, and of global Communion and its challenges, far
beyond the boundaries of the allies and their supporters. These alliances and related actions are
profoundly consequential because of the way they have shaped the globalization of the Episcopal
Church—meaning, here, the rise of global ecclesial consciousness and concerns among American
Episcopalian. The way this global vision has been brought into the Episcopal Church, primarily
through conservative dissidents’ solicitation of involvement by Southern leaders and discursive
use the moral authority of those leaders to rebuke the Episcopal Church, has resulted in a
situation in the Episcopal Church today in which reactions to the much-touted rise of the era of
Southern Christendom fall out along the lines of conservative/liberal polarization within
American society. Conservative Episcopalians see the rise of Southern Christianity primarily as
an opportunity, since they tend to see the global South as a monolithic, powerful, orthodox entity
backing their position in battles within ECUSA.

Meanwhile, moderate and liberal Episcopalians increasingly regard Christianity in the global
South as a threat, largely because they have accepted American conservatives' portrayal of the
Southern churches' character and intentions. The frequency of remarks and questions to me along
the lines of, “I had never thought much about the rest of the Anglican Communion until all this
came up,” and, “Is it really true that African Anglicans are so conservative?,” serves as evidence
that for many Episcopalians, growing consciousness of the rest of the Communion has coincided with a growing perception of the global South—a majority of the Communion—as conservative and hostile. One liberal priest recently told me that he hears that African Anglicans all think the American church is spiritually dead and can't wait to come take over.

Such anxieties about global South Christendom and its impact on American mainline churches are not limited to the Episcopal Church. Philip Jenkins’ work raised these issues for Northern Christianity in general, and leaders in other American mainline denominations have been watching conflicts in and over the Episcopal Church unfold with curiosity and some anxiety. At a seminar of Christian scholars held at the Louisville Institute in January of 2004, one of my colleagues explained to me that the reason he and others were so interested in my work was because they wanted to know if what is happening to the Episcopal Church is going to happen in their churches, too. Will the integration of formerly-marginalized groups become tied up with complex, divisive moral issues in other denominations, as well? Few other American denominations have the same international scope as the Anglican Communion, but some are receiving large numbers of immigrants, such that the composition of their churches is dramatically shifting even in the domestic context. Hence the salience, for other Northern Protestants, of the questions of difference and inclusion with which the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion are struggling. Other American Protestants mulling over the rise of global South Christianity may also be seen in a recent edition of *Pulpit & Pew*, a publication of the Lilly Foundation, which funds a great deal of research on American mainline Christianity (including my own). This edition contained one Christian (Episcopalian, in fact) scholar’s observations on Christianity in the global South. Donald Miller, the writer, found the churches he visited quite inspiring, and his conclusions are very affirming of the gifts and lessons Southern Christianity might have for the Northern churches (Miller 2003). He writes:

> I believe that the locus of the Christian church has changed poles. It is no longer in the West or the Northern Hemisphere. Therefore, a paradigm shift in
our thinking is in order that reflects this changed locus of the church’s
costituencies.... Churches have an obligation to better understand our global

Interestingly, responses to Miller’s piece, included in the same volume, express more mixed
reactions to the growing influence and visibility of Southern Christianity. Methodist pastor and
professor William Willimon writes, “[Miller’s work] is an impassioned confrontation with a
mode of Christianity that is both an inspiration for and a judgement upon declining European
and North American Christendom” (Miller 2003:36). Baptist leader Chad Hall notes that
American leaders need to decide “whether to brace for these shifts [in the locus of world
Christianity], embrace these shifts, or do both” (Miller 2003:31). These other Protestant leaders,
then, articulate ambivalence about the potential impact of Southern Christianity on Northern
churches—an ambivalence which is often sharpened to outright negativism or even hostility in
the Episcopal context, where many have already seen that impact, mediated through Southern
Christians’ alliances with Episcopalians opposed to the Episcopal Church.

Because of such negative perceptions, many liberal and moderate Episcopalians are
simultaneously becoming more aware of Christianity in the global South, and more likely to cede
the possibilities of relationship with Southern Christians to the American church's conservatives.
Likewise, Southern Christians, though always somewhat more globally-aware than Northerners,
have grown in awareness of their Northern co-religionists—getting much of their information
from Northern conservatives. In Uganda I received many “Is it true...?” and “I have heard...?”
queries about whether the Northern church is really as liberal as it’s made out to be. Anglicans
North and South have gotten the message that Northern and Southern Christianity have nothing
in common (except a few Northern Christians who really belong on the Southern side).

Thus in the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion context, the intersection of two great
trends, the polarization of American Christianity and the rise of Southern Christianity, is
presently producing a situation in which Americans’ and Africans’ ideas about growing Southern
Christianity conform to the pattern, and are laden with the content, of American church
polarization. Likewise, Episcopal Church debates are now often framed in terms of talk about
Southern Christianity and its role in the worldwide Communion. At a recent diocesan
convention, debates over resolutions proposed by the diocese’s conservative minority were
couched in terms of the impact of the Episcopal Church’s consecration of Gene Robinson on the
unity of the worldwide Anglican Communion, and the relations of the Episcopal Church and this
diocese with the rest of the Anglican world. One conservative, arguing for a resolution which
would dissociate this diocese from the Robinson consecration, said, “This is not about
homosexuality, but about unity and amicable relations within the worldwide Anglican
Communion.” Another, in a similar context, accused the Episcopal Church of violating its
relationship with the African churches. A sympathizer with this view in the audience shook her
head in frustration and said, “They’re missing out on the big picture.”

Conservative dissidents at this convention, then, spoke of their efforts to pass a resolution
affirming the conservative position on homosexuality in a vocabulary of worldwide vision and
worldwide unity. In the talk of liberals and moderates, too, this diocese’s and this church’s
relations with Anglicans elsewhere in the world were key topics. Some diocesan leaders publicly
affirmed their own positive relations with African and other Southern leaders, thereby
challenging conservatives’ claims that the Episcopal Church’s policies violate such relationships.
Other Episcopalians present questioned how much relations with Southern Christians mattered,
given the apparent vast differences between American and African Christians, for example.
When a conservative insisted in one public conversation that the Episcopal Church’s relations
with the African churches were at stake, I overhead one listener raise a question to his neighbor
concerning the quality of African Christianity, passing on some stories he had heard about the
corruption and patriarchalism of one African church. His neighbor nodded and responded by
observing, “They’re just not where we are.” Some Episcopal liberals and moderates, then,
respond to these challenges by asserting that relationships with Southern Christians offer little benefit; others respond by arguing that conservatives’ alliances with Southern Christians will not hinder their continuing relationships with them as well. But all liberal and moderate Episcopal leaders’ ideas about, and efforts toward (or not), relationships with Christians in the global South have been deeply marked by the alliances of some Southern leaders with Episcopal dissidents.

It is this outcome and its potential implications which I find so consequential. If Anglicans increasingly act out their global relationships on the basis of assumptions that Southern Anglicans have an inherent affinity with Northern conservatives, this global vision of North/South division may become more and more descriptive of realities. American liberals and moderates (who control a vastly disproportionate amount of the worldwide Communion’s funding) may become more hesitant about establishing and maintaining relationships of companionship, exchange, and mutual support with Southern Anglicans, fearful that Southern Christians are uniformly hostile to non-conservative Northern churches. Southern leaders and churches, in turn, in at least some cases may become more guarded about accepting offers of relationship or support from Northern churches, fearing that ideological strings may be attached (though, as I have shown in chapter 8, the many locally-unmet needs of Southern churches seems to give their church leaders a stronger sense of the necessity and desirability of North/South inter-church alliances than many Northerners may feel). This ambivalence about relations with Southern Christians may be seen in some American liberal and moderate leaders’ negative public statements about Southern Christianity (e.g., following Lambeth; see chapter 5), and in cases in which American churches or church-related agencies have cut off, or threatened to cut off, relations with and funding to Southern partners who are now seen by their former Northern companions as hostile towards or incompatible with the Northern churches’ values and priorities. Only a few such cases have become public, and these have received somewhat disproportionate attention from conservative American sources eager to play up evidence of American liberal
racism. In the absence of evidence, it is impossible to know whether these few cases are isolated, or whether they represent a wider but largely invisible trend towards pulling back from relations with Southern and especially African churches, with the exception of a few well-established Southern partners (South Africa is a recurring favorite). But given the evidence of the few known cases, and given American liberal and moderate Episcopalians’ evident trepidation about the character and intentions of Southern Christianity, such a trend seems quite possible and even likely. As I have shown in the Church of Uganda, Southern Anglicans in turn experience hurt and indignation over Northerners’ negative evaluations of Southern Christianity, and in some cases withdrawals of, or attaching ideological conditions to, funding and relationship.

Thus, instead of Northern and Southern Anglicans coming together with enthusiasm and good feelings to create a renewed global Communion together, as the globalist discourses of Lambeth 1998 urged, Southern Anglicans and the liberal-to-moderate Northern Anglican majority may find themselves increasingly suspicious of one another. The globalism of celebrating difference within community which was so often invoked at the time of Lambeth 1998 has taken a beating, facing stiff competition from the North-vs-South global-shift globalism with its implications of irreconcilable differences and inevitable conflict. Some liberal and moderate Episcopal leaders and commentators continue to try to articulate and argue for alternative global visions. For example, in his review of Jenkins’ *Next Christendom*, liberal Episcopal scholar Ian Douglas explicitly countered Jenkins’ globalist vision with one of his own:

> If there is a crisis in world Christianity, it is not between an old Christendom of the West and a new Christendom of the South but rather between an hegemonic, monocultural expression of Western Christianity and an emerging, multicultural global Christian community embodying radical differences. *The emergence of the diverse voices of Christianity in the Third World is not "the next Christendom" but rather a new Pentecost.* The amazing growth of these churches cannot be fully explained by the categories of the past, those of Christendom or some other form of the project of modernity. Rather, God is indeed doing a new thing in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as the power of the Holy Spirit is blowing over these regions, making all things new. Consistent with the experience of the early followers of Jesus, as recorded
in the second chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, God's ongoing intervention in the world is being made real in the many tongues and cultural realities of a new Pentecost. [Douglas 2003b, emphasis added]

Douglas thus argues that what American Christians should feel, in gazing upon the rise of Southern Christianity, is a sense of wonder and excitement about radically new possibilities—not a sense of fear about being overrun by judgmental fundamentalists. But even among those liberal and moderate Northerners who find the global-shift vision alarming and might well be happier viewing Southern Christianity in other terms, this North-vs-South globalist vision has a strong hold, well-established by its circulation in the press and in Episcopal circles, and apparently-well-substantiated by six years’ worth of collaborative globalist projects by Northern conservative dissidents and their Southern allies.

**Conclusion**

Both Jenkins’ currently-influential account, and debates within ECUSA itself, are dominated by binary oppositions: liberal/conservative, North/South. The situation of the Anglican Communion, and indeed of world Christendom, is described in terms of a fundamental opposition between the conservative South and the liberal North, less a few conservative defectors. Yet critical analysis of cross-cultural Anglican alliances reveals that they are not the result of some natural and exclusive affinity between Northern conservatives and a monolithic, orthodox Southern Christendom. Rather, these relationships must be understood as the work of particular people and groups striving to live their faith and create new ways to be Anglican together. Analysis of these relationships reveals not a convergence of natural allies, but an unlikely, fragile, and remarkable coalition, painstakingly built across profound differences in culture and experience. Thus the binary oppositions of North/South, liberal/conservative, cannot in themselves provide an adequate understanding of these relationships, nor of what they signify for the larger question of the impact of rising Southern Christianity on American churches.

Anna Tsing, in her article on studying globalization, repeatedly stresses that, though globalist
projects and ideologies can be very powerful, scholars should not assume “their ability to remake nature and society according to their visions” (Tsing 2001:347). True, an ideology or discourse, widely-accepted and acted out in projects, can become constitutive of social realities; I have traced hints of such trends in the Episcopal Church and Anglican Communion in the preceding pages. But the analysts’ role is not to accept the terms of that globalism, but to demonstrate how, why, when, and where it has been articulated, taken hold, been instantiated, elaborated, or challenged, in order to offer “a critical perspective rather than a negative or positive endorsement of projects for making a future imagined as global” (Tsing 2001:352). I have endeavored, in this work, to ‘write against globalization’–that is, to write without taking globalization for granted–by, in Tsing’s words, studying a global vision “without imagining [its] world hegemony” (Tsing 2001:353).

The final significance of my analysis lies in the way an ethnographic approach and an analytic focus on relationship serve to complicate and undermine the dualistic understandings of American and world Christianity which threaten to become hegemonic–widely accepted and unquestioned. The leaders and members of the Episcopal Church and other denominations will meet the changes and challenges of this new era differently, depending on the globalist lenses through which they perceive the global South. Tsing concludes her essay laying out a program for studying globalisms with this hope: “Outside the thrall of [the idea of] globalization, a more nuanced and surprising appreciation of the making and remaking of geography might yet be possible.” The popularity of Jenkins’ work has shown the potency of scholarly texts in serving and propagating certain globalisms. In concluding, I dare to hope that my own writing against globalism might have parallel effects, and reopen, especially for my Episcopal and Anglican readers, ‘more nuanced and surprising appreciations’ of the changing geography of worldwide Anglicanism, its challenges and its opportunities.
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Notes

Chapter 1

1 Australia and New Zealand do not fit this quasi-geographical classificatory scheme terribly well. The Anglican church in New Zealand is relatively liberal, and the church in Australia is divided between conservatives and liberals, with one conservative leader, Archbishop Harry Goodhew, playing an active role in global Anglican politics.


3 See, for example, chapter 8 on the Ugandan debate over homosexuality.

4 However, many projects defined as globalist do not involve pursuing global connections, per se. Consider, for example, cultural-awareness-oriented global events, such as those frequently held in schools and churches, which may be globalist in their language and intent but involve no actual cross-cultural or -national contact.

5 This is a pseudonym, as are all the names of people and places mentioned from my ethnographic research.

6 African Christianity is often treated as the epitome of Southern Christianity; see chapter 7.

7 The only exception to this lack of regional variation might be Northern Ugandans, who seemed to be, not less aware, but less interested than other Ugandans in current inter-Anglican conflicts over morality and orthodoxy, and more willing to seek relationships with Northern Anglicans of any political or moral persuasion. I suspect—indeed, at least one of these consultants more or less told me—that this is the result of Northern Uganda’s long experience of war and struggle for peace, and the resultant sense among Northern Ugandans that they need any friends and allies they can find in their work for the well-being of their region.

Chapter 2

8 A recent article in one of the Ugandan papers charted the high proportion of Ugandan politicians and state officials who are Anglicans, rather than Muslims or Roman Catholics, even though more Ugandans are Roman Catholic than Anglican.

9 The term “fundamentalist” is often used to describe the African Anglican churches, frequently as a negative label intended to denote an intolerant and unreflective attitude towards Christian morality and Biblical authority. However, no one in the groups I studied, in Africa or the U.S., self-identifies as fundamentalist; nor do I find the term applicable, from an analytical perspective. Generally speaking, fundamentalists tend to take hardline literalist positions on Biblical meaning, and a more separatist position relative to the wider society. Both the American
and Ugandan Christian groups I present in this work are better described as evangelical, by virtue of their moderate literalist stance on Biblical authority and their orientation towards engagement with society in the interests of spreading the Christian message. See Woodberry and Smith1998 for an explanation of the difference between evangelicals and fundamentalists, which are often elided by the uninformed.

10 We were told repeatedly by Ugandan clergy and lay leaders that their parishes desperately need new musical equipment—electronic keyboards, electric guitars, drum kits, amps and speakers—in order to improve their praise music offerings.

11 The Pittsburgh-area evangelical seminary Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry has been one of the significant sites in the development of the current international alliances of protest against the Episcopal Church (Kimball 1999). TESM was founded in 1976, with the intent of creating a seminary which could offer “an evangelical, biblically-based education, within the context of the Anglican tradition” (Steer 1998:349; Sumner 1985:103).

12 Uganda was one of the African countries affected earliest and most pervasively by the AIDS virus. The country today is regarded as a success story, due to the success of its National AIDS Control Programme in bringing together government agencies, NGOs, and churches to fight the spread of the disease. By 1999 the prevalence and infection rates had fallen dramatically from their peak in the early 1990s. However, even the improved prevalent rate is very high, around 12 percent, and the infection rate likewise remains troubling. Living with HIV/AIDS and its consequences, then, is part of life in Uganda (Leggett 2001:36-42).

13 The naming of the American province as “Episcopal,” rather than “Anglican,” partly reflects the assistance of the Scottish Episcopal (Anglican) church in its founding. “Episcopal” was also chosen in order to avoid the term “Anglican,” meaning “English,” an unpopular association in the period after the Revolution.

14 There is a distinction between High Church and Anglo-Catholic liturgical styles, but their general orientation—towards a stress on the ritual, aesthetic, and symbolic elements of liturgy—is similar enough, and their influence on the Episcopal Church sufficiently shared, that I do not bother to distinguish here.

15 I suggest ‘traditionalist’ is a better description of Episcopal attitudes towards the liturgy than ‘conservative’ because, though some Episcopalians are true liturgical conservatives, resisting any liturgical change or innovation, most Episcopalians in the church today have tolerated at least one prayer book revision. Many Episcopalians value keeping to Prayer Book liturgies but welcome some degree of liturgical flexibility and change, especially if those changes are seen as restoration of ancient church practices or as borrowing from elsewhere in the Anglican tradition or world Christianity. Traditionalism is a better word for such attitudes, since changes or innovations are welcomed or at least tolerated if they can be legitimized with reference to Anglican or Christian tradition.
The term ‘practicing’ is used by those who believe homosexuality is sinful to express their acceptance of the idea that some people have homosexual urges or orientation, and their conviction that nevertheless, acting on these urges is sinful and goes against Scripture. From this perspective, the only two holy options for homosexuals are to seek healing and live a heterosexual life, or to live a celibate life.

One tiny Continuing Church did actually form in 1962 in response to all this, but it is an exception.

The newly-formed body was not officially part of the Anglican Communion, since it was formed by breaking away from the recognized American Anglican province, the Episcopal Church.

Lists of relevant verses, and arguments about how to interpret them, are easily found; see, for example, http://blogs.salon.com/0001772/thebibleandhomosexuality.html.

Moore is currently Dean of the evangelical seminary Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry, and is one of several British Anglican evangelicals who were influential in developing this movement in the U.S. Evangelicalism was and remains a strong tradition and presence in the Church of England (Steer 1998:348).

As one member of the American Anglican Council explained it to me, “There are various terms people have tried to come up with to keep the largest number of people in the one group together.... When you use the word ‘evangelical movement’ in the Episcopal Church, I tend to use it in the wider sense of the term.”

For example, when I began my fieldwork at St. Timothy’s the parish had recently begun offering the evangelically- and charismatically-toned Alpha course.

These included John Rodgers, future bishop in Anglican Mission in America (see chapter 6); and Stephen Noll, a professor of Biblical studies and future Vice-Chancellor of Uganda Christian University.

No action seems to have been taken by the national church leadership against Wantland, possibly because his retirement was imminent. It is noteworthy that Bishop Wantland was the primary author of the presentment against Righter (LeBlanc 1995).

PECUSA is an older name for the national Episcopal Church, which dropped the use of the word ‘Protestant’ in the 1964 (hence its current acronym, ECUSA). Because the national Episcopal Church’s headquarters are in New York City, the church was only incorporated in, and its various names and trademark symbols only registered in, the state of New York (Taylor 1998; AAC “Fact Sheet”).

I use the term “tolerance” to describe this majority position with a consciousness of the that
term’s equivocality—implying, as it does, a superior’s attitude towards an inferior.

Interestingly, according to an account of current conflicts within the Presbyterian church, the conservative evangelical/renewal movement in that denomination uses very similar language, with the leaders of that movement describing it as “a popular rebellion from the pews against a tyrannical and elite denominational leadership and its supposedly ‘secular humanist’...agenda,” in a rhetorical move which the (liberal) author of this account refers to as “pseudo-populism” (Daly 2000: 4). However, this discourse should not be dismissed as mere political rhetoric, for though some conservative Episcopal leaders may consciously use this rhetoric of ‘pseudo-populism’ to try to delegitimize ECUSA’s liberal positions, other Episcopal conservatives do experience their church as having been taken over by tyrannical liberal leadership.

For example, lay deputies elected by their home parishes (for annual diocesan conventions) or dioceses (for the national-level, triennial General Conventions) constitute a sort of House of Commons to the clergy’s House of Lords, and thus play a significant legislative role in church affairs. It seems likely, therefore, that the Episcopal Church’s policy on issues such as racial equality, leadership roles for women, and tolerance of homosexuality, have been and are shaped and supported by a broad spectrum of Episcopalians of all ecclesiastical ranks.

In another example, an Episcopal scholar blames Northern evangelicals for spreading this ‘incomplete’ Anglicanism and thus creating the intolerance of Southern Anglicanism. Episcopal scholar John Kater argues, “The situation in Africa and Asia has more to do with missionaries who took the distorted or truncated view of Anglicanism to (those continents). What they taught was not the fullness of the Anglican tradition.” [O’Connor 2003]

Chapter 3

Williams replied responded to the latter question first, replying that he believes personally in the virgin birth, but going on to explain the thinking of those who do not. In answering the earlier, even more loaded question, concerning homosexuality, Williams began, “This question is not directly relevant to the topic of the afternoon, but I feel I must answer it because it preoccupies many people.” He went on to reveal that his personal view is that “what the church has said about homosexuality through the ages does not reflect our current understandings....I wish I could say more wholeheartedly that I agree with the traditional teachings and official beliefs of the church.” He expressed regret that this issue has been so divisive in the Church, and stressed that he would not want to impose a view from Europe or America on any other Anglican province.

Strong connections with the global North, for Southern leaders, continue to carry weight as well. The bishop who invited Archbishop Williams to Uganda and hosted him on a visit to his diocese, Bishop Henry Orombi, has since been elected the next Archbishop of the whole Church of Uganda. Again, his elevation is surely not due in any direct way to his international ties (including a demonstrated friendship with the Archbishop of Canterbury), but those ties likely gave some strength to his candidacy.
This number, according to Sumner, had dropped to 124 by 1977, and remains close to that level today. Missionaries are sent forth from other Episcopal Church organizations as well; those numbers represent only those officially sent and supported by the denomination. However, the general decline in numbers of Episcopal missionaries from the mid-1960s was part of a larger trend. The numbers of missionaries going out from mainline denominations fell dramatically in that period, while missionaries sent from evangelical churches and organizations rose in numbers (corresponding with the neo-evangelical revival). I have suggested elsewhere that many non-evangelical mainline Christians began taking their missionary urges into the Peace Corps and other service bodies during this period, rather than working as missionaries per se (Smith 2001).

For example, during the 1970s Episcopal evangelicals founded two significant new missions agencies, the Episcopal Church Missionary Community (ECMC) and the South American Missionary Society (SAMS).

For a fascinating examination of the importance of (media images of) Third World missions in the American evangelical imaginary, see Hancock and Gordon 2003.

The terminology used by conservative Episcopalians to refer to Africa, Asia, and Latin America is particularly interesting. Today, many use the vocabulary of the “global South,” which often surprises my academic readers who expect that terminology to be limited to academics and progressive activists. In the 1990s, and to an extent today, conservative Episcopalians also use the term “Two-Thirds World.” Again, as with the “global South” terminology, this term is more commonly associated with progressive activists, but conservative Episcopalians have taken it up in talking about the parts of the world where their new allies live.

It is true that African and other Southern bishops played a role in the debate over women’s ordination, which was the great controversial issue of Lambeth 1988, much as homosexuality would be in 1998 (Marshall 1988:144). Homosexuality did come up in 1988, but did not receive much attention or coverage, though public statements by several African bishops expressing clear opposition to tolerance of homosexuality may have impressed some Northerners with the idea of future alliances on that issue (Marshall 1988:154-155). Marshall notes the convergence of interests, though not a full-blown alliance, between Northern conservatives and Southern bishops in this debate. However, neither Marshall nor other commentators on Lambeth 1988 describe this debate as if Southern bishops, or an alliance of Southern and conservative Northern bishops, dominated and determined the outcome. A clear voting bloc did not emerge, perhaps because alliances had not been built before the conference, perhaps because difficulties with language and procedure still limited full participation by Southern bishops in the proceedings, perhaps because the issue of women’s ordination does not neatly define a constituency. Many evangelicals and other Anglicans around the world do not oppose the ordination of women, or oppose it only weakly, and some African provinces were already practicing women’s ordination in 1988.

Lambeth 1998 was also a particularly large conference because all suffragan bishops—
assistant bishops, who do not themselves have full charge of a diocese—were invited, with the expressed intent of maximizing this conference’s diversity. Suffragans have been invited to only one other previous Lambeth Conference.

38 The Anglican Communion News Service is the official news organ of the Communion. It issues press releases and other bulletins and informational pieces about events, conferences, etc. all over the Communion. It positions itself as an objective news source, and is basically a moderate source. The ENS, the Episcopal News Service, is the official news organ of the American Episcopal Church. It, too, strives to be a moderate source, though its moderate stance may be slightly to the left of that of the ACNS.

39 The rather anomalous position of Maurice Sinclair, one of the major organizers and leaders at this conference (as well as a prolific publicizer of its results), highlights the complexity of these issues of voice. The AAC member quoted above demonstrated this when he described the Kuala Lumpur meeting as a Southern initiative, then qualified it: “That was a bit more out of the Third World itself. Although even there there were some Northern organizers like Maurice Sinclair...” Sinclair, though head of the Anglican church in South America, is an Englishman, appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to head the South American province, which was formed in 1981. There is some question, then, of the sense in which Sinclair speaks for his church, given this quasi-missionary situation.

40 Some funding, at least, came from the conservative Ahmanson Foundation, according to information found on the Ekklesia Society’s website by church scholar Lewis C. Daly (2001). The question of whether any Episcopal Church money went into the Dallas Conference has occasioned some discussion. A brochure for the conference (formally entitled the Anglican Life and Witness Conference) claimed that it was co-sponsored by the Ekklesia Society and the Oxford Centre for Mission Studies, with help and support from the AAC and especially its member bishops (including, most notably, the bishop of Dallas), but another piece on the event also listed the Episcopal Dioceses of Dallas and Fort Worth as sponsors (LeBlanc 1997a). On one liberal Episcopalian email list, a correspondent familiar with these dioceses claimed—and cited sources to confirm—that as much as $40,000 was given to the conference by the Diocese of Dallas. Furthermore, he claimed this money was given out of funds which were being withheld by the diocese, as a means of protest against Episcopal Church policies, from its usual required contribution to the national church. Others on the same list, however, contested this claim. One list member noted that there were enough wealthy conservative Episcopalians supporting the conference that there was no need for official church bodies like the local dioceses to contribute.

41 It is not entirely clear whether this number represents all who attended, or all who were willing to sign the Dallas Statement, the final declaration of the conference attendee’s positions and concerns. *Episcopal Life*, a publication of the national Episcopal Church, carried the story of one bishop (from India) who attended the conference, but refused to sign the statement, feeling “betrayed... by the decision to criticize a partner church in the Anglican Communion on its own turf” (Stannard 1997).
This bishop refers to this meeting as Kampala One, to distinguish it from a second important meeting held in Kampala in October 1999. See chapter 5.

While debt was also a topic at this meeting, and the teaching about debt made a big impression on some attendees (see chapter 4), for the most part—and as in many other instances—the issue of sexuality dominated the meeting, or at least the ways it is described and remembered.

For example, the May 1999 edition’s Letters pages included thank-you notes from a Singaporean and a Kenyan bishop.

For example, one Ugandan leader, when I asked about his knowledge of AMiA, replied: “Things have been flowing down, or blown by the wind.” And a young Ugandan student and churchman told me he doesn’t know much in detail about the Episcopal Church, but acknowledges that there seems to be a “problem of liberality” there on the basis of “what [he] hears—in newspapers and from other people.” One liberal-leaning Ugandan leader, discussing this issue of where Ugandans get their information about the Northern church, pointed out that Ugandans are not naive, and understand that there are two camps in the American church; but they may nevertheless have been persuaded to have more sympathy for the conservative side. “I think people here know that there were two camps [in the American church]—those for and against [homosexuality]. So I think there was a very strong group [of Americans] which was against [homosexuality] which really came to Africa. And then when those people [Africans] were most convinced that those people were right, when they heard another voice [Northern liberals], already they said, ‘Well, these people are the ones about whom we were warned against!’ So the reaction was not to listen.”

The fact that American conservative accounts of ECUSA are widely circulated among African Anglican leaders is hinted at by the frequency with which African bishops and other leaders mentioned American bishop John Spong as the epitome of all that’s wrong with the Episcopal Church. A good number of African bishops have had some direct contact with Spong through Lambeth 1998, but many more than these few have heard of him and speak of him (sometimes in vague or confused terms) in ways that make it clear that his name is standing in for all the perceived ills of Northern Christianity, in much the same way it often does in Northern conservative writings.

NAMS was founded by a priest, Jon Shuler (who was also one of the original signers of the First Promise document), and a bishop, Alden Hathaway. The organizations’ goal was to plant and develop charismatic Episcopal parishes around the U.S., with the consent of the local diocesan bishop—an important qualification which shows NAMS was not trying to be a confrontational organization, merely to spread what they believed was the right approach to Christian faith. Shuler was indirectly instrumental in connecting St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, with T.J. Johnston, and NAMS apparently suffered sanctions as a result. Shuler recounts being disinvited from several diocesan conventions and many other Episcopal Church events around the country, in the months of the controversy over St. Andrew’s (Stockdale 1994:390-398;
The *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette* article mentions that one factor which “earned the ire” of the people who broke off and eventually founded St. Andrew’s was Bishop Maze’s signing of the 1994 Koinonia Document, which stated that committed, monogamous same-sex relationships could be holy. Maze’s awareness of sharp differences of opinion between himself and the St. Andrew’s group may have influenced his decision to refuse their request; pragmatic issues like finances and the reasonable distribution of Episcopal churches within a diocese may also have been factors.

Salmon is notable among Episcopal bishops for his efforts to accommodate conservative actions. This case is one example, in which he willingly facilitated the placing of an Episcopal priest in another bishop’s jurisdiction under the authority of an overseas bishop. In 2000, when one of Salmon’s parishes, All Saints’ Church in Pawley’s Island, became the headquarters of the dissident Anglican Mission in America movement, Salmon again made every effort to keep the parish within the Episcopal Church for as long as possible.

This was easier for St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, than for some of the other churches which later entered into similar arrangements, because St. Andrew’s was a new church and thus did not already have assets—financial or material— which the diocese could claim the right to keep.

**Chapter 4**

Lumping together journalists and activists like this might seem odd, but getting accredited as a journalist was a way many activists were able to come to Lambeth, attend the press conferences, or otherwise observe and participate. There were also activists not registered as journalists, and many journalists who were not activists, including many representatives of the secular press.

John Shelby Spong, bishop of the Diocese of Newark from 1976 to 2000, is arguably the best-known Episcopal bishop of his generation, with greater name recognition both within the U.S. and around the world than even the Episcopal Presiding Bishop Frank Griswold. One feature about Bishop Spong, describes Spong as “easily the most controversial figure in the Episcopal Church” (Brown 2001:28). Spong’s involvement with gay and lesbian rights is secondary to his theological radicalism as a factor accounting for his notoriety and/or renown. Spong’s theology comprises an effort to modernize and rationalize Christian doctrine. He believes that many fundamental Christian doctrines—such as Jesus Christ’s death as a sacrifice for the sins of the world, and his resurrection from the dead and ascension into heaven, to name just a few—are ideas which the modern scientific mind cannot accept, and that the churches need to abandon these mythic metaphors and find new languages for God and Christ which modern, critically-thinking people can accept (Spong 1998). Spong’s critics have long insisted that as a bishop of the church, Spong ought not to be able to continue to publicly propagate heretical views and should repent, resign, be removed, or keep his mouth shut. Spong retired in 1999.
Spong did attempt to clarify or qualify his remarks on a couple of public occasions, but both times succeeded only in ruffling more feathers, without making any impression that he really understood the offensiveness of his remarks. For example, at a public occasion a week into the conference, Spong was asked to explain his remarks. He reportedly replied as follows: “My experience of the Church in Africa, and it is basically of the Church in Kenya, is that the conversions to Christianity...were coming from people who were relatively uneducated and were moving out of animistic religions into what I regard as a very...superstitious kind of Christianity.” These remarks further antagonized Kenyan bishops, and did little to soothe anyone else’s feelings (LeBlanc 1998c).

This has been a long-term project of certain American conservative leaders and commentators, who describe the entire Episcopal Church (or at the very least, its clergy and seminaries) as thoroughly infected with “Spongianity.” Some acknowledge that most Episcopal bishops and other leaders don’t share Spong’s extreme theological views, but assert that the fact that they’ve been unwilling to censure him shows that the rest of the church is weak and therefore almost as bad as he is. For example, the article on Spong already cited quotes a conservative American priest expressing the idea that Spong’s heresy taints the whole Episcopal Church: “For the Episcopal Church to stand silently by while he professes an apostate religion, under the guise of a 21st-century ‘Christianity,’ makes the church guilty of complicity” (Brown 2001:31). Other conservative critics of Spong and the Episcopal Church take a second approach and assert that in his books and public speaking, Spong is only giving voice to heretical views which are privately shared by the entire Episcopal Church, or at the very least its entire hierarchy of clergy and bishops (with, of course, a few orthodox exceptions).

The Rev. Dr. Cyril Okorocha, a Nigerian priest, had been hired to work at the Anglican Communion Office to coordinate the Anglican Communion’s Decade of Evangelism, which was established at Lambeth 1988 for the years 1990-2000. According to sources familiar with the situation, both the funding and the tasks associated with Okorocha’s position ended as the Decade of Evangelism drew near its close. Thus Okorocha was not in fact fired, but simply reached the end of a temporary appointment.

In an article in the July 28 *Lambeth Daily*, entitled “Bishop Spong Apologises to Africans,” David Skidmore, an American churchman and an official Lambeth press team member, summarized Spong’s explanations of his remarks:

His criticism of attitudes in the developing world, said Bishop Spong, was not intended to denigrate the personal faith commitments of the bishops nor of their churches. His point was that cultural differences between churches in the developed and developing worlds require the Gospel to be communicated using different language and symbols. ‘In the process of saying that, I’ve been heard to insult Africans, for which I am really sorry. That is certainly not my intention,’ Bishop Spong said.” He also said of his use of the word ‘superstitious,’ “‘That was an unfortunate word and I think it communicated an unfortunate message.’” [Skidmore 1998a]
Contrary to many people’s expectations, Spong went on to play very little public role during the rest of the Conference, including during the sexuality debate, apart from providing comments on events to reporters who asked his opinions.

The majority of the resolutions which emerged from this committee work, as is usual at Lambeth, were so uncontroversial that they were passed without debate.

Stephen Noll, in his account of Lambeth 1998, complained, “The predominance of non-white bishops here is striking. Sadly, this predominance is not matched in terms of the Conference leadership, which is largely white and largely liberal theologically.” He noted the control of the conference agenda by the Anglican Consultative Council (ACC), and wrote, “In the eyes of many, the ACC (note not AAC!) has been inordinately influenced by the West and the Episcopal Church USA in particular” (Noll 1998a).

As Ndungane and Buchanan’s positions suggest, South Africa is an exception to the widespread opposition to homosexuality found among African Christians. South Africa was even cited in one American conservative’s list of countries needing moral rebuke, along with the U.S., New Zealand, and Australia (Wetzel 1998c).

Many of those I quote in this and succeeding chapters use the vocabulary of “Western” cultural influences, etc. (as opposed to ‘non-Western,’ ‘Southern’, or ‘Third World’). For the sake of consistency in my usage, I will use “Northern” throughout, but for purposes of this chapter the terms “Northern” and “Western” should be read as roughly equivalent.

See England 1998b; Solheim 1999b; Noll 1998a for a conservative account; and Byham 1998b for a liberal account, as well as numerous resources on the Anglican pages of Louie Crew’s website (http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~lcrew).

Two resolutions (authored by Moses Tay, and cited in section g of this resolution) which would have constituted stronger affirmations of the Kuala Lumpur statement were on the table for discussion the next day, but when the time came to debate or vote upon them, the majority apparently did not have the will or energy. A vote was taken to move on to other business (in effect, a decision that Lambeth 1998 had already said enough on the issue of human sexuality) and passed, 331 to 202 (Sarmiento 1998c).

For example, one person told me: “We found many in our schools, mainly in single [sex] schools. And even many literatures posted from abroad to these kids. Equipment, guidance on how to use these, how to influence your friends, you know?....We said, Eh! Is this the influence we are getting from outside?”

The London Times article from the same day (Gledhill 1998a) contained almost the same text in explaining Bishop Mutebi’s Ugandan context. A short piece in the British Daily Mail (1998) put the Martyr’s story even more briefly (and inaccurately): “African Anglicans revere the memory of 11 [sic] Christians put to death in 1885 because they refused to be sodomised by the
“King of Uganda.” In this nutshell version of the story, the sodomy theme appears to have taken on such central meaning that the ‘11 Christians’ are not even referred to as martyrs. It is not clear how these reporters came to be informed (however minimally) about the Martyrs. It may well be that Mutebi himself told them the story, in the same public appearance at which he made the statements quoted in these articles. Mutebi is one Ugandan bishop who has long seen the Martyrs’ significance in their resistance to homosexual practice, having preached about them in this light as early as 1989.

Lilian suggests some of the advantages of being publicly gay in Uganda (e.g., less pressure from parents to have grandchildren), and mentions that there are a couple of gay bars in Kampala these days.

Apparently homosexuality, though not a major issue at Lambeth 1988, was enough of an issue to draw some attention and conversation in the Church of Uganda. My own newspaper research does not extend far enough back to judge whether this conversation reached the newspapers; I suspect that, if it did, the subject quickly fell into relative obscurity, as it did for some time even following Lambeth 1998.

The influence of missionaries—an explanation often offered by Northern liberals trying to make sense of African Christian conservativism—can (and often is) be overstated. Ward (2002) notes that many Northern liberals have attributed African opposition to homosexuality to the work of the Church Missionary Society, a strongly evangelical British Anglican agency, which, the theory runs, planted a very strong and uncritical Biblical literalist approach in those parts of Africa where it was the chief Protestant missionary agency. Ward argues, and I agree, that while this explanation may have some limited value, it both oversimplifies the character and work of the CMS, and underestimates the significance of other historical and cultural factors which have shaped the various African churches. Ward writes, “The difference [in style, theology, and attitudes among African churches]...seems much more to do with the different histories of colonialism in these areas, and different contemporary social and political situations.”

I did not seek to air or press my own views on homosexuality, during the course of my fieldwork, in Uganda or the United States. Given the salience of the issue to the contentious debates I was studying, to do so would have been, in effect, to enter those debates in a way which did not serve my research objectives. I hoped, and still hope, to intervene in these debates by offering a different perspective, rather than by adding the weight of my opinions to any of the perspectives already in play. When my consultants asked my views, I shared them. I was interested to find that, among Ugandans, my personal pro-gay rights position was received with interest and curiosity rather than hostility. However, I was also interested to note how rarely I was asked about my views. Most Ugandans seemed to assume, or chose to assume, that my husband and I were the kinds of American Christians they were used to seeing in Uganda: renewal-oriented in worship and relatively conservative in moral and theological convictions. Both of these traits also characterize many, if not most, of the Ugandan Anglicans I met and interviewed. These assumptions about my beliefs and preferences did not particularly impede
most conversations or interactions, and where they did, I felt free to explain my own positions more clearly in order to facilitate more honest and open interaction.

To be sure, not all African societies do show similar configurations of issues and positions. In some countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, where homosexuals frequently serve as Mugabe’s rhetorical scapegoats) the debate is harsher and more pervasive; in others, the official position is much more tolerant. It should be understood that in these matters, as in many things, South Africa is an exception and little I have said here will apply to that state and society.

See chapter 8. One interesting side story here is that some liberals recurrently bring up the idea of getting Africans to accept homosexuality, by in turn being accepting of polygamy. For example, Solheim writes that retired, openly gay Episcopal bishop Otis Charles “found it ‘ironic’ that today’s church could not make the connection between its change of attitude toward polygamy, at the urging of African bishops, and a call to revise its attitude toward homosexuals” (Solheim 1999b:63). Charles, then, feels that because African bishops convinced the rest of the church to be less judgmental towards polygamy, American bishops should be able to convince the rest of the church to ease up on homosexuality. However, this approach is both quite transparent, and quite unconvincing, to African leaders. Most African Christian leaders don’t see polygamy as something they’re happy to be living with, but as an unfortunate weakness they have to accept and respond to pastorally. As one bishop told me, “In the past, we have had weaknesses—say, polygamy—in the South. But... nobody has ever [said] since we have got a problem here in the South, let's go to the North and convince them that they should have more than one wife. We know it is a weakness—that is not something you would want everybody to get in.” Thus African church leaders’ views towards polygamy simply aren’t analogous to Northern liberals’ views towards homosexuality.

The speed with which the Five Talents initiative was pulled together—from a determination to come up with something of the sort in May, to a fully-developed proposal complete with promotional materials in July—suggests that Five Talents received a great deal of help from Opportunity International, a large existing Christian micro-enterprise body with which Five Talents partnered.

In fact, some African bishops spoke to this explicitly, stating that because homosexuality had become such a prominent issue associated with Lambeth and was hence receiving lots of press coverage in their home contexts, they needed a strongly conservative resolution on sexuality to show their constituents and rivals at home that Anglicans were standing firm for orthodoxy.

Some sources, such as English bishop Peter Selby’s book Grace and Mortgage (1997), would actually argue that the Bible has a fair amount to say about debt and ethical lending practices—quite possibly more than it has to say on sexual ethics. The reason for greater attention to sexual than monetary ethics in today’s church and media must, perhaps, be sought elsewhere than in relative degrees of Scriptural attention.
AACOM was put forward as primarily representing beleaguered conservative would-be Anglican parishes in the U.S., but functioned mainly as a temporary umbrella for a number of American conservative organizations, including First Promise, the Episcopal Synod of America (ESA), and Episcopalians United (EU).

Many of my citations in the following pages come from these documents; however, many of these documents are also available on, and were collected by AACOM from, Louie Crew’s comprehensive and userful Anglican pages. The interested reader will find most of the cited documents there (andromeda.rutgers.edu/~lcrew/rel.html).

The American Anglican Council bishops and other leaders, while welcoming the involvement and support of overseas primates in their struggle with the Episcopal Church, discouraged the formation of a separate province, preferring to continue to seek some form of domestic alternative oversight arrangement.

Or, as Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni titled one of his books, “What is Africa’s problem?” (Museveni 2000)

Resolution 1.6, “The Plight of the People of Northern and Western Uganda,” calls on the Ugandan government to work to end the civil war afflicting that region, and calls upon the ACC and the UN to “assist in bringing about a quick settlement of this armed conflict.” The next resolution, Resolution 1.7, is entitled “The Plight of the People of the Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi” and expresses the Conference’s “horror at the human disaster in the Sudan and Rwanda,” urging that member churches of the Anglican Communion provide as much assistance as possible in ending conflicts and rebuilding these nations. Resolution 1.13, condemning the use of landmines, notes that the wife of the Bishop of Kitgum, Uganda, was killed by a landmine. Resolution IV.13, on “Unity within the Provinces of the Anglican Communion,” reads in part: “This Conference notes with gratitude the ministry of support which the Archbishop of Canterbury has been able to give in Sudan and Rwanda, and recognises that he is called upon to render assistance from time to time in a variety of situations” in providing “extra-ordinary ministry of...pastoral oversight” in “exceptional circumstances”–as in the Church of Rwanda, in which Carey intervened to re-establish the church hierarchy after most of the Hutu bishops fled the country following the Tutsi victory in the civil war which accompanied the genocide. Additional resolutions did address other world ‘trouble spots,’ including Northern Ireland, the Middle East and South Asia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the Koreas.

It is not known how every bishop voted at Lambeth, since this was not a roll-call vote but a show of hands, and press and activists were not allowed in the plenary hall to count. Many American bishops, but not all, have revealed how they voted.

Note that this account, unlike most of the liberal accounts already cited, attributes considerable political savvy to the “Southern axis.”
Many of the 45 abstentions apparently represented people who could not stomach voting for the resolution, but didn’t dare, for various reasons, to vote against it. For example, Frank Griswold, Presiding Bishop of ECUSA, abstained from this vote, but his personal belief that gay and lesbian persons should be affirmed by the church is well known. Perhaps it is relevant to observe here that close to 100 of the bishops present at the conference are not accounted for in the vote totals; some of those absentee may also have been, effectually, abstaining from this controversial vote.

For that matter, many who would have preferred a sterner resolution compromised their views by voting to accept the weaker language of Resolution 1.10.

Gerd Baumann (1999:122) quotes Audrey Kobayashi’s work on multiculturalism as a familiar Western form for organizing and displaying cultural difference, as in the multiethnic parade, “a kind of stage show that... ‘celebrates diversity.’”

There are, of course, Anglican and Episcopal leaders and commentators who articulate and pursue more radical commitments to diversity and its implications. Thrall’s criticisms (and Douglas’s, to be quoted below) show that some of the Episcopal Church’s left-leaning scholars and observers, for instance, find this sort of liberal/moderate ‘red-boots globalism’ almost as distasteful as any conservative alternative.

For example, the Diocese of Massachusetts, whose annual convention fell in November in 1998, passed a resolution which took a clear stance against aspects of the Lambeth resolution:

Resolved, that the 213th Convention of the Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts affirm that God calls some homosexual people to live together in committed relationships and that the Church can and does appropriately bless such unions, and that God calls some homosexual people in such relationships to ordained ministry and that the Church can and does appropriately ordain them. [Diocese of Massachusetts 1998]

For example, Bishop Jerry Winterrowd of Colorado mentioned this possibility in the course of explaining his vote for the sexuality resolution: “Winterrowd, who said he considers himself a moderate, regards the American church as ‘split right down the middle’ between liberals and traditionalists. The prospect of a schism from the mother church is a possible but unlikely prospect. ‘I don't even want to think about that,’ he said. ‘I want to stay with the church’” (Torkelson 1998).

Two major commissions since Lambeth 1988 had examined issues of authority, unity, identity and relationship within the Anglican Communion. The Eames Commission, which explicitly focused on the question of how some provinces’ acceptance of the ordination of women affected their communion with other provinces, met several times in the early 1990s. The Inter-Anglican Theological and Doctrinal Commission evolved out of the Eames Commission, in order to examine issues of Anglican identity and community more generally. This second commission produced a report on its conclusions known as the Virginia Report (so called because the
Commission met at Virginia Theological Seminary). Solheim writes, “The Virginia Report is an intense theological examination of what it means to be a Communion, an exploration of its unity and diversity....The report traced the church’s struggle to maintain koinonia [community] while facing a vast range of social, political, and cultural challenges” (Solheim 1999b:16). The report questioned what happens when such challenges push different provinces towards positions out of step with the rest of the Communion—a situation not by any means limited to the issues of ordination of women (which by Lambeth 1998 was widely accepted in the Communion and was therefore largely a non-issue) or the blessing of same-sex unions, but also to issues such as lay presidency at the Eucharist, which has been energetically pursued in recent years by evangelical Anglicans in Australia.

89 The position of the Archbishop of Canterbury as head of the church in England goes back to well before the Reformation, but the other three Instruments of Unity have been added through the Anglican Communion’s history in response to the Communion’s growth in both size and complexity. The Lambeth Conferences began in the mid-19th century, spurred by the need to keep in touch and maintain unity across a church now spread throughout the growing British Empire. The Anglican Consultative Council was initiated in 1971 “as a representative body of the churches of the Anglican Communion made up [of] equal numbers of bishops, priests, and lay people” (Douglas 1998:27). This body would meet regularly in order to be in dialogue and deal effectively with the diversity of the post-colonial Communion. Douglas explains that the Primates’ Meeting were actually initiated in 1979 by the Presiding Bishop of ECUSA, John Allin, a conservative-leaning primate, in order to balance the progressive leanings of the ACC (Douglas 1998:27).

90 However, conservatives took comfort in the fact that the wording of the resolution had been considerably weakened by the time it passed, as one conservative scholar noted:

The Resolution [initially said] that it is inappropriate for a Bishop or Priest to minister in another Diocese without first obtaining the permission of the local Bishop. What was passed was much weaker.... The Archbishops were to advise their Bishops to consider the implications of [a past resolution on boundaries]. Presumably those who cross boundaries will have given this great consideration and will have explained the matter in writing to the local Bishop, who will, of course, neither be pleased nor agree. There is plenty of room for the ‘Shyira Connection’ [Bishop John Rucyahana’s oversight of St. Andrew’s, Little Rock, Arkansas] to continue under this recommendation and be in accord with it. [Rodgers 1998]

The author of this piece? Conservative scholar John Rodgers, who, slightly over a year later, would be one of two American priests consecrated as a ‘missionary bishop’ to the United States by the Archbishops of Rwanda and Southeast Asia.

91 Note that Mattingly puts this sentiment in the mouths of Southerners. Doubtless many Southern bishops do feel this way; I have heard a number of Ugandan Anglicans express the view that American culture has gone beyond the reasonable limits of cultural diversity. The fact
that Mattingly and other Northern writers have chosen to use Southern voices to make their arguments is nonetheless significant. These writers realize the rhetorical power of attributing arguments for strict limits on what is tolerated as cultural difference to Southern bishops, who belong to cultures which Northerners perceive as ‘other’ and thus as the primary beneficiaries of cultural tolerance. In contrast, Northern conservatives making the same argument could easily be written off as the familiar conservative anti-diversity trope.

92 Macdonald Radcliff’s phrase is a telling modification of the more common ‘instruments of unity.’

Chapter 6

93 By most accounts, around 30 of St. Timothy’s members left the church in order to attend other ECUSA churches in the area and, ultimately, to reform as a small St. Timothy’s-ECUSA congregation. A high proportion, if not all, of these members were lifelong or long-term Episcopalians. Some of those who chose to stay with ECUSA shared the concerns of St. Timothy’s leadership about ECUSA’s direction, but did not believe that breaking from the Episcopal Church and joining AMiA was the right response. An example of this sentiment comes from elsewhere in the AMiA world, a Florida parish whose rector left with about a third of the congregation to form an AMiA church. A member who stayed with the existing parish said, “Most of us who are staying [in ECUSA] are sympathetic with [the rector] and his group and feel the same way about the Church’s permissive attitude, but we chose to stay and see if we can change the church’s direction” (Living Church 2000:7).

94 As in many cases where the majority of the parish decided to join AMiA, St. Timothy’s tried to keep the church building and other property and assets, which under Episcopal Church canons officially belong to the diocese; as in many other cases, St. Timothy’s eventually lost its legal battle and is now meeting in a school cafeteria and building its own new church building.

95 Several Primates did respond to the AACOM Petition by taking up these issues with the Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, Frank Griswold. In late February of 1999, eight Primates (including the outspoken conservatives Emmanuel Kolini of Rwanda, Moses Tay of South East Asia, and Maurice Sinclair of the Southern Cone of South America) wrote an extremely cordial, but nonetheless admonitory, public letter to Griswold in response to the petition, asking him to examine his province and “take whatever steps may be necessary to uphold the moral teaching and Christian faith the Anglican Communion has received.” (ACNS 1999a). Griswold replied in like courteous tone, inviting the Primates to visit the Episcopal Church and judge its health and morality for themselves (Griswold 1999). Accordingly, a few months later in September of 1999, two overseas Primates (Sinclair and Goodhew) and three bishops representing other Primates (of Tanzania, Rwanda, and Kenya) visited the U.S. in order to explore and evaluate the Episcopal Church. Though some American conservatives retrospectively describe the “Come and See” visit as the turning point at which international primates realized that something had to be done, the immediate and concrete outcomes of the trip
were far from definitive. The ‘Come and See’ report which the visiting bishops wrote reveals that, having seen the Episcopal Church for themselves, the bishops agreed with conservative Episcopalians that matters were seriously awry in the Episcopal Church, but apparently also found the situation less dire than they had been led to expect, and expressed a preference for internal, rather than international, solutions (“Come and See” 1999).

96 These last three bishops are all retired. There is a long history of active participation by retired bishops in oppositional politics in the Episcopal Church; they don’t have to worry about the political repercussions of their actions the way sitting bishops do, and are thus freer to participate in controversial actions as they choose.

97 This clue came out in David Virtue’s interview with Rodgers, in which Rodgers made this statement, as one of the reasons for acting before the March Oporto meeting: “Archbishop Tay was to retire in mid-February and he wanted to share in this step. In fact we had received no assurances that this step would ever have been taken without his leadership” (Virtue 2000a). Rodgers here states the facts of Tay’s upcoming retirement clearly enough; but this is the only place I have seen it cited as a factor accounting for the timing of the consecrations. Yet it seems a logical motivating factor. Kolini, Murphy, and the other supporters of some sort of strong international action wanted the support of Primates, because that would give the action the greatest legitimacy. But they had already apparently failed to gain additional primatial support—Archbishops Njojo of Congo and Nkoyooyo of Uganda had declined to be involved. And there was no guarantee that Tay’s successor, Archbishop Yong, would be willing to take the initiative in such an action, as Tay was. Losing one of the two willing Primates, through Tay’s retirement, would have greatly weakened the force and challenge of the consecrations. Further, it would have been harder to cast the consecrations as an action of the righteous global South, with Kolini’s support alone; having Primates involved from both Africa and Asia made a stronger impression. I find it quite credible, then, that the timing of Tay’s retirement was a major factor, even the major factor, influencing the exact timing of the consecrations. Why, then, was this reason not mentioned more often? I suspect because of the desire for the consecrations to appear as an action representative of the whole orthodox global South. Stressing Tay’s impending retirement as a factor would draw attention to the contingency of the consecrations happening at all. Rodgers’ admission to Virtue that the consecrations might well not have happened without Tay’s leadership undermines other arguments for their necessity and validity, and makes the consecrations sound less like an event of global weight and significance and more like a fluke action of a very few radical conservative activists who happen to include two Anglican Primates.

98 It is traditional in Anglicanism for at least three bishops to participate in the consecration of a new bishop. I have been told that there was to have been a third “missionary bishop” consecrated in Singapore, which would have meant those three bishops could consecrate further bishops without additional help, but again, the shadowy third did not materialize.

99 For a hint of parallel developments in the Roman Catholic church, see sociologist of religion Jose Casanova, who noted in 2001, “In the last decades there has been a remarkable increase in
transnational Catholic networks and exchanges of all kinds, which crisscross nations and world regions, often bypassing Rome” (Casanova 2001:433-434).

100 This leader’s attribution of that language to Chuck Murphy conflicts with the fact that several sources claim to be quoting Kolini himself using the refugee metaphor. It is conceivable, however, that Murphy or another American source originated the metaphor, and Rwandan leaders found it so persuasive or powerful that they began using it themselves. Naturally, in turn, other American conservatives would find it more affecting, and more effective, to quote such a metaphor on the lips of a Rwandan leader rather than an American one. The question of the origin and history of the refugee metaphor presents interesting issues of voice and representation, but resolving it is unfortunately beyond the reach of the data available to me.

101 The spirituality resources provided for attendees included a labyrinth, red and black draperies in the prayer room, and an emphasis on meditation, all of which were seen by some conservatives as, at best, alarmingly syncretistic and, at worst, an open invitation to the powers of darkness to invade the Convention. One charismatic priest even went so far as to place salt—believed to be a spiritual purifying agent—under the chairs of a number of leaders at the Convention, sparking an outcry from liberal leaders offended by the gesture.

102 This effort met with little success. Some Primates were probably sympathetic, but apparently did not exert enough pressure on Frank Griswold to lead to the Jubilee proposal being taken up at the subsequent meeting of the Episcopal Church’s House of Bishops. Thus yet another Primates’ Meeting passed without significant pressure being put on Griswold or the leaders of any other liberal provinces. Indeed, by this writing, four Primates’ Meetings have passed since Lambeth 1998 without any significant pressure being exerted by conservative primates on liberal primates. It almost seems at this point that the high hopes placed in the Primates’ Meetings by conservatives around the time of Lambeth were misplaced, based on a false understanding of the kind of men and the kind of gathering comprising a Primates’ Meeting. Primates’ Meetings are entirely closed to observers and journalists, so it is difficult to know more about their events and dynamics than is revealed by the press releases they put out.

103 Recall that Uganda had had its chance to be involved, but, despite considerable persuasive efforts from his Rwandan colleagues, Archbishop Nkoyooyo had declined—with the approval of his House of bishops—to play the role of the third international Primate in the Singapore consecrations.

104 In fact, Turumanya and Rucyahana studied at TESM on the same scholarship program, the Stanway Fellowship, which brings East African church leaders to Pennsylvania for theological study. Stanway was TESM’s first Dean, and a retired Bishop of Tanganyika.

105 The Post-Gazette article explains that the immediate cause for the split was a conflict over whether John Guest, Christ Church’s rector and an active international evangelist, should be rehired at his former Episcopal parish. “The pastor of Christ Church is the Rev. John Guest, the former rector of St. Stephen’s and an acclaimed evangelist currently preaching in Ghana.
resigned from St. Stephen's in 1990 to concentrate on evangelism. When his successor died in 1994, many members wanted Guest back. But another priest was chosen, and about 200 people left to form what is now Christ Church at Grove Farm” (Rogers-Melnick 1998).

106 Nashotah House, located in Wisconsin, is Anglo-Catholic in its orientation and much smaller than the evangelical-charismatic seminary, Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry in Ambridge, PA.

107 The extent to which conservatives in the Episcopal Church have been excluded by others in the church, or have excluded and withdrawn themselves, is difficult to determine. In defense of the choices of those who turn away such candidates, an Episcopal priest acquainted with this process in his own diocese observed to me that evangelical candidates seeking ordination usually prove—while very sincere and enthusiastic in their Christian faith and ministry—to know little, and often to care little, about the Episcopal Church and the Anglican tradition, per se. Thus, he argued, it makes little sense for the Episcopal Church to invest in training and ordaining people who have, in turn, minimal investment in the Episcopal Church.

108 In the Episcopal Church, every priest is first ordained as a deacon (in what is called the ‘transitional diaconate’) and serves as a deacon for some time (often about a year) before being ordained as a priest. The church also has a distinct order of life-long deacons, known as the ‘vocational diaconate.’

109 FIF-NA has consistently been sympathetic and occasionally allied with AMiA, and likewise with the AAC; but efforts to unite this Anglo-Catholic group with more evangelically-oriented dissident bodies have not yet fully succeeded. These constituencies share the perception that ECUSA has gone drastically wrong and something must be done, but the priorities and concerns of Anglo-Catholic traditionalists and conservative evangelicals are significantly different. The issue of the ordination of women, for example, has often been a major stumbling block in relations.

110 There are signs that the Anglo-Catholic conservative organization Forward in Faith-North America (FIFNA) may also be encompassed in the new Network. FIFNA is currently listed (as of March 2004) on the Network’s website as a non-geographic convocation within the Network.

111 The fourteen Primates were the heads of the Anglican churches in the West Indies; the Southern Cone; Nigeria; Sudan; Kenya; both the outgoing and incoming Primates of Uganda; Congo; Tanzania; Central Africa; South India; Pakistan; South East Asia; and the Philippines (Mason 2004).


113 One matter to which the travelers devoted a good deal of energy in both learning and teaching was the Rwandan genocide of 1994, probably the biggest stumbling block for Americans trying to relate to Rwanda. In talks to various congregational groups and in written pieces in the parish
newsletter and other contexts, the travelers taught their fellow parishioners about the genocide, both from books and from what they’d learned on their journey. In this teaching, the travelers struggled not to ‘other’ Rwanda, even as they strove to convey the horror of the genocide. One of the travelers told his audience: “I didn’t sign up to be born a white male in North America. That’s what God dealt me. If I’d been born a Hutu in Rwanda, what would I have done?” Further, the travelers strove to put a hopeful spin on their teachings. One traveler observed that being in Rwanda gave them a chance to “see the mercy and grace of God in the process of healing a nation.” Thus the issue of the genocide was handled, both by teaching about it in a way which helped make sense of it historically (much as I had learned about it in graduate courses at UNC-Chapel Hill), and by assimilating it to the wider picture of a suffering, but always faithful and joyful, Africa.

Chapter 7

114 All these names are pseudonymic replacements for the posters’ actual user IDs.

115 Official figures often place the Church of England as the largest Anglican church, with Nigeria and Uganda following. However, the Church of England is an established church, meaning all English people are officially members of the church unless they declare membership in another religious body. Attendance at churches in England is actually relatively low, so the placement of the Church of England as the largest Anglican church does not have a great deal of credibility in many quarters.

116 He added, “...if the American church will accept to listen....they could say no.”

117 For example, missiologist Andrew Walls noted the southward shift in world Christianity in a 1991 essay (Walls 1991).

118 I also heard Ugandan church leaders and members make reference on a number of occasions to the joke that Europeans came to Africa, gave Africans the Bible and taught them to pray, and then, while the Africans had their eyes closed praying, the Europeans stole all the land.

119 An American missionary present at the service told me that he’d heard the same debate over Christianity’s Africanness rehearsed many times in the UCU staff room.

120 Theologically and socially, if not geographically, New Zealand is definitely identified as a Northern province; indeed, it is one of the Communion’s most liberal.

121 Another fascinating example along similar lines comes from a 2001 visit to the U.S. by Nigerian Archbishop Peter Akinola. In an interview about his trip, Archbishop Akinola responded to a question about whether ECUSA is really in a state of crisis:

I [recently] visited Chicago, S. Ohio, Houston and parts of Michigan. From what I have seen in these four dioceses, I am quite satisfied within me that the Church I saw is as healthy as any church can be.... I have heard from a
number of our bishops that Orthodoxy is in jeopardy in the American church in the sense that a number of dioceses do not uphold the Authority of Scripture.... [But] to say that Orthodoxy is in jeopardy or is in trouble in America may be a sweeping statement. [Adekola 2001]

122 One liberal-leaning Episcopal bishop recently challenged the repeated stress on numbers and growth as the justification or proof that African evangelical Christianity (and its eager promoters, conservative American Episcopalians) are on the morally and spiritually right track, by suggesting that the success of an ideology is not necessarily proof of its validity or morality. In a January 2003 NPR “Morning Edition” piece on transnational Anglican alliances, reporter Barbara Bradley-Hagerty quoted liberal Pennsylvania bishop Charles Bennison as claiming that “just because there are millions of conservative Christians who rally around issues like homosexuality, that doesn't mean they're right. Adolf Hitler ... had many followers as well” (Morning Edition 2003). The analogy between African Christianity and Nazism with which Bennison chose to try and make his point was widely regarded as unfortunate, at best, and sparked outraged responses from conservatives.

123 Some number of Ugandans—usually young people with little exposure to church politics and international church news—get their impressions of the Northern church largely from Lighthouse TV, the Northern Pentecostal-owned TV station which carries largely American and European Pentecostal shows (such as Benny Hinn). This minority of people unreservedly said Northern Christianity is much more zealous and has many more adherents than Ugandan churches.

124 The phrase ‘looking into the face of death’ apparently refers to the Rwandan genocide. Rucyahana was undoubtedly profoundly affected by these events in his home country, but he himself was actually studying in the United States at the time of the genocide and was presumably never in any physical danger from the violence of 1994.

125 A significant exception to this generalization would be some Northern Ugandans, whose home region continues to be ravaged by ongoing conflicts between the Ugandan army and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army, a long-running conflict which has taken a significant toll on the civilian populace of the area—particularly through the kidnaping of children to serve as child soldiers for the LRA.

126 As in all things, there are differences in the situations of poverty of different African nations and peoples. In Uganda, for example, in much of the country even the poorest rural people are able to eat reasonably well, because of the fertility of the soil and the relatively high nutritive value of bananas, the dominant starch crop. But in other respects, these rural populations are dramatically underserved (e.g., they have very limited access to desired goods like clean water, education, and health care) and constrained by their economic position (pushed into cash cropping, families split up by the necessity of the husband going to an urban area to earn money, etc.).
This idea also has significant resonances with certain Christian teachings (for example, Jesus’ statements concerning how difficult it is for the rich to enter the Kingdom of Heaven) and aspects of Christian tradition (for example, the voluntary poverty of many monastic traditions).

AMiA’s “missionary bishops” are all native-born Americans; they are missionaries in the name of their Southern archbishops. AMiA has not made it a goal to bring Southern missionaries to American churches. But in spite of the lack of direct contact with Southern Christians in this organization founded on the hope that Southern Christians would save the Northern church, AMiA’s leaders feel that the organization nonetheless embodies the idea of South-to-North missionization. Indeed, AMiA members are apt to describe themselves as Southern missionaries. In an NPR Morning Edition report on one AMiA parish, Barbara Bradley-Hagerty noted that since joining AMiA, members of this parish see themselves as ‘Rwandan missionaries’ (Morning Edition 2003). I have heard members of St. Timothy’s describe themselves in the same way. When I talked with Bishop John Rucyahana about the AMiA endeavor, he addressed this issue by describing himself, Kolini, and Tay as enabling their American AMiA charges to serve as native missionaries, on behalf of the Southern leaders, but in their own homeland: “We have now a mission in America. But all our centers are being manned by whites.... We are empowering them, we are discipling them, we are facilitating them.... We need prepare Americans for America, you see the point?” The point, apparently, is this: that missionary initiative and missionary energy, if not always actual missionary bodies, are flowing from South to North through the structures and relationships that comprise AMiA, as well as through other relationships and structures, from the CMS to the various international arrangements cited in chapter 6, which put into practice this ideology of South-to-North flows within contemporary Christendom.

A Ugandan bishop told me about an incident which occurred while he was working in a provincial post, some years earlier, and which he saw as revealing of a much wider problem of Northern unwillingness to support Southern Christians in their work and witness, including to the Northern churches. He came across a magazine article about the abundance of funds for mission work, and shortage of missionaries, in Europe. He then approached a CMS representative in Uganda and suggested that those funds might be used to support African missionaries in Europe and other parts of the world. However, as he recounted to me, the CMS man told him, “‘You know, [whispering for emphasis] in CMS, the money which is there has been given by British people for British people also.’” When I asked if he thought this was racism, he replied tactfully that he preferred to see it as ‘lack of vision’: “To think like that missionary, who said, British people have given the money and therefore British people must benefit from it—I think that there is lack of vision. Lack of vision.” But whether that anonymous CMS man’s reluctance is named as racism or lack of vision, the story illustrates the difficulty of matching up African Christians’ enthusiasm and will for mission with the means to undertake international missions.

Nor are these visits usually limited to Episcopal churches. Ugandan visiting preachers frequently preach at various evangelical and Bible churches, as well as or even instead of the local outposts of Anglicanism.
Another rhetorical device Spurr identifies is that of Insubstantialization, in which Westerners experience the non-Western world as an “inner journey, turning that world into a backdrop for the drama of the [Westerner’s] self.” This trope is extraordinarily common in talk about mission trips in the Northern church in general, but the experience of being inspired and renewed by contact with Southern Christians may even be further intensified for Northerners who are seeking solace from the Northern church in their Southern alliances. Members of St. Timothy’s who went on the trip to Rwanda talked very much in terms of this trope, when describing what the trip meant for them. One described how God had used the experience of the trip, and the Rwandan people, to change the American visitors: “It was a deep spiritual blessing for all of us in our individual lives.... We all matured spiritually.” Thus African Christians serve as a sort of mirror that helps Americans see, and correct, their own faith.

The formation of Integrity-Uganda was first announced (in a press release from Integrity-USA) in the summer of 2000, though because of the hostile political and social climate in Uganda the organization did not really ‘go public’ there until the spring of 2001, when its leaders were finally named in the press (Integrity-USA 2000).

Chapter 8

Though the papers often identified him as such, Ssenyonjo was not, strictly speaking, the founder of Integrity-Uganda. That distinction should probably go to Erich Kasirye, a priest who worked with youth as a member of the provincial staff of the Church of Uganda. Kasirye came to the conclusion that the gay youth he encountered needed help—counseling, advocacy, community—and approached Ssenyonjo, who was a counselor and had Northern training in matters of sexuality and relationships, for assistance. Ssenyonjo, who had retired in early 1998 after 24 years as bishop of the Diocese of West Buganda, was running a consultation and counseling service to use some of his training and augment his meager pension. His experiences as a counselor predisposed him to take Kasirye’s request seriously, and he agreed to become involved with the organization—at, as it transpired, considerable personal cost.

Ssenyonjo had already retired by the time of Lambeth 1998, and did not attend; thus his opinions on homosexuality had not come out during the Lambeth debate.

Another explanation advanced in the copious press coverage was that Ssenyonjo and the group’s other leaders had taken up Integrity’s cause in order to trick gay and lesbian Americans into giving them money. Proponents of this theory suspected that, whatever Bishop Ssenyonjo and the others lost (including jobs, friends, and public esteem) by their involvement with Integrity, it might have been worth it, or seemed worth it, to take those risks in order to win favors from Integrity-USA. But while some (especially American observers) questioned Integrity-Uganda on the basis of whether its leaders were using Integrity-USA for their own financial gain, for most Ugandans the primary concern seems to have been whether Integrity-USA were using the Ugandan Integrity leaders for their own ideological gain—that is, to spread homosexuality in Africa.
For example, in one newspaper article, Ssenyonjo insisted, “I am not doing this ministry for the sake of money, though I trust that God will not allow me to starve. Some people have been accusing me of being money hungry. I am not” (Ssenyonjo 2001a).

Thrall goes on to observe that this would be a worthwhile subject to explore, but beyond the scope of his current work.

“The truth is so much more interesting: secret societies have not had power in history, but the notion that secret societies have had power in history has had power in history” (Crowley 1987:388).

In the London Times article which is the original source for Holloway’s remarks, journalist Ruth Gledhill does not quote him directly but apparently summarizes what he said to her in an interview: “He said the American conservatives, while not handing over dollar bills to the Africans to persuade them to take a particular line, had laid on facilities and thrown barbecue parties at the conference in a bid to win them over” (Gledhill 1998c).

In one instance, some liberal Episcopalians argued that money being withheld from the Episcopal Church for reasons of doctrinal/moral disagreement was actually being directly funneled into building international alliances, through funding the pre-Lambeth Dallas Conference. However, the evidence in this case is unclear; I mention it only as an example of how some have made the connection between conservatives’ withholding funds to the Episcopal Church, and allegedly disbursing them to potential Southern allies.

For a study suggesting the scope and importance of American evangelical mission and development work in Africa, see Hearn (2002).

Note that nearly all the quotations of liberal accusations about conservative exploitation of Southerners which I used, above, come from conservative sources. Conservatives’ eagerness to document and publicize such liberal accusations is due to their confidence in their ability to turn such remarks to their advantage by pointing out their implied racism.

One leader associated with the FSC, the Indian head of the Oxford Centre for Mission Studies, actually argued strongly against this vocabulary of ‘help’. He makes a strong argument that FSC was, in fact, a multicultural effort which should be seen as, in itself, a sign of the end of colonial patterns in the Anglican Communion as non-Western Anglicans claim their own voices. Samuel argued that the FSC team “was an international effort under the leadership of non-western people,” and that “it would be an error to suppose the core team consisted of American people.” Samuel concluded strongly: *To suppose otherwise... would perpetuate the erroneous impression and prejudice that western leaders, while they might not have 'bought' bishops' votes as alleged, nevertheless provided the platform for them to speak. This is far from the truth. As long as [this notion] persists, people will fail to get a true picture of what is happening in the Anglican Communion. Non-western bishops do not need such platforms. They will make their own voice heard and views known in*
their own way... Any post-Lambeth efforts which continue to create this false impression will not get the support of non-western bishops who used the resources of OCMS with its clear understanding that they were not being facilitated as marginal people to make their voice heard by powerful Western leaders. [Christian Challenge 1998b, emphasis added]

Conservative American commentator Robert Stowe England’s “Lambeth’s Plenary Debate on Sexuality” article describes the Center as follows: “A number of English, American, and Australians worked out of the Franciscan Student Center on the campus under the auspices of the Oxford Center for Mission Studies....A number of Americans were working out of the center under the leadership of Dallas Bishop James Stanton, head of the American Anglican Council” (England 1998b).

Several informed liberal observers of the conference agreed that the FSC’s activities should not be described in terms of bribery or persuasion, but rather perhaps in terms of facilitation, since African and other Southern bishops were already predisposed to side with Northern conservatives on the sexuality issue. A piece in the conservative publication the Christian Challenge quoted Rutgers professor, founder and past president of a gay and lesbian Episcopalian organization, and commentator on all things Anglican, Dr. Louie Crew observing that it is “‘wrong to suggest that the African votes were bought at Lambeth. Anyone who did not already know Africans’ stated views about homosexuality simply had not paid much attention to them....[Conservatives] did not buy votes; instead, they organized coalitions and taught those who already agreed with them how to make the system work for their advantage” (Christian Challenge 1998b). And an editorial in the left-leaning British paper the Church Times (the counterpart to the conservative Church of England Newspaper) on August 14th raises a very pertinent question. Many Africans and other Southern leaders, as well as various Northern allies, seem to agree that Lambeth procedures are prohibitively complex, and that a concerted effort to provide resources for understanding and participating in the Conference for Southern participants would be helpful and well-received by those participants. Given that, why was it that in 1998 Northern conservative partisans were the ones who provided more resources of this sort than at any previous conference, rather than Anglican Communion staff? The editorial stated,

Several overlapping organisations set up shop in the Franciscan Centre at the University in Canterbury to provide an alternative source of technical support and coordination to Southern bishops: hosting meetings, advising on strategy, distributing documents, schooling on procedure.....All that the conservative Americans can be accused of is identifying a sympathetic body of opinion and helping it to develop the political skills needed to make itself heard. The process was one of enablement rather than manipulation, and the fact that it needed to be done by the conservatives is another question to be asked of the Anglican Consultative Council, whose job it more properly was. [Church Times 1998, emphasis added]

Though here reserving judgment on conservatives’ motives in providing such resources, some liberals did concur with conservatives’ arguments that the work of the FSC was a much-needed intervention in the long, subtly-accomplished but undeniable, marginalization of Southern
Anglican leaders in Anglican Communion affairs.

Maari voted with the majority on the sexuality vote, but is not, in general, very involved or interested in Anglican Communion politics and conflicts. His reply to Haines was as conciliatory as was possible without actually compromising his views. However–possibly because the case became something of a *cause celebre* for American conservatives–Haines never replied, and the possibility of funding from the Diocese of Washington, D.C., for UCU was apparently dropped (LeBlanc 1999b).

I am reading Mauss’s work through the lens of Bruno Latour’s understanding of modernity, laid out in *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993).

One short satirical piece which appeared in a Ugandan paper while we were there quoted an imaginary Ugandan official thanking President Bush for sending them an aid package, but complaining that the aid had all leaked out from between all the strings attached to the package, and suggesting that next time they might try using cellotape instead of string.

My husband and I made a point of noticing the infamous ‘spraying’ when we flew out of Uganda, and indeed, soon after everyone was seated, airplane staff walked briskly down both aisles holding small canisters which emitted a fine mist.

Notable exceptions to Northern clothing in Uganda include the West-African-turned-Pan-African tailored styles in African fabrics worn by some urban young people; and the traditional dress often worn by older and rural people. As in many contexts, what is regarded as ‘traditional’ dress in Uganda actually shows significant traces of colonial and other outside influences. For example, the Baganda women’s *gomesi* is strongly influenced by late 19th century European women’s styles, and the *kanzu* worn by older men (invariably with a Northern-style suit coat over it) is a style adopted from the Muslim societies of the east coast of Africa.

These clothes make their way from donation points in these Northern countries, by way of companies who sort, bale, and sell them, to the markets of poor nations in the global South, like St. Balikuddembe (Owino) Market in Kampala.

Museveni’s idea was that making *mivumba* more expensive would make locally-made clothing and other goods more competitive, which would then stimulate the Ugandan economy and create jobs. Furthermore, proponents of the raised *mivumba* tax argued, this proposal would have the effect of heightening Ugandan self-esteem by encouraging Ugandans to stop using other people’s garbage and start making and using their own goods, as a nation. The attractiveness of self-sufficiency to Ugandans can be seen in the regular editorials on the subject in the Ugandan papers. For example, an opinion feature, entitled “Africans should reject all donations,” from early in 2002 stated: “I believe strongly that Africa should stop getting money from donor countries. We should have learnt our lesson by now. Let us stop getting money from these people and study economic history.... I know there’ll be a lot of hardship but our children will enjoy the success from our sweat. Stop getting donations, then people will start working harder” (Ejullu...
Museveni’s tax proposals also included sharply lowering the tax on beer, and a columnist in one of the Kampala papers quipped that Museveni’s new tax package must mean he expects the populace to get so drunk that they forget they’re naked.

This term is roughly equivalent to the Catholic concept of inculturation.

The degree of indigenization which took place in Ugandan Anglicanism during its first few decades in the area seems to have varied a good deal by region. Western Ugandan Anglicanism has integrated more local music, used local languages, and otherwise been more thoroughly indigenized from quite early on, as many Ugandans told me. In the central region, Buganda, there seems to have been a more complete adoption of the missionaries’ aesthetic norms as to how worship should look and feel—e.g. for decades, the organ was the only musical instrument permitted in Baganda Anglican churches.

Interestingly, many supporters of renewal actually describe it, not as Westernization, but as a kind of indigenization—arguing, for example, that the lively beat and free prayers are more in keeping with the indigenous African spirit. In general, the Ugandans who described renewal as a form of Westernization (and not indigenization) were those who oppose this trend, more or less vehemently. Some of these are pro-indigenization, some are Balokole or Bazuukufu who prefer their own forms of renewal, some are just ordinary Ugandan Anglicans who want to keep using the prayer book and music they’ve been using all along.

For example, Kampala Pentecostal Church (KPC), the huge and vastly popular Pentecostal church in downtown Kampala, is associated with Canadian Assemblies of God churches and likely (judging by the resources evident in their operations) receives a significant amount of support from these and other Northern donors. One Ugandan Anglican told me, “I think there are some financial attachment to it. People have found out that when you go with these [Pentecostal churches, you receive some] foreign assistance.”

A conversation I had with one Church of Uganda priest is telling in this regard. He had just written to several American parishes (on the advice of an American colleague) to explore the possibility of partnership relationships.

Very recently I wrote to about twenty-five pastors of the Episcopal Church.... Only one of them has replied, the others haven’t replied. ... I was writing to them to say look, I would like to establish some kind of contact so you can visit us, so we can visit you, as Episcopalians in the Communion. And only one has replied so far. He thought I was asking for money, which I wasn’t. I was asking for camaraderie, I was asking for fellowship.... I am saying to them, we need to visit one another. You come to Africa, see how we do things, and we come there and we see how you do things, and we get mutually carried by each other’s faith and way of doing things. But this gentleman replies and says—he may have thought I was asking for money, which I wasn’t at all. I
mean, eventually the question of finances will come in, but that was not the
immediate thing.
The ‘question of finances,’ as he noted, will, inevitably, come in—as it comes in to many North-
South relationships. But he was both insulted by the presumption that financial interest was his
primary motive in seeking to establish these relationships, and discouraged by the fact that the
American priest perceived his letter in that way.

Not everyone finds such assertions credible. A former member of St. Timothy’s who left the
church when it split from the Episcopal Church to join AMiA told me, “If you look at St.
Timothy’s parish, they have some high rollers in there. And when you have a church that’s going
to join your diocese—I’m not sure but I can guess that the people in Africa don’t have the
standard of living that we do. [So] as a parish [St. Timothy’s] could bring into the [Rwandan]
diocese a whole lot more than any other church. In fact, they might bring in as much money as
all the other churches in their diocese do. And money talks, no matter where you are or what you
are doing.”

In contrast with all these affirmations, I heard very few criticisms of the efforts by
conservatives to prepare Southern bishops for Lambeth. One church leader was put off by the
fact that these lobbyists represented only one side in Northern intra-church debates, and said he
would’ve preferred for the Anglican Communion’s central administration to provide similar
preparation and assistance. Thus he affirmed the need for the help, but wished it could have
come from a perhaps less partisan source. Another Ugandan, a priest and theology professor,
questioned the implications of the fact that so much Northern help was needed for an African
voice to be heard at Lambeth:

Since the beginning of the Christian mission in Africa, I think Africans
sometimes have not been allowed to articulate their own problems and issues. I
think when you look from the beginning of the mission movement, it has been
mainly the Western missionaries thinking and talking on behalf of the
Africans.... And now I think that it has not died altogether. When you bring this
question of the discussion at Lambeth, clearly any contribution which the
African church was trying to make was not taken seriously. Either it was
brushed off as people being naive, or people who have not sensitized the issues,
or people who have been recently converted from heathenism, that kind of
attitude I think was somehow—it emerged into the Lambeth conference. Even
the voice which came out from the African church was channeled through, I
think, some of the Western church leaders,... the ones who were sympathetic
with the African stand. These were the people to articulate, and then [the other
bishops] could listen, but not [to] the Africans themselves. ... So I think there is
still that kind of attitude. It has not completely died altogether.... I think when it
comes to articulating issues, [Africans’] articulation is not taken seriously.
[Emphasis added]

This Ugandan scholar, then, wonders with some cynicism whether the opinions of African
bishops would really have had an impact at Lambeth 1998, without the involvement of Northern
conservatives. Instead of the language of assistance used by most of the leaders quoted above, he described the Northerner’s role as “channeling” and “articulating” issues for the African churches. This is a view which casts into question African bishops’ ownership of their positions and actions, implying instead a significant degree of Northern agency behind the appearance of Southern action at Lambeth. By this view, the work Northern conservatives did preparing Southern bishops for Lambeth—such as providing study materials on the key issues which included ‘sample’ arguments against the liberal positions, and helping draft resolutions for Southern bishops to present and/or support—amounted to a harnessing of the Southern Anglican voice, with all its moral authority (see chapter 8). Yet while this scholar takes a more cynical view of the involvement of Northerners in the Southern role at Lambeth, his basic perspective on the persistent colonial power structures of the Anglican Communion is similar to that of his bishops and other Ugandan colleagues. He, too, sees Lambeth and the Communion as being so Northern-dominated that it is very difficult for Southern bishops to break in and have their say; the main difference between this perspective, and the others given above, is that this scholar sees these Northern efforts as merely another manifestation of colonial patterns of relationship, while most Ugandan bishops seem to see the Northern conservative efforts as having a decolonizing impact by enabling more effective Southern participation.

For an interesting parallel to these Ugandan leaders’ ambivalent talk about Northern sponsors, see David Maxwell’s study of the rise of the Zimbabwean Assemblies of God, Africa (Maxwell 2001). Maxwell examines the spiritual autobiography of Ezekiel Guti, an important figure in the church. Maxwell describes a “parable” Guti tells about his early travels to the United States: “He is offered financial assistance from a white man if he will submit to his authority.” Guti rejects the offer; but, as Maxwell shows, his work and ministry are funded to a substantial degree by Northern white donors. However, Guti describes this support positively, as “love-offerings,” in contrast to that first offer of assistance, framed as an attempt at coercion.

Corresponding to such perceptions, a view of Integrity-Uganda as a fundamentally colonial institution—that is, something imposed on Uganda by outsiders who believe they know better and possess superior political, cultural, and economic power—carries great weight in Uganda. Indeed, coverage in the newspapers and data from my interviews suggest this may well be the majority view. One of the leaders of Integrity-Uganda told me that many Ugandans refer to the current president of Integrity-Uganda, Rev. Michael Hopkins, as “colonizing Africa”—though, he points out, nobody says the same thing about various conservative Northerners who have been hired to head Ugandan institutions or have come to Uganda to share their beliefs or practices. The ‘colonial’ view of Integrity-Uganda was strengthened by the coincidence that Integrity-USA founder and past president Dr. Louie Crew was in Uganda on unrelated Episcopal Church business at the time that Integrity-Uganda’s first press release was published. The coincidence of Crew’s presence at that key juncture when the Ugandan organization made its first public ‘appearance’ doubtless strengthened the belief of many Ugandan church leaders that Integrity-USA was originated, sponsored, and supported by American gays and their allies, and is thus fundamentally a colonial institution, bringing Western values and practices to African soil and demanding compliance from African minds and bodies. Condemnations of Bishop Christopher
Ssenyonjo and Integrity-Uganda, then, carry the weight of postcolonial indignation—a sense that the forming of this organization constitutes a violation of core cultural values, and furthers of the work of assimilating Ugandan society to the ways of the great neocolonial cultural and economic power, the United States.

163 Note that the language which some Ugandans use to describe economically coercive North/South relations carries resonances with the language of sexual exploitation: “keeping African and Asian churches” (like a mistress?); “with a hungry man you can do what you want,” “there is some hidden thing.” It is difficult to judge, on the basis of these examples, whether such resonances are merely incidental results of different usages of the English language; but they are intriguing.

164 For another interesting study in African pragmatism in relations with Northerners (in this case, African-American tourists), see Hasty 2002.

Chapter 9

165 Robinson was first elected as a bishop by his own diocese. Then his suitability for that post was affirmed in a controversial, but conclusive, vote at the Episcopal Church’s General Convention in the summer of 2003. Finally, on November 2, 2003, he was consecrated—sacramentally made into a bishop—at a service in New Hampshire.

166 For verification of this, the reader might turn to the Episcopal Church’s website listing overseas dioceses seeking companion diocese relationships with American dioceses (http://www.episcopalchurch.org/agr/companion5.html). These dioceses’ expressed hopes to find an American companion diocese are fulfilled only when an American diocese decides it wants an overseas companion.

167 Note that Miller’s positive conclusions do not closely conform to the general discourses about Southern Christianity I discussed in chapter 8; he begins, and arrives, in somewhat different places than these widespread ideas.